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Compared to the unmistakable impact of absurd theatre, literature, and art on 
contemporary European and American cultures, the philosophy, morality, and politics 
of the absurd have remained relatively obscure. Few interpretations of Albert Camus’ 
philosophical contribution have successfully defined the meaning of absurdity, its 
components and dynamics, or its moral and political consequences. This dissertation 
attempts to clarify these areas of absurd thought by applying the logic of ambivalence 
to Camus’ philosophy of the absurd, revealing its compelling diagnosis of extremism 
and indifference, its experiential grounding for post-traditional values, and its unique 
appeal for moral and political maturity.    
   After reviewing the recent history of the concept of absurdity in Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard, Sartre, Nagel, and elsewhere (Chapter 2), I offer detailed analyses of 
Camus’ absurd and the contributions of his scholarly critics (Chapter 3). I introduce 
the concept of ambivalence in the work of Eugen Bleuler, Sigmund Freud, Melanie 
  
Klein, Otto Kernberg, and relevant sociological and political researchers (Chapter 4) 
to argue that the absurd is best understood not in skeptical or existential terms, but as 
an ambivalent ‘position’ with respect to countervailing desires, primarily a desire for 
unity and a kind of principium individuationis (Chapter 5). These ambivalent desires 
are implicated in the moral and political tensions between self and others, absolutes 
and limits, creation and destruction, even good and evil.  
 Applying this interpretation to Camus’ The Stranger and its main character, 
Meursault (Chapter 6), and to The Myth of Sisyphus, The Rebel, The Plague, and 
other works (Chapters 7 and 8), I argue that the destructive ideologies Camus decried 
may be understood as defenses against the ambivalence of the absurd, while an 
absurd morality demands mature and creative resolutions of contradiction, resistance 
against defensive reactions, and deliberate moral and emotional identifications with 
others and enemies. Analyses of two controversial cases, Camus’ defense of Kaliayev 
and the ‘fastidious’ Russian assassins of 1905 and Camus’ unpopular stance on the 
Algerian War (1954-1962), are offered as miniature case-studies to ground 
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This dissertation has its origins in two fairly humble and not-so-scholarly sources: the 
indefinable pleasure I have always taken in absurd things, absurd ideas, and absurd 
experiences, and the mundane intuition that a great many moral challenges have to do 
with learning how to live with (or in, or through) contradiction. While I am tempted 
to speculate that absurdities offer a strange and frightening pleasure because they 
afford us brief opportunities to satisfy otherwise forbidden desires for senselessness, 
selflessness, even craziness, contending with contradiction is likely a bit more 
complicated. If the difference between success and failure in managing contradiction 
has anything to do with balancing strength and gentleness, with being able to forgive 
and forget when necessary, too much of any of these things, too much absurd glee or 
too much fear of absurdity, too much comfort with contradiction or too much 
discomfort with it, can lead to hypocrisy, rigidity, a divided self, or worse.  
 At least on my reading, questions of how to balance senselessness with good 
sense, strength with gentleness, and contradiction with coherence are the central 
questions of the philosophy of the absurd. They are also the implicit questions asked 
by most theorists of ambivalence. In this work, then, I use ambivalence to interpret 
the philosophy of the absurd in the hope that doing so will reveal something not only 
about the harrowing and thrilling experience of absurdity, but about the challenges, 
dangers, and moral and political consequences of living with contradiction.  
 It is not unreasonable to wonder if resurrecting the poor philosophy of the 
absurd after all these years is really warranted, especially when there are so many 




Perhaps the best justification for doing so is that at a time when so much postmodern 
thought and critique seems undercut by its own hermeneutical stance, “lost in texts,” 
as a teacher of mine put it, the absurd is something we can feel and, I dare say, 
something that feels real. Attempting to ground absurd moral and political reflection 
not in narratives, discourses, or intertextual spaces, but in the complex but powerful 
emotions of absurdity, is part of this dissertation’s attempt to explore a neglected path 
in absurd philosophy and its application to moral and political theory, a path that 
leads directly to the question of how we ought to face the conflictual, contradictory, 
and absurd challenges of our time.            
 The reader will be very happy to know that it is not my intention to use the 
philosophy of the absurd to fashion a new theory of ambivalence. Although I think 
Albert Camus may be considered a theorist of ambivalence of sorts, I do not suggest 
that ‘absurd drives’ replace Eros and Thanatos, nor do I propose that an ‘Absurd 
Personality Disorder’ be added to the DSM. Instead, this work argues that we may 
use ambivalence and its related constructs as analogies to give richer content and 
consequence to the philosophy of the absurd.  
 That marks the first disclaimer: that as a work of political theory and not of 
psychoanalysis or psychology, ambivalence plays a secondary and supporting role. 
The second disclaimer is that while I have come to believe in the expressive, 
heuristic, and philosophic potential of the absurd, I have sought to adopt neither a 
pro- nor anti-Camus stance. The voluminous and often cantankerous critical literature 




 Beloved by artists, university students, and humanists of all kinds because of 
his (deceptive) simplicity and his willingness to be a sensitive moralist in a cynical 
age, Camus is mocked by both serious philosophers and political realists on largely 
the same grounds. His critics have a point: there are moments of naïve and ‘bad’ 
philosophizing, idiosyncrasy, and unreasonableness in Camus’ expository works. But 
his defenders have a point as well: there is something noble and admirable about 
Camus’ serious contemplation of moral dilemmas, his honest indignation at suffering 
and cruelty, and his unflagging commitment to humanity.  
 It is unfortunate and ironic that the contemporary champion of la mesure 
(measure) has been treated so extremely by both his adherents and his detractors. I 
feel obliged to try a more balanced approach. I hope that this work will be read as 
constructive criticism of Camus’ philosophy of the absurd, not only because it 
proceeds without assuming either a disparaging or a valorizing tone, but, more 
importantly, because it analyzes, criticizes, and interprets Camus’ thought in the hope 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A Stranger in the Lone Star State 
In August 2006, then-White House Press Secretary Tony Snow revealed that 
President George W. Bush had been reading Albert Camus’ famous novel, The 
Stranger, while vacationing at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. When asked to 
comment, Snow said that President Bush “found it an interesting book and a quick 
read” and that he and the President had discussed its meaning. “I don’t want to go too 
deep into it,” Snow explained, “but we discussed the origins of existentialism” 
(Dickerson 2006).    
 Satirists seized upon the otherwise trivial news item for its offerings of 
political humor. Lee Siegel blended Bush’s no-nonsense rhetoric with the terse 
‘American’ style Camus used to fashion the memorable voice of Meursault, fusing 
the two figures together in his New Republic article entitled “Strangerer” (Siegel 
2006), while writers with more of a political axe to grind reveled in the ironic contrast 
between Bush’s and Camus’ positions on just about everything, from religious faith 
to the use of military force to capital punishment.  
 One might be surprised that sharper contrasts were not drawn between the 
President who dubbed himself ‘the decider’ and Camus’ Meursault, who decides next 
to nothing. The closest anyone came to making such a comparison was apparently in 
the vague suggestion floating around the Press Room that the President was going 
through an ‘existential’ foreign-policy crisis, or, as Maureen Dowd called it, “a 




somewhat tastelessly) rebuffed this suggestion by insisting that “he [the President] 
doesn’t feel like an existentialist trapped in Algeria during the unpleasantness” 
(Dowd 2006).   
 A few writers who were familiar with Camus’ work understood that the 
greatest irony of all was the discomfiting parallel between the racial and colonial 
violence between the lines of The Stranger and America’s questionable and 
controversial war in Iraq. While not all were familiar with Conor Cruise O’Brien’s or 
Edward Said’s scathing critiques of Camus’ colonialism, John Dickerson understood 
that Bush’s taking-up of the novel was ripe for “geopolitical literary 
misinterpretation” (2006). Half-sarcastically concerned that a Camus-Bush 
connection would be misunderstood in the Middle East and around the world, 
Dickerson proclaimed it to be “the first time that national security demand[ed] an 
official version of literary criticism” (2006).  
 Putting aside concerns about national security and international perception for 
a moment, it is curious that this otherwise insignificant Presidential tidbit aroused so 
much fascination. The rest of the President’s summer reading list, which reportedly 
included a study of Robert Oppenheimer and a biography of Abraham Lincoln 
(meaning the President was reading about absurdity, atomic weapons, and a divided 
nation all at once), made less of a media splash (Gopnik 2006). A few critics were 
offended by what they saw as a misguided attempt by the White House to bolster 
Bush’s image as an intellectual, but I think the fascination that the story sparked in 
those who had read Camus derived from a genuine interest in how the President 




of the text’s subtler critiques of interpretation, legal judgment, and modern culture. 
 The reason that President Bush’s reading (or anyone’s reading) of The 
Stranger is a fascinating subject is that the novel poses a particular challenge to its 
readers. Meursault’s blankness and equivocality seem to demand interpretation, but 
the novel critiques and even condemns interpretation in its second part. The Stranger 
places its audience in a difficult position, demanding that we reflect upon and struggle 
with our own judgments as we strive to resolve the contradictions we face. It would 
be fascinating, for some at least, to know how President Bush interpreted The 
Stranger because our interpretations and judgments of absurd works tend to reveal as 
much about us as they do about the works themselves.  
Waiting at San Quentin 
The absurd made headlines about fifty years earlier (after all, it doesn’t happen very 
often) by sparking a similar fascination, although in a different context, when the San 
Francisco Actors’ Workshop performed Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot before 
fourteen hundred male prisoners at the San Quentin penitentiary (Esslin 2001, 19-21). 
No live theatrical performance had run at San Quentin since 1913, and Waiting for 
Godot, which had unsettled audiences since its debut in Paris, had apparently been 
chosen not on artistic grounds but for the simple reason that “no woman appeared in 
it” (Esslin 2001, 19).  
 The big question was: how would the men react to Godot? But contrary to 
prejudices and doubts about the inmates’ abilities, the play was reportedly 
“immediately grasped by an audience of convicts.”  One prisoner offered his 




“He’s the outside.”  A teacher at the prison explained that the play was well-suited to 
its audience because the men clearly understood “what is meant by waiting… and 
they knew if Godot finally came, he would only be a disappointment” (Esslin 2001, 
20). A review of the play in the prison paper demonstrated a similarly impressive 
interpretation of Beckett’s work: “We’re still waiting for Godot, and shall continue to 
wait. When the scenery gets too drab and the action too slow, we’ll call each other 
names and swear to part forever — but then, there’s no place to go!” (Esslin 2001, 
20) 
 Part of the power of absurd literature, theatre, and even philosophy seems to 
derive from its ability to capture the imagination of any audience, to depict through 
mystery and strangeness something that is, nevertheless, recognizably human, and to 
call forth our creative and interpretive faculties, allowing us to read ourselves into the 
story. However, those same mysterious properties often seem to obscure and confuse 
the absurd, leaving us with a shallow understanding of the experience.  
 While being able to define absurdity clearly would surely spoil the fun of 
reading an absurd novel or seeing an absurd play, failing to answer (or even to ask) 
questions about the nature of absurdity prevents us from thinking clearly about what 
it means to feel or to be absurd. And without such clear thinking, the conceptual and 
critical contribution of the absurd to the study of philosophy, psychology, literature, 
and moral and political philosophy will remain severely limited.   
 Unfortunately, most theoretical interpretations of the absurd have only added 
to our confusion. Some seem to have wholly mistaken the concept, while others have 




particularly marked in the area of absurd moral and political philosophy, in spite of 
the fact that these areas were the natural intellectual home of thinkers like Camus. 
What is the moral of the absurd story? What are the consequences of absurd thought 
and feeling? Can the absurd help us to contend with moral and political dilemmas in a 
postmodern climate? Critical failures to ask or answer these questions are especially 
disconcerting if we confess that we now face, in new guises perhaps, many of the 
same dilemmas with which absurdists contended in the mid-twentieth century.  
 In this work, I try to show that we have been wrong to assume that the absurd 
derives its power from its vagueness, as we have been wrong to fear that analyzing 
absurdity will ruin its magic. This investigation finds not mystery but powerful 
ambivalence and contradiction at the heart of the absurd; forces that give the absurd 
its vital tension, its meaning, and its power. The absurd, as this volume interprets it, 
challenges us to devise interpretive, creative, and mature responses to this 
ambivalence.  
Absurd Climates 
It is certain that the concept of absurdity has made an impression on contemporary 
thought and culture. Apart from Camus’ well-known works, it has been impossible to 
ignore the absurdity in Franz Kafka’s trials, judgments, and penalties, Samuel 
Beckett’s and Eugene Ionesco’s groundbreaking dramas, Václav Havel’s unique 
blend of art and politics, even Paul Goodman’s famous sociological analysis, 
Growing up Absurd (1962). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an absurd 
intellectual climate seemed to take hold of Europe. From the work of Nietzsche to the 




hais les mots à majuscules” to the absurd surrealism of the 1930s, cultural and 
political events seemed destined to produce what John Cruickshank would call the 
“inevitable attitude” of absurd revolt expressed in the works of Malraux, Sartre, and 
Camus (Cruickshank 1960, 6). Camus described his own writings as an effort to 
confront that absurd climate, to come to terms with the conflicted age into which he 
was born (Cruickshank 1960, viii). In an interview with Nicola Chiaromonte, Camus 
said that his intentions had always been to write “the story of a happy man,” but that 
he often considered such a project impossible because he and his peers “of the 
generation that has become mature from 1938 to 1945 have seen too many things. I 
don’t mean too many horrors, but simply too many contradictory, irreconcilable 
things” (Cruickshank 1960, 4). Living through the terrible contradictions of the 1930s 
and 1940s in an already absurd climate demanded not stories of happy men, but new 
ways of seeing, thinking, and acting that contended honestly with absurdity.  
 That Europeans of the mid-twentieth century faced an absurd world, 
compelling them to partake in a kind of absurd gestalt, is suggested particularly 
strongly in the work of André Malraux. Malraux’s Tentation de l’occident finds 
occidental rationalism and the fragmentation of life responsible for an “une absurdité 
essentielle,” an essential absurdity “au centre de l’homme européen, dominant les 
grands mouvements de sa vie” (Henry 1975, 58). Garine, the hero of Malraux’s Les 
Conquérants, finds neither evil nor the potential for good in his society, only 
absurdity: “Je ne tiens pas la société pour mauvaise, pour susceptible d’être 
améliorée; je la tiens pour absurde” (Thody 1989, 116n). And Patrick Henry writes 




“the key word ‘absurdité’ has finally been pronounced and with this 
acknowledgement we have reached the epitome of anti-rationalist thought. Western 
man finding himself in a universe whose key has been lost can do nothing but 
proclaim the fundamental absurdity of his existence” (Henry 1975, 58).   
 On Malraux’s account, we are confronted with a fundamental absurdity 
because we are “the first civilization in the world to be deprived of transcendence” 
(Cruickshank 1960, 6). But it was perhaps even more than that. The absurd climate 
grew out of an awareness of the failures of the Enlightenment and the groundlessness 
of its grand narratives, to be sure. But it also arose in response to what absurdists saw 
as the responses to that transcendental deprivation, to the disparity and contradiction 
between the promise of freedom, equality, and progress and the reality of war, terror, 
and totalitarianism, between the violent conquest of peoples, nations, and nature and 
the doctrines of civilization and progress that justified those evils. Perhaps as much as 
that “grandeur et misère” with which Charles Taylor famously characterized 
modernity (Isaac 1992, 2), the absurd climate was generated by the stark contrast 
between our creative and moral possibility and what Abraham Heschel described as 
our seemingly limitless “capacity to hurt… the immense expansion of power and the 
rapid decay of compassion” because of which “life has, indeed, become a synonym 
for peril” (Braiterman 1998, 69).    
 
The Absurd in Moral and Political Philosophy 
Germaine Brée tells us that the philosophy of the absurd was at the center of an acute 




boldly, with the end of the Roman Empire. Brée finds the concept of absurdity to be 
representative of “a whole trend of twentieth-century European thought which grew 
out of a painful awareness of the impossibility of finding a rational justification for 
any system of moral values” (1964, 26). The absurd thought which developed from 
such painful awareness, she worries, may no longer be understood by contemporary 
thinkers who no longer feel the acute agony of that climate. But even if our awareness 
is no longer ‘painful’ (perhaps eventually pain yields to irony), moral and political 
philosophers ought to be able to sympathetically engage the absurd tradition. After 
all, its fundamental concerns are ours.  
 In the absurd climate, as in the postmodern climate, we find ourselves “bereft 
of externally imposed or intellectually authoritative standards of behavior… left 
entirely to [our] own devices in the midst of an existence that lacks any intrinsic 
meaning” (Willhoite 1968, 6). Suspicious of traditional sources of value and 
authority, the absurd climate is akin to the postmodern condition described by C. 
Wright Mills (1959) and defined even more famously by Jean-Francois Lyotard as the 
state of “incredulity toward metanarratives” (1984, 260). In this climate, traditional 
stories, myths, principles, and heroes no longer legitimate moral and political values. 
For Mills (1959, 166), our “happy assumption of the relation between reason and 
freedom” is shattered while, for Lyotard, we are forced to recognize that our 
knowledge-claims are grounded in logically unjustified ends, rather than the other 
way around.    
 The dilemma of the absurd and postmodern climate, then, is one of finding 




absolutes. It is the dilemma of defining and defending moral values in a world of 
plural values, multiple ‘narratives’, and numerous ‘language-games’. This dilemma 
is, of course, a central problem, if not the “supreme problem” of contemporary moral 
and political philosophy (Willhoite 1968, 4-5). And Camus’ philosophy explicitly 
addresses it, although rarely by playing the particular ‘language-games’ of 
philosophical academic disciplines.  
 If Thomas Thorson and Fred Willhoite are correct in asserting that “Camus’ 
thought is ‘to the point’ in political philosophy in a way that little else is in our time” 
(Willhoite 1968, 7), they would seem to hold the minority view. Very few theorists 
would say that Camus’ work converses with that of better-known contemporary 
political theorists like John Rawls (1996, 1999), Robert Nozick (1974), or Jürgen 
Habermas (1985, 1998), even though it is possible to understand the works of these 
theorists as attempts to defend modern values in an absurd moral climate. Of course, 
scores of critics have argued that these vaunted attempts have failed to face the full 
impact of absurdity and postmodernity insofar as they rely upon conceptions of 
reason, freedom, or subjectivity inherited from the grand narratives of the 
Enlightenment.  
 Neither has the philosophy of the absurd been heeded in critical and 
alternative discussions about what appears to be a political philosophical point of 
impasse. That discussion has included Frankfurt School critical theorists like Herbert 
Marcuse (1989, 1991), Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2002), post-
structuralists like Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) and Michel Foucault (1980, 1995) 




by the quite distinct contributions of Hannah Arendt (1958), Alasdair McIntyre 
(1984), and Richard Rorty (1989), just to name a few. Each of these theorists has 
received more serious political and social philosophical scrutiny than has Camus.    
 Perhaps not surprisingly, the philosophy of the absurd has been almost 
entirely ignored in the related political philosophical debates over the limits of 
liberalism and democracy in a postmodern era. One of the easiest ways to uncover 
these limits is to ask: How much illiberality must liberal tolerance tolerate? Whatever 
answer we give will be informed by a basic tension at the heart of liberal democratic 
thought, a tension Chantal Mouffe treats in her The Democratic Paradox (2000) and 
which John Gray names the Two Faces of Liberalism (2000): the tension between a 
liberalism that prioritizes specifically liberal values and a liberalism that prioritizes 
the plurality and incommensurability of values (see also Crowder 2007). In the 
ensuing debate over these limits and tensions, which might be characterized more 
simply as a debate about the extreme limits of freedom and justice, Camus’ thought, 
particularly his work on revolution and rebellion in The Rebel, may have something 
to say.  
 “Absolute freedom,” Camus writes, “is the right of the strongest to dominate. 
Therefore it prolongs the conflicts that profit by injustice. Absolute justice is achieved 
by the suppression of all contradiction: therefore it destroys freedom… The 
revolution of the twentieth century has arbitrarily separated, for overambitious ends 
of conquest, two inseparable ideas” (1956b, 287-291). And Camus’ solution to this 
dilemma, that “to be fruitful, the two ideas [justice and freedom] must find their limits 




extensively in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. Of course, it is not yet clear how an absurd 
philosophy could begin to reconcile justice and freedom, and it is no easy task for any 
philosophy. I will argue that the absurd offers a unique solution by grounding its 
vision of moral limits and political action in the dynamics of ambivalence and the 
norms of creativity and maturity.  
 Mine is not Václav Havel’s otherwise compelling argument that absurdity and 
meaninglessness are complementary opposites, that “the outlines of genuine meaning 
can only be perceived from the bottom of absurdity” (Havel 1990, 113). Havel means 
not only that the irony and humor of absurdity make it possible for us to suffer and 
sacrifice, but that absurdity and idealism are “only two sides of the same coin… [that] 
without the constantly living and articulated experience of absurdity, there would be 
no reason to attempt to do something meaningful” (1990, 114). The ambivalence I 
refer to is of a different kind, perhaps less comprehensive but a bit more precise. This 
volume argues that the philosophy of the absurd grounds moral value in the maturity 
and creativity of our responses to ambivalent desires to lose and to preserve the self. 
In doing so, the philosophy of the absurd explicates the psychological and social 
forces which compose an absurd ‘position’ with respect to those desires as well as the 
moral and political implications of our reactions to them.  
 For over fifty years, scholars have poured over Camus’ life and works looking 
for answers to practical political questions about “the proper way to organize 
politically and… [the] criteria for making choices in a political context” (Willhoite 
1968, 7). But these efforts have failed to yield any compelling formulas for political 




well-known book on Albert Camus and Hannah Arendt, Jeffrey Isaac contends that 
both thinkers deserve consideration as democratic theorists of civil society. But in 
order to classify Camus as a democratic theorist, Isaac is forced to ignore the more 
radical and ambivalent aspects of Camus’ thought, only to confess at the end of his 
work that he remains uncertain about what type of rebellious or democratic politics 
he, or Camus or Arendt, might recommend (Isaac 1992, 258).  
 Camus, himself, was known to have felt that “the most acute human problems 
are not political and cannot be solved by political action” (Cruickshank 1960, 126-
127). In spite of Camus’ obvious political commitments, Germaine Brée has noted 
that “political problems were of interest only in so far as they touched one of his 
major preoccupations, that is, the daily life of human beings, their freedom and the 
human justice meted out to them on this earth” (1964, 8). While Camus disdained 
conformism and political indifference, he continued to believe that “fundamental 
human problems will persist whatever progress may be made in the improvement of 
social and political institutions and that any effort aimed at perfecting mankind by 
collective means is doomed to failure” (Willhoite 1968, 47). Perhaps Serge 
Doubrovsky put the paradoxical political relevance and irrelevance of Camus’ 
philosophy of the absurd best when he described it as “an ethics rigorously separated 
from politics, or, if you prefer, inseparable from the sort of politics that can be 
reduced to ethics” (Brée 1962, 18).  
 If we are to search for the moral and political philosophical implications of 
Camus’ absurd, we must not look for clear maxims, concise principles, or simple 




done so have been disappointed, or worse. What may be worse than disappointment is 
the reduction of the philosophy of the absurd to platitudes about democracy and 
dialogue, leaving us with an absurd theory that is far too simple to be of any service 
in the face of real moral or political dilemmas. Rather, what this dissertation hopes to 
reveal is Camus’ complex, non-systematic, and often personal appraisal of 
experience, action, and emotion that, with some extrapolation and interpretation, may 
help us to frame questions of moral and political theory in a different light. Although 
the absurd is incapable of providing clear-cut answers to specific moral or political 
problems (at least to the difficult ones), absurd philosophy may offer a grounding for 
moral and political reflection and an appeal to think about moral and political 
philosophical matters differently.  
An Absurd World 
It would be a good time for the philosophy of the absurd to offer whatever moral and 
political contributions it has to offer, for the early twenty-first century seems poised 
to re-create, and perhaps even to globalize, an absurd climate of its own. The last 
half-century has been marked by rapid global and technological changes, increasing 
disparities between the very rich and the very poor, and a heightened degree of social 
and cultural dislocation, all of which have generated a widespread sense of “political 
fatalism and chronic insecurity” (Held et al. 1999, 1).  
 In the renewed absurd climate, we face many of the contradictions of the mid-
twentieth century, contradictions between progress and poverty, freedom and tyranny, 
peace and warfare, fundamentalism and tolerance, but we face them in the context of 




‘contradictory, irreconcilable things’ that Camus’ generation witnessed seem to be 
multiplied by the “push and pull… mix and break” of globalization (Chan and 
McIntyre 2001, 4). This ‘push and pull’ refers to the ambivalent dynamics and 
“fundamental contradictions” of globalization to which increasing numbers of 
individuals and groups are subjected: contradictions between “inclusion and 
exclusion,” “market and state,” “growing wealth and impoverishment,” “the economy 
and the environment,” the “national and the global citizen” (Castles 1998), 
“unification versus fragmentation,” “powerlessness versus appropriation,” “authority 
versus uncertainty,” “personalized versus commodified experience,” and ontological 
security versus existential anxiety (Giddens 1991, 181-208).  
 For years now, scholars from a variety of fields have argued that the 
contradictions implied by global change have profound effects upon local and 
personal experience as “intensive [change] reaches through to the very grounds of 
individual activity and the constitution of the self” (Giddens 1991, 184). Yet, the 
institutions in which individuals might find shelter from global change and crisis may 
be in crisis as well. In his essay on Antonin Artaud, Eugene Ionesco described the 
absurd effects of the condition in which “our culture no longer contains ourselves (or 
only contains an insignificant part of ourselves) and forms a ‘social’ context in which 
we are not integrated” (Esslin 1960, 10). If Ionesco is right, then even the declining 
relevance of geographic borders and the intensifying global transfer of cultural 
artifacts suggest the growing political and psychological significance of absurdity. 
But, of course, wondering about the contemporary political significance of absurdity 




Whose absurd? What absurd? 
A great deal of attention has been paid to Camus’ life and his fiction. But while the 
absurd as we know it is undeniably shaped by Camus, there is no reason why we must 
approach the absurd as biography, as the outlook of a single individual. Unlike other 
works on this subject, therefore, this dissertation does not treat the philosophy of the 
absurd as an aspect of Albert Camus’ personality or as the support-system for his 
fictional creation. Instead, I critique and interpret the philosophy of the absurd as a 
theory in development, as a potentially fruitful, but as yet unclear, theoretical 
possibility. Unlike other psychodynamically-informed treatments of the absurd, I do 
not seek to psychoanalyze Camus or to reduce him or his work to psychiatric 
categories. Rather, I attempt to analogize the absurd with a relevant (but relatively 
simple) psychoanalytic construct, in order to give some substance and contour to the 
philosophy of the absurd. My hope is that doing so will re-open a discussion about the 
absurd that has been closed for some time due to a variety of unfortunate 
circumstances, not least a misplaced biographical orientation of critics.          
 This volume takes up the task of clarifying and re-interpreting the philosophy 
of the absurd in part because ‘the philosophy of the absurd’ has become impossibly 
obscure. Because it has found no clear disciplinary home, because it has lacked 
conceptual clarity almost from the start, because of a skewed critical orientation, and 
because of the striking absence of even a preliminary moral and political theory of the 
absurd, the philosophy of the absurd is in a state of sickness unto death. This 
unfortunate state of the philosophy of the absurd was made apparent in 1994, when 




published. After more than thirty years of relative scholarly disinterest, the 
appearance of The First Man sparked a minor recrudescence of critical attention to 
Camus. The book was hailed as a ‘magical Rosetta stone’ to Camus’ entire oeuvre, 
was praised and reviewed as one might expect, and was eventually put aside. But 
while the late novel was analyzed (and psychoanalyzed) as revelatory of Camus’ 
personality and artistic vision, there was virtually no discussion of its contribution to 
the meaning or status of the philosophy of the absurd. While the controversies 
surrounding Camus’ life had survived, the philosophy had all but passed away.  
 For the philosophy of the absurd to be of service in addressing moral, 
philosophical, political, or social issues, even in its own subtle way, we must attain a 
clearer sense of its scope and meaning. But here we face another problem. For Søren 
Kierkegaard, the first philosopher to make extensive use of the term, the absurd was 
the paradox of faith. For Sartre, it was “the given, unjustifiable, primordial quality of 
existence” (Cruickshank 1960, 45n). For philosophers like Thomas Nagel, the absurd 
is the disparity between our serious pursuit of our goals and the ultimate 
insignificance of our efforts, while scholars of European literature classify a work as 
‘absurd’ if it manifests “extreme forms of illogic, inconsistency, nightmarish 
fantasy,” a rejection of “usual or rational devices,” and a “use of nonrealistic form” 
(Holman in Balogun 1984, 44). Eugene Ionesco’s famous definition of the absurd is 
“that which is devoid of purpose” (Esslin 2001, 23), while, for Václav Havel, the 
absurd is akin to “the experience of the absence of meaning” (1990, 201). 
Sociologists like Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott (1970) define the absurd as the 




(1962) understands absurdity as a lack of fit between individuals’ needs and what 
social institutions can offer. A recent study in the psychology of advertising even 
sought to operationalize ‘absurdity’ by “incongruously juxtaposing pictorial images, 
words, and/or sounds that viewers perceive to be irrational, bizarre, illogical, and 
disordered,” examples of which included “ads for Camel cigarettes…, the Energizer 
Bunny, Joe Isuzu, the Coca-Cola Polar Bears, and the California Raisins” (Arias-
Bolzman 2000, 1). 
 This absurd laundry list merely hints at the profound confusion and 
disagreement about the meaning of absurdity across disciplines, fields, and eras. And 
I have not even mentioned Camus’ understandings of the absurd, which, too, are 
almost impossibly varied. In The Myth of Sisyphus alone, Camus treats the absurd as a 
sickness, a dichotomy, a paradox, an attitude, a climate, and a human condition. 
Among other things, he describes the absurd as “a feeling that deprives the mind of 
sleep” (Camus 1955, 6), a “divorce between man and his life” (6), an “odd state of 
soul in which the void becomes eloquent” (12), a moment when “the stage sets 
collapse” (12), a “revolt of the flesh” (14), “the familiar and yet alarming brother we 
encounter in our own photograph” (15), “the confrontation between the human need 
and the unreasonable silence of the world” (28), “lucid reason noting its limits” (49), 
a “gap” (19), a “condition (20), a “passion” (22), a “revolt” (25), a “datum” (31), an 
“equation” (50), and a “wager” (52). The next two chapters of this dissertation are 
specifically addressed to the problem of clarifying the meaning of the absurd, in its 




undertakes is, in a sense, an effort to give the philosophy of the absurd greater 
conceptual clarity, substance, and force.  
 With a theory as rich as the philosophy of the absurd, it is tempting to find 
connections between it and any number of more complex philosophical, hermeneutic, 
or psychoanalytic theories. But applying these more complex theories would probably 
serve the interpreting construct more than the interpreted one, and, in this case, it 
would only further obscure the already muddled concept of absurdity. Thus, I have 
sought to explain and interpret the absurd in the simplest terms possible without 
doing violence to its subtleties. As this volume sees it, the absurd is about desire. The 
absurd describes conflicting desires between losing and holding onto the self, 
ambivalent desires which then pose moral and political challenges, and which, we 
may speculate, may themselves be affected by changing political and cultural 
conditions that place new demands on selves. I argue that understanding the absurd as 
ambivalence is enough (and not too much) to see the philosophy of the absurd clearly 
and to identify its most significant moral and political implications.  
 
The Organization of this Work  
This dissertation begins with a brief history of the philosophical concept of the 
absurd, from Nietzsche to Nagel, as it were (Chapter 2). Taken together, these various 
approaches have contributed to our understanding of, as well as our confusion about, 
the meaning of the absurd. It would be impossible to review every theory, 




justified one), I limit myself to relevant philosophical accounts of the absurd in order 
to situate Camus’ thought and my interpretation of it in an appropriate context.  
 In Chapter 3, I examine Albert Camus’ philosophy of the absurd. I discuss its 
virtues and its flaws, while reviewing the most significant critical scholarship on 
Camus’ work to offer a few simple but necessary clarifications. Specifically, I 
analyze the nature of the absurd, the status of the absurd, and the relationship between 
the descriptive and normative treatments of the absurd in Camus’ work.  
 In Chapter 4, I introduce the concept of ambivalence in selected 
psychoanalytic and social scientific contexts, highlighting the work of Eugen Bleuler, 
Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Otto Kernberg, along with some relevant sociological 
and political researchers. I give the subject of ambivalence a bit more attention than 
one might expect in a political theory dissertation because it forms the cornerstone of 
my interpretation of the absurd and its moral and political consequences in later 
chapters.  
 In Chapter 5, I apply the analogy of ambivalence to the absurd by carefully 
examining Camus’ work (primarily The Myth of Sisyphus) to reveal its underlying 
forces, tensions, and dynamics. I describe the ambivalence in Camus’ philosophy of 
the absurd as an ambivalence between the desire for unity and a principium 
individuationis, although this conflict involves related ambivalences about self and 
others, absolutes and limits, creation and destruction, and good and evil. This chapter 
analyzes specific passages from a number of Camus’ texts with reference to the 




 In Chapter 6, I apply the analogy between absurdity and ambivalence to 
Camus’ most famous novel, The Stranger, but not by arguing that the character of 
Meursault is absurd. Rather, I try to show that Meursault is taboo in a Freudian sense, 
revealing an ambivalence about his behavior among those who condemn him. This 
chapter argues that Meursault’s apathy and indifference represent taboo offenses 
against the ideals of freedom and autonomy envisioned in the kingdom of ends, 
described in Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). This more 
complex relationship between Meursault, ambivalence, taboo, and the absurd, reveals 
that the role of absurdity in The Stranger is more subtle than is generally thought.  
 In Chapter 7, I turn to Camus’ The Rebel in order to explore the meaning of 
absurd révolte, Camus’ preferred expression of the moral and political consequence 
of the absurd. I treat in detail the difficult relationship between the condition or 
‘position’ of absurdity and its moral consequences in The Myth of Sisyphus and The 
Rebel. I seek to highlight the most important distinctions between révolte, rebellion, 
and revolution, as these distinctions are crucial to my (and any) interpretation of 
absurd morality.       
 In Chapter 8, I apply my interpretation of the absurd from Chapters 5 and 7 to 
the moral issues raised in The Rebel, arguing that absurd morality insists upon a 
mature and creative response to the ambivalence of the absurd. This response 
involves a tolerance and integration of ambivalence, a measuredness and self-
limitation, a resistance against extreme or defensive reactions, and a kind of moral 
resourcefulness.  While it can not produce a formal ethics, I claim that the philosophy 




 In the concluding chapter, Chapter 9, I examine the political philosophical 
implications of the absurd moral grounding described in Chapter 8. Specifically, I 
explore two very different (and very difficult) political cases: (1) Camus’ defense of 
Kaliayev and the Russian assassins of 1905 and (2) Camus’ controversial stance on 
the Algerian War (1954-1962). I reflect upon these cases to see if Camus’ views are 
more comprehensible in light of the interpretation of the absurd this volume has 
offered, and to draw broader conclusions about the meaning of absurd politics.     
 Throughout the work, I maintain that it is necessary to be clear about the 
concept of the absurd, and I analyze Camus’ texts closely in an attempt to achieve a 
more precise understanding. I do not, however, preserve any strict distinction between 
the terms ‘the absurd’ and ‘absurdity’. I use the term ‘the absurd’ a bit more often 
mainly because Camus does (l’absurde), but where Camus and others have suggested 
a difference between ‘the absurd’ (as a kind of abstract thing) and a feeling of 
‘absurdity’ (as a sentiment), I try to show that this distinction is misleading and 
unproductive.  
 My contention in this work is that the absurd (or absurdity) may be interpreted 
as a special kind of ambivalence and, thus, as an aspect of psychological experience 
that demands a morally mature response. Absurdists’ cries of spiritual anguish are 
evidence not that the absurd is ‘evil’, nor that its speculations about metaphysical 
solitude are ‘true’, but that the absurd represents a kind of ‘position’ that contends 
with powerful, agonizing, and ambivalent feelings about self and others, unity and 
separation, creation and destruction. The absurd moral agent must carefully manage 




involvement with evil, and seek to make reparations when he falters. The ideal of 
maturely-integrated ambivalence, then, may serve as a kind of psychodynamically-
informed absurd moral stance that requires that we hold together (without smashing 
together) what we are tempted to split apart, devalue, or deny. As such, the 
philosophy of the absurd offers both a grounding for moral and political thinking and 









Chapter 2: A Brief History of the Philosophy of the Absurd  
 
Our present confusion about the absurd results not only from a lack of attention to 
Camus’ theoretical contribution, to which all but one of the following chapters of this 
work are addressed, but from the many competing philosophical understandings of 
absurdity, which I review here. In ordinary language, we use the word ‘absurd’ 
interchangeably with ‘incongruent’, ‘irrational’, ‘senseless’, and ‘ridiculous’, but 
these synonyms stand in an unclear and uncomfortable relation to the philosophical 
meanings of the term. In fact, in standard dictionaries, ‘absurd’ is often given two or 
more separate meanings. The first is generally that which is “utterly or obviously 
senseless, illogical, or untrue… laughably foolish or false,” while the second is “the 
quality or condition of existing in a meaningless or irrational world” (Random House 
Webster’s College Dictionary 1991). This humorous double-sense of ‘absurd’ 
suggests that even the word may be charged with a kind of ambivalence, a tension 
between comedy and tragedy, laughter and despair.  
 The word ‘absurd’ is actually derived from the Latin absurdus, which means 
“out of harmony,” what is unharmonious to the ear (see Esslin 2001, 23), but its likely 
root is not surd, meaning ‘deaf’, but svar, meaning ‘tune’ or ‘sound’ (Halsey 1882, 
151). While this chapter refers to Camus’ work, its goal is to briefly treat other absurd 
theorists in order to highlight key themes and debates within the development of 
absurd thought and to give the reader a sense of the various interpretations of 




 Because the absurd remains such a muddled concept, attempts to trace its 
heritage have had only the most limited success. To give but one example, John 
Cruickshank sees in Camus’ absurd “a contemporary manifestation of a scepticism as 
old at least as the Book of Ecclesiastes” (Cruickshank 1960, 44). But Cruickshank’s 
equation of both Ecclesiastes and absurdity with skepticism seems strangely 
shortsighted for such a thoughtful critic. Most studies have focused, instead, on the 
absurdity inherent in Qohelet’s key word, hebel, translated often as ‘vanity’, but 
which literally denotes ‘breath’, ‘breeze’, or ‘vapor’ (see Fox 1989, 29; Fredericks 
1993, 12n; Dor-Shav 2004; Berger 2001). These studies have argued that the sense of 
the term, and of that key phrase which so often follows it, reut-ruah, or ‘chasing after 
wind’ (Jastrow 1919, 204n), are not far from the contemporary notion of absurdity. 
Unfortunately, very few of these studies have been clear about what that 
contemporary notion of absurdity entails.  
 Michael Fox’s study of Ecclesiastes specifically unites Qohelet’s words with 
Camus’ absurd philosophy and makes a detailed argument for the relationship 
between the two. “The best translation-equivalent for hebel in Qohelet’s usage,” says 
Fox, “is ‘absurdity’, understood in a sense and with connotations close to those given 
the concept in Albert Camus’s classic description of the absurd, The Myth of 
Sisyphus” (1989, 31). What is lacking in Fox’s account of this relationship, however, 
is a thorough examination of the concept of the absurd, itself. For instance, while 
making the case that the words of Qohelet are “absurd,” Fox describes the absurd to 
be “humanity’s condition of existence” (1989, 32), “an affront to reason” (1989, 31), 




harmony or causality but are actually disjunct or even conflicting” (1989, 31). At the 
same time, Fox argues that “to call something ‘absurd’ is to claim a certain 
knowledge of its quality: that it is contrary to reason — perhaps only to human 
reason, but that is the only reason accessible to humans without appeal to revelation” 
(1989, 35, emphasis in original).   
 J.L. Crenshaw’s Ecclesiastes appears to agree with Fox’s conclusions but to 
mistake the absurd, and in doing so, perhaps to mistake Qohelet. Crenshaw writes: 
“Life is profitless; totally absurd. This oppressive message lies at the heart of the 
Bible’s strangest book. Enjoy life if you can, advises the author, for old age will soon 
overtake you. And even as you enjoy, know that the world is meaningless. Virtue 
does not being reward. The deity stands distant, abandoning humanity to chance and 
death” (Fredericks 1993, 13). While Benjamin Berger claims that there are affinities 
between Qohelet, Camus, and Leo Chestov, he equates ‘utter absurdity’ with ‘total 
negation’, only to bundle Camus with “existentialists,” like Heidegger and Sartre, all 
of whose work is taken to express “the inchoate nature of this universe, and the 
irrationality of existence” (2001, 164). Berger concludes from these comparisons that 
absurd rebellion is “merely indifference to, and accepting of, the absurdity of 
existence” (2001, 168), an interpretation which is quite obviously shortsighted.  
 In addition to Qohelet, scholars have discovered absurdity in the Akedah, the 
story of Abraham’s near-sacrifice of his son Isaac (see the discussion of Kierkegaard 
below), as well as in the Book of Job (Gordis 1968, 112-121). Paul Archambault’s 
Camus’ Hellenic Sources (1972) traces Camus’ thought to the works of Homer, 




common to discuss the relation between the absurd and Pyrrhonic, Humean, or other 
branches of skepticism (see Gabhart 1994). Donald Crosby’s The Spectre of the 
Absurd (1988) finds the seeds of modern nihilism, which he equates with both 
absurdity and existentialism, in the thought of Descartes and other early moderns. A 
number of Camus’ best-known critics like Germaine Brée, John Cruickshank, and 
Philip Thody have pointed out the intimate relationship between Camus’ thought and 
that of Blaise Pascal (see McNulty 1992, 53n). Patrick Henry (1975) has suggested 
that, in addition to Pascal, Camus’ absurd owes its development to Voltaire and the 
tradition of anti-rationalist thought. And Avi Sagi (2002) begins his book on Camus 
with a history of the concept of alienation, thereby connecting Camus’ absurd to the 
thought of Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger. In fact, Camus references many of 
these same thinkers in his notebooks and essays.  
 But because these studies suffer from the same lack of conceptual clarity 
about the meaning of the absurd, it remains impossible to draw consistent or useful 
conclusions from their comparisons. Because the remainder of this dissertation is 
devoted to offering a clearer interpretation and understanding of Camus’ philosophy 
of the absurd, and because it would be impossible to review the idea of absurdity in 
all of its contexts and fields, the following brief overview limits itself, with one 
exception, to the most recent and most relevant philosophical treatments of the 






It is unusual to begin a discussion of the absurd with Nietzsche, but it is helpful to 
note the philosophy of the absurd’s ethical, psychological, and political resonances 
with the work of Nietzsche, whom Camus acknowledged as a guide and “spiritual 
ancestor” (Sefler 1974, 415). Although Nietzsche is still widely misunderstood, 
perhaps more than most philosophers, the destruction of values he advocated was 
intended to make room, as it were, for the creation of new, if sometimes unattractive, 
values. Camus even seems to imply that without Nietzsche’s powerful negations, his 
call for the transvaluation of values, and his subjection of ideals to genealogical and 
psychological scrutiny, the philosophy of the absurd may have never been possible. 
 It is fair to say that Nietzsche’s universe becomes Camus’ absurd climate, one 
in which both idealism and nihilism are seen as dangerous and decadent illusions. 
Camus weaves his own thought with that of Nietzsche throughout The Rebel, but 
addresses him specifically in the lengthy section devoted to “Nietzsche and Nihilism” 
(1956b, 65-80), where Camus writes of Nietzsche’s discoveries as the advent of a 
new world: “From the moment that man believes neither in God nor in an immortal 
life, he becomes responsible for everything alive, for everything that, born of 
suffering, is condemned to suffer from life.’  It is he, and he alone, who must discover 
law and order. Then the time of exile begins, the endless search for justification, the 
aimless nostalgia, ‘the most painful, the most heartbreaking questions, that of the 
heart which asks itself: where can I feel at home?’” (Camus 1956b, 70).  
 Nietzsche’s anguish at this new world, his exile, alienation, responsibility, and 




Nietzsche’s hope, which Camus understands to be “to render the situation untenable 
to his contemporaries,” to “arrive at the extremity of contradiction,” and to rush “with 
a kind of frightful joy… toward the impasse into which he methodically drives his 
nihilism” (Camus 1956b, 71), is, like Camus’, to confront nihilism, but only in order 
to exceed it.  
 Of course, to exceed nihilism, Nietzsche had to resurrect the classical, tragic 
worldview that also flavors much of Camus’ thought. Nietzsche’s formulation of the 
contrast between the Dionysiac and Apollonian principles, between intoxication and 
the principium individuationis (Nietzsche 1956, 22), is not at all dissimilar to the 
formula of a basic ambivalence by which we will interpret Camus’ absurd. Camus’ 
absurd vision of life as incommensurate is, indeed, deeply informed by Nietzsche’s 
perception of life as “an incarnation of dissonance” (Sefler 1974, 419). Nor are tragic 
ethics and aesthetics far removed from Camus’ absurd literature and drama (see 
Lazere 1973, 21). Phillip Thody claims, for example, that Camus’ play, Caligula, 
“announces his discovery of the absurd” with the words, “‘Men die and they are not 
happy’” (Thody 1989, 47), words that echo the tragic wisdom of Silenus, Dionysus’ 
sometime companion (see Nietzsche 1956, 29).     
 Within this tragic context, Nietzsche’s philosophically pessimistic ethos 
refused to escape suffering through abstractions or ressentiment. In his Critical 
Backward Glance on The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche asks if the true tragic spirit, a 
spirit of pessimism, perhaps a proto-absurd spirit, may actually be a sign of health and 
strength, of facing the world on one’s own two feet. And by contrast, he wonders if 




decadence (Nietzsche 1956, 3-9). This line of thought is not at all dissimilar to the 
spirit of the absurd inquiry articulated in The Myth of Sisyphus, where Camus 
transforms an investigation of the necessity of physical suicide into a scathing critique 
of ‘intellectual suicide’ and a call for the creative development of new values. The 
idea that an ‘absurd’ climate could also be a healthy one in which it is possible to 
rediscover oneself, one’s role, and one’s limits, is an idea inspired by Nietzsche’s 
revival of the tragic spirit.  
 Like Camus, Nietzsche is not satisfied with a morality of license. Rather, “the 
essence of [Nietzsche’s] discovery consists in saying that if the eternal law is not 
freedom, the absence of law is still less so. If nothing is true… then nothing is 
forbidden… But, at the same time, nothing is authorized; there must also be values 
and aims in order to choose another course of action… If fate is not guided by 
superior values, if chance is king, then there is nothing but the step in the dark and the 
appalling freedom of the blind” (Camus 1956b, 71). This contradictory situation, both 
the freedom and the emptiness of a world without values, leads Nietzsche to his 
conclusions of lucidity, necessity, and affirmation. To the question, “How can one 
live freely and without law?,” Camus finds that “Nietzsche at least does not flinch” 
(1956b, 72). Nietzsche’s bold reply is that “Damocles never danced better than 
beneath the sword. One must accept the unacceptable and hold to the untenable.”  But 
Camus also recognizes that “from the moment that it is admitted that the world 
pursues no end, Nietzsche proposes to concede its innocence, to affirm that it accepts 




all judgments based on values by absolute assent, and by a complete and exalted 
allegiance to this world” (1956b, 72).  
 Herein lie the roots of the most significant disagreement between Camus and 
Nietzsche, for “this magnificent consent, born of abundance and fullness of spirit, is 
the unreserved affirmation of human imperfection and suffering, of evil and murder, 
of all that is problematic and strange in our existence,” says Camus (1956b, 72). 
Nietzsche, like all of the revolutionaries (as opposed to the rebels) Camus reviews in 
The Rebel, goes too far. His amor fati, “which begins with the recognition of fatality,” 
ultimately results in “a deification of fate” and in “the individual’s absolute 
submission to the inevitable” (1956b, 72-73). Nietzsche’s rejection of judgment and 
idealism ends in an “exaltation of evil” (1956b, 74).  
 Thus, Camus finds Nietzsche’s stance to be collaborationist with crime, 
cruelty, and murder. Of course, Camus was well aware that the abuse of Nietzsche’s 
work by anti-Semitists and Nazis was the very opposite of his true message and 
meaning. Nevertheless, Camus points out that Nietzsche’s work does contain the 
seeds of a rational justification for evil. Camus claims that Nietzsche’s path from 
rebellion to affirmation, “from the negation of the ideal to the secularization of the 
ideal,” gives him an “involuntarily responsibility” for the ideologies of 
superhumanity and domination which neither Nietzsche nor Camus would support 
(1956b, 77).  
   While Nietzsche might strike absurd philosophers as overly insistent that 
suffering must be accepted, and overly willing to sacrifice the many to the 




contribution to the development of the philosophy and psychology of the absurd, 
which likewise accepts suffering as an unfortunate fact and offers a tragic ethos as a 
basic orientation to the world. But perhaps what later chapters will recall the most 
about Nietzsche’s contribution to the absurd is his insistence upon the impossible, his 
demand, mirroring Camus’ demand, that we “accept the unacceptable and hold to the 
untenable” (Camus 1956b, 72).  
Søren Kierkegaard 
Literature reviews of the concept of the absurd often begin with the work of Søren 
Kierkegaard because of his early use of the word in relation to paradox and because, 
in The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus famously criticized Kierkegaard for taking a leap of 
faith over absurdity (1955, 37-50). But the simplest way to introduce Kierkegaard’s 
thought on the absurd is by way of his interpretation of the Akedah in Fear and 
Trembling (1843), where he discovers in Abraham the quintessence of faith, a faith 
that believes “on the strength of the absurd” (1985, 65-70, 75-76, 83-85).  
 Kierkegaard understands Abraham’s journey toward Mount Moriah as the 
apex of a paradoxical life. When he has to think about it, Kierkegaard says he is 
“virtually annihilated… all the time aware of that monstrous paradox that is the 
content of Abraham’s life” (1985, 62). Kierkegaard is “constantly repulsed” at this 
paradox and his thought, “for all its passion, is unable to enter into it” (1985, 62). In 
the face of the impossible contradictions between Abraham’s love for Isaac, God’s 
promise to make Abraham a father and a father of nations, and God’s command to 




that Abraham believes “that God would not demand Isaac of him,” while at the same 
time being “willing to offer him if that was what was demanded” (1985, 65).   
 In Kierkegaard’s terms, Abraham transcends and suspends ‘the ethical’ on the 
grounds of a particular and absolute relationship to God. What is complex and 
perhaps problematic in this interpretation, is that ‘the particular’ is the realm of sin as 
much as salvation. When we move from heeding the particular self to heeding 
universal ethics, we subordinate our personal interests to the universal. But for 
Kierkegaard, there is a step above the universal, which Abraham is the first to take. 
That step is the step of faith, which is a particular, personal, irrational, and absurd 
relationship to the divine. Kierkegaard’s famous problema, “the teleological 
suspension of the ethical” (1985, 83-95), describes Abraham’s predicament and his 
eventual choice of a particular faith over a universal ethic. “Abraham represents faith, 
and that faith finds its proper expression in him whose life is not only the most 
paradoxical conceivable, but so paradoxical that it simply cannot be thought. He acts 
on the strength of the absurd; for it is precisely the absurd that as the single individual 
he is higher than the universal” (1985, 85).  
 The absurd, for Kierkegaard, is the paradox, and the paradox is faith. To put it 
a different way, faith is the only thing that can hold together the absurd and 
contradictory elements of the paradox. If he were to proceed logically, Abraham 
would be in trouble: he would be either a criminal or a sinner, either insufficiently 
ethical or insufficiently faithful. As opposed to a rational reading of the Akedah (for 
instance, Kant’s reading that God could not possibly have ordered Abraham to do 




Abraham the sacrifice of Isaac. It is in the (sickening) unreason, in the 
incomprehensible enormity of precisely such an injunction that the believer will 
recognize God’s authentic summons” (Steiner 1998, 107, emphasis in original).  
 It is difficult to call Abraham’s a ‘leap’ of faith because the journey to Mount 
Moriah takes three days, but through his ‘journey’ of faith, Abraham, in some bizarre 
sense, accomplishes both what God commands and what ethical duty and paternal 
love demand. He believes ‘on the strength of the absurd’ because only the absurdly 
contradictory ideas that (a) God is commanding Isaac’s sacrifice, (b) God does not 
wish to sacrifice Isaac, and (c) Isaac will be killed and will not be killed, are able to 
hold or resolve the paradox. In the simplest terms, “faith does the impossible” 
(Mooney 1981, 109).  
 Kierkegaard, himself, appears to have suffered crises of faith, experiences of 
absurdity and anguish which he recorded dutifully and eloquently in his journals, 
papers, and even major works. Camus called him the most engaging philosopher to 
confront the absurd, one who “for a part of his existence at least, does more than 
discover the absurd, he lives it” (Camus 1955, 25). Paul Ricoeur said of him that “no 
one else has ever transposed autobiography into personal myth as he did,” that “to 
understand him one would need to be able to grasp [his] unprecedented combination 
of irony, melancholy, purity of heart and corrosive rhetoric, add a dash of buffoonery, 
and then perhaps top it off with religious aestheticism and martyrdom” (Ricoeur 




 In spite of his extraordinary complexity, there are very few accounts of the 
feelings that precipitate absurdity that are as simple and straightforward as the one 
that follows, from a student sermon Kierkegaard delivered in 1841: 
Was there not a time also in your consciousness, my listener, when cheerfully 
and without a care you were glad with the glad, when you wept with those 
who wept, when the thought of God blended irrelevantly with your other 
conceptions, blended with your happiness but did not sanctify it, blended with 
your grief but did not comfort it? And later was there not a time when this in 
some sense guiltless life, which never called itself to account, vanished? Did 
there not come a time when your mind was unfruitful and sterile, your will 
incapable of all good, your emotions cold and weak, when hope was dead in 
your breast, and recollection painfully clutched at a few solitary memories of 
happiness and soon these also became loathsome, when everything was of no 
consequence to you, and the secular bases of comfort found their way to your 
soul only to wound even more your troubled mind, which impatiently and 
bitterly turned away from them? Was there not a time when you found no one 
to whom you could turn, when the darkness of quiet despair brooded over 
your soul, and you did not have the courage to let it go but would rather hang 
onto it and you even brooded once more over your despair? When heaven was 
shut for you, and the prayer died on your lips, or it became a shriek of anxiety 
that demanded an accounting from heaven, and yet you sometimes found 
within you a longing, an intimation to which you might ascribe meaning, but 
this was soon crushed by the thought that you were a nothing and your soul 
lost in infinite space? Was there not a time when you felt that the world did 
not understand your grief, could not heal it, could not give you any peace, that 
this had to be in heaven, if heaven was anywhere to be found; alas it seemed 
to you that the distance between heaven and earth was infinite, and just as you 
yourself lost yourself in contemplating the immeasurable world, just so God 
had forgotten you and did not care about you? And in spite of all this, was 
there not a defiance in you that forbade you to humble yourself under God’s 
mighty hand? (Kierkegaard 1980, x-xi) 
  
This excruciating melancholy and anxiety seems to be brought on by painful contrasts 
between comfort and despair, defiance and submission, the desire for and the disdain 
of heavenly comfort, even the pleasures and agonies of life and death. And these 




having faith on the strength of the absurd is the only cure for this extraordinary 
despair.  
 Kierkegaard’s individual is faced with paradoxes and contradictions even in 
everyday life, in his desire to ask for temporal help from God (which implies that God 
should correct his perfect creation) and in his search for the forgiveness of his sins 
(which implies that an omniscient God could ‘forget’ the sin). At these moments of 
contradiction, “the possibility of faith presents itself in this form: whether he will 
believe by virtue of the absurd… (Here lie all the paradoxes)” (Kierkegaard 1938, 
238). But what gives cogency to Kierkegaard’s vision of the absurd is the recognition 
of a special kind of paradox, and the choice to see in it something divine. “Not every 
absurdity is the absurd” (1938, 362-363), says Kierkegaard, because everyday 
absurdities pale in comparison to the absurd by which faith is possible, just as 
intelligible contradictions which can be resolved through reason differ from the 
absolute paradoxes that define absurd faith.  
 “The absurd is not one distinction among others embraced by the 
understanding. It is not the same as the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen” 
(Kierkegaard 1985, 75). Rather, the absurd is an insoluble problem and an impossible 
solution, a paradox and its paradoxical solution. Kierkegaard explains:   
If I really have powers of reflection and am in a situation in which I have to 
act decisively — what then? My powers of reflection will show exactly as 
many possibilities pro as contra. The meaning of which is that I, like all men, 
shall be pleased to observe that there is a providence, guidance, a God, and 
that my powers of reflection, or those of any man, only enable one to learn 
and become aware of this fact; that here, if I may so express myself, is where 
one pays the turnpike money. Now what is it that I have come up against? The 
absurd. And what is the absurd? It is, as may quite easily be seen, that I, a 
rational being, must act in a case where my reason, my powers of reflection, 




reason and reflection say: you cannot act — and yet here is where I have to 
act… The absurd, or to act by virtue of the absurd, is to act upon faith, trusting 
in God. It is perfectly simple. I must act. But reflection has closed the road, so 
I take one of the possibilities and turn to God saying: This is what I do, bless 
my action, I cannot do otherwise because I am brought to a standstill by my 
powers of reflection. (1938, 291, emphasis added)   
 
If one is foolish enough to believe that genuine reflection can lead to genuine action, 
Kierkegaard thinks, then one either has no powers of reflection, because reflection 
always throws up possibilities both pro and contra, or one does not know the meaning 
of action (1938, 291-292). Rather, the only solution to the paradox that cannot be 
resolved through reason is faith.   
When we test ourselves and fail to comprehend the paradox, our reason knows 
itself better and becomes less naive. Kierkegaard’s journal entry of 1847 could have 
been the words of Maimonides on the lesson of Job: “For it is the duty of the human 
understanding to understand that there are things which it cannot understand and what 
those things are. Human understanding has vulgarly occupied itself with nothing but 
understanding, but if it would only take the trouble to understand itself at the same 
time it would simply have to posit the paradox” (1938, 194). The relationship to truth 
that Kierkegaard offers, therefore, is a negative one, through the absurd and through 
the failure of reason. Gregory Schufreider explains that for Kierkegaard, “a naïve 
reason, which has not come face to face with paradox cannot know itself, is a reason 
confounded by its finitude, for it generates the illusion of infinity as it endlessly 
circles within its own domain, but never tests the limits. Self-conscious reason, on the 
other hand, knows its boundaries by having come up against them, and this is exactly 




Schufreider sensibly reads Kierkegaard’s absurd as a “category” (1983, 61), a 
“class of ideas which are in principle unconfirmable” (67), and as “reason’s 
consummate playmate” (83). He analyzes Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments (1846) in order to define his absurd as “the 
most extreme form of paradox” (Schufreider 1983, 77), by which he means that it is 
inherently unknowable but not nonsensical. The absurd is “the proper object of faith” 
(Schufreider 1983, 78), recognizable through reason, and yet it represents a set of 
ideas which “reason relates to in a strictly negative way in admitting that it can 
neither understand nor dismiss them, and thus they call forth a form of belief which is 
in no sense conditional upon reason” (1983, 71). 
Because of Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard for taking the leap of faith, and 
because of the apparent differences in their opinions about God and religion, the 
relationship between the two absurdists has become confused. Although 
Kierkegaard’s despair and Camus’ absurd sentiments have certain affinities, the two 
thinkers clash most dramatically over the recommended response to the absurd. On 
one hand, Camus hears Kierkegaard’s worry that “if man had no eternal 
consciousness, if at the bottom of everything, there were merely a wild, seething force 
producing everything, both large and trifling, in the storm of dark passions, if the 
bottomless void that nothing can fill underlay all things, what would life be but 
despair?” (Camus 1955, 41). But Camus argues that in the face of such despair, 
Kierkegaard chooses to deify the absurd, to make the absurd into God, and so to take 
a leap of faith toward an absolute which he admits he can not comprehend. While 




tensions of the absurd, Kierkegaard responds to the absurd by taking it as the catalyst 
for faith and even as faith itself.  
 Or, at least, that is Camus’ understanding of Kierkegaard. But it is possible 
that Camus’ critique is too hasty, for the two shared a contempt for easy answers that 
suggests that their visions of absurdity may be a bit less disparate. For Kierkegaard, 
one must act by virtue of the absurd without becoming content in one’s inability to 
resolve the paradox. If the believer rests content in the unintelligibility of his faith, 
then it becomes easy, trivial, and no longer an expression of true spiritual belief. 
“Faith must not rest content with unintelligibility; for precisely the relation to or the 
repulsion from the unintelligible, the absurd, is the expression for the passion of 
faith” (Kierkegaard 1846, 255). That is, for Kierkegaard, faith recognizes in the 
absurd the face of God and, at the same time, is repulsed by it. It must both reject the 
absurd and adhere to it passionately. Faith becomes “objective uncertainty along with 
the repulsion of the absurd held fast in the passion of inwardness” (1846, 255). This 
ambivalent formula of absurd faith fits only the person of faith and “no one else, not a 
lover, not an enthusiast, not a thinker, but simply and solely the believer who is 
related to the absolute paradox” (1846, 255). It involves the believer in a 
contradiction which exposes the tension of Kierkegaard’s absurd, a tension that will 
be echoed in my interpretation of Camus.   
 Kierkegaard introduced us to “the baneful confusion in talking about faith,” 
which results from the fact that “the ‘immediate believer’ cannot apprehend the 
thought that the content of faith is… the absurd, and that to become a believer 




that the content of faith is absurd, but “nevertheless to believe it” (1938, 386). In this 
state of confusion and contradiction, “the believer is not dialectically consolidated as 
‘the individual’, cannot endure this double-vision — that the content of faith as seen 
from the other side is the negative, the absurd. This is the tension of the life of faith, 
in which one must try to remain” (1938, 386-387). While Kierkegaard’s solution of 
faith is in certain respects antithetical to Camus’, the two share more than we might 
think: the absurd, for both Kierkegaard and Camus, is a tension, a contradiction, and 
an ambivalence which one must nevertheless strive to endure, to maintain, and not to 
deny. George Steiner even suggests that we ought to think of Don Quixote, 
Dostoyevsky’s Prince Muishkin, Antigone, or Cordelia when we watch as 
Kierkegaard “wrestles with the contraries of the apostolic” (1998, 111). On this point, 
Kierkegaard joins thinkers like Nietzsche and Camus who use the concept of the 
absurd to give definition to the extraordinary struggle ‘to accept the unacceptable and 
hold to the untenable.’   
Jean-Paul Sartre 
Sartre did not use the term ‘absurd’ very often and his understanding of it is perhaps 
less persuasive than Camus’. Nevertheless, Sartre’s commentary upon Camus’ use of 
the term and Sartre’s much ballyhooed quarrel with Camus, which only partly 
concerned the meaning of the absurd, recommend that we briefly discuss him here. 
Philip Thody summarizes Sartre’s view in appealingly simple terms: “If there is a 
God, [Sartre] argued, the world is not absurd… Everything in it has a purpose, and 
the first chapter of Genesis tells us that this is a good one. But if you don’t believe in 




therefore, in Sartre’s view, absurd in the sense of having no ultimate reason for its 
existence” (Thody 1989, 45-46).    
But Sartre’s absurd is perhaps a bit more complicated than that. In La Nausée 
(1964, 126-129), Roquentin encounters things that give him the frightening sentiment 
that everything is “de trop,” which is a kind of hallmark of Sartrean absurdity. “De 
trop” means not only ‘in the way’, but ‘too much’ or ‘superfluous.’  The world is de 
trop (in the way), for Roquentin in large part because his life and his intellect are de 
trop (superfluous). What Roquentin feels before the roots of chestnut tree is the 
melting away of his intellect before an irreducible physicality. When he feels that 
everything is beastly and monstrous, covered with a sticky filth, he seems to be giving 
voice to the experience of de trop in the face of primordial things, things without 
abstraction, categorization, or intellectuality. Roquentin says: 
The word absurdity is coming to life under my pen: a little while ago, in the 
garden, I couldn’t find it, but neither was I looking for it, I didn’t need it: I 
thought without words on things, with things. Absurdity was not an idea in my 
head, or the sound of a voice, only this long serpent dead at my feet, this 
wooden serpent… But faced with this great wrinkled paw, neither ignorance 
nor knowledge was important: the world of explanations and reasons is not the 
world of existence. A circle is not absurd, it is clearly explained by the 
rotation of a straight segment around one of its extremities. But neither does a 
circle exist. This root, on the other hand, existed in such a way that I could not 
explain it. (Sartre 1964, 129, emphasis in original)   
 
When faced with things that refuse to be understood, Roquentin is stricken 
with an illness, a nausea. It is in the diagnosis of this illness that the absurd and the 
existential have been thought to meet. Hayden Carruth’s Introduction to Nausea 
perhaps unwittingly illustrates how Sartre’s and Camus’ notions of absurdity would 




in the opacity of the here and now… in the actual empirical existence which is just as 
it is and not otherwise.’ Why is it not otherwise? Why is it at all? What is this is-ness? 
Isn’t it simply nothing, or rather Nothingness, the unknowable, indispensable Void? 
What could be more absurd, ‘non-rational,’ meaningless? The mind of man, which he 
did not ask to be given, demands a reason and a meaning — this is its self-defeating 
cause — and yet it finds itself in the midst of a radically meaningless existence. The 
result: impasse. And nausea” (Sartre 1964, xi, emphasis in original). Carruth thus 
equates the non-rational with the absurd, comparing Sartre’s vision of the 
contingency and gratuitousness of existence to the irrationality and impasse which 
Sartre would read into Camus’ absurdity.  
 Sartre’s basic understanding of absurdity derives from his proposition that the 
mind is de trop in a non-rational world, usually expressed as “the contingency of 
being” (Sartre in Cruickshank 1960, 45n). In his “An Explication of The Stranger,” 
Sartre blends his understanding of the absurd with Camus’ when he claims that 
Camus’ absurd is “both a state of fact and the lucid awareness which certain people 
acquire of this state of fact” (1962, 108). Sartre refers to Camus’ statement that “if we 
are able to refuse the misleading aid of religion or of existential philosophies, we then 
possess certain basic, obvious facts” (Sartre 1962, 110). Among these, Sartre singles 
out the ‘facts’ that “the world is chaos,” that “tomorrow does not exist,” and that 
“man is not the world” (1962, 110, emphasis in original). Meursault is an absurd 
person, for Sartre, because he “does not hesitate to draw the inevitable conclusions 




 Sartre’s interpretation of The Stranger is telling about an important distinction 
between Camus’ and Sartre’s understandings of absurdity. For Sartre, the source of 
the absurd is “our inability to think, with our words and concepts, what happens in the 
world” (1962, 115, emphasis in original). And Sartre finds historical precedents for 
the fragmented, minimalistic narration of The Stranger that expresses this inability in 
“what Hume did when he stated that he could find nothing in experience but isolated 
impressions,” in “what the American neo-realists do when they deny the existence of 
any but external relations between phenomena,” and in “Voltaire’s method in 
L’Ingénu and Micromégas, and Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels” (Sartre 1962, 118). Sartre 
interprets Camus’ absurd, therefore, as an attempt at non-rational thought, as an 
expression of the lack of essences or absolutes that would otherwise explain 
experience and justify being.  
 The “extremes of the absurd” in Sartre’s analysis, connect The Stranger to 
The Myth of Sisyphus as explorations of “chance, death, the irreducible pluralism of 
life and of truth, the unintelligibility of the real” (Sartre in Showalter 1989, 11). 
Indeed, Sartre’s premise, that The Myth of Sisyphus is Camus’ “precise commentary 
upon [The Stranger]” (1962, 108), has likely contributed more than any other 
interpretive proposition to persistent misunderstandings of both Camus’ famous novel 
and his philosophy of the absurd. Sartre argues that The Myth of Sisyphus is “the 
theory of the novel of absurdity,” that Myth “teaches us how to accept our author’s 
novel,” and that Myth is Camus’ “philosophical translation of his fictional message” 
(1962, 111-112). Sartre then defines Meursault’s absurdity in ways that careful 




 According to Sartre, Meursault, who is “neither good nor bad, neither moral 
nor immoral… belongs to a very particular species for which the author reserves the 
word ‘absurd’” (1962, 108). But Sartre seems to have made an interpretive leap here, 
for while The Myth of Sisyphus describes the absurd as a subjective experience of 
conflict and tension, Meursault appears to have no such experience and to feel no 
such tension. Indeed, as Donald Lazere argues, “Meursault is not in the least 
disturbed by his subjectivity… he is more an object than a subject” (1973, 154). 
Furthermore, Meursault is very nearly the antithesis of the rebellious, heroic absurd 
individual that Camus defines in The Myth of Sisyphus.  
 Adding further confusion to the concept of absurdity in relation to the works 
of both Camus and Sartre is the insistence of many critics to confuse the absurd with 
the existential, leading to regular classifications of Camus as ‘an existentialist’, often 
warping his meaning thereby. In response to this confusion, which persists to this day, 
Camus said in a 1945 interview with Jeanine Delpech: “No, I am not an existentialist. 
Sartre and I are always surprised to see our names linked. We have even thought of 
publishing a short statement in which the undersigned declare that they have nothing 
in common with each other and refuse to be held responsible for the debts they might 
respectively incur. It’s a joke, actually. Sartre and I published all our books, without 
exception, before we had ever met. When we did get to know each other, it was to 
realize how much we differed” (Camus 1968, 345).  
 Perhaps if this statement had been heeded, the famous quarrel between Camus 
and Sartre would have been less explosive. Much of the quarrel between the two men 




it may be helpful to address the most salient theoretical, moral, and political 
disagreements that resulted from Camus’ and Sartre’s differing understandings of the 
absurd.   
 The most significant difference between Camus’ and Sartre’s understanding 
of absurdity may be understood as a debate about the singularity of the concept. For 
Sartre, absurdity results from a single source, the unjustified contingency of being, 
while for Camus, as we will see, absurdity is, itself, a tension, the result of 
contradictory forces. As Avi Sagi points out, “Camus’ emphasis on the claim that the 
absurd does not spring from one single source has Jean-Paul Sartre as its immediate 
target, and he expressly states that he wrote The Myth of Sisyphus against Sartre’s 
existentialist philosophy” (2002, 56). Sartre, too, was aware of a difference between 
the two thinkers’ meanings of the absurd, although even in recognizing this 
difference, Sartre read aspects of his existentialism into Camus’ absurd. Sartre said 
that “Camus’ philosophy is a philosophy of the absurd. For him the absurd arises 
from the relation between man and the world, between man’s rational demands and 
the world’s irrationality. The themes which he derives from it are those of classical 
pessimism. I do not recognize the absurd in the sense of scandal and disillusionment 
that Camus attributes to it. What I call absurd is something very different: it is the 
universal contingency of being which is, but which is not the basis of its being; the 
absurd is the given, unjustifiable, primordial quality of existence” (Sartre in 
Cruickshank 1960, 45). For Camus, the absurd is a kind of double-vision, not a single 




to show, is more akin to a conflicted or ambivalent experience than to the rational 
conclusion of absurdity that Sartre’s approach suggests.   
 As subsequent chapters will argue, Camus’ absurd, because it is not a 
conclusion, and because it is not entirely rational, involves an emotional and creative 
response, whereas Sartre’s would seem to inspire only a methodical response. Sagi 
agrees that “Camus is not an existentialist, if by this we mean the philosophy of Jean-
Paul Sartre or of Martin Heidegger… [Camus] is interested in the ‘how’ instead of the 
‘what’ that explains the ‘how’; his existentialism is an existentialism of action” 
(2002, 28-29). That course of action is summed up in Camus’ famous riff on the 
Cartesian cogito in The Rebel: ‘Je me révolte, donc nous sommes’, “I rebel — 
therefore we exist” (1956b, 22).  
 As we will see, absurd rebellion paradoxically relies upon pre-existing values 
and, at the same time, creates those values. Camus will claim that, while appearing to 
be negative, “revolt is positive in a profound way since it reveals those elements in 
man which must always be defended” (Cruickshank 1960, 97). This claim highlights 
a second significant difference between Camus’ and Sartre’s visions of the absurd. 
While the existentialist must deny the pre-existence of all values and essences, 
including the values implied by a universal human nature, Camus’ absurd takes a 
some what more complex, even ambivalent stance toward them. John Cruickshank 
explains:    
Existentialism denies the existence of a permanent and universal human 
nature. It also denies the existence of permanent and universal values deriving 
from such a concept. Sartre asserts that values do not pre-exist. They are 
simply invented or made by man as he performs acts and accepts choices in 
the process of living… No doubt Camus is unsure about the metaphysical 




individual. He is not saying that such values are absolute or eternal in the 
traditional sense. But contrary to Sartre he finds their pre-existence, in some 
form, essential to his picture of what it means to be a human being. (1960, 97)      
 
Camus’ absurd, unlike Sartre’s, contains a contradiction which limits, but does not 
completely exclude, the possibility of human nature or other universal values. The 
meaning of this limited rejection will be taken up in much greater detail in Chapters 7 
and 8.       
For Camus, “the only reasonable freedom” will not be found amidst the 
postulates of existential philosophy but in “that which the human heart can experience 
and live” (1955, 59-60). That is, for Camus, freedom itself must be bounded by 
experience and measured with reference to other values, while for Sartre, the 
individual’s freedom is superior and anterior to the creation of values, making 
individual freedom and responsibility absolute and inescapable. Put another way, 
Camus’ absurdity emphasizes the limits of freedom and asks how to arrive at a 
definition of what we must not choose, while Sartre’s existentialism emphasizes the 
absence of limits given our inescapable and radical freedom to choose.  
The limitedness and ambivalence in Camus’ absurd rebellion is not altogether 
unlike what Sartre decries as mauvaise foi, bad faith. In Being and Nothingness, 
Sartre writes that “the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity 
and a transcendence” may give rise to bad faith, which, very much like Camus’ 
absurd revolt, “does not wish either to coordinate them [facticity and transcendence] 
or to surmount them in a synthesis… Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while 
preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and 




apprehends one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other” (Sartre in Sherman 
1995, 61). In Chapter 8, I will argue that Camus’ vision of the absurd leads him to 
advocate an ethical position which in many ways resembles Sartrean bad faith, but 
that such a position, upon further consideration, may be defensible rather than 
condemnable in spite of that resemblance.          
Related to the notions of freedom and bad faith, Simon du Plock has raised an 
interesting comparison between Sartre’s Orestes in his play The Flies and Camus’ 
hero, Sisyphus, that serves to summarize the subtle but critical differences between 
Camus’ and Sartre’s absurd (2005, 18-19). In Sartre’s play, Orestes defends his 
murders of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra on the grounds of freedom and reason. 
Orestes then rejects the threats of the gods and the avenging Furies, shouting at Zeus: 
“Your whole universe is not enough to prove me wrong… I am doomed to have no 
other law but mine. Nor shall I come back to nature, the nature you found good; in it 
are a thousand beaten paths all leading up to you — but I must blaze my trail” (Sartre 
1989, 117-119). Sartre’s Orestes is sure of himself, even in his acts of murder, 
denying that the world of the gods has anything at all to do with him; indeed, he and 
Zeus “glide past each other like two ships in a river, without touching” (1989, 119). 
In the end of Sartre’s play, Orestes rebukes his people, compares himself to a pied 
piper, and exiles himself from his kingdom with the avenging furies shrieking after 
him.  
By contrast, Camus’ hero, Sisyphus, whose crime is not murder but rather an 
escape from death, accepts his punishment and lives within the limited context of that 




combines good and evil in complex ways and confronts the contradictions of his 
actions. Sometimes, he even “knows what is good and, despite himself, does evil” 
(1956b, 285). By both rejecting and re-creating pre-existing values, by recognizing 
the presence and consequence of both good and evil, by embracing both the freedom 
and the limits that Orestes refuses, absurd heroes like Sisyphus and the ideal rebel are 
able to find the balance that Camus’ absurd ethos recommends.  
Perhaps the best way to articulate this difference between Camus and Sartre is 
to compare Sartre’s Orestes to Melanie Klein’s (see Klein 1975b, 283-284; Alford 
1989, 130-134, 184). Klein’s Orestes actually resembles, much more than Sartre’s, a 
Camusian absurd hero. For Klein, and according to the more traditional 
understandings of Aeschylus’ trilogy, Orestes’ sufferings lead to the eventual 
transformation of the Furies into the Eumenides, the striking of a precarious balance 
between ‘old’ justice and ‘new’ justice, and the integration of opposites that respects 
both the limits and progress of civilization. For Klein, Orestes’ hubris is not excessive 
because his actions reflect both a sense of dike (justice) and guilt that Agamemnon’s 
and Clytemnestra’s acts of murder did not. That is, Orestes somehow finds a way to 
hold on to the agonistic tendencies that would otherwise tear his kingdom, and 
himself, apart. He integrates love and hate, revenge and repair, says Klein, because 
“he never gives up the urge to cleanse himself of his crime and to return to his people 
whom presumably he wishes to govern in a benevolent way. These intentions point to 
the drive for reparation” (Klein 1975b, 286). Because Sartre’s Orestes refuses to 
admit any laws or limits other than his own, because he exiles himself, rejects the 




inspire the transformation of the cruel Furies into the more benevolent Eumenides, he 
hardly faces the complexities of the drama, and his solution is not one that permits 
further personal, moral, or political development.  
 This philosophical difference concerning ambivalence and limits seems to 
have played a significant role in shaping Camus’ and Sartre’s opposing views about 
politics, an opposition made apparent in the now well-known and thoroughly 
analyzed ‘break’ between the two thinkers. The break was made official upon the 
(1952) publication of an unsparing critique of The Rebel written by Sartre’s disciple, 
Francis Jeanson, in Les Temps Moderns. It was worsened by Camus’ reply, and 
worsened still by Sartre’s violent response to Camus’ reply. Jeanson had accused 
Camus of being “separated from reality” and of having become “an unrepentant 
idealist” who had lost touch with history (Jeanson in Aronson 2004, 143). Against 
these charges of anti-historical idealism, Camus had claimed that his sole thesis in 
The Rebel was “that whoever seeks to serve history for its own sake ends in nihilism” 
(Camus in Aronson 2004, 144). The Rebel, Camus insisted, had argued merely that 
something apart from history, some value or norm, must inform and guide the 
direction of history in order to prevent the rationalization and justification of 
revolutionary abuses.  
 But Camus’ response was angry; perhaps not violent, but sharp. And it was 
clear that Camus had intended to indict not primarily Jeanson, but Sartre. Sartre, in 
response, “publicly flay[ed] Camus in the most personal terms,” by “explain[ing] 
Camus’s anti-Communism as an evasion of personal growth and a refusal to fully live 




acrid response to Jeanson evinced “a racism of moral beauty” (Sartre in Aronson 
2004, 148-149). “You rebelled against death,” Sartre wrote to, or rather at, Camus, 
“but in the industrial belts which surround cities, other men rebelled against social 
conditions that raise the mortality rates. When a child died, you blamed the absurdity 
of the world and the deaf and blind God that you created in order to be able to spit in 
his face. But the child’s father, if he was unemployed or an unskilled laborer, blamed 
men. He knew very well that the absurdity of our condition is not the same in Passy 
as in Billancourt” (Sartre in Aronson 2004, 153).     
 The excessiveness of this attack on Camus, itself, has been taken to suggest a 
difference between Camus and Sartre, for while Camus wrote his response with 
indignation but a stylish restraint, Sartre’s vehemence exploded in an all-out assault 
on Camus, which partially succeeded in destroying Camus’ reputation in France. 
David Sprintzen believes that this exaggerated response may have even resulted from 
a kind of self-hatred on Sartre’s part.  “Sartre’s critique of Camus,” Sprintzen says, 
“is really an attack on the being that Sartre had been, which he now projects onto 
Camus. A careful reading of Sartre’s critique of Camus in Les Temps Moderns shows 
that he did not pay careful attention at all to what Camus had actually said. He rather 
imputes to Camus precisely those positions that he, Sartre, once held but had since 
come to repudiate” (Sprintzen 1988, 296n).  
 But regardless of the motives and tenor of this quarrel, the line of argument 
between the two men makes apparent the difference between Camus’ and Sartre’s 
visions of the limits of absurd revolt. The Rebel, itself, is a direct attack on the theory 




revolutionary thought, while “Sartre, in his essay on Baudelaire, takes the opposite 
view to Camus on the question of the relative merits of revolt and revolution. The aim 
of the metaphysical rebel, he says, is to keep intact the abuses from which he suffers 
so as to be able to continue his rebellion against them. The revolutionary, on the other 
hand, is actively concerned to change the world of which he disapproves… From 
Sartre’s point of view Camus’ preference for revolt over revolution is sentimentality, 
ineffectualness and ‘bad faith’ in the existentialist meaning of the term” (Cruickshank 
1960, 103).  
 The argument between the two men was not limited to books; it eventually 
centered upon Camus’ terre natale, Algeria. Camus had advocated limited steps 
toward a peaceful resolution of the Algerian War (1954-1962). For reasons I will 
discuss more fully in Chapter 9, Camus considered French Algerians like himself to 
be ‘native’ Algerians to some degree, and while his sympathies were with both sides, 
he opposed French withdrawal. Sartre denounced Camus’ position as bad faith, 
vacillation, and colonialism. Taking direct aim at Camus, Sartre’s introduction to 
Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth argued: “If you’re not victims when the 
government you voted for, when the army in which your younger brothers are serving 
without hesitation or remorse have undertaken race murder, you are, without a doubt, 
executioners” (Sartre in Jacoby 2004, 27). Their disagreement over rebellion, 
revolution, and reform therefore illustrates that what may appear as minor differences 
between the philosophy of the absurd and existentialism can, in fact, generate 
radically different moral and political philosophical conclusions. In the end, one is 




a bit more complex than Sartre’s, but we will have to return to these themes of 
complexity and maturity in discussing Camus’ absurd morality and politics in later 
chapters.     
The Theatre of the Absurd  
To even mention the theatre of the absurd in the context of a dissertation devoted to 
the philosophy of the absurd is fraught with danger, for we risk losing our focus, 
losing hold of the concept amidst an array of different absurds, absurd literatures, 
absurd plays, absurd styles, and absurdities of language. We also risk 
misunderstanding the theatre of the absurd if we imagine that a philosophical analysis 
of the concept of absurdity can capture the voice and power of absurd drama. But in 
spite of these risks, it is warranted to make a single exception to my promise to treat 
only recent philosophical accounts of absurdity because the absurd theatre remains 
one of the most influential contexts of the term in shaping our ideas about absurdity, 
and because the following example is useful to preface later discussions of 
ambivalence and the absurd.   
 Martin Esslin is widely credited with coining the phrase ‘the theatre of the 
absurd’ in his landmark study of the same name which treats those whom we now call 
‘absurd’ dramatists: Beckett, Adamov, Ionesco, Genet, and others. Esslin finds 
“metaphysical anguish” to be the central theme of the plays and playwrights he 
studies (Esslin 2001, 24); he therefore situates the absurd in a mid-twentieth century 
attitude of uncertainty and loss. “The hallmark of this [absurd] attitude,” 
 Esslin writes, “is its sense that the certitudes and unshakable basic assumptions of 




that they have been discredited as cheap and somewhat childish illusions. The decline 
of religious faith was masked until the end of the Second World War by the substitute 
religions of faith in progress, nationalism, and various totalitarian fallacies. All this 
was shattered by the war. By 1942, Albert Camus was calmly putting the question 
why, since life had lost all meaning, man should not seek escape in suicide” (Esslin 
2001, 23).  
 But it is Ionesco who supplies the operative definition of absurdity for Esslin’s 
analyses. In his well-known essay on Kafka, Ionesco argued that the “absurd is that 
which is devoid of purpose” and that when “cut off from his religious, metaphysical, 
and transcendental roots, man is lost; all his actions become senseless, absurd, 
useless” (Esslin 2001, 23). This loss of transcendental, cultural, and spiritual 
moorings seems to provide the framework for Esslin’s approach to the concept of the 
absurd, but neither Esslin nor Ionesco is particularly concerned to provide a precise, 
systematic, philosophical definition of absurdity. Instead, Esslin offers a robust yet 
vague conceptualization of the term and moves on to assert, quite rightly of course, 
that it is not the treatment of the subject of metaphysical anguish that makes a play 
absurd.  
 “A similar sense of the senselessness of life,” Esslin points out, “of the 
inevitable devaluation of ideals, purity and purpose, is also the theme of much of the 
work of dramatists like Giraudoux, Anouilh, Salacrou, Sartre, and Camus himself” 
(Esslin 2001, 24). Yet Sartre’s and Camus’ plays, for instance, are hardly absurdist in 
style or form. These authors tend to discuss the absurd rationally, with lucid and 




rationalistic and discursive style of an eighteenth-century moralist, in well-
constructed and polished plays” (Esslin 2001, 24). By contrast, the theatre of the 
absurd “strives to express its sense of the senselessness of the human condition and 
the inadequacy of the rational approach by the open abandonment of rational devices 
and discursive thought” (Esslin 2001, 24). Here we confront the limit of the 
usefulness of comparing the theatre of the absurd with the philosophy of the absurd, a 
limit this section of this chapter meets, but hopes not to cross.    
 Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is perhaps the most widely recognized absurd 
play, and while it can not possibly speak for all absurd theatre, a brief consideration 
of its relationship to the concept of absurdity suffices for the purposes of this chapter. 
Not a logical conclusion about the contingency of being like Sartre’s absurd, the 
absurdity of Godot seems to be a product of its complex web of tensions and 
ambivalences, the most noticeable of which is the paradoxical identity of Vladimir 
and Estragon. The contradictory and complimentary heroes of the play almost appear 
as two sides, two halves of a single, torn individual. As Esslin points out,  
In eating his carrot, Estragon finds that the more he eats of it, the less he likes 
it, while Vladimir reacts the opposite way — he likes things as he gets used to 
them. Estragon is volatile, Vladimir persistent. Estragon dreams, Vladimir can 
not stand hearing about dreams. Vladimir has stinking breath, Estragon has 
stinking feet. Vladimir remembers past events, Estragon tends to forget them 
as soon as they have happened… It is mainly Vladimir who voices the hope 
that Godot will come and that his coming will change their situation, while 
Estragon remains sceptical throughout and at times even forgets the name of 
Godot… The opposition of their temperaments is the cause of endless 
bickering between them and often leads to the suggestion that they should 
part. Yet, being complementary natures, they are also dependent on each other 





 One is tempted to say that the subject of Waiting for Godot is the tension 
between these contradictory aspects of ourselves and others. Vladimir and Estragon 
are different, even opposite, but are also identical. They long to part, but cannot bear 
parting, so they must remain together. In doing so, they express their hostile 
interdependence as well as their profound conflictedness about themselves and each 
other. “Estragon: Don’t touch me! Don’t question me! Don’t speak to me! Stay with 
me! Vladimir: Did I ever leave you? Estragon: You let me go” (Beckett 1956, 38).  
 It is precisely this playing on the difference between one self and two, 
between one identity and two, in Beckett’s plays that Litowitz and Newman take up 
in their fascinating study “The Borderline Personality and The Theatre of the 
Absurd.” Litowitz and Newman point out that the very opposition of Vladimir’s and 
Estragon’s character-traits serves to “dramatize their complementarity” (1967, 272). 
In spite of their seeming differences, the two characters fit and fuse together so often 
that the boundaries of their identities are often radically blurred. At the same time, the 
two men appear deeply anxious about their relationship, about their connectedness, 
and about the dreaded loss of the other. Christopher Lasch has remarked that the 
theatre of the absurd often “centers on the emptiness, isolation, loneliness, and 
despair experienced by the borderline personality. The affinity between the theater of 
the absurd and the borderline’s ‘fear of close relationships,’ ‘attendant feelings of 
helplessness, loss, and rage,’ ‘fear of destructive impulses,’ and ‘fixation to early 
omnipotence’ inheres not only in the content of these plays but… in their form” 




 The “disturbance in the differentiation in the object relationship” between 
absurd characters like Vladimir and Estragon has deleterious effects on the possibility 
of meaningful reflection and interaction (Litowitz and Newman 1967, 272), which 
certainly is part of the absurdity of Godot when witnessed on stage. Vladimir and 
Estragon rely on each other’s help to complete a single thought, and yet they seem 
unable to think anything through because of their constant need to chatter (Litowitz 
and Newman 1967, 273).   
Estragon: In the meantime let us try and converse calmly, since we are 
incapable of keeping silent. 
Vladimir: You’re right, we’re inexhaustible. 
Estragon: It’s so we won’t think. 
Vladimir: We have that excuse. 
Estragon: It’s so won’t hear. 
Vladimir: We have our reasons. 
Estragon: All the dead voices. 
Vladimir: They make a noise like wings.  
Estragon: Like leaves.  
Vladimir: Like sand. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
 […] 
Vladimir: What do they say? 
Estragon: They talk about their lives.  
Vladimir: To have lived is not enough for them. 
Estragon: They have to talk about it. 
Vladimir: To be dead is not enough for them. 
Estragon: It is not sufficient.  
  Silence. 
Vladimir: They make a noise like feathers. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
Vladimir: Like ashes. 
Estragon: Like leaves. (Beckett 1956, 40) 
 
In this passage, one of the most beautiful in the entire play, Vladimir and Estragon 
talk so they do not have to hear the silence, the rustling of dead voices, the sounds of 




yet, when together, their conversations often throw one or both of them into despair. 
 An exaggerated variation on these themes of identity-loss, internal conflict, 
and emptiness appears in Beckett’s Endgame, where each character seems to be a 
fragment, a part of a single and rather unhappy self. Here we have a sort of 
monodramatic version of Sartre’s Huis Clos, a depiction of the complex and hostile 
interdependence of competing drives, feelings, and sensory functions within an 
individual from which there may be ‘no exit’.  
Clov: Why do you keep me?  
Hamm: There’s no one else.  
Clov: There’s nowhere else.  
 (Pause.)  
Hamm: You’re leaving me all the same.  
Clov: I’m trying. (Beckett 1958, 6) 
 
In Endgame, Clov serves as the eyes and legs, while Hamm, blind and bound to a 
wheel-chair, possesses the will and emotional force. Hamm’s hated and legless 
parents, Nagg and Nell, reside in trash cans by the wall. Clov feeds Hamm, but 
Hamm stores all the food. The world outside is absolutely lifeless, and the drama of 
the play revolves largely around whether Clov will leave Hamm for the lifeless world, 
effectively killing them both (see Esslin 2001, 62-65).  
 Esslin endorses the monodramatic reading of Endgame, noting the 
psychological resonance of “the enclosed space with the two tiny windows through 
which Clov observes the outside world; the dustbins that hold the suppressed and 
despised parents, and whose lids Clov is ordered to press down when they become 
obnoxious; Hamm, blind and emotional; Clov performing the function of the senses 




repressed memories in the subconscious mind, the emotional and the intellectual 
selves” (Esslin 2001, 66). Esslin even discusses the various levels on which the 
interdependence of many of Beckett’s characters might register.  
The peculiar psychological reality of Beckett’s characters has often been 
noticed. Pozzo and Lucky have been interpreted as body and mind; Vladimir 
and Estragon have been seen as so complementary that they might be the two 
halves of a single personality, the conscious and the subconscious mind. Each 
of the three pairs — Pozzo-Lucky; Vladimir-Estragon; Hamm-Clov — is 
linked by a relationship of mutual interdependence, wanting to leave each 
other, at war with each other, and yet dependent upon each other. ‘Nec tecum, 
nec sine te’. This is a frequent situation among people — married couples, for 
example — but it is also an image of the interrelatedness of the elements 
within a single personality, particularly if the personality is in conflict with 
itself. (Esslin 2001, 67)  
 
Thus, the tension between Vladimir’s and Estragon’s ambivalent qualities, and 
between their confused identity and separateness, is vitally related to the meaning of 
absurdity in Godot, and perhaps in Beckett’s absurd and in the theater of the absurd 
more generally.   
 The real subject of Waiting for Godot is, of course, “not Godot but waiting” 
(Esslin 2001, 50), for it is in their waiting that the limits and contradictions of 
Vladimir’s and Estragon’s thoughts, emotions, and relationship become apparent. 
While it often seems that Vladimir and Estragon have known each other since birth 
and that they may even have been born together (see Beckett 1956, 9), their 
personalities and their relationship are brought into relief by their condition of 
attending a savior figure who may never arrive. If Vladimir and Estragon could 
emancipate themselves from waiting, if they were certain Godot would come or if 
they could accept that he would never come, if they felt strongly that they should not 




drama nor the characters would strike us with the same absurdity. “Vladimir: Well? 
Shall we go? Estragon: Yes, let’s go. They do not move. (Curtain)” (Beckett 1956, 
60). Is Godot worth waiting for or is he just false hope? If one abandons hope in 
Godot, what else is there? Is even interminable waiting more pleasant than having to 
face the fact that one has nothing to do? Vladimir’s and Estragon’s indecision and 
ambivalence about Godot, about what to do, is also at the center of their despair and 
is responsible for part of the absurdity of the drama.  
 The emotions of Vladimir and Estragon conflict and oscillate, making it 
impossible for them to commit to either individual or coordinated courses of action. 
Indeed, the two frequently struggle in an equivocal or ambivalent manner with the 
very subject which Camus identified in The Myth of Sisyphus as the sole 
philosophical problem of the absurd: whether or not to commit suicide. Of course, 
Vladimir and Estragon broach the subject with disarming and humorous nonchalance, 
but become grave and frightened at the thought that one will leave the other alone.    
Vladimir: What do we do now?  
Estragon: Wait. 
Vladimir: Yes, but while waiting. 
Estragon: What about hanging ourselves? 
Vladimir: Hmm. It’d give us an erection. 
 […] 
Estragon: Let’s hang ourselves immediately! 
Vladimir: From a bough? (They go towards the tree.) I wouldn’t trust it. 
Estragon: We can always try. 
Vladimir: Go ahead. 
Estragon: After you. 
Vladimir: No no, you first. 
Estragon: Why me? 
Vladimir: You’re lighter than I am. 
Estragon: Just so! 





Estragon: (with effort). Gogo light — bough not break — Gogo dead. Didi 
heavy — bough break — Didi alone. Whereas —  
Vladimir: I hadn’t thought of that. 
 […] 
Estragon: Let’s don’t do anything. It’s safer.”  
Vladimir: Let’s wait and see what he says. 
Estragon: Who? 
Vladimir: Godot. (Beckett 1956, 12)  
 
 In addition to the ambivalence of their relationship and the absurdity of their 
waiting, Vladimir and Estragon face a complex and seemingly contradictory social 
world represented by Pozzo and Lucky. Vladimir struggles to articulate his protest of 
the treatment of Lucky, Pozzo’s slave. “It’s a scandal,” says Vladimir, “to treat a 
man… like that… I think that… no… a human being… no… it’s a scandal” (Beckett 
1956, 19). Estragon is less bothered; he utters a quiet protest, but continues gnawing 
on a bone. Pozzo eventually replies to these vague protests that he “might just as well 
have been in [Lucky’s] shoes and he in mine. If chance had not willed otherwise. To 
each one his due” (Beckett 1956, 21).  
 These obviously contradictory explanations for the status of Pozzo as master 
and Lucky as slave (‘because it is chance’ and ‘to each one his due’) connects the 
tangible violence between Pozzo and Lucky to a broader confusion about the human 
condition. Pozzo explains: “The tears of the world are a constant quantity. For each 
one who begins to weep, somewhere else another stops. The same is true of the 
laugh” (Beckett 1956, 22). In these absurd cycles of weeping and laughter, mastery 
and slavery, and in the contradictory explanations for each, we begin to see a familiar 
theme of the absurd. Vladimir and Estragon are confused, conflicted, and outraged by 




alike to all” (Eccl. 9:2, AV), that there is evil and iniquity under the sun, that we labor 
(or we wait), and yet we are governed by chance. Litowitz and Newman argue that 
this outrage, directed against the characters of Pozzo and Lucky, actually reflect 
Vladimir’s and Estragon’s tortured relationship with their “bad, sadistic, and 
depriving” mother (Litowitz and Newman 1967, 274). Godot, in this interpretation, 
represents the fantasy of a perfect, loving mother who will eventually save and 
embrace the men. But whether we imagine Godot as fantasized mother or as God, and 
whether we conceive of Pozzo and Lucky as an externalization of a bad memory or, 
perhaps more plausibly, simply as symbols of the brutality and chaos of the world, 
Vladimir and Estragon are conflicted about whether to hope for Godot’s unlikely 
arrival or to resign themselves to the depravity and eventual blindness and deafness of 
Pozzo and Lucky.  
 The absurdity of a play like Waiting for Godot, therefore, is related to the 
contradictions and ambivalences that unfold, in layers, throughout the drama: the 
absurdity of the relationship between Vladimir and Estragon, the absurdity of the 
world they see depicted in the sado-masochistic relationship between Pozzo and 
Lucky, their uncertain waiting for a savior who seems to promise to come but never 
actually arrives, their ambivalence over whether to stay or go, live or die. Indeed, if 
Waiting for Godot “is a poem on time, evanescence, and the mysteriousness of 
existence, the paradox of change and stability, necessity and absurdity” (Esslin 2001, 
61-62), its most direct commentary upon the issues usually treated in the philosophy 




“think” on demand. His disquisition begins when Pozzo jerks the rope that serves as 
his leash and commands him to “think, pig!”:    
Lucky: Given the existence as uttered forth in the public works of Puncher and 
Wattmann of a personal God quaquaquaqua with white beard quaquaquaqua 
outside time without extension who from the heights of divine apathia divine 
athambia divine aphasia loves us dearly with some exceptions for reasons 
unknown but time will tell and suffers like the divine Miranda with those who 
for reasons unknown but time will tell are plunged in torment plunged in fire 
whose fire flames if that continues and who can doubt it will fire the 
firmament that is to say blast hell to heaven so blue still and calm so calm 
with a calm which even though intermittent is better than nothing… (Beckett 
1956, 28-29)  
 
 Here, most dehumanized character in the play embarks upon the most abstract 
and sophistic reflections. Of course, he does so absurdly, robbed of all coherence, and 
only on the demand of his brutal master. Beckett therefore simultaneously gives 
expression to and ridicules the philosophical roots of absurdity, which ought to serve 
as a kind of warning. While it is helpful to remark in Godot and elsewhere some of 
the absurd ambivalences which this volume will build upon, we must depart from the 
theater to return to a final philosophical approach to the absurd more in keeping with 
the scope and limits of this study.  
Thomas Nagel 
Although Thomas Nagel’s treatment of the absurd responds to Camus’, his is an 
independent rather than essentially critical reaction that represents a contemporary, 
philosophical approach to the concept. Nagel discusses those everyday instances in 
which we say that something about our lives is absurd, taking the example of a person 
who remarks that “nothing we do now will matter in a million years,” as a typical 




convey the absurdity of our lives,” to express our feelings of futility, to give voice to 
the feeling that “we are tiny specks in the infinite vastness of the universe; our lives 
are mere instants even on a geological time scale” (1971, 717). But one of the 
complexities of Nagel’s approach is that while he finds this basic intuition of the 
absurd to be more or less correct, he believes that the standard reasons given in 
support of it are inadequate. Thus, he affirms the intuition, rejects the standard 
explanations, and then supplies a new definition of the absurd in an attempt to clarify 
the concept.  
 “The sense that life as a whole is absurd,” Nagel claims, “arises when we 
perceive, perhaps dimly, an inflated pretension or aspiration which is inseparable 
from the continuation of human life and which makes its absurdity inescapable, short 
of escape from life itself” (1971, 718). Nagel’s absurdity involves us in a 
“transcendental step” in which we become conscious of the fact that we are human, 
and, by the same token, that we are unable to exceed our human strivings (1971, 725). 
Our intuition of the absurd involves a “conspicuous discrepancy between pretension 
or aspiration and reality” (1971, 718). This means absurdity is “the collision between 
the seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of 
regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt” 
(1971, 718). This is the intuition of the absurd that Nagel will wish to defend: an 
intuition of the limits of human certainty, purpose, and significance.  
 But although Nagel’s intuition of absurdity expresses something “difficult to 
state, but fundamentally correct” (1971, 718), he is compelled to argue against what 




argument, he replies: “Whether what we do now will matter in a million years could 
make the crucial difference only if its mattering in a million years depended on its 
mattering, period” (1971, 716). And against the notion that we are absurd because our 
actions are ultimately pointless, Nagel asserts that “life does not consist of a sequence 
of activities each of which has as its purpose some later member of the sequence” 
(1971, 717).  
   Therefore, Nagel wants to question the reasoning behind what he feels is an 
undue pessimism associated with absurdity. In response to the absurd, Nagel thinks 
we continue to engage in cosmically pointless activities because they are, 
nevertheless, important to us. “When we recognize what we do as arbitrary, it does 
not disengage us from life, and there lies our absurdity” (Nagel in Gordon 1984, 15). 
So instead of agonizing over “the dragooning of an unconvinced transcendent 
consciousness into the service of an immanent, limited enterprise like a human life” 
(1971, 726), Nagel recommends that we “approach our absurd lives with irony” 
instead of “heroism or despair” (1971, 727). Singling out Camus’ Sisyphean scorn as 
a “romantic and slightly self-pitying” attempt to resolve the absurd, Nagel says he 
offers a more grown-up, better-adjusted response to absurdity.  
 However, as I.J.H. Williams has pointed out (1986, 308), Nagel seems to have 
designed a peculiar definition of the absurd only to deny its importance. This move 
makes us suspicious that his absurd man is a kind of straw man, one whose problems 
and tensions Nagel defines in a way that diminishes them. Nagel argues for an ironic 
stance toward absurdity because “if sub specie aeternitatis there is no reason to 




and Cherry 1990, 202). But, the premise that equates ‘the feeling that nothing 
matters’ with the absurd is Nagel’s, not Camus’ or any other major absurd theorist’s.   
 Westphal and Cherry are correct in asserting that Nagel’s position requires 
that we imagine a difference between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ perspectives on ourselves 
and our commitments, that we ‘internally’ commit to things which, from an ‘external’ 
point of view, may be seen as pointless (1990, 199). But while Nagel goes too far by 
reducing the absurd to insignificance, Westphal and Cherry go even further, denying 
not only the significance of the absurd but even its existence. These authors argue that 
the entire idea of an ‘outside’ perspective on our lives is unnecessary, that there are 
things we can do (like “dine, play backgammon, make merry with our friends,” à la 
Hume) that negate the “wrongly set” problem of the absurd, which only amounts to 
“colourful rubbish” (Westphal and Cherry 1990, 203).  
 The flaw in both of these approaches is their excessively cognitive orientation. 
Nagel denies the importance of the absurd by claiming that we have no rational 
grounds for demanding that all of our actions be meaningful or significant. Since 
Nagel finds this to be an unreasonable demand, he thinks we can manage it well 
enough just by ironically carrying on the business of living our lives. It does not seem 
to occur to Nagel that the feeling or experience of absurdity might be valid or 
powerful even if it does not have a reasonable set of propositions to back it up. In a 
well-known essay on the logic of ambivalence, Patricia Greenspan takes up this 
question, yet while she challenges the notion that emotions must always be perfectly 
rational, Greenspan also defends the rationality of conflicting emotions on the 




whatever the reasons against it” (1980, 237). In the chapters that follow, I will argue 
that this cognitive or rational bias has caused us to look for the absurd in all the 
wrong places, preventing us from seeing the ambivalent emotions at its heart, 
emotions which are powerful and consequential regardless of the adequacy of 
‘reasons’ for or against them.            
 In spite of these unfortunate tendencies, Nagel does the philosophy of the 
absurd a service by attempting to understand it not as a mythical collision between the 
human and the natural worlds, but as a product of two countervailing intuitions, as “a 
collision within ourselves” (Nagel 1971, 723). Jeffrey Gordon specifically argues 
against this approach by returning to what he takes to be Camus’ formulation of the 
absurd: the result of the collision between ourselves and the world (1984, 17). Gordon 
claims that our intuition of the arbitrariness of our ends is less relevant to absurdity 
than the fact of our ultimate meaninglessness (1984, 20). Thus, a mouse’s life is 
absurd, even though the mouse does not know that it is. Gordon finds this move to be 
a triumph, wondering how Nagel’s answer, which is that the mouse’s life is not 
absurd because the mouse does not even know it is a mouse, can stand. Oddly 
enough, while Gordon critiques Nagel on skeptical grounds, asking how Nagel can be 
certain of the cosmic unimportance of his actions (Gordon 1984, 27), Gordon 
somehow argues that what he sees as Camus’ absurd (the figurative confrontation 
between people and the world) is more sensible than Nagel’s. Gordon, like others, 
seems to insist that meaninglessness and arbitrariness are ‘essential’ properties of the 
world while, at the same time, claiming that we must remain skeptical about any 




 Unfortunately, Nagel’s, Westphal and Cherry’s, and Gordon’s examinations 
of the absurd are misguided from the start insofar as they look for ‘reasons’ and 
‘facts’ that might justify absurdity. In the following chapters, I will argue that the 
only sensible way to speak about absurdity is to approach it as desire, emotion, and 
experience, not as essential properties of the world or ‘facts’ about meaninglessness 
discerned by the mind. These and other important clarifications of the philosophy of 
the absurd depend upon an analysis of the work of Albert Camus and his numerous 






Chapter 3: Albert Camus and his Critics 
 
Although the absurd has an ancestry that reaches back to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 
and perhaps even further, to Pascal (1670), Montaigne (1580), Augustine, Qohelet, 
and others, contemporary discussions of the philosophical concept of the absurd must 
begin and end with the work of Albert Camus. His collection of philosophical essays, 
The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) was the first serious attempt to investigate the meaning 
of absurdity in a thoroughgoing manner. In spite of the limitations of his work, 
Camus succeeded in giving greater substance to the concept of absurdity, and in 
subjecting it to critical scrutiny in order to seek out its concomitants and 
consequences. In addition to The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus’ four other major works, 
The Stranger (1942), The Plague (1947), The Rebel (1951), and The Fall (1956), 
have come to define (although not very clearly) the contemporary understanding of 
the philosophy of the absurd.  
 Camus is regarded as an integral part of the Francophone canon for these three 
completed novels and two lengthy essays, as well as for his lyrical essays, particularly 
Noces (1938), his short stories, especially “The Adulterous Woman,” “The Guest,” 
“The Renegade,” and “The Growing Stone,” collected in Exile and The Kingdom 
(1957), and his plays, particularly Caligula (1938), Le malentendu (1943), and Les 
justes (1950). But Camus is also known for his passionate political writings for Alger 
Républicain and the resistance journal Combat, where he published, among other 
pieces, his four famous Letters to a German Friend (1943-1944). And today, along 




Camus’ personal Notebooks, which, in fact, often give the appearance of having been 
written in order to be read.   
 When it was announced that Camus would receive the Nobel Prize for 
Literature in 1957, he was only forty-three years old, the second youngest person ever 
to receive the award. Camus was said to have been dismayed by his reception of the 
Nobel, saying repeatedly, “I wish Malraux had got the prize” (Todd 2000, 372). 
Roger Quillot reported that upon hearing the news, Camus was deeply troubled, 
“anguished, like someone buried alive” (Todd 2000, 372). Of course, while Camus 
was a bit ambivalent about public praise and while he revered Malraux, he also may 
have sensed that a Nobel at such a young age threatened to prematurely end his 
literary career, which would be cut short, instead, by the tragic car accident that killed 
him in 1960.  
 Near the end of his life, Camus’ reputation among the French public had 
waned. Jacques Laurent referred to Camus’ Nobel as the crowning of “a finished 
oeuvre” (Judt 1998, 87), and Lucien Rebatet wrote cruelly that “this prize which falls 
most often to septuagenarians is not at all premature in this case, because since his 
allegorical La Peste, Camus has been diagnosed with an arteriosclerosis of style” 
(Todd 2000, 373). While there was praise for Camus at that time as well, critics on 
the Left “fell over one another to bury [Camus],” whose “philosophical naivety” had 
occasioned the quarrel with Sartre discussed in the previous chapter, a quarrel which 
had “severely damaged [Camus’] credibility on the intellectual left and permanently 




Before his Nobel, even as early as 1945, Camus had been “France’s leading 
public intellectual… the moral voice of his era” (Judt 1998, 88). Germaine Brée 
refers to Camus’ early notoriety as inspiring “a certain hagiography” by which he had 
become the conscience of his generation. Even in 1952, after Hannah Arendt met 
Camus in Paris, she wrote to her husband that he was “undoubtedly, the best man 
now in France. He is head and shoulders above the other intellectuals” (Arendt in Judt 
1998, 87). But this kind of praise had become less common by the 1950s, when 
Camus’ works and his public life caused animated controversies that reduced the 
public’s estimation of him. Camus’ moralistic tone got him accused of having 
become a “secular saint” (Todd 2000, 374), not unlike his character, Tarrou, in The 
Plague. Sartre’s and Jeanson’s personal rebukes of Camus tried, and succeeded to 
some degree, to cut his image down to size. Even well after his death, Patrick 
McCarthy would introduce Camus to readers as “a bad philosopher” whose “honesty 
could be devious and [who] was insufferably self-righteous” (1982, 6-7).    
But it is likely that Camus’ lofty style belied a certain philosophical humility. 
While often indignant about moral ills, Camus rarely took an absolute stance against 
anything more morally controversial than torture or wanton murder. In working out 
his positions, Camus seems to have been aware of his own limitations, often 
attempting to discount his contributions and his worth as a systematic thinker with 
comments like, “I am not a philosopher and I never claimed to be one” (Camus in 
Judt 1998, 90), and “I don’t think I’m worth a red cent as a philosopher; what really 




Statements like these, while not altogether humble, do illustrate that Camus’ primary 
concern was morality, not logic or theory.  
Indeed, dedicated scholars of Camus’ work recognize that he belongs not in 
the tradition of twentieth century existentialist philosophers like Sartre, but alongside 
moralists and essayists like Montaigne, Pascal, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Gide. Camus 
certainly would have been more comfortable in this company, and perhaps his work 
would have received a more generous reading there as well. Nevertheless, as he 
remarked to Madeline Chapsal with characteristic balance, “one must live among 
one’s contemporaries, smiling when it is possible. You see, our intellectual society, 
whether leftist or rightist, is almost always frightfully mean and nasty, and would be a 
sure sign of decadence, were there not some warm-hearted exceptions” (Camus in 
Todd 2000, 375).   
Camus’ public denouncement of both existentialism and Marxism, his critique 
of revolution in The Rebel, his highly-publicized break with Sartre, and his equivocal 
stance on Algeria lost him a great number of admirers on the Left. Some saw his 
refusal to endorse Communist revolution and Algerian independence as signs of 
bourgeois and colonial complacency. Even The Plague drew criticism from the Left 
because its explicit subject was a disease rather than a war or an occupation. Since the 
novel was written and published in a time of terrible political and ideological conflict, 
critics like Roland Barthes and Simone de Beauvoir found its symbolism especially 
misleading. Why write an allegory about a plague, they asked, which implicates no 
particular historical evils and which simplifies the political questions of combating 




(1955), which claimed that The Plague was applicable to “any resistance against any 
tyranny” because “terror has several faces. Still another justification for my not 
having named any particular one, in order to better strike at them all” (Camus 1968, 
340). In Chapter 8, I discuss The Plague in a bit more detail to assess its moral 
implications and to evaluate Camus’ choices of symbols, battles, and heroes.    
Recently, scholars have questioned the breadth and depth of Camus’ political 
critique, wondering exactly who is included in the absurd fight and what issues he 
deemed worth fighting for. These inquiries revolve around matters of race and 
empire, making them among the most divisive topics debated in the context of 
Camus’ politics. In addition to Camus’ expository writing and public positions on the 
Algerian issue, some have even read Camus’ fiction as indicative of a failure to 
confront colonialism, racism, and violence in North Africa. For instance, In The 
Stranger, Meursault’s victim, “l’Arabe,” is given no other name in the text; like other 
Arab Algerian characters in Camus’ work, he is not much more than a ghost. 
Likewise, in The Plague, the Arab quarter is ravaged by pestilence but is almost 
completely ignored; even the heroes of the tale, Rieux and Tarrou, do not carry their 
battle against the plague that far.  
Some have claimed that Camus was simply unable to bridge the gap between 
his Europeanness and what should have been his sympathies for colonized Algerians. 
Conor Cruise O’Brien’s Albert Camus of Europe and Africa (1970) has made the 
greatest impact in examining issues of colonialism and race with respect to Camus’ 
life and work. O’Brien contends that Camus’ books and articles bury, as it were, 




plague, the earlier invasion of North Africa by France. Few would maintain that 
Camus consciously sought to perpetuate oppression and injustice, but O’Brien and 
others have argued that Camus was blinded by his proximity to the Algerian issue, 
perhaps even resorting to fantasy and a kind of willful self-delusion to justify a quasi-
colonial stance.  
There remains a heated debate over whether Camus’ work attempts to expose 
the inhumane divisions of race, class, power, and privilege in North Africa or whether 
it tacitly approves of these divisions. In Chapter 9, I specifically take up the issue of 
Camus’ complex and unpopular rejection of both Algerian independence and French 
reconquest. There, I attempt to relate Camus’ position on political conflicts like the 
Algerian War for independence to a renewed theoretical understanding of the absurd. 
Addressing these controversial questions in light of the links between the philosophy 
and politics of absurdity is a method which has been largely ignored, and one which 
depends upon a clearer understanding and a more effective interpretation of the 
meaning of Camus’ absurd.  
The Meaning of Camus’ Absurd  
Camus’ philosophy of the absurd often strikes us as absurdly ambiguous. Olivier 
Todd noted in his authoritative biography that while Camus’ absurd had broad 
application and “worked on several different levels,” the thought-processes in Camus’ 
expository writing often “seemed rapid, punchy, and fluid. He sought a certain 
lucidity without quite attaining it” (Todd 2000, 144).  
 Tony Judt agrees that Camus “was investing the word [absurd] with many of 




relationship with his mother, an illiterate and almost silent presence/absence during 
his impoverished childhood in Algiers” (1998, 90). For Judt, Camus’ absurd referred 
to precise, personal sensations, and it is true that Camus’ expressions of the absurd 
are often tinged with very unique emotional resonances.  
 By contrast, however, Robert de Luppé’s Albert Camus defines Camus’ 
absurd as “the meaninglessness of life,” indeed, the meaninglessness of “everything.”  
For Luppé, “in a broad sense the absurd is everything which is without meaning: 
therefore the world is absurd… just as I myself am absurd” (1966, 5-6). Jacob 
Golomb takes an equally grand but perhaps even more transcendental tack by 
claiming that “Camus invites us to accept the immanence of the absolute absurd,” as 
opposed to making leaps of faith (1994, 268). But what exactly ‘the absolute absurd’ 
is and how exactly it could be ‘immanent’ are not at all clear. One bizarre step further 
and we reach Jean Onimus’ not entirely sympathetic reading of Camus, where the 
absurd is explained as the condition depicted in the stories of Christ, but only if “the 
final pages of the gospel are ripped out” (1965, 49).  
 We may understand why there so many competing versions of Camus’ absurd 
if we turn to Camus’ work, itself. In the first essay of The Myth of Sisyphus alone, 
Camus describes the absurd in an astounding variety of ways. He refers to either “the 
absurd” or “absurdity” as: “a feeling that deprives the mind of sleep” (1955, 6), a 
deprivation of “the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land” (6), a 
“divorce between man and his life” (6), a “divorce between the mind that desires and 
the world that disappoints” (50), something that one “believes to be true” that must 




eloquent” (12), “the metaphysical state of the conscious man” (40), a moment when 
“the stage sets collapse” (12), a “definitive awakening” (13), a “revolt of the flesh” 
(14), “the denseness and strangeness of the world” (14), “the familiar and yet 
alarming brother we encounter in our own photograph” (15), “the elementary and 
definitive aspect of the [mortal] adventure” (15), “the confrontation between the 
human need and the unreasonable silence of the world” (28), “lucid reason noting its 
limits” (49), a “climate” (12), a “universe” (12), a “contradiction” (18), a “gap” (19), 
a “condition (20), a “confrontation” (21), a “passion” (22), a “revolt” (25), a 
“comparison” (30), a “datum” (31), an “equation” (50), an “awareness” (52), and a 
“wager” (52).  
 These impossibly numerous understandings of the absurd have led many 
investigators to offer up a vague definition of the absurd as the lack of 
correspondence between the human and natural worlds. One such investigator is John 
Cruickshank, whose seminal work, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (1960), 
uniquely advanced our understanding of Camus by attempting to clarify his two most 
important ideas: absurdity and revolt. It was Cruickshank, almost as much as Camus, 
who established the understanding of the absurd as “something which arises from a 
confrontation between the human desire for coherence, for understanding, and the 
irrationality, the opacity, of the world” (Cruickshank 1960, xiii). This basic 
orientation to the absurd as a kind of human tragedy has guided nearly all 
interpretations of the absurd since Cruickshank’s work first appeared in 1959.  
 Cruickshank notes that Camus’ vision of absurdity begins with a dualism, a 




awareness of the inevitability of death, his sense of nascentes morimur, of being born 
to die (1960, xi). Cruickshank argues that this simple dualism — the richness of life 
and the certainty of death — is elevated to the level of paradox even in Camus’ early 
work, with the positive side elaborated in Noces, and the negative explored in The 
Myth of Sisyphus (1960, x-xi).  
 But Cruickshank is not unaware of the confusion and contradiction that 
weighs upon Camus’ absurd. He argues that Camus’ formulation of absurdity “seems 
to involve a petitio principii” (a circular argument), and that it contains numerous 
verbal and logical contradictions (Cruickshank 1960, 62). Summarizing the various 
senses of the absurd as presented in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, 
Cruickshank argues that “Camus gives the notion of the absurd three different 
meanings during the demonstration of his cogito: (i) it is the whole tragic paradox of 
the human condition and a subject of scandal and complaint; (ii) it is a situation that 
we are called upon to maintain as fully as we can; (iii) it is an attitude of revolt (the 
wager of the absurd) which somehow requires us to use the absurd in sense (ii) above 
against the absurd in sense (i) above. These different meanings of the term ‘absurd’ 
involve three different kinds of relationship and are both confused and confusing” 
(1960, 63).  
 In spite of the great confusion, Cruickshank settles on an explication of 
Camus’ absurd as “the absence of correspondence or congruity between the mind’s 
need for coherence and the incoherence of the world which the mind experiences” 




Cruickshank, but as “a relationship with an experiencing mind as one of its terms, a 
confrontation between “existence and the individual mind” (1960, 51).  
 Now, these clarifications of Camus’ absurd are helpful if one wishes to get a 
vague sense of Camus’ basic intentions, but they remain inadequate as complete 
explications of the concept. Indeed, Cruickshank admits as much in his thorough 
critique. One gets the sense that Cruickshank finds the philosophy of the absurd to be 
compelling but logically hopeless, arguing that the entire question of The Myth of 
Sisyphus, stated by Camus to be the question of a logic unto death, the question of the 
relationship between the absurd and suicide, is meaningless and tautological (1960, 
47).  
 But Cruickshank partly defends Camus by pointing out, correctly and 
significantly for our purposes, that Camus’ goal in The Myth of Sisyphus is not to 
present the reader with a systematic philosophy of the absurd, but rather to describe 
the feeling and sensibility of the absurd. “What we primarily have in Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe,” writes Cruickshank, “is a testimony to a certain widespread state of mind 
rather than a strict philosophical scrutiny of it” (1960, 47). That his is an accurate 
assessment of Camus’ intentions is clearly confirmed in a short prefatory note 
(Camus 1955, 2), discussed below. Cruickshank is right to suggest that this prefatory 
note has been too often ignored by readers and critics.  
 But while Cruickshank neither apologizes for nor condemns Camus’ absurd, 
he does offer a piercing analysis of its major logical problem: the confusion of the 
unknown with the unknowable (Cruickshank 1960, 52; Hall 1960, 27). The problem 




what seems to be a leap from epistemological skepticism to essentializing 
descriptions of the human condition, a leap from uncertainty and doubt to a bold 
characterization of the relationship between the human being and the world. Camus’ 
absurd has been said, therefore, to jump from a recognition that the world is not 
known to a claim that the world is inherently unknowable (Cruickshank 1960, 52). 
But this jump presents itself as such only if we take an overly cognitive orientation to 
Camus’ work, only if we mistakenly assume that it begins as methodical doubt or 
epistemological skepticism.  
 Many philosophically-inclined critics have tended to conceive of the absurd as 
originating in just such a condition of doubt, which encourages them to equate 
absurdity with a skeptical stance. Cruickshank, himself, is guilty of taking this route.  
“One is indeed tempted to describe Le Mythe de Sisyphe as Camus’ Discours de la 
méthode,” Cruickshank writes. “It is founded on a doubt that extends to the evidence 
of both sense and mind. It derives its own particular kind of cogito from this doubt. It 
produces a provisional morality also, though this provisional morality of Camus 
would be much less generally approved — if perhaps more widely practiced — than 
that of Descartes” (1960, 43). Similarly, Gary Madison claims that, in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, Camus undertakes “an inventory of consciousness… in quasi-Cartesian 
fashion… asking in effect… What exactly do I know with certainty?” (Madison in 
Shaw 2004, 867). And as we have already discussed, Cruickshank and others have 
frequently treated Camus’ absurd as a variant of the skeptical method, as “a 
contemporary manifestation of a scepticism as old at least as the Book of 




 Donald Lazere attempts to address this matter of the leap from the unknown to 
the unknowable by splitting the absurd into two categories: metaphysical and 
epistemological absurdity. The former type of absurdity is constituted by “the brevity 
of life and inevitability of death, the indifference of the natural universe to human 
existence and of men to one another’s existence, and the absence of a God and an 
afterlife that would give this life a transcendent purpose or universal system of moral 
values” (1973, 52). Epistemological absurdity, on the other hand, Lazere understands 
as “the limitations of human understanding in general — the foundering of reason in 
logical dilemmas, the mind’s failure to explain or unify experience totally, the 
frustration of our ‘nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute’” (1973, 52).  
 Unfortunately, Lazere’s distinction is suspect, for not only does Camus resist 
making broad, sweeping metaphysical claims about the non-existence of God or 
human purpose, but logically, if one admits to ‘epistemological absurdity’, then one 
could never find the grounds to postulate ‘metaphysical absurdity’. That basic 
conundrum is the central problem with confusing the unknown with the unknowable, 
and Lazere’s answer does not resolve it. Moreover, when Camus does wax 
metaphysical, any methodical or skeptical reasoning he once professed seems to be 
completely forgotten. For instance, Camus’ well-known argument in his Fourth 
Letter to a German Friend, that a human being “has a meaning… because he is the 
only creature to insist on having one” (1960, 28), may be aesthetically pleasing but is 
logically outrageous. Cruickshank and others have described Camus’ tendency 
toward illogic as “a failure to separate clear thinking from an emotional attitude” 




entirely obfuscating, actually offers important clues about the meaning of Camus’ 
absurd.   
 In the end, critics like Cruickshank and Lazere are not entirely to blame for 
approaching Camus’ absurd in this way. As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, 
Camus often invoked skeptical and Cartesian motifs as basic touchstones for his 
thought, even formulating his absurd formula as a neo-Cartesian cogito: ‘Je me 
révolte, donc nous sommes’, “I rebel — therefore we exist” (1956b, 22). But even if 
Camus is guilty of creating such confusion, to suggest that absurdity is primarily a 
survey of doubt is to impoverish the concept and to run headlong into the dilemma of 
the unknown and the unknowable. Camus should have been able to recognize that his 
absurd did not begin in methodical doubt but in tension, conflict, and contradiction. 
For, as even Sartre was able to see, Camus’ absurd “is not… the object of a mere 
idea; it is revealed to us in a doleful illumination” (1962, 110). In this and the 
following two chapters, I attempt to show that although Camus’ absurd fails to hold 
the center of a coherent skeptical analysis, it does achieve limited success in 
describing absurdity in emotional terms as an “intellectual malady,” as Camus 
himself defined it (1955, 2).  
The Status of Camus’ Absurd  
It is not possible to fully comprehend the meaning of the absurd unless we clarify its 
status. That is, we must ask and answer the question: What type of thing is the 
absurd? We are repeatedly told by Camus and his critics that the absurd is a cosmic 
conflict, manifested in the irreconcilable differences between human beings and the 




uncertainty that results from those metaphysical differences. But on this issue, it 
seems that critics have taken Camus (and Camus perhaps even took himself) too 
literally. To really understand the status of Camus’ absurd, we must approach his 
descriptions of absurdity as metaphors. When we do, we see that the ‘facts’ and 
‘truths’ of the absurd are metaphors for the feelings and experiences of absurdity.  
 One of Camus’ most famous definitions of the absurd is the “confrontation of 
this irrational [world] and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human 
heart” (1955, 21). And some of Camus’ most beautiful and memorable prose treats 
absurdity in just this way, as a tragedy of cosmic proportions. Camus metaphorically 
locates the absurd between the person and the world. “The absurd,” he writes, “is not 
in man (if such a metaphor could have meaning) nor in the world, but in their 
presence together” (1955, 30). He therefore depicts the absurd as a kind of 
incommensurability, found in “neither of the elements compared” but “born of their 
confrontation” (1955, 30). Camus even attempts to give mathematical dimension to 
this metaphor of the absurd by defining it as a comparison between two discrete 
(although nebulous) terms, in which “the magnitude of absurdity will be in direct 
ratio to the distance between the two terms of my comparison” (1955, 30). These 
formulations of the absurd as contrast, confrontation, or comparison compose the 
traditional understanding of Camus’ absurd, which many readers and critics have 
followed.  
 But the conflict and confrontation Camus describes is not what we might 
imagine. The confrontation of the absurd does not play itself out in bloody battles 




negotiation between desire and unfulfillment, longing and refusal. Camus’ absurd 
consists of “the confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence 
of the world” (1955, 28). The gentler metaphors of silence and need seem to have 
become lost behind the stronger metaphors of conflict and confrontation. Even as a 
metaphor, the absurd resembles not so much a clash between titanic forces as the 
painful silence of a broken relationship.  
 Remembering that we are still chasing after metaphors, we may ask, what is 
this ‘world’ with which we have, or do not have, a relationship? What is it that we 
need and desire and who or what is silent? I try to offer answers to these strange 
questions by replacing their metaphysical overtones with emotional ones in Chapters 
4 and 5. For now, Camus’ elliptical answer is that the absurd is “that divorce between 
the mind that desires and the world that disappoints, my nostalgia for unity, this 
fragmented universe, and the contradiction that binds them together” (1955, 50). Like 
a truly unhappy or broken relationship, the disappointment and resentment created by 
absurdity is all that links the individual and the world together. Indeed, “it binds them 
one to the other as only hatred can weld two creatures together” (1955, 21). 
According to Camus, we feel a kind of love and a kind of hatred toward ‘the world 
that disappoints’, and this constellation of feeling is what binds us to the absurd.  
 These metaphors of confrontation, disappointment, and divorce have been 
taken by many critics as evidence that Camus’ philosophy requires the assertion of a 
fundamental difference between human consciousness and the physical world. 
Ostensibly, only a radical and insurmountable difference can explain why the world 




speak. But there is no reason why we must assert such a difference and there are a 
number of good reasons not to.  
 First of all, Camus would have rejected such a proposition if it had been set 
before him. Camus shared Nietzsche’s view that “when one speaks of humanity, the 
idea is fundamental that this is something which separates and distinguishes man 
from nature. In reality, however, there is no such separation: ‘Natural’ qualities and 
those called ‘human’ are inseparably grown together” (Sprintzen 1988, xvi). As I will 
show in Chapter 5, Camus’ treatment of nature and the relationship between 
humanity and nature can not be reduced to an absolute split between the human and 
the natural worlds. In fact, Camus will argue against such a split, encouraging us to 
recognize and to experience the complex, interdependent, and ambivalent 
relationships between individual, social, and natural ‘worlds’.  
 Second, if we assert a fundamental difference between two categorically 
discrete types of being, we only return to the problem of the unknown and the 
unknowable described above. Camus asks (rhetorically), “What constitutes the basis 
of that [absurd] conflict, of that break between the world and my mind, but the 
awareness of it?” (1955, 52). Here, we get a little closer to the emotional quality of 
Camus’ absurd, but even conceiving of the absurd as the awareness of a break has its 
problems. How could we be aware of a break with something that is fundamentally 
beyond our awareness? It is not terribly sensible to assert that there is a property of a 
thing that refuses us and that this property is the thing’s absolute unknowability. 
These problems find no solutions as long as we understand the notion of ‘refusal’ to 




 It is also worth pointing out that this description of a conflict, a divorce, and 
an absolute difference has strong elements of denial and projection to it, as it avoids 
any involvement in the conflict and insists that our absurdity is caused by an essential 
and insurmountable disjunction between us and a ‘world’ which only disappoints us. 
It is more informative to read Camus’ metaphor as an expression of ambivalence, for 
Camus is claiming that sometimes we refuse and sometimes we feel refused, that 
while part of us desires, part of us rejects. After reviewing the concept of ambivalence 
in Chapter 4, I will return to an exploration of these themes of desire, rejection, and 
ambivalence in Chapter 5. But, for now, we can see that even though Camus’ 
metaphors are better poetry than philosophy, it is important to get the metaphors right 
in order to contextualize and eventually interpret his account of the absurd.    
 Finally, when critics insist upon understanding Camus metaphysically, they 
work against the very spirit of the absurd investigation. “If you want to unify the 
entire world in the name of a theory,” Camus wrote, “the only way you will do so is 
to make the world as gaunt, as blind, and as deaf as the theory itself” (Camus in du 
Plock 2005, 22). In fact, one of Camus’ goals in The Myth of Sisyphus is to challenge 
all the doctrines that “explain everything” and that therefore “debilitate [him] at the 
same time” (1955, 55). It is fair to say that a strong argument against metaphysical 
theorizing is present in most, if not all, of Camus’ expository works.  
 In spite of the temptation to imagine the absurd as a cosmic clash and a 
metaphysical difference, Camus relied on metaphors of desire and relationship, and 
he returned to an explicitly emotional vocabulary when he felt it was important to 




Myth of Sisyphus, likely added in response to early criticism, Camus wrote: “The 
pages that follow deal with an absurd sensitivity (sensibilité) that can be found 
widespread in the age — and not with an absurd philosophy which our time, properly 
speaking, has not known” (1955, 2). Camus then defined his purpose in the work in 
perfectly clear terms: “There will be found here merely the description, the pure state, 
of an intellectual malady (mal de l’esprit). No metaphysic, no belief is involved in it 
for the moment. These are the limits and the only bias of this book. Certain personal 
experiences urge me to make this clear” (1955, 2).  
 Camus opens The Rebel in similar fashion, by describing the “absurdist 
sensibility” as an illness and the study of it, a diagnosis. “If it was legitimate to take 
absurdist sensibility into account,” he writes, “to make a diagnosis of a malady to be 
found in ourselves and in others, it is nevertheless impossible to see in this sensibility, 
and in the nihilism it presupposes, anything but a point of departure, a criticism 
brought to life” (1956b, 9-10). These clarifications alone should challenge us to re-
evaluate many years of overly literal interpretations of Camus’ absurd.    
 In their place, we should notice that as Camus develops his argument in The 
Myth of Sisyphus, he describes the emotional experience of absurdity as a “distressing 
nudity” (1955, 11), a “strangeness” (14), and an “odd state of soul in which the void 
becomes eloquent” (12). We even find Camus insisting upon the significance of the 
feeling of the absurd with respect to its idea, its notion. Camus writes: “The feeling 
(le sentiment) of the absurd is not, for all that, the notion (la notion) of the absurd. It 
[the feeling] lays the foundations for it [the notion], and that is all. It is not limited to 




Subsequently it [the feeling] has a chance of going further. It [the feeling] is alive; in 
other words, it must die or reverberate (Camus 1955, 28-29).   
 Oddly enough, some critics use this passage as evidence that conscious 
notions of the absurd are what define absurdity and its consequences (see Sprintzen 
1988, 53-54). Perhaps they draw such conclusions because of a translation issue 
which I have attempted to address above: while the English is confusing because of 
repeated ambiguous references to ‘it’, the French is clear because of the differences in 
the gender of the nouns, le sentiment and la notion. Once the translation has been 
clarified, it becomes apparent that, while the exact relationship between the feeling 
and the notion of the absurd is never quite clarified by Camus, it is the feeling of the 
absurd that grounds the notion, the feeling that has a chance of going further, the 
feeling that is less limited, and the feeling that is alive.  
 Such privileging of emotional over cognitive interpretations of the absurd is 
apparent again in The Rebel, where Camus insists that it is not callous logic or 
shallow resentment that motivate absurd rebellion, but genuine emotions, even love.  
In the act of rebellion as we have envisaged it up to now, an abstract ideal is 
not chosen through lack of feeling and in pursuit of a sterile demand. We 
insist that the part of man which cannot be reduced to mere ideas should be 
taken into consideration — the passionate side of his nature that serves no 
other purpose than to be part of the act of living… When Heathcliff, in 
Wuthering Heights, says that he puts his love above God and would willingly 
go to hell in order to be reunited with the woman he loves, he is prompted not 
only by youth and humiliation but by the consuming experience of a whole 
lifetime. The same emotion causes Eckart, in a surprising fit of heresy, to say 
that he prefers hell with Jesus to heaven without Him. This is the very essence 
of love. Contrary to Scheler, it would therefore be impossible to 
overemphasize the passionate affirmation that underlies the act of rebellion 
and distinguishes it from resentment. (1956b, 19)   




Understanding the absurd in emotional terms is really the only way to make sense of 
passages like these. It is also the most straight-forward way to interpret the analogy 
Camus draws in The Myth of Sisyphus between the absurd and Eurydice, Orpheus’ 
beloved, in which love and attention keep the absurd and the beloved alive. “Living is 
keeping the absurd alive. Keeping it alive is, above all, contemplating it. Unlike 
Eurydice, the absurd dies only when we turn away from it” (1955, 54).   
 Although Camus is often tempted to mythologize and to symbolize the absurd 
in ways that tempt us to imagine essential conflicts between human beings and the 
natural world, it is really the feeling of conflictedness to which those myths refer that 
interest Camus. In fact, understanding the absurd not as metaphysics but as emotion 
opens up interpretive avenues in one of the more problematic areas of Camus’ 
thought: the relationship between the absurd description of experience and the 
possibility of an absurd morality.    
Absurd Facts, Data, and Values 
Any interpretive approach to Camus’ philosophy of the absurd must strive to 
elucidate the meaning of absurdity. But any interpretive approach to the absurd must 
also seek to reconcile the descriptive with the normative accounts of the absurd, a 
difficult task since Camus’ absurd appears to shift from one to the other, from a fact 
to a value, especially between The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel (see Cruickshank 
1960; Hochberg 1965; Sagi 1994, 2002). Such a shift, especially when left 
unaccounted for, is clearly a cardinal sin of reasoning. The goal in this section of the 




exploration and interpretive solution to this problem as it relates to absurd morality in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
 John Cruickshank, Herbert Hochberg, and others have fairly criticized Camus 
for making a value out of what was, at first, a description of an unfortunate condition. 
Over-zealous supporters of Camus, on the other hand, tend to reply with specious 
reasoning to this criticism. In an attempt to save the philosophy, Camus’ advocates 
have suggested that the thesis of absurdity may be accompanied by unspoken a priori 
judgments. They claim, for instance, that honest recognition of the ‘fact’ of the absurd 
entails a normative orientation toward that fact, that if something is ‘true’, then it 
must be preserved as truth (see Duff and Marshall 1982; Golomb 1994; Sagi 1994).  
 These unconvincing proposals have been provoked by the difficulty critics 
face in harmonizing a prominent argument in The Myth of Sisyphus, that “everything 
is equivalent” (1955, 45), with the ethic of revolt and rebellion advocated as the 
primary ethical stance of the absurd person in both The Myth of Sisyphus and The 
Rebel. It is easy to see the tension between these two positions if we ask: Why should 
one rebel if all events, all things, and all values are equivalent? Don’t rebels need to 
believe in values, in better and worse, maybe even in best and worst, in order to 
motivate and justify their rebellion? And if the absurd is ‘true’, what does one rebel 
against? Should one rebel against the absurd or preserve the absurd as a truth? 
Germaine Brée directed even more difficult questions at Camus’ philosophy: 
“Against what exactly is mans’ revolt directed? Against death, or the limits imposed 
upon his reason, or the inscrutability of the cosmos? What is a revolt that ends in the 




  In response to her own difficult questions, Brée can only insist that “whether it 
be seen in man’s mortality, or in the irremediable incoherence of his experience and 
his drive for rational unity, or in the insignificance of his life and his passion for 
absolute values and meaning, Camus adopts one term [the absurd] to express all 
facets of the essential obstacle” (1964, 210). She claims that “Camus aimed at 
nothing less than to operate a radical transmutation of values, to elicit from the notion 
of the absurd a positive response to life instead of the negative one he discerned 
around him” (1964, 199). But of course, while her characterization of Camus’ work is 
not inaccurate, understanding the absurd as an ‘essential obstacle’, or as that which 
elicits a ‘positive response’ to life, does not offer much additional clarity.    
 The Sisyphus symbol is particularly perplexing because of its central 
importance in Camus’ thought and because Sisyphus is a confusing, changing hero, 
who does not “quite correspond to the general climate of Camus’ thought, even when 
Camus stretches the image by drawing on diverse aspects of the story and personality 
of Sisyphus” (Brée 1964, 206). Sisyphus, of course, is condemned to eternal, futile 
labor, but, for Camus, much of the absurdity of our condition seems bound up with 
our mortality. We are confused because Sisyphus seems to change from a mortal 
rebel against the gods to an immortal condamné. Sisyphus accepts his task, which is 
his punishment for rebellion against the gods, but it is not clear whether absurd 
rebellion is symbolized in his crime or in his acceptance of his punishment. In the 
end, Sisyphus finds contentment by struggling toward the summit, which is why 
Camus proclaims, “il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux,” “one must imagine Sisyphus 




summit? “The ethics peculiar to Camus’s four preceding heroes are derived from the 
assertion that there is no ‘upward’ path. But Sisyphus is now a moral hero, a stoic, 
convinced that, in spite of the gods, man’s dignity requires him to “struggle toward 
the summit” (1964, 208).  
 The four preceding heroes Brée refers to are Don Juan, the Actor, the 
Conqueror, and the Artist or Creator. Camus invokes these symbolic figures in The 
Myth of Sisyphus to express the absurd attitude toward life, the ethos or style of 
absurdity (1955, 68-118). These images, while imperfect and even regrettable in 
many ways, are not defenses of values or moral ideals in any traditional sense. They 
are absurd ‘styles’, reflecting, sometimes imperfectly, the absurd attitude or stance, a 
way of living, a “style of life worthy of a man” (Brée 1964, 209). As I will attempt to 
show in later chapters, this absurd stance is what makes the creation of values 
possible.    
 The guiding principle of these styles was defined by Camus as an ‘ethic of 
quantity’, although, as I hope to show in Chapters 7 and 8, the very notion of 
‘quantity’ must be revisited in order to understand Camus’ meaning. Donald Lazere 
offers an interpretation of the absurd ethical ‘style’ that has become quite common 
among contemporary critics: that the absurd denies the reality of transcendent values 
in order to place supreme importance on the value of individual life. For Lazere, 
Camus’ ethos of the “quantity of life” in The Myth of Sisyphus, which appears to 
advocate “not the best living but the most living” (Camus 1955, 61), coincides with 
an argument implicit in The Myth of Sisyphus, The Plague, The Rebel, and elsewhere: 




Lazere that absurdity recommends a kind of simple individualism. Lazere describes 
what he sees as Camus’ ethic thus: “Once we affirm every individual consciousness 
as an absolute value, we become bound to seek a social system that promotes 
maximal length, intensity, and freedom for each individual’s life. Hence we must 
oppose war, capital punishment, and any ideology that subordinates human flesh and 
blood to abstractions such as nationalism or bourgeois property” (1973, 138). 
 But such an ethic tends to strike us as overly simplistic, particularly in its 
opposition to issues that are not exactly moral paradoxes, such as war, premature 
death, or the sacrificing of human beings to nationalism and bourgeois property. 
Furthermore, it risks absolutizing individual life in such a way that, if ever faced with 
a more complex moral dilemma, might undermine the very causes it seeks to defend. 
If nothing were as valuable as a long and intense individual life, then there would be 
no grounds for social, political, or moral values, for there would be nothing to defend 
except oneself and nothing for which risking one’s own well-being would be 
worthwhile.  
 Avi Sagi’s attempt to resolve Camus’ apparent fact/value shift is more 
complex, but ultimately returns us to an unhelpful formulation of the absurd. Sagi 
recognizes that in order to make sense of absurdity, one must reconcile the two uses 
of the absurd; he proposes we think of them as “the absurd as datum and the absurd as 
concept” (Sagi 2002, 47). Sagi claims that the absurd, whether we know it or not, “is 
present in our lives without analyzing its meaning: it exists” (Sagi 2002, 47). He even 
goes so far as to claim that absurdity is “an essential aspect of human existence” (Sagi 




matter for thought, an object of knowledge, meaning that the absurd is an 
“undecoded, vague (implicit) datum” (2002, 47), that “rests on the structure of an 
absurd human existence” (1994, 281).  
 The term ‘datum’ can be a bit misleading in this case, because ‘datum’ 
suggests some correspondence with an objective reality or with something that we 
could, at least theoretically, verify. But Sagi intends to argue that Camus is best 
understood “when viewed through the prism of the ontology and epistemology of 
Husserl and Heidegger… although [Camus] disagrees with Husserl regarding several 
basic issues” (1994, 282). Sagi compares the absurd to the Heideggerain existenziel 
because “just as the existenziel is an ontological structure in human existence, so is 
the absurd” (2002, 48). “At the beginning of the process,” Sagi writes, “consciousness 
appears to be constituted by the sense of the absurd although, in truth, it is merely 
awakened by it. We are thus led to conclude that the revelation of the structure or the 
conception of the absurd is a process of explication which, according to Camus, is 
identical to the process of self-explication taking place within consciousness” (1994, 
281). As we explicate this primordial thing that is the absurd, although we can never 
fully explain it, says Sagi, we are elaborating a kind of self-knowledge.  
 Sagi declares this self-knowledge, then, to be the grounding for the normative 
aspect of the absurd because self-knowledge, according to his ontological-existential 
approach, is an “expression of a metaphysical concern” which is “ethical, in the sense 
of a return to concrete existence moulded by acquaintance with its foundations” 
(1994, 282). The idea is that ‘realizing’ the absurd leads to us a choice about whether 




meaning — reflecting the human readiness to explicitly actualize the ontological 
structure typical of dasein” (Sagi 1994, 283). This choice to accept the absurd, 
according to Sagi, while not precisely derived from an ethical system, is something 
that we ought to do in the name of transparence and truth.       
 I find this approach not only excessively abstruse, but misguided in its 
interpretation of Camus and his conclusions. The decision to ‘accept the absurd’ is 
taken by Sagi to be a reflection of the call of authenticity, coherence, transparence, 
and “the return to factuality… the authentic decision, the culmination of human 
existence” (Sagi 1994, 283). But these thinly-veiled values are given no explanation 
or justification, meaning they find no clear place in Camus’ absurd philosophy. What 
is worse, asserting that the recognition of the absurd ‘data’ of our existence leads us 
to absurd ‘values’ like authenticity and self-awareness fundamentally misrepresents 
Camus’ thought. In order to align his existential values with Camus’ thought, Sagi is 
forced to conclude that the goal of the philosopher of the absurd is to “accept the 
basic facts of existence” (1994, 283). Perhaps because of these conclusions, Sagi 
attributes to Camus’ absurd an ethic of amor fati (Sagi 1994, 283). These conclusions 
and attributions could hardly be more incorrect: not only did Camus call for absurd 
rebellion against realism and against absolute affirmations of fate, but he explicitly 
rejected Nietzsche’s amor fati, insisting that we not accept reality but re-create it, 
change it, and struggle with it.  
 On one hand, an ‘ontological-existential’ interpretation of the relationship 
between absurd data and absurd values leads us astray by exaggerating the degree to 




absurd is an evil, something only to be combated or defeated, errs in the opposite 
direction. Thomas Merton specifically argues against the idea of the absurd as truth, 
criticizing the notion that Camus “preached ‘the absurd’” (1981, 182). Rather, Merton 
believes, “[Camus] wants his reader to recognize ‘the absurd’ in order to resist it” 
(1981, 182). But Merton’s view is flawed because he neglects the valuable potential 
of the absurd and understands it, instead, as a sub-species of evil. The absurd, for him, 
is “simply one face of ‘the plague’ which we must resist in all its aspects,” while the 
plague refers to “the tyranny of evil and death, no matter what form it may take: the 
Nazi occupation of France, the death camps, the bourgeois hypocrisy of the French 
system… Stalinism, or the unprincipled opportunism of certain French Marxists” 
(1981, 182).  
 Faced with the fact/value problem, some critics have argued, with a hint of 
desperation, that Camus’ must have made his absurd intentionally inscrutable. 
Germaine Brée thought that “perhaps the ambiguity is deliberate, for the enemy is the 
absurd in all its forms and it must be mastered” (1964, 209). But, of course, it is not at 
all clear that the absurd should be described as ‘the enemy’ any more than it should 
be described as an ally, or as the truth. I will argue that the answer to this fact/value 
problem lies in ‘mastering’ absurdity in a different sense.  Because the absurd is itself 
ambivalent, it requires that we contain and maintain the tensions inherent to it in 
order not to be diminished or overwhelmed by it. This interpretation accords with 
Camus’ Fourth Letter to a German Friend, in which Camus argues that the absurd is 
the shared beginning of both the Nazis and the Resistance, and therefore, that what 




account, is not evil or truth, but the truth of the absurd is that our responses to it may 
lead us to evil. Unfortunately, neither Camus nor his critics have yet offered a 
convincing account of how one avoids those ‘evil’ responses or how one might arrive 
at ‘good’ moral and political responses to the absurd.  
 Jeffrey Isaac’s well-known Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion argues that 
the sense of absurdity is something shared by Camus and Arendt, something that 
signals “the exhaustion of the vital energies of modern culture” (1992, 93). Absurdity, 
itself, is the result of the twentieth century’s “monstrous disjuncture between human 
purpose and outcome that could only invite an intense feeling of unredeemable exile, 
a sense that the world was emptied of all meaning and that human living was 
pointless” (1992, 93). The basic problem that Camus and Arendt face is the modern 
rebel’s recognition that the foundations of ethical and political values are suspect and 
even dangerous, but that the rejection of all foundations and all values is intellectually 
and practically disastrous as well. Camus’ task, according to Isaac, is to find a way 
between absolutism and nihilism, to assert or discover a relative ethical and political 
stance that can withstand the pressures of both absolutism and nihilism.  
 Isaac’s book contends that Camus would endorse a basically democratic 
politics, a preference for intersubjective and dialogic communities, and a defense of 
ethical reflexivity. Although Isaac admits that Camus’ absurd fails to coalesce into a 
coherent social theory and is marked by a noticeable “lack of theoretical rigor” (1992, 
240), he finds Camus’ absurd to be “much like Arendt’s ‘human condition’” in that it 
reflects a “dissonance,” a “product of the human encounter with a world that is 




119-120). But, confronted with this silence, the supplicant/rebel does not withdraw 
and, somehow, this frustrating encounter with the world becomes a source of value. 
“Absurdity involves, then, not just the absence of an ultimate answer, but a question, 
as well as a questioner, whose inquiry attests to the value of human life and to the 
importance of the freedom to ask elusive questions and dream elusive dreams” (Isaac 
1992, 120). According to Isaac, the absurd itself attests to a value because values are 
what elude us in the absurd.       
 At times, Isaac seems to refuse to allow the full force of Camus’ absurd to 
come to light. For instance, he cites a well-known passage from The Myth of 
Sisyphus: “The absurd does not liberate; it binds. It does not authorize all actions… 
All systems of morality are based on the idea that an action has consequences that 
legitimize or cancel it. A mind imbued with the absurd merely judges that those 
consequences must be considered calmly” (Camus in Isaac 1992, 98-99). But the 
ellipsis here is Isaac’s, not mine, and the five sentences Isaac skips over are quite 
significant:  
…‘Everything is permitted’ does not mean that nothing is forbidden. The 
absurd merely confers an equivalence on the consequences of those actions. It 
does not recommend crime, for this would be childish, but it restores to 
remorse its futility. Likewise, if all experiences are indifferent, that of duty is 
as legitimate as any other. One can be virtuous through a whim… (Camus 
1955, 67)  
 
Passages like this one give us greater difficulty in deriving a political or ethical theory 
from Camus’ work. They demand a more complex and more subtle interpretation of 
Camus’ absurd theory, which, at times, insists that all experiences and all 




mean that one ought to be criminal any more than it means one ought to be moral, but 
many critics seem to wish to ignore this entire problem, to stop short of this radical 
component of the absurd, likely because any strictly philosophical approach to the 
absurd can not resolve the contradiction.  
 While Isaac draws many reasonable and illuminating conclusions about 
Camus’ politics, he avoids the problem of how to connect these particular conclusions 
to the philosophical concept of the absurd. My interpretation recommends that we 
understand the absurd as a ‘position’ of ambivalence that holds implications for 
values, a position which must be worked through and to which mature and creative 
resolutions must be attained in order to sustain the possibility of values which are, in 
a sense, unreal.  
 Fred Willhoite Jr.’s Beyond Nihilism: Albert Camus’ Contribution to Political 
Thought (1968) offers an interpretation of Camus’ work as ‘existential’, which causes 
confusion until one realizes that Willhoite means only that Camus’ work is personal 
and based on experience rather than derived from the set of philosophical 
propositions we have come to know as existentialism. Willhoite understands Camus’ 
absurdity to be “a wrenching and inescapable existential reality… [Camus’] way of 
expressing his inability to discern either a cosmic or a divine order of which man is a 
part and which makes human life ultimately coherent” (1968, 49). But in spite of 
Willhoite’s insistence that Camus is a personal thinker, Willhoite finds that the absurd 
has a “metaphysical basis” which consists in “the confrontation of Reason with the 




impossibility of communicating with what Camus calls ‘the sacred’, is seen to be 
pivotal in turning Camus toward communication and communion with others.  
 This notion becomes, for Willhoite, the central good in Camus’ political 
theory. Willhoite defines Camus’ moral and political good as “dialogic communion,” 
which Willhoite draws from Martin Buber’s notion of dialogue and his distinction 
between I-Thou and I-it relationships (Willhoite 1968, 64-69). “Dialogic communion” 
is a slightly vague norm in which communication, comprehension, and dialogue are 
valued over their opposites: directives, monologues, and deafness. The appropriate 
attitude of the absurd person is that of the “genuinely free dialogic attitude that exalts 
and enhances life” as opposed to the “monological hardness and fanaticism that leads 
to death” (Willhoite 1968, 66). But, perhaps like Lazere, at this point in his analysis, 
Willhoite risks emptying the absurd morality of any real content. If the absurd merely 
values ‘life’ against ‘death’, it probably will not help us address complex moral 
problems. Nevertheless, although Willhoite’s absurd moral theory remains a bit 
vague, his idea of dialogic communion and his provocative argument that a fitting 
example of absurd revolt would be the American civil rights movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s are ones I will revisit in the conclusion of this volume.  
 This volume argues that the link between the descriptive and the normative 
aspects of absurdity is apparent when we resist those tempting defenses that prevent 
us from perceiving, confronting, and managing the complex and contradictory 
emotions of the absurd. My interpretation of Camus’ argument is that the 




political understanding, communication, or action can occur. I treat this formulation 
of absurd morality and politics extensively in Chapters 8 and 9.  
The interpretation of the philosophy of the absurd I offer in the following 
chapters permits us to discuss absurdity in emotional terms, rather than in terms of 
cosmic conflicts or metaphysical differences. As Camus’ philosophy of the absurd is 
about confronting our conflicted experience “without appeal” to abstractions (1955, 
60), it is hoped that removing unnecessary speculative and philosophical complexities 
from the absurd will allow it to find its real voice and power. To this end, the 
following chapter introduces the concept of ambivalence in psychoanalytic and social 
scientific contexts in order to more firmly ground the interpretation of the absurd on 








Chapter 4: The Concept of Ambivalence   
Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast!  
— Goethe, Faust 
 
Over the past thirty years, increasing numbers of researchers in political and social 
scientific fields have argued that uni-valent, one-dimensional models of human 
attitudes are inadequate to describe the complexity of experience. Social 
psychological assessments and investigations of ambivalence have been applied to a 
wide range of topics, from parenthood to race relations, from the selection of 
presidential candidates to attitudes about abortion and the death penalty. For over a 
century, psychoanalysts have argued that ambivalence, in various shapes and guises, 
is at the heart of psychological life. It might even be argued that ambivalence 
(although not always going by that name) has been treated as a central aspect of the 
human condition since Goethe, Pascal, Montaigne, Shakespeare, even in classical 
Greek tragedy and the wisdom books of the Tanakh.  
 This dissertation argues that a fruitful analogy may be drawn between the 
philosophy of the absurd and the concept of ambivalence. It is important to clarify, 
however, that I do not wish to reduce either Camus’ work or the idea of absurdity to 
any of the more traditional psychoanalytic categories of ambivalence, e.g., 
ambivalence about mothers, ambivalence resulting from the Oedipus conflict, or 
ambivalent sexual or destructive drives. Instead, I seek to use our understanding of 
the dynamics of ambivalence, an understanding that has been informed by 
psychoanalytic and social scientific study, to explore what I find to be very similar 




I use ambivalence as an analogy to explicate the absurd, primarily by applying the 
mechanics of ambivalence, if you will, to the emotional material of the absurd. In 
Chapter 5, I apply these mechanics to the absurd directly, by attempting to understand 
Camus’ thought as an expression of ambivalent desires related to the loss and 
preservation of the self. In Chapter 6, I argue that linking absurdity and ambivalence 
is especially helpful in making sense of one of Camus’ best-known yet still 
controversial works, The Stranger. In Chapters 7 and 8, I argue that the concept of 
ambivalence permits us to give meaning to the famous but ambiguous concept of 
absurd rebellion, as presented primarily in The Rebel. But before any of this is 
possible, it is necessary to introduce the concept of ambivalence, which is the goal of 
this chapter.   
 While the psychoanalytic understanding of the term ‘ambivalence’ still guides 
contemporary usage, a number of recent studies and applications of the concept have 
dislodged it from a purely psychoanalytic context. For instance, the philosopher 
Philip Koch uses the term ‘ambivalence’ to refer to all kinds of “conflicted feelings” 
(1987, 258n). Likewise, Ihor Zielyk’s taxonomy of ambiguity and ambivalence 
defines ambivalence as “the taking of a mixed stance toward a social object or 
category of objects” (1966, 57). Steve Harrist, in his interesting phenomenological 
investigation of ambivalence, takes ambivalence “in the broadest sense,” meaning 
simply “attraction and/or aversion… so as not to prematurely restrict the horizon of 
inquiry” (2006, 87). Harrist construes ambivalence as “both sides are strong” or “both 
sides have their own worth” (2006, 91) and his interviews begin with the simple 




 A psychodynamically-informed but nevertheless broad definition of 
ambivalence as conflicting emotions serves us best in attempting to clarify the 
meaning of the absurd. Such a definition respects the etymology of the term as dual 
(ambi) emotional forces (valences) while distinguishing it from ‘ambiguity’, which 
denotes indeterminacy or uncertainty. It also follows standard usage: “A duality of 
opposed emotions, attitudes, thoughts or motivations, which a person simultaneously 
holds towards a person or object, is the centerpiece of the standard psychoanalytically 
shaped definition of ambivalence” (Oxford English Dictionary 1989). More 
importantly, this definition permits us to make use of the psychodynamically-
informed understanding of ‘ambivalence’ as it was established by Eugen Bleuler and 
Sigmund Freud in the early 1900s and later developed by Melanie Klein and others. 
In this chapter, I will briefly review these approaches to ambivalence, along with the 
role of ambivalence in the study of borderline personality disorder and even its 
integration into sociological and political research, in order to lay a foundation for the 
analogy with the absurd that follows.     
Eugen Bleuler 
Eugen Bleuler, a contemporary of Freud, used the term ‘ambivalence’ in his The 
Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism (first published in 1910), but it is his Dementia 
Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias (completed in 1908 but not published until 
1911) that is widely credited as the first comprehensive psychoanalytic investigation 
of ambivalence (Graubert and Miller 1957, 458; Harrist 2006, 87; Lorenz-Meyer 
2001, 3-4). In both of these works, Bleuler defined ambivalence as the simultaneous 




ambivalence to be present in ‘healthy’ and ‘normal’ individuals as well as in those 
whom he diagnosed with dementia praecox, or precocious dementia, otherwise 
known as schizophrenia.  
 While Bleuler is regarded as the founder of the concept of ambivalence, his 
approach may have been rooted in a reading of Freud’s Three Contributions to the 
Theory of Sex. After reading Freud’s thesis of the ‘contrasting pairs’ at the heart of 
sexual perversions (discussed briefly below), Bleuler apparently wrote an energetic 
letter to Freud to tell him of his epiphany that “our entire life is regulated by an 
interplay of contrasting forces. We find this in the chemical, as well as the nervous 
and psychic areas” (Bleuler in Makari 2008, 208). But Bleuler’s now rarely-read texts 
are illuminating because he treats ambivalence more explicitly than Freud does in his 
early work.  
 Bleuler characterizes ambivalence as both a universal and potentially 
pathological phenomenon.  
Even for the healthy everything has its two sides. The rose has its thorns. But 
in ninety-nine out of a hundred instances, the normal person compares the two 
aspects, subtracts the negative from the positive values. He appreciates the 
rose despite its thorns. The schizophrenic, with his weakened associative 
linkings does not necessarily bring the different aspects of a problem together. 
He loves the rose because of its beauty and hates it because of its thorns. Thus 
many simple as well as complicated concepts and, above all, many complexes 
have for him both affective signs, the plus and the minus, which appear side 
by side, or alternatingly, one after the other. Certainly even under normal 
conditions, synthesis may be omitted. The healthy, too, feels something like 
‘two souls in his breast’; and he, too, would be less inclined to speak so much 
of sin if it did not also have some pleasant connotations. (1950, 374-375) 
 
While ambivalence, for Bleuler, is universal, what distinguishes the ‘healthy’ 




ambivalent aspects of an object together and to experience it in both its positive and 
negative aspects. The presence of excessive or unresolved ambivalence therefore 
evinced an inability to reconcile or neutralize opposing feelings.  
 In Dementia Praecox, Bleuler classified ambivalence as one of four 
fundamental diagnostic characteristics of schizophrenia, along with “inappropriate 
affect,” “loosening of associations,” and “autism.”  He understood ambivalence as an 
“association disturbance” which resulted in “the tendency of the schizophrenic psyche 
to endow the most diverse psychisms with both a positive and a negative indicator, at 
one and the same time” (1950, 53). At the root of the diagnostic criterion Bleuler 
established, ambivalence was not the sole issue; rather, ambivalence combined with 
an association disturbance to prevent the individual from recognizing, holding, or 
otherwise integrating contradictory feelings or forces.  
 The difference between ambivalence among ‘healthy’ individuals and ‘sick’ 
ones, therefore, is not precisely the presence of ambivalence, but rather the ability to 
hold it together, to sustain a consistent view of an object in spite of its ambivalent 
appraisals. Whereas the ‘healthy’ individual will come to accept his or her 
ambivalence as a mixed stance toward an object, the schizophrenic in Bleuler’s 
theory is forced either to oscillate between all-good and all-bad impressions, or to 
split the object in two, one loved and one hated. Of this difference between the 
‘normal’ and the ‘abnormal’ experiences of ambivalence, Bleuler explains that “in the 
case of an idea which arouses both negative and positive feelings, the difference is 
not always sharply appreciated even in health, or otherwise expressed, when a normal 




account of another, the result is not an entirely unitary feeling tone, either the 
positive, or the negative outweighing at times. The ultimate conclusions are not 
necessarily drawn by the split psyche of the schizophrenic. The mentally sick wife 
loves her husband on account of his good qualities and hates him at the same time on 
account of his bad ones, and her attitude towards each side is as though the other did 
not exist” (1912, 31-32).   
 Ambivalence, for Bleuler, was not merely sexual, nor was it purely a 
conflicting emotional appraisal of an object. Rather, Bleuler outlined three basic types 
of ambivalence, each of which he tried to give equal independence and weight: 
affective ambivalence, ambivalence of the will or ambi-tendenz, and intellectual 
ambivalence (1950, 53-55; 1912, 31). In the Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism, 
Bleuler summarized these various expressions of ambivalence concisely: “to 
accompany identical ideas or concepts at the same time with positive as well as 
negative feelings (affective ambivalence), to will and not to will at the same time the 
identical actions (ambivalence of the will) and to think the same thoughts at once 
negatively and positively (intellectual ambivalence)” (1912, 31).  
 But while he maintained a degree of distinction between these categories, 
Bleuler knew that they were, in fact, highly interdependent. “These three forms of 
ambivalence,” he wrote, “are not easily distinguished from one another… Affectivity 
and will are merely different facets of the same function; even the intellectual 
contradictions often cannot be separated from the affective. A mixture of 
megalomania with delusions of persecution and inferiority may result from wishes 




powerful and at the same time powerless; the beloved or the protector becomes just as 
easily the persecutor without surrendering his previous role” (1950, 54). For Bleuler, 
individuals expressed ambivalence not only in affective terms, but in ambivalent 
thoughts, ambivalent beliefs, and ambivalent actions.  
 Bleuler quotes a patient, whom he describes as a “philosophically educated 
catatonic,” who describes his experience of intellectual ambivalence: “When one 
expresses a thought, one always sees the counter-thought. This intensifies itself and 
becomes so rapid that one doesn’t really know which was the first” (Bleuler 1950, 
54). This is a rather lucid expression of the experience of ambivalence which most of 
Bleuler’s patients do not articulate. In fact, Bleuler observes that many of his patients 
are unable even to note the contradictions in their thoughts, feelings, or actions. 
Suspecting that one of his patients is hearing voices, Bleuler asks him, “Do you hear 
voices?,” which the patient denies. Bleuler then asks, “What do they say to you?,” to 
which the patient replies, “Oh, all sorts of things” (1950, 54). Bleuler even finds 
marked unconscious and unrecognized ambivalence in the delusions of his patients, 
as in the example of a “Catholic paranoid patient… [who]… claimed to be persecuted 
by the Pope who nevertheless wanted to shower the patient with millions of dollars” 
(1950, 54).  
 But we should not see in these examples anything categorically distinct from 
the ambivalence that the ‘healthy’ person feels. Bleuler wishes to remind us that, 
while certain expressions of, defenses against, and responses to ambivalence may be 
taken as a diagnostic sign of schizophrenia, no one is exempt from ambivalence or 




in ordinary life. Just as his patient tries to escape a locked ward moments after telling 
him (with what appears to be sincerity) that he has no further interest in escaping, 
when Bleuler enters a large store, he confesses that “I wish to get something at a 
particular counter; I carefully determine the one I do not wish to go to, but then it is 
that very one to which I go” (1950, 375).  
 While Bleuler defined and applied ‘ambivalence’ broadly, to refer to any 
number of conflicting ideas, emotions, beliefs, affects, and volitions, Freud would 
narrow its reference but afford it an even greater significance. And while both men 
would recognize ambivalence in everyday life, Bleuler emphasized its presence in 
schizophrenic patients, while Freud would emphasize its role in neurotic individuals 
and groups. While it is not incorrect to say that Freud’s operating definition of 
ambivalence was “the co-existence of [love and hate] simultaneously directed 
towards the same object” (Freud in Graubert and Miller 1957, 460), such a definition 
understates and over-specifies the profound ambivalences and conflicts that inform 
almost all of Freud’s thought: ambivalences not only about love and hate, but about 
pleasure and pain, survival and the self, life and death. Indeed, just as Freud would 
modify his metapsychological theory and his vision of the content and composition of 
instincts, his thought on the etiology and development of ambivalence would change 
throughout his life.  
Sigmund Freud 
While it would be impossible to entertain a complete discussion of Freud’s thought 
on ambivalence, it is useful to briefly review Freud’s use of the term and to show that 




neurosis and repression. Freud’s use of the concept of ambivalence is commonly 
traced to his A Phobia in a Five-Year Old Boy (1909), better known as the case of 
Little Hans, although ambivalence plays a role in earlier works like The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex (1905), 
and even in his and Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria (1895), where Freud saw the origin 
of psychoneurotic symptoms in the repression of traumatic “incompatible ideas” 
(Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 27, 33).  
 Freud’s purpose in The Interpretation of Dreams was to “elucidate the 
processes to which the strangeness and obscurity of dreams are due and to deduce 
from those processes the nature of the psychical forces by whose concurrent or 
mutually opposing action dreams are generated” (Freud in Abel 1989, 39). In the 
short section rather fittingly devoted to “Absurd Dreams,” Freud argues that dreams 
regularly reflect emotional conflict and that dreams of a dead loved one, for instance, 
are marked by an “especially profound ambivalence of feeling which controls the 
relation of the dreamer to the dead person” (1900, 295-296). Freud notes that it is 
common in such dreams for the deceased person to alternate, as it were, between 
being dead and alive; and he interprets this as a fantasized indifference. “This 
indifference, of course, is not real, but wished; its purpose is to help the dreamer to 
deny his very intense and often contradictory emotional attitudes, and so it becomes 
the dream-representation of his ambivalence” (1900, 296, emphasis in original). Here, 
dreamed indifference protects against ambivalent feelings, feelings that are especially 




many of these ideas and relate them to identification, melancholy, and mania in his 
Mourning and Melancholia (1917, 250-251, 256-258).  
 In his Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, Freud finds that “certain 
perverted tendencies regularly appear in contrasting pairs” that reflect unresolved 
ambivalences and polarities of pre-genital phases (1938, 571). For instance, the anal-
sadistic phase is governed by a highly-charged polarity of activity and passivity, 
which, Freud suggests, mirrors the ambivalent nature of sadism and contains many of 
the “contrasts which run through the whole sexual life” (1938, 598). This polarity 
between activity and passivity was one of three basic ambivalences (also subject vs. 
object and pleasure vs. pain) that composed basic axes of conflict between desires and 
the choice and cathexis of objects in his early work (see Graubert and Miller 1957, 
460). The presence of these pairs of conflicting desires, Freud notes later, was 
“happily designated by Bleuler by the term ambivalence” (1938, 598).  
 In Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (1909), otherwise known as 
his study of the Rat Man, Freud relies heavily on the concept of ambivalence to 
explain the patient’s behavior and treatment. One cannot do much better in this case 
than to quote Freud at length: 
The chronic coexistence of love and hatred, both directed toward the same 
person and both of the highest degree of intensity, cannot fail to astonish us. 
We should have expected that the passionate love would long ago have 
conquered that hatred or been devoured by it. And in fact such a protracted 
survival of two opposites is only possible under quite peculiar psychological 
conditions and with the cooperation of the state of affairs in the unconscious. 
The love has not succeeded in extinguishing the hatred but only in driving it 
down into the unconscious; and in the unconscious the hatred, safe from the 
danger of being destroyed by the operations of consciousness, is able to 
persist and even to grow. In such circumstances the conscious love attains as a 
rule, by way of reaction, an especially high degree of intensity, so as to be 




The necessary condition for the occurrence of such a strange state of affairs in 
a person’s erotic life appears to be that at a very early age… the two opposites 
should have been split apart and one of them, usually the hatred, have been 
repressed. (1963, 73)   
 
In this case, Freud is arguing that a basic ambivalence between love and hatred, along 
with a repression of the hatred (rather than a resolution or ‘conquest’ of the hatred), 
have set the course of neurosis. “We shall find it impossible,” Freud writes, “to 
escape the impression that a relation between love and hatred such as we have found 
in our present patient is among the most frequent, the most marked, and probably, 
therefore, the most important characteristics of the obsessional neurosis” (1963, 74).  
 For Freud, ambivalence is at the root of neurosis but it is not exactly its 
efficient cause. Rather, ambivalence, which is universal, is exaggerated and 
exacerbated to different degrees by different individual reactions to it. In neurosis, the 
presence of intense feelings of both love and hatred spark repression, in which the 
hatred is merely ‘driven down into the unconscious’ where it survives and persists 
alongside conscious love. Neurotic symptoms, then, may be understood as attempts to 
cope with ambivalence “while effectively preserving it and restraining behaviour” 
(Lorenz-Meyer 2001, 4). Later, in The Dynamics of Transference (1912) and in The 
Unconscious (1915), Freud would depict the unconscious as a ‘reservoir’, a ‘seething 
cauldron’ for those intolerably intense or persistent ambivalences which must be held 
down by the organized personality (see Giovacchini 1982, 12)  
   While hatred remains in the unconscious, defensively intense conscious 
feelings of love must counteract them, contributing to a greater ambivalent conflict 




opposite compose part of Freud’s concept of reaction-formation, elaborated in his 
later Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1925). With the cooperation of the 
unconscious, ambivalence can therefore divide ambivalent feelings, paralyze the will, 
or displace ambivalent conflict over any number of everyday matters. The compulsive 
individual, for instance, repeats his protective measures in order to compensate for the 
growing doubts he has displaced from his ambivalent love and hatred onto his 
memory, his observations, his intentions, and even the reliability of others or the 
physical world (Freud 1963, 74-77).  
   Indeed, Freud finds the root of the Rat Man’s neurosis to be his repression of 
and reactions to his ambivalent emotions, resulting in three dis-integrated 
personalities: an unconscious personality full of passionate and evil impulses, a 
cheerful and sensible personality that functioned well with others, and a personality 
that consisted mainly of reaction-formations against the unconscious, full of 
spiritualism and asceticism (Freud 1963, 80-81). This personality dis-integration, like 
neurotic symptoms, preserves the unconscious repression of the ambivalence which 
gave it rise. 
 In his (1909) Analysis of a Phobia of a Five Year Old Boy, Freud famously 
attributed Little Hans’ emotional difficulties to ambivalence rooted in the Oedipus 
conflict. Freud argues that “Hans really was a little Oedipus who wanted to have his 
father ‘out of the way’, to get rid of him, so that he might be alone with his beautiful 
mother and sleep with her” (1909, 111). The wish that his father ‘be away’ becomes a 
wish that his father “be permanently away – that he should be dead… And Hans 




while his intellect demurred to such a contradiction, he could not help demonstrating 
the fact of its existence, by hitting the father and immediately afterwards kissing the 
place he had hit” (1909, 112). Hans’ identification with the father, which expresses 
love and admiration as well as the urge to take his place with respect to the mother, is 
in Freud’s later words “ambivalent from the very first” (1959, 47). And, of course, for 
Freud, the Oedipus conflict itself was that “nucleus of desire, repression and sexual 
identity” which leaves in its wake “a lifelong ambivalence towards the keeping and 
breaking of taboos and laws” (Wright 1998, 14).  
 In Repression (1915) and in his Introductory Lectures (1916-1917), Freud 
describes the incomplete or ineffective neutralization of ambivalence which permits 
the child (or neurotic patient) to ignore ambivalences that would otherwise generate 
conflict in the adult because of the development of the adult personality and a greater 
unification of the ego (Graubert and Miller 1957, 460-461). The conflicts implicit in 
the Oedipus situation involve “contrary — or, as it is better to say, ‘ambivalent’ — 
emotional attitudes” which are not neutralized in childhood and which are 
ineffectively neutralized in neurosis because, in both of these cases, ambivalent 
attitudes remain along with their contradictory emotions in the unconscious (Freud 
1966, 412-413). That is, the conflicts implicit in the Oedipus situation may take on a 
pathological character if they are inadequately resolved. In fact, the persistence of 
unreconciled ambivalent attitudes is apparent not only in children and neurotic 
individuals but, Freud would speculate later, in so-called ‘primitive societies’ and in 
groups (see Freud 1959, 15-16n; Graubert and Miller 1957, 459). Indeed, these 




of the Ego (1921), where he compares Oedipus dynamics to the processes of 
identification and idealization of group leaders (see Freud 1959, 43-46; Freud 1961b, 
30). The “primordial ambivalence” at the root of Freud’s concept of guilt in 
Civilization and its Discontents (1930) is also an ambivalence of this kind, an 
ambivalence about the killing of the primal father that symbolizes the conflicts at the 
root of collective life (1961, 94-95).      
 But before both Group Psychology and Civilization and its Discontents, Freud 
had applied the concept of ambivalence to ideas of social and moral development in 
Totem and Taboo (1913). Here, Freud argues that “the basis of taboo is a forbidden 
action for which there exists a strong inclination in the unconscious” (1938, 832). 
Drawing analogies between taboo prohibitions and neurotic symptoms, both of which 
reflect distressing ambivalences about the demands of collective existence, Freud 
argues that like neurosis, “taboo has grown out of the soil of an ambivalent emotional 
attitude” (1938, 855).  
 Taboo restrictions are most remarkable in areas of life that are central to 
collective existence (like religious or political authority, marriage, intercourse, 
childbirth, and death). Freud claims that these areas of life also reflect the most 
profound ambivalences among group members who must negate powerful but 
frightening desires, maintain severe renunciations, and manage persistent anxiety 
about the tensions between these forces. “The persistence of taboo,” says Freud, 
“teaches that the original pleasure to do the forbidden still continues.”  Individuals 
therefore “assume an ambivalent attitude toward their taboo prohibitions; in their 




also afraid to do it; they are afraid just because they would like to transgress, and the 
fear is stronger than the pleasure. But in every individual… the desire for it is 
unconscious, just as in the neurotic” (1938, 831).  
 The central psychic characteristic of the taboo society is the “ambivalent 
behavior of the individual to the object, or rather to an action regarding it” (Freud 
1938, 830). As in neurosis, the division between conscious and unconscious desire is 
the key to persistent ambivalence and to the taboo reaction against it. The individual 
longs to act in a way that is forbidden; indeed, “he sees in it the highest pleasure, but 
he may not carry it out, and he even abominates it. The opposition between these two 
streams cannot be easily adjusted because — there is no other way to express it — 
they are so localized in the psychic life that they cannot meet. The prohibition 
becomes fully conscious, while the surviving pleasure of touching remains 
unconscious, the person knowing nothing about it. If this psychological factor did not 
exist the ambivalence could neither maintain itself so long nor lead to such 
subsequent manifestations” (Freud 1938, 830).   
  Freud argues that the vehemence with which taboos are punished reflects not 
just a criminal sanction, but a defense against ambivalence toward the taboo object. 
Therefore, taboo offenders, either those who have committed taboo crimes or those 
who have come into exceptional circumstances that give rise to ambivalent emotions, 
threaten the group with ambivalence, so to speak, and are treated like carriers of a 
deadly contagion or epidemic (Freud 1938, 824). “Persons or things which are 
regarded as taboo may be compared to objects charged with electricity; they are the 




with destructive effect if the organisms which provoke its discharge are too weak to 
resist it” (Thomas in Freud 1938, 823).   
 Like the neurotic who has a délire de toucher, a phobia of touching anything 
unclean, prohibited, or otherwise ‘impossible’, the group punishes, exiles, or cleanses 
itself of taboo through elaborate expiations. Thus, Freud concludes that the danger 
that the taboo person presents to the group must be the danger of imitation, the 
possibility that the taboo person will discharge, as it were, his ambivalence onto 
others and unsettle their renunciations. The taboo person is punished precisely 
because of his “propensity to arouse the ambivalence of man and to tempt him to 
violate the [taboo] prohibition” (Freud 1938, 832). This understanding of 
ambivalence grounds my interpretation of The Stranger in Chapter 6, where I will 
argue that the relationship between Meursault and the absurd may be understood if 
we recognize and define Meursault’s taboo as one that activates a repressed 
ambivalence about freedom and autonomy and one that demands, therefore, a special 
kind of punishment.  
 Throughout his various treatments of ambivalence, Freud is clear that conflict 
is a part of normal psychic life, not just that of taboo societies or individuals suffering 
from neurosis. And although we are not always consciously aware of our 
ambivalence (indeed, because we are not), we should not forget that “the emotional 
life of man is in general made up of pairs of contraries… Indeed, if it were not so, 
repressions and neuroses would perhaps never come about” (Freud 1909, 113). Freud 
even footnotes his observations on ambivalence with two lines of poetry from C.F. 




element of the human condition: “In fact, I am no clever work of fiction; / I am a 
man, with all his contradiction” (Freud 1909, 113n). It is at least partly because Freud 
viewed the human experience as one of ambivalence, one in which our mental life is 
“perpetually agitated by conflicts which we have to settle” (Freud in Abel 1989, 39), 
that he often insisted that there was no clear line between neurosis and normality, that 
“an unbroken chain bridges the gap between the neuroses in all their manifestations 
and normality… We are all to some extent hysterics” (Abel 1989, xv).  
 Freud would fundamentally reconsider his instinctual and metapsychological 
theories in later works like On Narcissism (1914), which spelled the beginning of the 
end for his theory of the sexual- and ego-instincts, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920), which led him to posit the life and death drives, and in The Ego and the Id 
(1923), where Freud revised and expanded his theory of psychic structure. In later 
works, the primary ambivalences are considered to be the result of the contrast 
between Eros and Thanatos, the drives toward life and death, rather than as polarities 
within and between drives. In Freud’s later vision, life itself is “a compromise of the 
two drives, a phase between the initiation of life and its end” (Graubert and Miller 
1957, 461-462), and ambivalence is a kind of incomplete compromise. But even of 
this significant modification to his theory Freud writes that “our views have from the 
first been dualistic, and to-day they are even more definitely dualistic than before — 
now that we describe the opposition as being, not between ego-instincts and sexual 
instincts but between life instincts and death instincts” (Freud in Abel, 41-42, Freud’s 




 Thus, regardless of the instincts, drives, or structures in conflict, Freud’s 
understanding of psychological experience was always informed by the premise of 
basic ambivalences and contrasts. And what is of particular interest to us about 
Freud’s approach to ambivalence is perhaps not even the specific content of 
ambivalences as he saw them, but the psychological significance of their enduring 
tension and the intense pressure experienced by individuals and groups to react to, 
resolve, or repress them. When faced with dangerously ambivalent feelings, the 
Freudian self is at a sort of cross-roads: either aspects of that ambivalence are 
repressed, split-off, and driven into the unconscious where they persist, or the 
ambivalent feelings are (perhaps adequately, but never completely) resolved through 
integration into the mature personality.  
Melanie Klein 
Melanie Klein, by her own accounts a Freudian, but whose work diverged from 
Freud’s in several ways (see Alford 1989, 23-26; Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 120-
121; Minsky 1998, 33), posited basic ambivalences at the heart of the psychological 
life of the child. Setting aside metapsychological differences in the origin and 
direction of drives and the nature and significance of internal and external objects, the 
central place that Klein affords to ambivalence and reactions to it are, for our 
purposes, the more significant continuity with Freud’s work. For Klein, “the central 
conflict in human experience… is between love and hate, between the caring 
preservation and the malicious destruction of others” (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 




understanding of ambivalence, anxiety, and integration, but one of the defensive 
reactions to ambivalence that her work emphasized: splitting.  
 One of Klein’s earliest uses of the term ‘ambivalence’ comes in her 1921 
paper, “The Development of a Child,” in a discussion of Fritz’s wishes and beliefs 
about his parents’ omnipotence and omniscience. Working out the limits of his own 
power and abilities as well, Fritz occasionally admits his own ignorance and 
frequently inquires whether his father is ignorant, too. Klein writes that this “clearly 
shows an ambivalent attitude,” for “while the answer that papa and mamma too do 
not know something seems at time to content him, at other times he dislikes this 
knowledge and tries to modify it by proofs to the contrary” (Klein 1975, 15). Fritz’s 
ambivalent attitude is related to his estimation of his parents’ power and, therefore, to 
his power and his relation to them in the dynamics of the family. Klein explains: 
[Fritz] once told his mother that he had caught a fly and added, ‘I have learnt 
to catch flies.’  She enquired how he had learned to do this? ‘I had tried to 
catch one and managed it and now I know how.’  As he immediately 
afterwards inquired whether she had learnt ‘ to be a mamma’ I think I am not 
mistaken in considering that — perhaps not quite consciously — he was 
making fun of her. This ambivalent attitude — explained by the fact that the 
child puts himself in the place of the powerful father (which he hopes to 
occupy at some time), identifies himself with him but yet on the other hand 
would fain also do away with the power that restricts his ego — is certainly 
also responsible for this behavior in reference to the omniscience of the 
parents. (1975, 16)  
 
Here, the concept of ambivalence invoked in reference to the limitations of Fritz’s 
power (Klein refers to his ‘reality-sense’ and his ‘omnipotence-feeling’) relates to 
Oedipal ambivalence and the conflicts he feels about the possibility of destroying his 




 But for Klein, ambivalence is present even before Oedipal issues arise. One 
might say that, for Klein, we are ambivalent at birth, experiencing almost 
immediately a conflict between life and death instincts (see Segal 1964, 12-13). Even 
before children face Oedipal desires and restrictions (and they face them earlier for 
Klein than for Freud), Klein thinks ambivalence confronts infants who fear not 
reprisals from fathers, but the consequences of aggression and the projections of their 
own anger and rage. Basic ambivalences exist, even at a very young age, between 
experiences of comfort and frustration, between feelings of love and gratitude and 
feelings of envy, anger, and fear. The contrasts between the infant’s fantasies and 
feelings compose “an instinctive emotional ambivalence towards the mother” which 
plunges him or her into “a desperate conflict between alternating emotions of love 
and hate which cause acute anxiety” (Minsky 1998, 33).  
 Klein finds that the earliest and most radical solution to the presence of 
ambivalent feelings is to split the world, the parent, the breast, and even the self into 
two categories, absolutely good and absolutely bad. The goal of splitting is “to keep 
persecutory and ideal objects as far as possible from one another, while keeping both 
of them under control” (Segal 1964, 13-14). Splitting is a reaction to ambivalence in 
the sense that it seeks to prevent conflicting feelings from coming into contact with 
each other, so that the bad does not destroy the good. Thus, bad and good are 
separated and exaggerated, making both poles increasingly extreme. “It is 
characteristic of the emotions of the very young infant that they are of an extreme and 




good breast tends to turn into the ‘ideal’ breast which should fulfill the greedy desire 
for unlimited, immediate, and everlasting gratification” (Klein 1975b, 64).  
 The splitting ‘solution’ to early ambivalence is the ground of what Klein calls 
the paranoid-schizoid position; ‘paranoid’ because it involves a fear of persecution by 
‘bad’ things, and ‘schizoid’ because the world and the infant now exist in split pairs. 
Paranoid-schizoid defenses are accomplished through rather complex processes of 
projection, introjection, and identification which are not necessary to review fully 
here. But there are two crucial points about this position we should observe. First, 
Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position and the later depressive position are not strictly 
analogous to developmental phases which are passed through and overcome in due 
course. The characteristic problems and processes of these positions may reappear 
well into adulthood, and not only for individuals suffering from mental illness (see 
Segal 1964, xii-xiii; Minsky 1998, 33-34). A second and related point is that in the 
struggle to contend with ambivalent experience in both a loving and an anxiety-ridden 
environment, splitting is, at first, a necessary defense for the developing child. 
Splitting, like ambivalence itself, may serve first as a healthy protection against 
overwhelming threats to the self. But, if severe splitting continues, it becomes a 
regressive defense that precludes further development.  
 Originally, ambivalence handled through splitting allows the child to begin to 
develop relationships with imaginary ‘good’ objects. “Ambivalence,” Klein writes, 
“carried out in a splitting of the imagos, enables the young child to gain more trust 
and belief in its real objects and thus in its internalized ones — to love them more and 




At the same time the paranoid anxieties and defences are directed towards the ‘bad’ 
objects” (1975, 350). 
 And yet, those objects which the child has split apart and endowed with good 
and bad properties must be eventually reconciled in the on-going search for balance 
between super-ego, id, and reality (Klein 1975, 205). With each successive encounter 
with loved people and a fulfilling environment, with each split and each renewed 
attempt to synthesize the good and the bad, Klein argues that the extremity of the 
imaginary objects decreases. “Each step in the unification leads again to a renewed 
splitting of the imagos. But as the adaptation to the external world increases, this 
splitting is carried out on planes which gradually become increasingly nearer and 
nearer to reality” (1975, 350).  
 An increasing ability to tolerate ambivalent emotions, therefore, depends upon 
a succession of pleasant or at least adequately reassuring experiences in reality. 
“Through being loved and through the enjoyment and comfort [the child] has in 
relation to people his confidence in his own as well as in other people’s goodness 
becomes strengthened, his hope that his ‘good’ objects and his own ego can be saved 
and preserved increases, at the same time as his ambivalence and acute fears of 
internal destruction diminish” (Klein 1975, 347). It is only after a certain security has 
been attained that ambivalence, which, itself, is “partly a safeguard against one’s own 
hate and against the hated and terrifying objects,” may gradually decrease (Klein 
1975, 350).  
 If the tolerance and integration of ambivalence fails, then the persistence of 




greater ambivalence, psychic conflict, anxiety, and defective relations to reality 
(Klein 1975, 204-205). In her 1929 paper, “Personification in the Play of Children,” 
Klein understands neurotic children in terms of their failure to synthesize the highly 
polarized identifications and imagos of the developing super-ego, which are 
manifestations of ambivalent feelings toward the parent (1975, 204). The greater the 
polarity of ambivalence, the more difficult it becomes to reconcile the opposing 
forces in a working synthesis. And in her later 1945 paper, “The Oedipus Complex in 
the Light of Early Anxieties,” Klein describes the case of a ten-year-old boy, Richard, 
who suffers from nightmares, anxiety, depression, and general inhibitedness due to 
his inability to find such a synthesis.  
 Richard’s difficulty managing his ambivalent desires toward his mother and 
father are expressed in his nightmares, in rather fascinating drawings of birds and 
submarines, and in his play where he is a navy destroyer named ‘Vampire’ who 
bumps into ships symbolizing Klein and his mother. So, in her analysis, Klein helps 
Richard to integrate his ambivalent feelings about his mother and to reconcile his 
phantasies and splits with his real parents. Klein explains: “When Richard had 
become able during his analysis to face the psychological fact that his loved object 
was also his hated object… he could establish his love for his mother more securely. 
His feelings of love had become more closely linked with his feelings of hatred… He 
was therefore no longer driven on the one hand to form such a terrifying picture of the 
bad mother. Whenever he could allow himself to bring the two aspects of the mother 




in his own constructive and reparative tendencies, as well as in his internal and 
external objects, had increased” (1975, 396-397).   
 For Klein, successful tolerance and integration of ambivalence means that the 
child is able to see parents and significant others as real persons, just as successive 
non-threatening experiences in reality permit the child to tolerate greater and greater 
degrees of ambivalence. This ability to tolerate ambivalence represents the beginning 
of the depressive position, in which the child recognizes whole or integrated objects 
and is able to relate to them (see Klein 1975, 286-289; Segal 1964, 55). The 
depressive position is the result of the gradual abandonment of radical splitting and 
the gradual integration of the good and the bad into whole people and a whole self, 
both of which may have good and bad qualities.  
 The old paranoid threats of persecution and terror are replaced in the 
depressive position by new challenges, like jealousy, guilt, and anxiety. But beneath 
these challenges of the depressive position lies ambivalence. According to Klein, the 
child in the depressive position feels powerful guilt and anxiety about the welfare of 
the objects that he may consume, incorporate, or destroy in fantasy (see Klein 1975, 
272-273; Segal 1964, 56-57). No longer operating with absolute separations between 
the good and bad aspects of himself and objects, the child now worries that the bad 
qualities of himself, even bad wishes or thoughts, may harm or ruin the good things 
he loves, both inside and outside of himself.  
 Klein’s depressive position is the basis for reparation and reparative morality, 
in which the child seeks to make amends for any injuries he causes. In time, the child 




diminishing guilt and anxiety allow the child to trust in the integrity of internal and 
external objects, at which point he may rely less and less on facile defenses like 
splitting (Klein 1975, 346-348; Alford 1989, 34-35, 84-87). Because the good and 
bad qualities of objects are less divided, and because the child identifies with the 
good objects to a greater degree, he seeks less frequently to split off and expel bad 
objects, knowing that there is a chance the good objects will be expelled as well 
(Klein 1975, 265-266). At the same time, he learns that his fantasies can not destroy 
people in reality, and so gains confidence in the integrity of objects and himself.  
 The depressive position is therefore the announcement of a more mature, more 
moral, and more creative position: one in which the child seeks to manage his or her 
ambivalence, feels a growing responsibility, desires to make reparations to others, and 
constructs a more integrated identity on proto-moral grounds (see Minsky 1998, 41). 
Indeed, “the pain of mourning experienced in the depressive position, and the 
reparative drives developed to restore the loved internal and external objects, are the 
basis of creativity and sublimation… to recreate and to create” in the name of care, 
reparation, and preservation of the good (Segal 1964, 62).    
 Thus, in Klein’s theory, ambivalence is, itself, ambivalent. The agonal forces 
that increase the child’s anxiety eventually permit the child to enter and work though 
(although never completely) the challenges of the depressive position. And the 
splitting reactions to them are at first developmentally adaptive, then regressive and 
destructive. Although Klein wrote almost exclusively of children, she thought that 
continued splitting “under the stress of ambivalence to some extent persists 




[splitting of imagos] in the phantastic belief in a God who would assist in the 
perpetration of every sort of atrocity (as lately as in the recent war) in order to destroy 
the enemy and his country” (Klein 1975, 203n). For Klein, ambivalent experiences of 
good and bad, love and hatred, rage and care may be taken as important components 
of both individual and collective psycho-social life. Her approach suggests that, with 
maturity, it is possible to achieve and contend with ambivalence through the gradual 
abandonment of splitting and related paranoid-schizoid defenses and the discovery of 
moral and creative resources in the personality. Klein’s particular emphasis on 
splitting, projection, introjection, idealization, and devaluation, therefore, leads us to a 
related area of psychoanalytic thought on ambivalence where splitting is marked: the 
borderline personality.  
Ambivalence and the Borderline Personality  
While we should not overlook the dangers and limitations of psychiatric diagnoses, 
the concept of ambivalence is very closely related to the clinical understanding of the 
borderline personality, and it is worth a moment to reflect upon this relation. Almost 
all theorists of borderline personality emphasize that it presents with dis-integrated, 
contrary, or conflicting affects and behaviors. Otto Kernberg’s ‘presumptive’ 
diagnostic elements include: anxiety, polysymptomatic neurosis, paranoid-, schizoid-, 
and hypomanic-personality structures, impulse neurosis and chemical addictions, 
emotional lability, narcissistic personality, and other signs of instability (1975, 8-21). 
These symptoms of emotional lability and seemingly dis-integrated personality are 
often conceptualized to be rooted in a defense against unbearable conflict, in the 




self- and object-representations (see Kernberg 1975, 5-7; Kernberg 1984, 12-13; 
Cooper and Arnow 1984). Recent interpersonal theories have argued that borderline 
symptoms suggest the presence of heightened psychological conflict (Benjamin 1993; 
Kiesler 1996). And a recent empirical study revealed that individuals with borderline 
diagnoses evinced a higher degree of ambivalence and inconsistency with respect to 
self-assessments of warmth, dominance, and other qualities (Hopwood and Morey 
2007). This recent theory and research suggests that a non-integrated emotional 
conflict or ambivalence may be at the root of the constellation of affects and 
behaviors generally classified as borderline. 
 Borderline individuals (so called because they appeared to be on the 
‘borderline’ between neurosis and psychosis) are not unable to distinguish between 
the categories of self and others. However, a borderline individual may have a great 
deal of difficulty integrating his identity and his perceptions of himself and others. 
This is referred to as “identity diffusion,” and it entails a “poorly integrated concept 
of self and of significant others… reflected in the subjective experience of chronic 
emptiness, contradictory self-perceptions, contradictory behavior that cannot be 
integrated in an emotionally meaningful way, and shallow, flat, impoverished 
perceptions of others” (Kernberg 1984, 12).  
 The aspects of borderline personality disorder of greatest relevance for our 
purposes are its defensive organization against contradiction and its related tendency 
to split. Otto Kernberg emphasized the borderline tendency to revert to primary-
process thinking and to rely on primitive defenses like splitting, denial, early forms of 




15-17). Splitting, as we have discussed, means essentially to deny ambivalence, 
conflict, or contradiction by dividing the world into separate and extreme categories 
of ‘all good’ and ‘all bad’. The borderline personality tends to undertake and maintain 
such splits in order to protect itself from dangerous aspects of the self and others, in 
order to preserve a tenuous hold on the ‘good’. Kernberg explains that “bringing 
together extremely opposite loving and hateful images of the self and of significant 
others would trigger unbearable anxiety and guilt because of the implicit danger to 
the good internal and external object relations; therefore, there is an active defensive 
separation of such contradictory self- and object-images; in other words, primitive 
dissociation or splitting becomes a major defensive operation” (Kernberg 1975, 165). 
Since the notion of giving up the split threatens to contaminate the ‘good’ with the 
‘bad’, we may say that the borderline personality splits in order to avoid a kind of 
ambivalence, to avoid a situation in which good and bad might co-exist in the self or 
in others.   
 Unfortunately, splitting is not only a result of the threatened and defensive 
self, but can be a cause of continued anxiety and instability. That is, the reversion to 
this type of defense against ambivalence does not help the individual develop the 
capacity to tolerate ambivalence or to integrate conflicting emotions or experiences. 
Rather, as Kernberg points out, “splitting… is a fundamental cause of ego weakness, 
and as splitting also requires less countercathexis than repression, a weak ego falls 
back easily on splitting, and a vicious circle is created by which ego weakness and 
splitting reinforce each other” (Kernberg 1975, 29). This vicious circle manifests 




affects and emotions, radical shifts in thoughts and feelings about the self and others, 
and “sudden and complete reversals of all feelings and conceptualizations” about the 
self or others (Kernberg 1975, 29).   
 While an emphasis on splitting has become a sort of hallmark of the 
borderline personality, so have its interpersonal consequences. Like the clinical 
narcissist, the borderline personality struggles not only with a diffuse and dis-
integrated self-concept but with an inability to relate effectively to other people. The 
borderline individual has difficulties relating with others because of his “defective 
object-constancy or incapacity to establish total object relations” (Kernberg 1975, 
166), which means that his intensely felt and rapidly changing emotions and ideas 
prevent him from seeing himself and others as whole, real people with both positive 
and negative qualities.  
 Integration of ambivalent or contradictory perceptions of others is made 
especially difficult due to the borderline’s “constant projection of ‘all bad’ self and 
object images [which] perpetuates a world of dangerous, threatening objects, against 
which the ‘all good’ self images are used defensively, and megalomanic ideal self 
images are built up” (Kernberg 1975, 36). That is, although the borderline 
individual’s defenses are attempts to protect himself by splitting the world into 
impossible contraries, they perpetuate an experience of life in which the precarious 
and ephemeral ‘good’ inside is constantly threatened from both within and without. 
The fact that the borderline individual deals in such excessively abstract, extreme, and 
unreal images further precludes any realistic assessment and understanding of self 




emotional shallowness and paranoia (Kernberg 1975, 166-167). Thus, the tendency to 
split, to radically idealize, and to radically devalue makes any rapprochement with a 
stable social reality increasingly problematic.  
 As we will see in subsequent chapters, both ambivalence and splitting are 
extremely important themes in Camus’ reflections on the absurd. Sometimes Camus’ 
own protests, such as “I want everything explained to me or nothing” (1955, 27), rely 
on a kind of splitting, a sort of petulant insistence on all or nothing. But, more often, 
Camus’ thought on the morality of the absurd is an argument against the dangerous 
consequences of splitting the world into absolute good and absolute evil. Camus’ 
absurd person, as we shall see, lives with profound ambivalences about losing himself 
in an ‘all’, asserting himself against a ‘nothing’, and affirming, rejecting, or 
remaining indifferent to good and evil. But Camus seeks to articulate and interpret 
these dangers (albeit without using psychological language) in order to avoid the 
facile solution of splitting the world and the self into absolute good and bad.     
 In spite of these connections, it is imperative that we not confuse the absurd, 
itself, with the borderline personality, or any other specific psychiatric diagnosis. For 
the purposes of this volume, I loosely refer to splits and related defenses as reactions 
to a kind of ambivalence, inasmuch as they defend the self against the threats and 
anxieties created by the mixing of highly-charged contraries. And yet, as we shall see, 
no particular defensive reaction exhausts the many possible responses one may have 
to ambivalence or to the absurd. Camus will address the desire to be indifferent and 
the desire to be committed, to be univocal and to be silent, to be perfectly separate 




ambivalent emotions, none of which accord perfectly with any single psychoanalytic 
theory, but all of which may be informed by a broad understanding of the dynamics 
of ambivalence.  
Ambivalence in the Social Sciences 
In the following chapters, I hope to show that Camus’ philosophy of the absurd relies 
on mechanics that are similar to the dynamics of ambivalence discussed here. But I 
also hope to show that the concept of ambivalence is relevant and applicable not only 
to individual psyches and close emotional relationships, but to political and social 
challenges and our responses to them.  
   Sociologists, anthropologists, and historians like Robert Merton (1976), 
Clifford Geertz (1968), and Robert Jay Lifton have all argued that the ambivalent 
demands made by social roles and cultural norms and institutions require a more 
dynamic understanding of the relationship between self and society, as individuals 
struggle to respond to incongruities in their environments and to the “absurdity” 
implied by “the absence of ‘fit’… between individual self and outside world” (Lifton 
1993, 94). In Boundaries (1970) and The Protean Self (1993), Lifton argues that 
individuals in the postmodern world are aggrieved by crises, conflicts, dislocations, 
contradictory possibilities for identity, and a collapse of the boundaries by which we 
formerly defined ourselves. While these contradictions may lead some to 
fundamentalism, fragmentation, and despair, Lifton argues that others may respond to 
them creatively, with novelty and protean fluidity (see Lifton 1993, 190-232).  
 “High modernity,” as Giddens (1991) calls it, or late modernity in connection 




but of increasingly contradictory and ambivalent pressures, of a “push and pull… mix 
and break,” that operates on levels from the global to the personal (Chan and 
McIntyre 2001, 4). If Roland Robertson’s (1995) term, “glocalization,” expresses 
some of the ambivalence at work, Stephen Castles has outlined it more fully. Castles 
highlights nine (admitting that the enumeration is arbitrary) “fundamental 
contradictions” at the heart of the processes of global change: contradictions between 
“inclusion and exclusion,” “market and state,” “growing wealth and 
impoverishment,” “the Net and the self,” “the global and the local,” “the economy 
and the environment,” “modernity and post-modernity,” the “national and the global 
citizen,” and “globalization from above and from below” (Castles 1998). Framing 
these issues as ‘contradictions’ that interpenetrate the spheres of politics, economics, 
citizenship, self, time, and space, Castles’ work makes for a convincing argument that 
ambivalence is a fundamental dynamic of contemporary globalization.  
 In only slightly different terms, Anthony Giddens’ well-known Modernity and 
Self-Identity describes the psychological impact of a world full of increasingly intense 
‘dilemmas’. These dilemmas are of an ambivalent nature: “unification versus 
fragmentation,” “powerlessness versus appropriation,” “authority versus uncertainty,” 
“personalized versus commodified experience,” and ontological security versus 
existential anxiety (1991, 181-208). Giddens sees the likely result of these dilemmas 
to be either a ‘return of the repressed’ or the development of a ‘life politics’. In either 
case, Giddens’ ‘reflexive selves’ must strive to heal the terrible rifts in their 
experience occasioned by these dilemmas, beneath which lies a constant and 




 Many theorists have argued that the ambivalent forces of globalization can not 
even be expressed as a single movement, a single ‘modernity’, or a single process of 
globalization, but rather in terms of “multiple modernities,” or as a “dialectically 
synthetic process that embraces the contradictory dynamics” of globalization (Chan 
and McIntyre 2001, 16). In particular, transcultural theorists of globalization define 
their subject in an illustratively ambivalent (if not absurdly confusing) way: 
Transculturation of modernity is imaginative and materialistic. It is fueled by 
transborder imaginations, which are hybridized and heterogeneous, 
deterritorialized and reterritorialized, continuous and discontinuous. Cultural 
imaginations are often stereotypically inflated, temporally compressed, 
historically flattened and contextually reworked… However, these transborder 
imaginations are also embodied within material exchanges, which are 
managed by nation-states, transnational agents, local firms, and the market… 
The real lasting power of globalization lies in the transculturation of daily 
routines and habitual activities which de-skill and re-skill individuals into 
‘modern’ subjects. Transculturing modernity is global, transnational, 
reciprocal, social, and personal. (Chan and McIntyre 2001, 16-17) 
 
 However we characterize the challenges of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, large-scale political and social change is increasingly recognized as 
reaching “through to the very grounds of individual activity and the constitution of 
the self” (Giddens 1991, 184). Advances in communication and media technologies 
have likely played a part in saturating contemporary selves with ambivalent 
possibilities and greater awareness of conflict and contradiction. As increasing 
exposure to others, to difference, and to contradiction has made “crises… a normal 
part of life” (Giddens 1991, 184), it may even be responsible for a condition Kenneth 
Gergen calls “multiphrenia,” which is “the splitting of the self into a multiplicity of 
self-investments” (2000, 73-74). For Gergen, the “social saturation” brought on by 




and of possibilities causes a sort of over-population of the self, where we exceed even 
Whitman in containing greater and greater ‘multitudes’, to the detriment of our values 
and relationships (Gergen 2000, 68-80).    
 T.K. Oommen reminds us that “the rise and fall, construction and 
deconstruction of different types of boundaries… make up the very story of human 
civilization and of contemporary social transformation” (Oommen in Chan and 
McIntyre 2001, xiii). On this account, the disparities between forces of the global and 
the local, enrichment and impoverishment, progression and reaction have profound 
psychological impacts because they break down, change, and reform symbolic and 
cultural boundaries. Globalization, itself, may be understood as “trans-boundary 
movements and their associated effects” (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 
669), taking place across national, cultural, geographic, and psychological borders. 
Since the boundaries and borders we construct, accept, or maintain allow us to make 
sense out of contradiction and diversity, and since “boundaries and identity are thus 
different sides of the same coin, with the former creating and being created thorough 
the latter” (Chan and McIntyre 2001, xv), individuals confronted with global change 
face increasingly ambivalent conditions while suffering impairments to the cultural, 
psychological, and symbolic resources available to cope with them.      
 Empirical social scientific researchers have approached the relationship 
between ambivalence and politics from a somewhat different direction, primarily 
investigating individuals’ ambivalent attitudes toward contemporary social and 
political issues. Jennifer Hochschild (1981) conducted a series of now well-known 




and social policy. Feldman and Zaller (1992) have examined the role of ambivalence 
in relation to economic ideologies and views of the welfare state. Alvarez and Brehm 
have examined ambivalence, along with equivocation and uncertainty, in American’s 
attitudes toward abortion, racial policy, and the IRS (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Craig 
and Martinez 2005). McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger (2003) have investigated the 
relationship between, and consequences of, both ambivalence and uncertainty in the 
processes of candidate evaluation. And Stephen Craig and colleagues (2005) have 
argued that many Americans hold ambivalent attitudes toward gay and lesbian rights, 
partly as a result of ‘core value conflicts’.  
 Many of these social scientific studies operationalize the term ‘ambivalence’ 
in ways that are in line with its psychoanalytic tradition, but with an attitudinal 
emphasis and a slightly softer touch, as either “the coexistence of both positive and 
negative evaluations of an attitude object” (McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger 2003, 
423-424) or “the presence of conflicting evaluations or beliefs held by a single 
individual about an attitude object” (Craig et al. 2005, 6; see Cacioppo, Gardner, and 
Berntson 1997). In recent attitude research, ambivalence has been framed as but one 
dimension of ‘attitude-strength’, that is, as one of many dimensions of attitude 
assessment which, along with importance, intensity, elaboration, certainty, and 
commitment, help complete the picture of respondents’ attitudes and/or attitude-
changes (Craig et al. 2005). But in political research, some form of ‘value-conflict’ 
seems to inform many discussions of ambivalence (McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger 
2003, 424). For Albertson, Alvarez, and Brehm, for instance, ambivalence ‘occurs’ 




respondents’ expectations of values are irreconcilable” (Craig and Martinez 2005, 
17).      
 How to measure ambivalence also presents interesting problems to social and 
political researchers. Thompson and Zanna (1995, 261) argue that ambivalence was 
left out of attitude research for many years because of the prevailing ‘all-or-nothing’ 
models of attitude-formation which insisted upon consistency. Kaplan’s (1972) well-
known method of measuring ambivalence suggested a scale that calculated the degree 
of intensity and conflict in order to avoid confusing ambivalence with indifference. 
Indeed, researchers have argued that attitude assessments must include not only a 
positive-negative dimension, but also an ambivalence-indifference dimension, which 
could measure the important differences between a neutral stance, where conflicting 
emotions are hardly present, and an ambivalent stance, which may look 
mathematically similar, but where the conflicting emotions are experienced with 
much greater intensity (see Priester and Petty 1996, 431).  
 But political and social scientific investigations of ambivalence are likely to 
disappoint the moral or political theorist or the psychodynamically-inclined thinker. 
For one thing, these discussions rarely, if ever, discuss the reactive potential of 
ambivalence that colors more psychodynamically-informed accounts. Unlike the 
psychoanalytic accounts we have reviewed above, very few ambivalent attitudes are 
conceptualized as intolerably threatening or as requiring complex or unconscious 
processes of repression, dissociation, splitting, or denial. And unlike psychoanalytic 




has focused on the manifestations of ambivalent attitudes in political or social 
behavior, without thoroughly considering their causes.  
 Neil Smelser, particularly in his compelling essay “The Rational and the 
Ambivalent,” has claimed that the concept of ambivalence presents a profound 
challenge to social scientists, one that should force us to re-examine many of our 
paradigmatic assumptions guided by the theory of rational choice. Smelser’s 
argument is that the consideration of ambivalence should check the “totemic status” 
of rationality and the corresponding decline of interest in non-rational or extra-
rational understandings of social and political subjects (Sica in Smelser 1998, 1). He 
takes social scientists to task for our tendency to “eschew dualistic or ambivalent 
constructs in favor of univalent statement” in a quest for “dominant patterns, 
univalent metrics, monochromatic path diagrams, and unilineal logical derivations” 
(Levine in Smelser 1998, 5).  
 But Smelser ultimately recommends that we attend to ambivalence not only to 
distinguish it from the categories associated with rational choice models, but because 
he sees ambivalence as a “fundamental existential dilemma in the human condition” 
(Smelser 1998, 13). Smelser’s account is perhaps one of the few approaches to 
ambivalence that respects its psychodynamic contours, that dares to posit 
ambivalence at the heart of the human experience, and that still maintains its 
relevance to social scientific inquiry. If Smelser is correct that recognizing 
ambivalence forces us to re-think our assumptions about the human condition, then it 




will permit us to re-think our assumptions about the morality and politics of the 
absurd, which is, after all, a more modest project.  
 By turning our focus away from metaphysical speculation about absurdity and 
by briefly reviewing the concept of ambivalence in psychoanalytic and social 
scientific thought, I hope to have set the stage for the analogy between ambivalence 
and the absurd that I present in the following chapters. I argue that, for Camus, the 
absurd operates very much like ambivalence, representing not a good nor an evil, but 
a tenuous and conflictual ‘position’ in relation to ambivalent desires. The absurd, like 
ambivalence, demands integration and maturity rather than primitive defenses or 
facile resolutions. Indeed, the working-through of absurd experience, like the 
working-through of ambivalence, permits individuals to develop moral, mature, and 




Chapter 5: Absurdity and Ambivalence  
 
While there have been a number of psychoanalytic studies of Camus’ life and works, 
most have aimed to interpret either Camus, himself, or the rich images and themes in 
his fictional works (see Viggiani 1956; Fletcher 1970; Lazere 1973; Fitch 1982; 
Abecassis 1997; Rizzuto 1998). And although Camus had little interest in 
psychoanalysis, what Malraux referred to as the science devoted to “un miserable 
petit tas de secrets” (Blanchard 1997, 670), psychoanalytic interpretations of Camus’ 
work have been far from fruitless. These interpretations have uncovered significant 
symbols, scenes, and conflicts that illuminate Camus’ thought. After the recent 
publication of The First Man, for instance, a number of scholars were able to argue 
even more convincingly that Camus’ search for his missing father, his relationship to 
his silent mother, and his basic struggles with identity and anonymity are of primary 
interest in many of his novels and stories (see Abecassis 1997). But while 
psychoanalytic and psycho-biographical works may hold promise for establishing a 
more complex understanding of the themes in Camus’ life and his fictional work, they 
do not shed much light on the subtleties of the philosophy of the absurd, itself.    
 In Chapter 3, I discussed some of the reasons why Camus’ absurd has been 
interpreted as a contrast between the human and the natural, between life and death, 
between knowledge and the unknowable. John Cruickshank finds that these basic 
contrasts run from Camus’ early Noces through The Myth of Sisyphus: “Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe sharpens the dualism of Noces to such an extent that this dualism takes on all 




paradox than with a dualism” (1960, 46). By distinguishing between dualism and 
paradox, Cruickshank alludes to one of the central dilemmas facing the absurd: the 
difficulty of living with it.  
 This difficulty, the “recognition of a paradox, together with persistent thinking 
about it, gives to Le Mythe de Sisyphe some sort of double tension so that the book 
opens on a note of anxious inquiry” (Cruickshank 1960, 46). What exactly is that 
double tension, that anxiety in Camus’ thought? As we will see, it is more than a 
philosophical reflection on humanity and nature, life and death. Perhaps it is even 
more than the metaphorical disappointments and silences described in The Myth of 
Sisyphus.  
 In a tough but not entirely unfair appraisal of Camus, Leo Bersani argues that 
Camus’ absurd “presupposes a need for cosmic unities and ultimate meanings which 
Camus presents as an unarguable fact of human nature… And Camus sets out to 
examine whether life’s absurdity demands that we escape from life by either suicide 
or hope… But these unacceptable consequences are really premises without which 
the argument would never have gotten started in the first place… That is, there is no 
‘confrontation’ between ‘l’appel humain’ and the world’s ‘irrational silence,’ but 
rather a single, emotionally prejudiced description of the world. The absurd man, 
Camus announces, doesn’t believe in the profound or hidden meanings of things. But 
of course — and it’s impossible to break out of the circle — there wouldn’t be any 
absurdity unless man thought it inconceivable that the world should be without 




 While Bersani goes a bit too far in claiming that the absurd position is 
‘circular’, his point that the absurd is founded upon a contradictory set of emotional 
premises is well-taken. This volume asks if these confused and conflicting emotional 
premises and prejudices, which have frustrated Bersani and many other critics, can 
help us to understand the ‘double tension’, the anxiety, and, ultimately, the dynamics 
of Camus’ absurd.  
 Although it is difficult not to notice the themes of duality, paradox, 
contradiction, and duplicity in Camus’ work, no study has attempted to interpret these 
themes in terms of the dynamics of ambivalence, or related such dynamics to the 
consequences of the absurd. In this chapter, I argue that, for Camus, the absurd is the 
tension between two powerful desires. Some of Camus’ most memorable passages are 
his descriptions of a deeply-felt desire for unity, for clarity, for wholeness. 
Sometimes, this desire is expressed in terms of a longing for transcendent meaning 
and values, or for the passion and intensity that absolute beliefs and principles would 
permit. At other times, it is expressed in naturalistic or romantic imagery, as a fusion 
with the world, an immersion in water, a merger with a landscape or climate.  
 On the other hand, Camus effectively conveys his revulsion for this desire for 
unity. He offers memorable denouncements of the consolations of certainty, God, 
eternal truths, and absolute values, repudiating overly-reconciled actions as a kind of 
rationalized crime. Camus often makes dramatic (sometimes melodramatic) refusals 
of unity and wholeness in favor of the realities of suffering, revolt, and exile. He 
disparages ‘escapes’, ‘leaps’, and anything that smacks of the superhuman on the 




 I examine these two general categories, the desire for and the rejection of 
unity, as the constituent elements of an ambivalent absurd position. Camus’ work 
describes the experience of the absurd as the experience of intense and ambivalent 
desires, and as the pressure to resolve or escape that ambivalence in order to decrease 
its attendant anxiety. Camus wrestles with the ambivalence he finds at the heart of 
human experience, but he does so in a highly figurative and often inconsistent 
language that has made his notion of absurdity difficult to see.  
 Understanding the absurd in the way I recommend dramatically changes its 
traditional interpretations as meaninglessness, evil, or the brutality of nature. The 
absurd is perhaps related to these notions, but, at best, they only represent parts of its 
ambivalent composition. If we must speak about the absurd in terms of meaning, evil, 
and nature, I propose that we learn to speak of the absurd as comprising both terms 
(good and evil, meaning and meaninglessness, nature and humanity) along with the 
various tensions between them. But for Camus, the most relevant ambivalence is 
between unity and individuality, wholeness and independence, selflessness and the 
self.  
 This chapter and the chapters that follow will argue that what Camus means 
when he claims, “there can be no question of… suppressing the absurd by denying 
one of the terms of its equation” (1955, 50), is that the absurd position is neither 
meaninglessness or meaning, neither evil or good, neither the rejection nor the 
affirmation of any absolute. Very much like the mature developmental processes by 
which ambivalence is tolerated and integrated rather than repressed, split, or denied, 




mature integration of these ambivalences and a recognition of the temptations and 
dangers implied by their continuing tension.    
The Desire for Unity 
Camus is at his most passionate when he describes what may be called his desire for 
unity, for clarity, for wholeness. But, as with other areas of his thought, Camus 
describes this desire in a daunting variety of ways. He refers to it not only as the 
“desire for unity” (1955, 51), “the mind’s deepest desire” (17), but as a “wild longing 
for clarity” (21), an “insistence upon familiarity” (17), a “longing to solve” (51), an 
“appetite for the absolute” (17, 51), a “longing for happiness and reason” (28), a 
“nostalgia for unity” (17, 50), and an “impulse that endlessly pursues its form” 
(1956b, 262).  
   In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus characterizes this desire most often as a 
desire to know, a desire for intellectual clarity. But in his early work and his short 
fiction, Camus seems to give voice to what can only be described as an erotic desire 
for a natural union. In yet other instances, particularly in The Stranger, characters like 
Meursault seem to desire an indifferent elementality in a way that reminds us of the 
notion of absolute indifference described by Camus’ teacher, Jean Grenier.  
 One thing that unites these various expressions of the desire for unity is that 
Camus presents them all as essentially human, irreducible, and undeniable. Camus 
persuades us of the presence of this desire, but he does not speculate about any deeper 
biological, psychological, or spiritual origins. Likewise, this section of the chapter 
does not attempt to reduce the desire for unity to any other drive or instinct. Rather, I 




nature, and Grenier’s elemental indifference) in an attempt to give shape and 
substance to the first term of the ambivalent conflict at the heart of the absurd.  
 Clarity and Unity. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus first presents us with a 
systematic exploration of what appears to be an intellectual appetite for explanation, 
for familiarity, and for clarity. “The mind’s deepest desire,” Camus writes, “even in 
its most elaborate operations, parallels man’s unconscious feeling in the face of his 
universe: it is an insistence upon familiarity, an appetite for clarity” (1955, 17). 
Camus claims that our profound desire for unity is the primary psychological force 
shaping human life: “That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute illustrates 
the essential impulse of the human drama” (1955, 17).  
 In ways that continue to inspire comparisons to Pascal, Camus persuades us 
that the knowledge of eternal or absolute principles would provide us with a kind of 
intellectual beatitude. “If thought discovered in the shimmering mirrors of 
phenomena eternal relations capable of summing them up and summing themselves 
up in a single principle, then would be seen an intellectual joy of which the myth of 
the blessed would be but a ridiculous imitation” (1955, 17). In fact, “all would be 
saved,” Camus writes, “if one could only say just once: ‘This is clear’” (1955, 27). 
 ‘All would be saved’, even by such a singular and fleeting moment, because 
that longing for unity is so powerful that we imagine even an instant of fulfillment 
would somehow change everything. Thus, we are entertaining a kind of fantasy. If we 
could attain (or perhaps re-attain) perfect clarity, so the fantasy goes, we would be 
completely transformed. To experience a moment of perfect clarity is supposed to 




fact, the somewhat narcissistic goal here seems to be find our ‘reflection’ in the 
‘shimmering mirrors’ of phenomena, where we might be able to see ourselves 
eternally, in eternal relations that would ‘sum’ us up in a single principle.  
 The desire for unity is a desire to live in “a world that can be explained, even 
with bad reasons” (1955, 6). That “familiar world” has obviously been lost when we 
experience the presentiments of absurdity, such as “the absence of any profound 
reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation, the uselessness of 
suffering” (1955, 6). With language that seems intended to evoke themes of 
enlightenment, Camus describes the experience of being “divested of illusions and 
lights” (1955, 6), lost in darkness, outside of the familiar, and disconnected from 
ourselves and others. In this murky and mystified condition, we see no past and no 
future, we are “deprived of the memory of a lost home” just as we are denied “the 
hope of a promised land” (1955, 6). 
 But in responding to this desperate situation, we see that the drive for 
intellectual clarity really expresses a deeper desire for unity. The real object of 
Camus’ demand for explanations and reasons is to become one with the world. In one 
case, it is the fantasy of a world with human properties that permits a feeling of 
identity: “If man realized that the universe like him can love and suffer, he would be 
reconciled” (Camus 1955, 17). In another case, this craving for identity requires a 
self-dehumanization, so as to become elemental and thus identical with the natural 
world: “If I were a tree among trees, a cat among animals, this life would have a 
meaning, or rather this problem would not arise, for I should belong to this world. I 




of identity suggest that the joy of clarity, to which Camus compared the myth of the 
blessed, may really be a joy of oneness, a joy of living in a world without difference, 
and perhaps, a joy of living without the demands of individuation.  
 In a slight variation, Camus’ describes the longing for clarity in a way not 
entirely dissimilar to the critique of reason offered by Frankfurt theorists. 
“Understanding the world for a man is reducing it to the human, stamping it with his 
seal,” Camus claims. “The truism ‘All thought is anthropomorphic’ has no other 
meaning. Likewise, the mind that aims to understand reality can consider itself 
satisfied only by reducing it to terms of thought” (1955, 17). Here, Camus speaks 
explicitly about ‘reducing’ and deforming phenomena by ‘stamping’ them into 
images of himself, molding them to fit his intellectual categories. These 
manipulations allow the individual to master, to grasp, to comprehend what he 
encounters. Thus, the longing for clarity is presented not only as a longing for unity 
and non-difference, but as a desire for control and possession.  
 Whether one craves clarity, identity, or control, the desire for unity appears 
throughout Camus’ work as both an intellectual demand and an emotional impulse. 
But the relation between intellect and emotion in Camus’ work is almost hopelessly 
confused. As we have seen, it is possible for Camus to imagine the intellect as a kind 
of extension of the emotions, as the intellectual quest for clarity seemed to serve an 
emotional appetite for unity. Yet, there are also moments in Camus’ account where 
the intellect seems to overwhelm and even ruin emotional experience. In an important 
qualification to his reflections on the desire for clarity, Camus claims that “so long as 




arranged in the unity of nostalgia” (1955, 18). Camus means that pre-reflective or 
naïve fantasies of unity may disappear when we subject them to examination and 
analysis. When the desire for unity is expressed as a “unity of nostalgia” (earlier, and 
somewhat confusingly, it was also a ‘nostalgia for unity’) that is disrupted by the 
mind’s activity, it is no longer an intellectual clarity but a nostalgic emotion that 
Camus identifies as a primary absurd desire. In this formulation, a blissful but 
unreasonable nostalgia is interrupted by the unwanted intrusions of the intellect 
which, for reasons which Camus does not explore, attempts to defeat, rather than to 
serve, nostalgic fantasies.  
 Perhaps, like many others before him, Camus simply saw the operation of the 
intellect as destructive of a natural or simple harmony between people and their 
environment. With a Rousseauean touch, Camus claims that “with [the mind’s] first 
move this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number of shimmering fragments is 
offered to the understanding. We must despair of ever reconstructing the familiar, 
calm surface which would give us peace of heart” (1955, 18). Here again the world 
appears as a strange kind of mirror or prism, where everything is “reflected in the 
unity of nostalgia” until the mind “cracks” the mirror’s “familiar, calm surface” 
(1955, 18, emphasis added). The mirror or prism is strange because it reflects not just 
an individual, as he or she is, but that individual’s lost or fantasized unity.          
 But if the intellect first appeared to work in tandem with the desire for unity, 
and then appeared to ruin our pre-intellectual nostalgia for unity, Camus also figures 
the intellect as a sort of inept servant to the emotions, a faculty that tries to, but is 




Camus’ most balanced view, and one that helps us to find an imperfect but 
satisfactory understanding of the dynamics of the absurd desire for unity. Camus 
writes, “I want everything to be explained to me or nothing. And the reason is 
impotent when it hears this cry from the heart. The mind aroused by this insistence 
seeks and finds nothing but contradictions and nonsense” (1955, 27). Reason, in this 
formulation, is simply incapable of performing the task asked of it. The intellect 
confronts the limits of the rational and perhaps recognizes a basic difference between 
reality and fantasy. Nevertheless, as we will see, Camus argues that we are rarely 
content to humbly accept our impotence in this regard. Instead, we are tempted to find 
quick fixes for our extraordinary demand for unity or to defend ourselves against 
experiencing such unfulfillable desires.  
 By the time he writes The Rebel, Camus has not clarified the desire for unity, 
calling it variously an idea, a passion, and a demand for form, reconciliation, and 
finality. What is clear, however, is the fact that the desire for unity remains 
unsatisfied, which only serves to heighten absurd ambivalence and tension. Camus 
explains:      
[Life] is only an impulse that endlessly pursues its form without ever finding 
it. Man, tortured by this, tries in vain to find the form that will impose certain 
limits between which he can be king. If only one single living thing had 
definite form, he would be reconciled!  There is not one human being who, 
above a certain elementary level of consciousness, does not exhaust himself in 
trying to find formulas or attitudes that will give his existence the unity it 
lacks. Appearance and action, the dandy and the revolutionary, all demand 
unity in order to exist, and in order to exist on this earth. As in those moving 
and unhappy relationships which sometimes survive for a very long time 
because one of the partners is waiting to find the right word, action, gesture, 
or situation which will bring his adventure to an end on exactly the right note, 
so everyone proposes and creates for himself the final word. It is not sufficient 
to live, there must be a destiny that does not have to wait for death. It is 




better does not mean different, it means unified. This passion which lifts the 
mind above the commonplaces of a dispersed world, from which it 
nevertheless cannot free itself, is the passion for unity. It does not result in 
mediocre efforts to escape, however, but in the most obstinate demands. 
Religion or crime, every human endeavor in fact, finally obeys this 
unreasonable desire and claims to give life a form it does not have. (1956b, 
262)     
 
As we remark again on the exaggerated hope tied to form (“If only one single living 
thing had definite form, he would be reconciled!”), we should also note that Camus 
again compares the tension between the desire for unity and its apparent impossibility 
to a romantic relationship, expressed perhaps paradoxically in each partner’s search 
for an ideal end, a way to remove all tension, a quest for ‘the final word’. The 
complex and obstinate passion for unity that drives this relationship is expressed 
figuratively by Camus here, just as, in other works, he and his fictional characters 
seem to be engaged in an erotic struggle with nature.  
 Loving Mother Nature. For Camus, the desire for unity is often expressed with 
the use of natural and sexual imagery. A natural eroticism seems both to ground and 
to mediate the relations between Camus’ frustrated desire for unity and his 
repudiation of that desire. As we have briefly discussed elsewhere, in early works like 
Noces, Camus contrasts an intense and sexual desire for life with the inevitable 
conclusion that such desires are insatiable, either by their very nature, at the 
insistence of reason and the self, or simply because of human mortality. A powerful 
passage in “Nuptials at Tipasa” describes an erotic encounter with nature. Camus 
senses that “even here, I know I shall never come close enough to the world. I must 
be naked and dive into the sea, still scented with the perfumes of the earth, wash them 




to lips, have so long been sighing” (1968, 68). But blissful unions like these can not 
last, and Camus contrasts them sharply with the superfluity of intellectual pursuits he 
returns to after separation. In the brief moments of union, “it was neither I nor the 
world that counted,” he reflects, “but solely the harmony and silence that gave birth to 
the love between us” (1968, 72).  
 This unifying relationship with nature is at the heart of Camus’ love for 
physical existence and his abhorrence of death. When the wind picks up at Djemila, 
Camus loses himself in its all-consuming force: “Like a pebble polished by the tides, 
I was polished by the wind, worn through to the very soul. I was a portion of the great 
force on which I drifted, then much of it, then entirely it, confusing the throbbing of 
my own heart with the great sonorous beating of this omnipresent natural heart… 
And I have never felt so deeply at one and at the same time so detached from myself 
and so present in the world” (1968, 75). It is this presence in nature, a loss of self and 
a kind of merger with the environment that releases Camus from the noisome 
demands of the self, from “the quivering of wings inside me, life’s complaint, the 
weak rebellion of the mind” (1968, 75).  
 But after such moments unity, Camus is thrust back upon himself, tempted to 
contemplate his death and to react violently against it. He ponders: “You can be lying 
in bed one day and hear someone say: ‘You are strong and I owe it to you to be 
honest: I can tell you that you are going to die’; you’re there, with your whole life in 
your hands, fear in your bowels, looking the fool. What else matters: waves of blood 





 John Cruickshank has described this basic emotional constellation of unity 
with nature and rage against separation and death as Camus’ “tragic ambivalence” 
between “the richness of physical existence and the inevitability of death” 
(Cruickshank 1960, xi). But it is not precisely the contrast between life and death, as 
Zygmunt Bauman might claim, that makes us absurd. Bauman sees the ultimate 
incongruity of the human condition in the fact that we have “the freedom of a 
symbol-making and symbol-using subject,” but, at the same time, a “fatal dependence 
on [the] natural body” (Bauman 1992, 1). Death, he argues, is the real “scandal of 
reason” because death is not up to reason, because death “loudly declares reason’s 
lie” (1992, 1). Rather, for Camus, while the desire for unity is tinged with a disdain 
for reason (just as reason will help us to point out the defect and danger implicit in the 
desire for unity), the real issue is not between physically living and physically dying 
or immediate and symbolic experience per se, but between the ambivalent desires to 
lose and regain the self.   
 In Camus’ later works as well, like the stories collected in Exile and the 
Kingdom, Camus places his characters in erotic relationships with the natural world 
that express, almost graphically, the desire for unity. In The Adulterous Woman, for 
instance, Janine is seduced by the natural environment. She dreams of “erect, flexible 
palm trees” (1958b, 14), and eventually escapes the coldness of her husband, Marcel, 
by having what can only be described as a sexual affair with the landscape. In the 
scene of her ‘adultery’, Janine has stolen away from her sleeping husband to an old 
fort, pressed herself against the parapet, and reached out to the sky, when “with 




rose gradually from the hidden core of her being and overflowed in wave after wave, 
rising up even to her mouth full of moans. The next moment, the whole sky stretched 
out over her, fallen on her back on the cold earth” (Camus 1958b, 33). David Carroll 
and others have pointed out that Janine is being unfaithful to her husband and to the 
French, occidental, ‘self’ culture he represents (Carroll 1997, 532). But Janine’s 
passion is about more than politics; her love for the landscape is profound, 
unfulfillable, and, therefore, ultimately tragic. In the end, Janine returns to her room, 
to her unknowing husband, and weeps.  
 In The Rebel, Camus speaks of the Romantic artists’ desire for union with the 
natural world in similarly suggestive language. “Far from always wanting to forget 
[the world],” Camus writes, “they suffer, on the contrary, from not being able to 
possess it completely enough… Their actions escape them in the form of other 
actions, return in unexpected guises to judge them, and disappear like the water 
Tantalus longed to drink, into some still undiscovered orifice. To know the 
whereabouts of the orifice, to control the course of the river, to understand life, at last, 
as destiny — these are their true aspirations. But this vision which, in the realm of 
consciousness at least, will reconcile them with themselves, can only appear, if it ever 
does appear, at the fugitive moment that is death, in which everything is 
consummated” (1956b, 260-261).  
 The desire for unity expressed in Romantic art, which Camus will relate to the 
development of authentic absurd rebellion, is presented here almost as the desire to 
return to a natural or maternal womb through an ‘undiscovered orifice’ into which the 




‘control the course of the river’ of life, which, once again, suggests the presence of 
less idyllic urges, urges to possess and control, within the desire for unity. Perhaps 
Camus even intuited the darker aspects of this desire when he confessed that it could 
only find complete fulfillment in “the fugitive moment that is death, in which 
everything is consummated.”   
 However we understand passages like these, it should be clear that critics who 
understand the absurd as nothing but ‘evil’, or who believe that Camus sees nature 
merely as a hostile or indifferent force, will find it quite impossible to understand the 
meaning of his philosophy of the absurd. Nature, here, is more of a love object than a 
brutal or unthinkable ‘is-ness’, as Hayden Carruth might say. Camus wrote that he 
was born “into a nature with which one feels a harmony, not a hostility” (Hall 1960, 
29). And careful critics have noticed that, especially in Camus’ early work, “it is 
difficult to see any connection between this harmony, this synthesis, even this tragic 
sense of natural beauty (which in another sense heightens the absurdity of death) and 
any natural hostility as such” (Hall 1960, 29). If the absurd individual feels an 
antagonism with nature, therefore, Camus would argue that it is not precisely the 
hostility of nature, but one’s ambivalent and ultimately tragic desire for a unity sought 
in nature that generates the antagonism.       
 In fact, in his tremendously violent story, The Renegade, Camus makes it 
clear that whatever hostility might be found in nature is no match for the hostility we 
create in reaction to the discomforts of our ambivalent and unfulfilled desires. In this 
story, a renegade missionary travels to the “white, burning hell” (Camus 1958b, 42) 




Taghasians, however, who live in a “city of salt” (41) and worship at “the House of 
the Fetish” (45), have forged for themselves an impossibly hostile natural 
environment, “just to show that they could live where no one ever could, thirty days’ 
travel from any living thing, in this hollow in the middle of the desert, where the heat 
of day prevents any contact among creatures, separates them by a portcullis of 
invisible flames and of searing crystals, where without transition the cold of night 
congeals them individually in their rock-salt shells” (42).  
 In this natural hell, the renegade is subjected to outrageous tortures, 
humiliations, and mutilations. The story is one of his journey from confused 
missionary to enthusiastic worshipper of evil, which is not a terribly long one. Here as 
elsewhere, Camus intends to show that it is an excessive or unchecked desire for 
unity, a kind of unnatural and destructive excess, that leads to the excesses of evil. 
The renegade, after gruesome tortures that culminate in having his tongue sliced off, 
yields to the brutal Fetish and whole-heartedly approves “his maleficent order” 
(1958b, 53), reflected in the sterility and unnaturalness of their environs. The 
renegade priest explains:    
A prisoner of his kingdom — the sterile city carved out of a mountain of salt, 
divorced from nature, deprived of those rare and fleeting flowerings of the 
desert, preserved from those strokes of chance or marks of affection such as 
an unexpected cloud or a brief violent downpour that are familiar even to the 
sun or the sands, the city of order in short, right angles, square rooms, rigid 
men — I freely became its tortured, hate-filled citizen, I repudiated the long 
history that had been taught me. I had been misled, solely the reign of malice 
was devoid of defects, I had been misled, truth is square, heavy, thick, it does 
not admit distinctions, good is an idle dream, an intention constantly 
postponed and pursued with exhausting effort, a limit never reached, its reign 





The renegade’s vision of nature, like his embrace of evil, is, of course, the opposite of 
Camus’. The renegade gives way to the impossibly hostile climate, just as he gives 
way to the temptation of absolute malice for the sake of its clarity, for the sake of a 
potent unifying principle that resolves his ambivalence, his anxiety, and his 
unquenchable desire.   
 Donald Lazere has pointed out the Oedipal aspects of this story, which begins 
with the renegade’s declaration that “one really ought to kill one’s father” (Camus 
1958b, 36), and ends with the symbolic castration of the removal of his tongue 
(Lazere 1973, 97-98). But the story is not about Oedipal or sexual conflicts per se, but 
about a person who is, from the start, unable to bear limitation, anxiety, and 
ambivalence. The renegade cannot tolerate the idea of returning to doubt, of wearing 
himself out “in fruitless efforts instead of hastening the realization of the only 
possible kingdom” (Camus 1958b, 57). The renegade is so revolted by the idea that 
there could be “still millions of men between evil and good, torn, bewildered” 
(1958b, 60), that he feels he must choose absolutely, and so he chooses evil.  
 Jean Grenier’s Influence. The desire for unity has its own intellectual 
tradition, one too vast to be reviewed here. Camus was familiar with the tradition 
treating the désir de dieu, with Plato and Augustine (1961, 21-43), with Pascal’s idea 
that people are “made for God” (1995, 8), and with Kierkegaard’s harrowing 
struggles with absurdity and faith. But, as Jean Onimus notes, Camus’ first real 
contact with philosophy and religion came under the tutelage of his teacher and 




and lesser-known perspective of Grenier that Camus first met the thinkers and ideas 
he would treat throughout his works (see Garfitt 2007, 31-33).  
 Camus’ Preface to Grenier’s Islands claimed that the book “initiated [him and 
his contemporaries] in disenchantment,” that through it, he had “discovered culture” 
(Grenier 2005, 8). But even more than culture, Grenier’s thought had informed 
Camus about the contours and limits of the desire for unity, as it would inform his 
ambivalent vision of absurdity. Camus wrote that Grenier’s work “without denying 
the sensible reality which was our realm, duplicated it with another reality which 
explained our youthful disquiet. We had lived only half-consciously the transports 
and instants of the Yes, which had inspired some of the most beautiful pages of 
Islands; Grenier at the same time reminded us of their imperishable taste and their 
transience” (Grenier 2005, 9). While Grenier’s eventual conclusions about unity 
would be partly rejected by Camus, in this and the following chapter, we will see that 
Grenier’s influence is unmistakable in shaping Camus’ desire for unity.  
 What Camus calls the desire for unity is quite similar to what Jean Grenier 
called “le goût de l’absolu,” the appetite for the absolute (see Garfitt 1983, 23). Like 
Camus’ claim that the desire for unity is the primary psychological force in human 
life, the Avertissement of Grenier’s Absolu et choix claims that “the idea of the 
absolute is the very foundation of all thought” (Grenier 1961, my translation). And 
yet, for both Grenier and Camus, the concept of unity or the absolute escapes any 
attempt to define, characterize, or qualify it. In his essay on India, Grenier argued 
that “the mind immediately adheres to the eternal; yet it soon discovers that it can 




1983, 25, my translation). Thus, like Camus’ brief unions with the sea or the wind, 
Grenier’s intuition of the absolute is the foundation of all thought, and yet it is 
absolutely momentary.  
 As soon as the idea is formed, it vanishes, and it is ultimately the 
disappearance of the absolute that sparks philosophical and religious reflection. When 
“what was previously thought to be a presence is realized to be an absence, or at least 
to mask an absence,” says Grenier, we experience the profound inquietude or 
étonnement philosophique which inaugurates our quest to retrieve what we have lost 
(Garfitt 1983, 21). Metaphysical thought seeks to reconcile and compensate for this 
loss; our disquiet, then, is not prompted by the feeling that the world appears to be 
bad, but “that it appears to be other” (Grenier 1961, 3, my translation).  
 The desire for unity, or as Grenier calls it, the appetite for the absolute, is 
derived from this “surprise when faced with an abyss” (Garfitt 1983, 28, my 
translation). “There is a manque or vide at the centre of conscious existence,” Toby 
Garfitt explains, “which is implied even in its denial by some philosophers. 
Philosophical and religious systems undertake to substitute for that vide some form of 
plein, ‘l’idée d’un Tout éternellement nécessaire ou d’une totalisation jamais finie’” 
(1983, 28). This manque, this lack or absence, is similar to what Camus would 
describe as the feeling of being lost or homeless, being “divested of illusions and 
lights” (1955, 6), or being exiled or estranged. And like Camus’ desire for unity, the 
impulse to compensate for that lack is a fundamental spiritual, philosophical, and 




 Grenier admits that his discussion of the idea that “that the non-existence of 
the world is just as possible as its existence,” is only a repetition of the basic 
existential theme of the contingency of being (Garfitt 1983, 21, my translation). If 
that were all he added to Camus’ thought, it might not be worth reviewing. But, at the 
heart of Grenier’s account of the appetite for the absolute, we find an experience 
similar to Camus’ expression of the desire for unity, as well as an extreme attitude 
toward it that may inform Camus’ Meursault. As Camus introduces us to the absurd 
as “that odd state of soul in which the void becomes eloquent” (1955, 12), for 
Grenier, our attraction to absolutes is based upon an ambivalent attraction to and 
revulsion at the void. In his short essay, “The Attraction of the Void,” Grenier 
describes the experience of engulfment, of being ‘swallowed up’ by the void, which 
strikes him as ambivalently seductive and terrifying.  
Stretched out beneath the shade of a linden tree, gazing up at an almost 
cloudless sky, I saw the sky topple and sink into the void: it was my first 
impression of nothingness, all the more vivid in that it followed a rich and full 
existence. Since then I have sought out why the one moment could follow 
after the other, and, owing to a misapprehension common to all those who 
search with their intellect rather than with their body and soul, I thought it was 
a question of that which the philosophers call ‘the problem of evil.’  Yet, it 
was more profound and more grave. I had before me not so much a collapse as 
a gap; everything, absolutely everything, risked being swallowed up by this 
gaping hole… The illusory character of things was once again confirmed for 
me… by my ceaseless frequenting of the sea; a sea whose ebb and flow… 
disclosed in certain bays an expanse which the eye could only embrace with 
difficulty. What void!  Rocks, mud, water… Lost, irremediably lost — and 
starless. These reveries had nothing bitter about them… It was an innate 
affliction in which I delighted. I did not yet have a name for this sense of the 
infinite, no more than I had a name for this sense of nothingness. An almost 
perfect indifference was its result, a serene apathy — the state of an awakened 





 Grenier feels that there are two radical ways to cope with that ambivalent 
void: the path of the sage who perfects an absolute indifference and the path of the 
hero who chooses himself and a personal and exceptional ethic. Both have an 
“attitude singulière,” which Garfitt argues is meant to be taken “in a mathematical 
sense” (1983, 23), which means that, like some of Camus’ formulations of the desire 
for unity, the singular attitude of both the indifferent sage and the absolute hero 
eliminate difference and contrast between the self and the world. In the case of the 
sage, the more interesting case for Grenier and Camus, the goal is to attain that 
“perfect indifference… a serene apathy — the state of an awakened sleeper” (Grenier 
2005, 20). That indifference is found by regressing to a state of pure elementality, “to 
go from the state of being a man to being a brute, to go from the state of being an 
organism to being an element” (Grenier 1967, 92). We undertake a kind of living 
death, an activity a bit reminiscent of the work of Freud’s Thanatos which 
“transform[s] organic substances into inorganic” (Graubert and Miller 1957, 462).    
 Grenier characterizes this indifferent attitude as one which “frees us of 
everything, and first of all from ourselves” (Grenier 1967, 93). That is, by abandoning 
values, reason, and willful action, our indifference is precisely what releases the self 
from its difference from the world, thereby “mak[ing] all psychological constraints 
disappear” (Grenier 1967, 53). By abdicating will and choice in submission to 
necessity and nature, “the supreme and incomparable freedom which the sage has 
acquired does not assist him in acting or controlling, but rather toward [sic] giving 
himself free reign and letting himself be dominated by using a will toward 




dépossession is not exactly a ‘deprivation’; more precisely, it is a radical 
dispossession of the self, the will, and the values by which most modern, ‘occidental’ 
individuals discriminate, choose, and act.  
 For Grenier, our desire to recover the initial unity we intuited (perhaps we 
may call it a ‘nostalgia for unity’, like Camus) manifests itself in both an attraction to 
and a revulsion at a unity which is both the void and the absolute. We desire to 
become one with it, but we fear to be swallowed up by it, or we long to be swallowed 
up by it, but we also fear it. “Throughout the course of life,” Grenier claims, “man 
frequently evinces, and all the more as he exercises his intelligence, this feeling of 
anguish, a veritable vertigo, which leads him to fear being joined with Everything 
(l’Unité), and at the same time to wish for it” (Grenier 1961, 42, my translation). Both 
Grenier’s sage and Camus’ Meursault seem to find unity and non-difference by 
yielding to absolute indifference, thereby escaping the psychological constraints of 
the will, the conscience, the self, the demands of individuality and responsibility, and 
the painful awareness of limitation and mortality. In the following chapter, I hope to 
show that it is this expression of Meursault’s desire for unity, this will toward 
dépossession, that makes him taboo in a society that is ambivalent about the 
constraints and demands of individual autonomy and freedom. But before we can turn 
to The Stranger, it remains to explicate the second half of the ambivalence of the 
absurd: the desire for the self or the principium individuationis.  
The Desire for the Self or the Principium Individuationis  
While Camus convincingly describes the power and beauty of our desire for unity, he 




repugnant. It is difficult to find an appropriate name for this desire that contrasts so 
sharply with the ‘desire for unity’. A kind of principium individuationis, one would 
like to call it the desire for ‘self-preservation’, but the connotations of that term in the 
sense of physically surviving are a bit too strong for Camus’ subtler concerns. Camus 
wishes to preserve the intellect, the memory, and a kind of personal relationship to 
these things that I have failed to characterize more cleverly than as a ‘desire for the 
self’, a desire to preserve individuality and experience accompanied by a rejection of 
the loss of self implied by the desire for unity.  
 Camus claims that the existential philosophies he reviews in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, without exception, “suggest escape” (1955, 32). They suggest escape from 
the very dilemma they set out to solve, by “deify[ing] what crushes them and 
find[ing] reason to hope in what impoverishes them” (1955, 32). But from what, 
exactly, do these philosophers seek escape and why, exactly, should they not? The 
answers to these questions form the content of the second half of the ambivalence of 
the absurd.  
 It is easy to miss the nuances of Camus’ absurd desires because of his catchy 
but overly simplistic formulations of them. Perhaps Camus’ most famous rejection of 
unity is his demand “to live solely with what he knows, to accommodate himself to 
what is, to bring in nothing that is not certain… to find out if it is possible to live 
without appeal” (1955, 53, emphasis in original). But this expression of the desire for 
the self does not sufficiently capture the complexity or ambivalence of the absurd.  
 Earlier, I discussed the changing role of reason in relation to the desire for 




clarify, merge with, or perhaps even possess the world. Now, Camus quickly changes 
course and emphasizes that reducing experience to rational thought leads to self-
contradiction. In spite of our desire for unity, he writes, “we fall into the ridiculous 
contradiction of a mind that asserts total unity and proves by its very assertion its own 
difference and the diversity it claimed to resolve” (1955, 18).  
 Reason fails us in our attempts to unify experience. In fact, it begins to deny 
experience when it refuses to acknowledge that one of the few things of which we 
feel certain is our own, simple, unreasonable existence. “This heart within me I can 
feel,” Camus writes, “and I judge that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise 
judge that it exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction. For if I 
try to seize this self of which I feel sure, if I try to define it and to summarize it, it is 
nothing but water slipping through my fingers… Between the certainty I have of my 
existence and the content I try to give to that assurance, the gap will never be filled” 
(1955, 19). Faced with this contradiction, this gap, the absurd individual is thrust back 
upon himself. He comes to realize that he will never find the clarity and unity he 
seeks, that he will never “apprehend the world” (1955, 20). Yet this is not an easy 
discovery for Camus; rather, it represents a devastating insult, a terrible defeat, for 
“there is no happiness if I cannot know” (1955, 21).         
 If we fail to find the reasonable, clear understanding we seek, Camus argues 
that this failure does not suggest that we should negate the desire for unity that 
prompted our quest. Instead, Camus claims that we must challenge the content of our 
nostalgia, but not its presence. We can “negate everything of that part of [us] that 




for clarity and cohesion” (Camus 1955, 51). As discussed earlier, reflections like 
these have prompted many critics to compare Camus’ method to Descartes’. Camus 
seems to say that he can be certain only that he feels and experiences; beyond that, he 
can not know. And if he wishes to be true to what he can experience, then while he 
must refuse illusions, he must, at the same time, give a place to the irrational part of 
his experience that desperately longs for an unattainable unity. Camus then claims 
that the persistence of this desire, along with its negation, teach him that he is in an 
absurd condition, one in which he must recognize his desire as real, while admitting 
the impossibility of satisfying it.  
 Camus’ undefended assertions about matters of knowledge, doubt, certainty, 
and the reality of sensory and emotional experience have annoyed their share of 
philosophical critics. But, to be fair, Camus is not interested in speculating about the 
reliability or verifiability of senses, emotions, or perceptions. Nor is he, as some have 
thought, defending a Cartesian method or advancing a skeptical philosophy. Rather, 
Camus seems to be trying to describe, in unfortunately abstract and philosophical 
terms, an aspect of the ambivalence of the absurd. Camus is claiming that, in spite of 
himself, he is unwilling to discredit his intellectual experience. He feels unwilling to 
forget the limits, boundaries, and flaws in his fantastic desires. He is unwilling to 
escape his “raison dérisoire” (1955, 51), which, rather than “ridiculous reason,” 
might be better translated as ‘ridiculing reason’ or ‘derisive reason’ because it mocks 
our irrational and hopes and fantasies. This ridiculing reason stubbornly refuses to be 
carried away by fantasies of clarity, unity, or wholeness, setting the absurd person in 




between desires, caught between feelings of integrity and estrangement, only feels to 
Camus like being set “in opposition to all creation” (1955, 51). 
 The reason so many critics have mistaken Camus’ absurd is that Camus, 
himself, often either pretends or mistakenly believes that his consideration of the 
absurd is guided by a commitment to the principles of logic and methodical 
reasoning. Camus pretends to dedicate himself to a rigorous “method” in both The 
Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel (1955, 11, 30). Throughout the opening essay of The 
Myth of Sisyphus, for example, Camus proclaims that he will conduct his pursuit 
“without reckless passion, in the sole light of evidence” (1955, 9), maintaining the 
“lucidity imposed on [him] by the pursuit of a science” (1955, 21). He uses language 
like “evidence” (1955, 6), “logic” (1955, 9), and “data” (1955, 30-31), as if there 
were a scientific method at work in his speculations about the absurd.  
 But even casual readers should notice that Camus’ insistence upon logic and 
rationality is not based upon a sober commitment to objectivity or a disinterested 
analysis of his subject. There is not, in The Myth of Sisyphus or The Rebel, a reasoned 
or grounded defense of a skeptical method, of uncertainty or doubt, even of fidelity to 
experience. Rather, Camus presents us with appeals, evocations of desire, and 
persuasive metaphors and images. Contrasting sharply with the longing for absolutes, 
Camus describes his desire to return to “what I touch, what resists me” (1955, 51), to 
feel not the joy of unity but the boundaries and edges of the self. He longs not only to 
lose himself in the wind at Djemila, but to return to his body even with all of its limits 
and frailties. “The important thing,” to continue the bodily metaphor, “as Abbé 




(Camus 1955, 38). Whereas the philosopher and the mystic want to be cured of their 
ailments, to transcend their bodies, to be unified and ‘singulière’, Camus rejects these 
desires, the very same desires he elsewhere defends.  
 Camus opens The Rebel with a telling quotation from Holderlin’s The Death 
of Empedocles: “Openly I pledged myself to the grave and suffering land, and often 
in the consecrated night, I promised to love her faithfully until death, unafraid, with 
her heavy burden of fatality, and never to despise a single one of her enigmas. Thus 
did I join myself to her with a mortal cord” (1956b, 2). These metaphors of love, 
burden, and mortal bonds echo the essentially emotional motivations for Camus’ 
refusals of unity. For Camus, to yield to one’s desire absolutely, to lose the self, to 
‘bow down’ to the occult or the transcendent are depicted as types of crimes, 
betrayals, even sacrifices of the self and others. In speaking of Kierkegaard, Camus 
asks how it is possible not to recognize in his works “an almost intentional mutilation 
of the soul” which allows him to derive hope from death (1955, 39). Perhaps more 
famously, Camus characterizes the capitulation to the desire for unity as “the sacrifice 
of the intellect” (1955, 37), and as “philosophical suicide” (1955, 28, 41). That is, for 
Camus, yielding to the desire for unity absolutely amounts to a metaphorical, but still 
disgraceful, killing of the self.    
 Philosophical suicide is the process by which “a thought negates itself and 
tends to transcend itself in its very negation” (Camus 1955, 41). When Karl Jaspers’ 
“inability to understand becomes the existence that illuminates everything,” Camus 
detects “a leap” which offends him (1955, 33). Whether in philosophy or in 




therefore it must be superhuman” (1955, 40). And Camus insists that such 
superhuman excesses are not only dangerous, but are betrayals of the self, of physical 
life, and of the intellect. “All I can say,” Camus continues, “is that, in fact, that 
transcends my scale… I want to know whether I can live with what I know and with 
that alone. I am told again that here the intelligence must sacrifice its pride and the 
reason bow down. But… I merely want to remain in this middle path where the 
intelligence can remain clear” (1955, 40). Here again, Camus couches his indignation 
in rationalistic language, but its bitterness and anger are visible in his use of terms 
like ‘sacrifice’, ‘pride’, and ‘bow down’.  
 While Camus defines the rebel as “a man who is on the point of accepting or 
rejecting the sacred and determined on laying claim to a human situation in which all 
the answers are human — in other words, formulated in reasonable terms” (1956b, 
21), what he is trying to express is a kind of outrage at the idea of impoverishing, 
sacrificing, or losing the self amidst the sacred. Not even as fulfilling as an erotic 
union with nature, Camus argues that such efforts to find ephemeral clarity 
“impoverish that reality whose inhumanity constitutes man’s majesty [and are] 
tantamount to impoverishing him himself. I understand then why the doctrines that 
explain everything to me also debilitate me at the same time” (1955, 55). Camus thus 
refuses unity not on rational or skeptical grounds, but on behalf of an intense and 
opposing desire to preserve his own integrity and experience, which would be lost in 
unity, and which the clarity of the absolute could only ‘impoverish’ and ‘debilitate’. 
In a fascinating twist, Camus condemns not the rejection of the sacred but the desire 




without God” (1955, 40), not because it is selfish and turns away from God or nature, 
but quite the opposite: because in desiring unity, we are tempted to turn away from 
ourselves and our own experience, which Camus finds sacred in a different sense.  
 The Three Refusals. Camus’ haphazard treatment of the rejection of unity in 
The Myth of Sisyphus is decidedly complex, but now we may work through its logic 
step by step. My intention in analyzing and re-presenting this complex process is not, 
however, to defend it as reasonable, but to show that the story that has been told about 
the absurd since Camus first told it, is, itself, a bit absurd. We have already noted that 
a basic desire for unity goes unfulfilled, according to Camus. In spite of fleeting 
moments of union and self-loss that Camus describes with lyrical intensity, the 
desired union is not sustainable as a permanent state. We are almost tempted to 
attribute this failure to a property of the world. Indeed, Camus often seems to imply 
as much; as if nature, itself, rejected us, threw us back upon ourselves, spat us out of 
the ocean and onto the shore. This is what we might call the first refusal: the absurd 
person is said to be unable to find unity; he feels that his longing for unity has been 
denied by the world.  
 Like Grenier’s individual, Camus’ absurd individual is stunned by this refusal, 
surprised and wounded in the face of a manque where he expected to find a plein. 
Thus, Camus’ individual looks to his intellect to compensate for the loss he feels with 
an intellectual clarity. But the intellect is unable to fulfill this demand. As Camus 
says, “reason is impotent when it hears this cry from the heart” (1955, 27). Reason 
simply can not find a way to deliver the sought-after unity by means of principles and 




contradiction and self-defeat, into the confusion of the mind that “asserts total unity 
and proves by its very assertion its own difference and the diversity it claimed to 
resolve” (Camus 1955, 18). Camus explores other limits and paradoxes that the 
intellect runs up against in its quest for clarity, some of which he seems to mistake, in 
order to suggest the inability of reason to resolve the emotional pain involved in the 
unfulfilled desire for unity. This, then, is the second refusal: the mind’s inability to 
compensate for the pain and frustration caused by the first refusal.    
 But Camus’ elaborate plot thickens. Camus comes very close to contradicting 
himself by arguing, first, that reason is simply unable to discover a path to the unity 
we desire, and second, that reason does find a path to unity, but that the path is a 
short-cut, achieving a facile or insubstantial union. The mind, in Camus’ continuing 
saga, is not content to admit its impotence and leave the desire for unity unsatisfied. 
On the contrary, as we have seen above, there is no mind that does not “exhaust 
[itself] in trying to find formulas or attitudes that will give his existence the unity it 
lacks… It does not result in mediocre efforts to escape, however, but in the most 
obstinate demands. Religion or crime, every human endeavor in fact, finally obeys 
this unreasonable desire and claims to give life a form it does not have” (1956b, 262).  
 That is, even though the intellect once found itself powerless to do so, it now 
accommodates the desire for unity by cheating, by reducing the world to categories 
into which it does not perfectly fit, by idealizing its ignorance and worshipping that 
which is obscure, or by imposing form upon a world without form, doing violence to 
the world and the self. These immature and ignoble means of fulfilling our desire for 




under various headings (existential leaps, intellectual suicides, revolutionary 
doctrines, absolute affirmations, and absolute negations of experience) but they all 
share a basic logic for Camus. If we recognize that these resolutions are false, empty, 
or easy, if we recognize them as ‘leaps’ of thought or even as brutal impositions of 
the mind upon experience, we are compelled to reject them. This, then, is the third 
refusal: continuing attempts at unity, which were necessitated by earlier refusals, are 
again rejected, and not without prejudice.  
 Earlier, I suggested that Camus came close to contradiction in defining the 
steps toward this third refusal. Now it should be apparent that there is no real 
contradiction, as reason is initially unable to solve the puzzle before it, but 
subsequently learns to cheat, often simply by declaring the unsolved puzzle to be 
solved. Throughout these three refusals, Camus’ absurd individual is rebuffed, first 
apparently by nature, then apparently by reason’s limits, then apparently by a fidelity 
to experience which reason’s cheating offends.  
 But there is no good reason to take such ludicrous figurative explanations 
literally. What could it mean to say that ‘nature casts us out’, that ‘reason baulks at 
unity’, or that our ‘absurd method’ repudiates ‘escape’? These abstruse explanations 
begin to look like figurative expressions of our own refusals, projections of our own 
ambivalence onto natural and metaphysical forces which are beyond our control. A 
much more sensible and textually-sensitive explanation for these three refusals, then,  
would be the presence of equal and opposite desires that reject unity, that embrace the 
boundaries of the self and the body, that desire separateness, independence, and the 




 When asked what possible grounds an absurd person could have for critiquing 
existential, religious, or revolutionary doctrines, Camus claims that the absurd person 
rejects ‘leaps’ because he recognizes that they substitute false and contrived 
categories for ‘his truth’. But this invocation of ‘truth’, like earlier invocations of 
reason, doubt, and uncertainty, really serves to cover over an essentially emotional 
appeal. When Camus detects a leap, he rejects it not exactly because it offends his 
logic, but because, for him, it requires “forgetting just what I do not want to forget” 
(1955, 46). While less philosophically rigorous, that is, at least, a more 
understandable stance.    
 It is not clear whether Camus actually believed that his arguments about the 
refusals of unity were logically sound or whether he merely dressed them up as such 
for effect. It is even tempting to speculate that Camus’ descriptions of these refusals 
may be so elusive because they had to mask a complex ambivalence that he either 
could not or would not fully articulate. What is clear is that Camus’ efforts to frame 
the contrast between the desire for and the rejection of unity in philosophical 
language are often belied by the underlying emotional logic with which he thought 
we experienced and responded to those contrasts. We hear the painful tension of 
being between refusal and reunion, neither a sage nor a hero, neither absolutely 
unified nor absolutely separate. And while we are told that the absurd person is 
opposed by a world that refuses him, we continue to see him opposed only by 
himself, torn between contrary desires within, and engaged in a difficult resistance 




 In Chapters 7, 8, and 9, I make detailed applications of this analogy between 
absurdity and ambivalence to moral and political questions like: What is the absurd 
person to do when faced with this conflicted condition? If he or she refuses to yield to 
either desire, then what course of action remains? But for now, we may briefly reflect 
upon Camus’ reply.  
The first, and after all, the only condition of my inquiry is to preserve the very 
thing that crushes me, consequently to respect what I consider essential in it. I 
have just defined it as a confrontation and an unceasing struggle. And carrying 
this absurd logic to its conclusion, I must admit that that struggle implies a 
total absence of hope (which has nothing to do with despair), a continual 
rejection (which must not be confused with renunciation), and a conscious 
dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature unrest). Everything 
that destroys, conjures away, or exorcises these requirements (and to begin 
with, consent which overthrows divorce) ruins the absurd and devaluates the 
attitude that may then be proposed. The absurd has meaning only in so far as it 
is not agreed to. (1955, 31)   
 
Here, we notice not only the precise qualification of the emotions of absurdity (an 
absence of hope that is not despair and a rejection that is not renunciation), but that 
the ambivalence of the absurd entails an ambivalent attitude toward absurdity, itself. 
The absurd must be ‘preserved’ even though it crushes us. It must be ‘struggled 
against’, but never ‘ruined’. It must ‘have meaning’, but must not be ‘agreed to’. 
Elsewhere, Camus will tell us that the absurd rebel must be “faithful to the absurd 
commandments” (1955, 34), while, at the same time, “the absurd requires not to be 
consented to” (1955, 35). Eventually, the absurd rebel must undertake the “discipline 
the mind imposes upon itself, that will conjured up out of nothing, that face-to-face 
struggle” (1955, 55), which is a struggle against himself and against the temptations 
of yielding to his ambivalent desires. I argue that the absurd rebel’s mental discipline, 




integration of ambivalence, and that the first step of absurd morality is being able to 
remain in what Camus calls “extreme tension” (1955, 55), which we may imagine as 
a kind of ‘absurd position’ with respect to the ambivalence of the absurd.       
 The ambivalent qualities of the absurd are readily apparent when we consider 
Camus’ preferred expression of the moral consequence of the absurd, révolte or 
rebellion, which I will only introduce here as it is also the subject of Chapters 7 and 8 
of this volume. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus asks if we can survive absurdity, or if 
the experience is so painful that it must end in suicide. Of course, his answer is that 
we must never choose suicide, neither the physical nor the metaphorical kind, but 
must seek to remain in perpetual ambivalence. Rebellion, he says, is “a matter of 
living and thinking with those dislocations, of knowing whether one had to accept or 
refuse. There can be no question of masking the evidence, of suppressing the absurd 
by denying one of the terms of the equation. It is essential to know whether one can 
live with it or whether, on the other hand, logic commands one to die of it… The 
danger… lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on that 
dizzying crest — that is integrity” (Camus 1955, 50).  
 Absurd rebellion, as we will see, is ambivalent rebellion, a complex, 
integrative activity that “expresses an aspiration to order” (Camus 1956b, 23), while 
at the same time, denying and refusing order by living “without appeal” (Camus 
1955, 53). The absurd rebel “attacks a shattered world in order to demand unity from 
it” (1956b, 23-24), while simultaneously insisting that the world remain shattered by 
living “solely with what he knows” (1955, 53). I hope to show that rebellion is a 




indifference and extremism, and that it seeks both unity and limits in an attempt to 
contain the destructive potential of the absurd. In the absurd context, we rebel when 
we recognize our ambivalence and act responsibly upon that recognition, when we 
neither crush it nor allow it to crush us, when as Germaine Brée put it, “our 
consciousness of [the absurd’s] existence is followed by the refusal to be obsessed 
and paralyzed by it” (Brée 1964, 210-211).  
 This chapter and the chapter that preceded it have been concerned with 
establishing a basic analogy between the concept of ambivalence and the absurd. 
Rather than over-specifying the absurd by attaching it to a singular psychological 
pattern or organization, I have merely tried to show that a broad conception of 
ambivalence can help us comprehend the meaning of Camus’ often ambiguous, often 
esoteric accounts of the absurd. I have focused primarily on The Myth of Sisyphus 
here, because this text, much more than any other, sets out to examine the meaning of 
the absurd itself. In Chapters 7 and 8, I turn to Camus’ The Rebel, the text which, 
more than any other, seeks to outline the moral and political consequences of the 
absurd.  
 But before turning to these questions, it is important to discuss the meaning of 
absurdity and ambivalence with respect to Camus’ most famous work, The Stranger. 
The Stranger, right or wrongly, is widely considered to be an absurd novel, perhaps 
the absurd novel par excellence. Its main character, Meursault, is widely considered 
to be absurd, and its themes are often connected with, and commonly confused with 
both existentialism and absurdity. I will argue that Meursault is not absurd or 




novel derives from the conflict between Meursault and the society that judges him. I 
argue that Meursault is taboo in his society (and, more broadly, in most of the 
societies in which The Stranger is read) because he violates the prescriptions of 
personhood set out in Kant’s kingdom of ends. Recalling Freud’s discussion of the 
relationship between taboo and ambivalence, I make the case that the absurdity of the 
novel lies in our reactions to Meursault as one who refuses the demands of modern 




Chapter 6: Absurdity and Ambivalence in The Stranger  
 
The moral and customary prohibitions which we ourselves obey may have some 
essential relation to this primitive taboo the explanation of which may in the end 
throw light upon the dark origin of our own ‘categorical imperative’.  
— Freud, Totem and Taboo 
 
I ask you for this man’s head… and I do so with a heart at ease… Never as strongly 
as today have I felt this painful duty made easier, lighter, clearer by the certain 
knowledge of a sacred imperative and by the horror I feel when I look into a man’s 
face and all I see is a monster.  
— Camus, The Stranger 
 
Over the years, critical interest in Camus’ most famous literary character, Meursault, 
has overshadowed interest in the role of absurdity in The Stranger. While analyses of 
Camus’ most famous novel abound, surprisingly few interpretations have adequately 
addressed the relationship between it and the philosophy of the absurd.  
 The earliest interpretations of The Stranger, like Sartre’s “Explication” 
discussed in Chapter 2, asserted a direct relationship between the absurdity depicted 
in The Myth of Sisyphus and the character of Meursault. Because of Meursault’s 
‘pitiless clarity’, his refusals of social convention, his ‘lucid awareness’ of the absurd 
‘facts’ of life, Sartre tells us that we may be assured that Meursault is absurd (1962, 
112-113). Thus, The Myth of Sisyphus gives the theory of absurdity, while The 
Stranger gives the example. On this account, The Myth of Sisyphus may be used as a 
kind of reading guide for The Stranger, a supporting text that “teaches us how to 
accept our author’s novel” (Sartre 1962, 111). Sartre’s reading of The Stranger as a 
novel of absurdity, and Meursault as homo absurdus, while an unfortunate reading in 




 Roger Quillot’s impressive but slightly less influential study, The Sea and 
Prisons, sees Meursault as symbolic of the ambiguity and duplicity which, Quillot 
claims, run through nearly all of Camus’ fictional works. Quillot claims that while 
Meursault is simple, indifferent, even primal, Meursault’s experience is actually 
“consciously mutilated,” that Meursault is “born to duplicity,” for “between that 
smile that he tries to express and the grimace that his tin plate flashes back to him, 
there is a kind of rift; already, a fall from innocence” (1970, 81-82). Perhaps more 
restrained than Natalie Sarraute’s interpretation of Meursault’s character as the result 
of “a haughty choice, a desperate denial” (Sarraute in Quillot 1970, 81), Quillot 
nevertheless asks us to see in Meursault an odd complexity. “Let us go still further: 
were the gunshots aimed at the Arab or at Meursault himself? Was he [Meursault] not 
obscurely tired of the very unconsciousness in which he was exhausting his life? In 
his innocence, was he not calling down a misfortune that would overwhelm him and 
lead him to his final convergence? The chrysalis breaks its cocoon; the surfeited 
young obstinately seek the suffering that awakens them” (1970, 82).   
 But, as I hope to show, Quillot’s interpretive idées clefs (duplicity and 
ambiguity) are not entirely warranted in the case of Meursault. In fact, in his 
description of Meursault as a “distorting mirror held up to us,” as someone who 
shows us ourselves, “doubly betrayed but fascinated” (1970, 83), Quillot seems to 
blend Meursault with Clamence, the hero of Camus’ later novel, The Fall.  
 The Fall, which I do not treat extensively in this work, is a complex and 
layered confession of a man struggling with duplicity, guilt, vanity, and vice (see 




Willhoite 1968, 83-92). The reader of The Fall is struck by its themes of doubleness, 
contradiction, and ambivalence almost from the first word. The novel begins with the 
description of an Amsterdam café owner who is likened to both a “worthy ape” and a 
“Cro-Magnon man lodged in the Tower of Babel” (Camus 1956, 3-4). It continues 
with an account of the sad citizens of Europe who have only two passions: ideas and 
fornication (1956, 6). And it finally introduces us to Jean-Baptiste Clamence, a 
“judge-penitent” with a vox clamens (Willhoite 1968, 83), whose “profession is 
double… like the human being” (1956, 10).  
 The story, as Clamence confesses it, began late one evening when Clamence 
noticed a young woman perched on a bridge over the Seine. Moments later, he heard 
the sound of her body hitting the water, but instead of jumping in to save her, he 
returned home, told no one, and, in an attempt to forget the experience, avoided 
reading the newspapers for a while. Two or three years later, Clamence is startled by 
the sound of eerie laughter as he crosses the Pont des Arts. Rushing home in a state of 
distress, he finds that his “reflection was smiling in the mirror, but it seemed to me 
that my smile was double” (1956, 40).  
 The awakening of Clamence’s repressed memory, the re-discovery of his 
hypocrisy, and the forced confrontation with his moral contradiction (all of which 
Quillot refers to somewhat confusingly as his ‘ambiguity’), set Clamence off on his 
increasingly self-conscious and arguably self-defeating quest to confront his own 
viciousness and pretense. And in Clamence’s complex confession, issues of duplicity, 
guilt, and ‘ambiguity’ are undoubtedly significant. Once a successful lawyer who 




motivated his virtue, that if he were a shop on a winding Amsterdam road, his shop 
sign would be “a double face, a charming Janus, and above it the motto of the house: 
‘Don’t rely on it’” (1956, 47). Yet in spite of his pseudo-insight into his own 
duplicity, Clamence’s lengthy confession to his interlocutor and to the reader, of 
course, actually serves to relieve his anxiety and to inflict his guilt on others, an even 
deeper subterfuge of which Clamence is not unaware.  
 Yet, while The Fall is clearly a tale of duplicity, and while it may be tempting 
to read the themes of The Fall back into The Stranger, even a cursory reading of the 
two texts reveals that Clamence is not at all like Meursault. As I hope to show, 
Meursault is more singular than double, he is not morally self-contradictory or 
‘ambiguous’ in Quillot’s sense, and he is not racked by guilt nor attempting to 
displace his guilt onto others. Indeed, as discussed earlier, “Meursault is not in the 
least disturbed by his subjectivity… he is more an object than a subject” (Lazere 
1973, 154). Against Quillot’s interpretation, then, I find Meursault’s lack of duplicity 
and ambiguity to be central to his character, his crime, his punishment, and the 
broader relationship between The Stranger and the philosophy of the absurd.  
 Although Sartre’s and Quillot’s interpretations were influential, Camus was 
especially concerned to respond to critics like Wyndham Lewis, Pierre Lafue, and 
Aimé Patri, who saw Meursault as “‘a schizophrenic,’ or ‘a moron,’ or… an example 
of the mechanization and depersonalization of modern life” (Camus 1968, 336n). We 
might call such readings ‘diagnostic readings’ of The Stranger inasmuch as they seek 
to diagnose Meursault’s ‘condition’ with reference to psychological, medical, or even 




surprisingly common. Colin Wilson finds Meursault to be “basically a brainless idiot” 
(Scherr 2001, 150), while Dennis Fletcher and Arthur Scherr argue that Meursault 
had ‘low self-esteem’ and ‘thwarted ambition’ attributable to his unloving mother 
(Scherr 2001, 150). Even more dramatic psychiatric, medical, and psycho-social 
explanations for Meursault have found all sorts of things wrong with him, from 
alexithymia to scoptophilia to post-traumatic stress disorder. I examine the motivation 
for these questionable literary diagnoses in the concluding section of the this chapter.   
 In his Preface to the American University Edition of The Stranger (1968, 335-
337), Camus tried to correct these critics, but, as might be expected, he did so only by 
complicating the story even further. Because of its interest, I quote his short Preface 
in full:    
I summarized The Stranger a long time ago, with a remark I admit was highly 
paradoxical: ‘In our society any man who does not weep at his mother’s 
funeral runs the risk of being sentenced to death.’ I only meant that the hero of 
my book is condemned because he does not play the game. In this respect, he 
is foreign to the society in which he lives; he wanders, on the fringe, in the 
suburbs of private, solitary, sensual life. And this is why some readers have 
been tempted to look upon him as a piece of social wreckage. A much more 
accurate idea of the character, or, at least one much closer to the author’s 
intentions, will emerge if one asks just how Meursault doesn’t play the game. 
The reply is a simple one; he refuses to lie. To lie is not only to say what isn’t 
true. It is also and above all, to say more than is true, and, as far as the human 
heart is concerned, to express more than one feels. This is what we all do, 
every day, to simplify life. He says what he is, he refuses to hide his feelings, 
and immediately society feels threatened. He is asked, for example, to say that 
he regrets his crime, in the approved manner. He replies that what he feels is 
annoyance rather than real regret. And this shade of meaning condemns him.  
 For me, therefore, Meursault is not a piece of social wreckage, but a 
poor and naked man enamored of a sun that leaves no shadows. Far from 
being bereft of all feeling, he is animated by a passion that is deep because it 
is stubborn, a passion for the absolute and for truth. This truth is still a 
negative one, the truth of what we are and what we feel, but without it no 
conquest of ourselves or of the world will ever be possible.  
 One would therefore not be much mistaken to read The Stranger as the 




happened to say, again paradoxically, that I had tried to draw in my character 
the only Christ we deserve. It will be understood, after my explanations, that I 
said this with no blasphemous intent, and only with the slightly ironic 
affection an artist has the right to feel for the characters he has created. 
 
But Camus’ explication is one-sided and perhaps even disingenuous. It advances 
Meursault’s heroic qualities while ignoring his flaws, his inhumanity, and all that he 
seems to lack. More importantly, it ignores the absurdity and ambivalence generated 
by the novel’s psychological and moral tensions, which we must address, as they 
must be addressed in any comprehensive interpretation.  
 Perhaps because of the confusion created by Camus and his early critics, some 
recent scholars have abandoned any attempt to find a relationship between The 
Stranger and the absurd. Peter Petrakis claims, for instance, that “The Stranger is not 
primarily an examination of the absurd; rather, it is an exploration of the effects of 
exile on judgment” (2003, 23). But removing absurdity from The Stranger is an 
extreme and unsatisfying solution because Meursault’s striking indifference, his 
obvious contrast with his society, and Camus’ ambivalent treatment of him, all lead 
us to believe that Meursault has something to do with the absurd, even if we are 
uncertain of what.  
 This chapter argues that assertions of a direct relationship and assertions of a 
non-relationship between The Stranger and the absurd are equally wrong-headed. I 
take the somewhat unusual tack of arguing that Meursault is not an absurd character, 
at least not in any strict sense, although a salient absurdity of the novel may be found 




both by the reader of the book and by the fictional court that also ‘reads’, interprets, 
judges, and condemns him in the novel’s second part.  
 I argue that if Meursault does not ‘play the game’, it is not just any game of 
conformity or convention that he refuses, but, rather, the much more fundamental 
game of modern moral freedom. Meursault’s refusal to play this game makes him a 
taboo offender in liberal societies still influenced by the ideals and principles of 
Kant’s kingdom of ends. By provoking an ambivalence about freedom and autonomy 
in those who encounter him, we might even say that Meursault threatens us with 
absurdity by activating the ambivalences and anxieties described in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The Kingdom of Ends-in-Themselves 
This chapter argues that Meursault may be considered taboo because he trespasses on 
the sacred and profane territories of moral life demarcated by the ideals of freedom, 
will, and autonomy in Kant’s kingdom of ends. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly 
describe that ‘kingdom’ whose basic laws Meursault offends. The kingdom of ends is 
Kant’s famous ideal moral universe, the “systematic union of different rational beings 
through common laws” (Kant 1981, 39), where all rational subjects treat each other 
only as ends-in-themselves and never as means-to-an-end. Of course, the fictional 
French-Algerian society that Meursault offends is not actually a Kantian kingdom of 
ends; indeed, no society, real or fictional, could be. But many liberal and democratic 
societies, even the caricatured colonial society depicted in The Stranger, are founded 
upon the ideals of the kingdom of ends insofar as our laws, norms, and values are 




  The foremost demand of the kingdom of ends is that its citizens must be free. 
“Morality consists in the relation of all action to that legislation whereby alone a 
kingdom of ends is possible. This legislation must be found in every rational being 
and must be able to arise from his will” (Kant 1981, 40). A citizen’s ability to 
legislate his will depends upon a peculiar kind of freedom, the freedom to give 
himself a law which he then ‘freely’ obeys. It is a kind of self-legislation that Kant 
equates with freedom when he asks rhetorically: “What else, then, can freedom of the 
will be but autonomy, i.e., the property that the will has of being a law to itself?” 
(1981, 49). And the only law that the will can reasonably give to itself is the well-
known categorical imperative: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become 
through your will a universal law of nature” (Kant 1981, 30). Thus, freedom, 
understood as self-legislation and autonomy, forms the founding principle, the raison 
d’état, as it were, of the kingdom of ends.  
 The foundation of the kingdom of ends, that without which the kingdom 
would fall, is the presupposition of the freedom of all subjects. “Since morality must 
be derived solely from the property of freedom, one must show that freedom is also 
the property of the will of all rational beings” (Kant 1981, 50). But showing that 
freedom is, in fact, a property of the will is impossible for Kant, and, indeed, for 
modern philosophy. Kant admits that although “we have finally traced the 
determinate concept of morality back to the idea of freedom… we could not prove 
freedom to be something actual in ourselves and in human nature. We saw merely 




with consciousness of its causality as regards actions, i.e., as endowed with a will” 
(1981, 51, emphasis added). 
 The presupposition of freedom, therefore, begs questions to which there may 
be no answers. Kant admits: “We could give no satisfactory answer if asked the 
following questions: why must the universal validity of our maxim taken as a law be 
a condition restricting our actions?; upon what do we base the worth that we assign to 
this way of acting — a worth that is supposed to be so great that there can be no 
higher interest?” (1981, 51). These are serious questions about the foundations of 
moral and social life, questions about the good of being good, for which Kant finds 
only the most precarious answers. 
 “Freedom is a mere idea,” Kant explains, “whose objective reality can in no 
way be shown in accordance with laws of nature and consequently not in any possible 
experience. Therefore, the idea of freedom can never admit of comprehension or even 
of insight, because it cannot by any analogy have an example falling under it. It holds 
only as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being who believes himself 
conscious of a will, i.e., of a faculty distinct from mere desire” (1981, 59). Somewhat 
ironically, the presupposition of freedom becomes an item of faith in the Kantian 
system, a necessary assumption in which we must believe, in spite of a lack of 
comprehension or evidence.  
 In his System of Logic, John Stuart Mill offers an account of the theory of free 
will that may surprise those who know him as the father of liberal freedom. “The 
metaphysical theory of free-will, as held by philosophers,” Mill writes, “was invented 




deemed inconsistent with everyone’s instinctive consciousness, as well as humiliating 
to the pride, and even degrading to the moral nature, of man” (1925, vi, 2). Mill 
means that our dignity as moral individuals, along with the rationale for liberal norms 
and values, all depend upon the happy assumption that we are, in an abstract and ideal 
sense, free.  
 Without the moral vision the presupposition of freedom sustains, it is difficult 
to imagine how liberal political and legal norms could retain their legitimacy. “In a 
causally determined system the notions of free choice and moral responsibility, in 
their usual senses, vanish, or at least lack application, and the notion of action would 
have to be reconsidered” (Berlin 1969, 35). That is, without presuming the freedom of 
the will, the moral and political capacities of the liberal subject would disappear and 
“the use or abuse of the human being’s power of choice with respect to the 
moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be 
called ‘moral’” (Guyer 2003, 79).  
 Presupposing the freedom of the will also entitles us to think of ourselves as 
privileged with respect to nature and necessity, as possessing faculties that are 
“distinct from mere desire” (Kant 1981, 59). By obeying his own law, the Kantian 
individual becomes “free as regards all laws of nature and he obeys only those laws 
which he gives to himself” (Kant 1981, 41). Thus, he is spared the indignity of having 
to admit that he obeys, depends upon, or is subordinate to someone or something 
beyond or below his better self. The “mere idea” of freedom, as it operates through 




moral sovereign and, therefore, as above all the “mere things of nature” (Kant 1981, 
43). 
 As that which defines our moral status, our self-concept, and our 
independence from the forces of nature and desire, freedom becomes the 
metaphorical boundary that demarcates the moral and intellectual ‘territory’ of the 
kingdom of ends from the outer territories of sense, impulse, and necessity. This 
demarcation is observable in most modern theorists of freedom. For Kant, freedom is 
the principal difference between ends and means, intelligence and sense, humanity 
and animality. Even Rousseau would agree that “renouncing one’s liberty is 
renouncing one’s dignity as a man, the rights of humanity and even its duties” (1987, 
144). For J.S. Mill, to lack freedom is to become inhuman: “He who lets the world, or 
his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him” is not completely human, for he 
“has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation” (1975, 56, 
emphasis added). More recently, Isaiah Berlin expresses in plain language how 
freedom marks the basic difference between persons and things, subjects and objects, 
free creatures and slaves. “I wish to be a subject, not an object,” Berlin writes, “to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which 
affect me, as it were, from the outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer — 
deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or 
by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a 
human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them” 




 Even as contemporary theorists of freedom like Berlin shy away from 
essentializing characterizations such as “freedom is the essence of man” (1969, 60), 
many share with him the conviction that “the need to choose, to sacrifice some 
ultimate values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the human 
predicament” (Berlin 1969, 50-51). Whether thought to be characteristic of humanity 
itself or only of the human predicament, freedom and autonomy (and therefore moral 
choice) are the prices of membership in the world of modern subjects. Indeed, for 
Kant and for many modern philosophers, a moral law is conceivable only “because 
the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world” (Kant 1981, 55).  
 Kant’s moral and political philosophy may be considered an attempt to 
reconcile the twin demands of freedom hinted at above: (1) the need to be protected 
from interference or incursions from the outside, from others, and from nature, and 
(2) the need to be able to will, to choose, and to determine oneself by overcoming 
obstacles, vices, or weaknesses on the inside. As freedom marks the territory of the 
intellectual world while also uniting the subject with himself, the concept of freedom 
appears to have developed in way that curiously resembles the concept of 
sovereignty, as a response to a dual threat, and as that which both unites sovereign 
and subject and defends them from the outside (see Hinsley 1966; Merriam 1972; 
Walker 1993). The twin goals of self-actualization and freedom from interference, 
which survive in discussions of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty, yield, for Kant, the 
moral equation of freedom and autonomy. Kant argued that the will must always have 
an end, for “in the absence of all reference to an end no determination of the will can 




inevitably drives the will, only self-determination can offer it both autonomy and 
independence. 
 We might say that the Kantian subject presupposes his freedom in order to 
defend himself against anxieties about domination and dependence from both within 
and without. Paul Guyer explains that, for Kant, “the avoidance of domination by 
one’s inclinations and the avoidance of domination by other persons are not 
two independent goals after all. Allowing oneself to be dominated by the 
inclinations of others depends upon allowing oneself to be dominated by 
one’s own inclination to be dominated by others’’ (2003, 75). Both the inner 
and outer enemies of freedom attack via our inclinations, our inclinations 
both to dominate and to be dominated. For the Kantian subject, then, “the only 
way out’’ of this troubling world ‘‘would be to subordinate the satisfaction of 
his inclinations to an impartial principle’’ (Guyer 2003, 75).  
 The only way to be free from all domination (or to imagine that one is free 
from all domination) is to presuppose the freedom of the will and to act according to 
the principles it recommends as if they were natural laws. “We can belong [to the 
kingdom of ends] as members,” says Kant, “only if we carefully conduct ourselves 
according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature” (1981, 61, 
emphasis added). Instead of being dependent and dominated, the Kantian subject 
presupposes his freedom and then obeys it, preserving the dignity of his will and his 
sense of autonomy and control.   
 While the categorical imperative is distinct from the general will, the sleight 




to all, each person gives himself to no one” (1987, 148). Since Rousseau’s subjects 
must inevitably submit to something or someone, either the state or other associates, 
either the general will or particular wills, they find freedom only insofar as they 
submit (individually) to themselves (collectively). And while Kant will idealize the 
moral law perhaps even more than Rousseau, it is the basic equation of self-rule, 
independence, and freedom that permits both Rousseau and Kant to say: “A free will 
and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same” (Kant 1981, 49). 
 In the kingdom of ends, willing according to the principle of a categorical 
imperative seems to be the only escape from being dominated, chosen for, or acted 
upon. And the categorical imperative is conceivable if and only if we can presuppose 
the freedom of the will and sustain the illusion of that freedom. Thus, the precarious 
presupposition of freedom is a kind of core belief on which rests the dignity, morality, 
and humanity of subjects in the kingdom of ends.  
Meursault’s Taboo 
If the presupposition of the freedom of the will serves as the primary line of defense 
against domination and indignity, then Meursault’s challenge to this presupposition of 
freedom may be understood as a threat to all that freedom protects. In Chapter 4, I 
described Freud’s argument that basic ambivalences are at the heart of taboo 
prohibitions, that “taboo has grown out of the soil of an ambivalent emotional 
attitude” (1938, 855). It was Freud’s thesis that taboo prohibitions, like neurotic 
symptoms, reflected deep-seated ambivalences about the restrictions associated with 
collective life. As taboos reveal powerful but partly repressed emotional 




or the ordinary. “The converse of taboo in Polynesia,” says Freud, “is ‘noa’ and allied 
forms which mean ‘general’ or ‘common’” (1938, 822). Indeed, strangers and 
outsiders have long been associated with taboo because they represent what is unique, 
exceptional, and beyond the grasp of the group (see Dillon 1999). This understanding 
of taboo as strange and exceptional, rather than merely bad or vicious, will permit us 
to see that the more significant moral conflict represented in The Stranger is not 
between innocence and guilt, or good and evil, but between inside and outside, 
between the accepted and the unacceptable, even between the conscious and the 
repressed.   
  Freud claimed that taboo prohibitions reflected profound ambivalences in the 
group, powerful but frightening desires that conflicted with severe renunciations. As 
discussed earlier, Freud thought these ambivalences remained in individuals and in 
the group, even if they were driven into the unconscious. “The persistence of taboo,” 
Freud wrote, “teaches… that the original pleasure to do the forbidden still continues.”  
Individuals therefore “assume an ambivalent attitude toward their taboo prohibitions; 
in their unconscious they would like to do nothing better than to transgress them but 
they are also afraid to do it; they are afraid just because they would like to transgress, 
and the fear is stronger than the pleasure. But in every individual… the desire for it is 
unconscious, just as in the neurotic” (1938, 831).  
 The vehemence with which taboos are punished, for Freud, reflects not just a 
criminal sanction, but a defense against the ambivalence inspired by the taboo person 
or act. Coming into contact with taboo involves a risk of unleashing repressed and 




tempt him to violate the prohibition” (Freud 1938, 832). The real danger of the taboo 
person, then, lies in “the possibility of imitation, as a result of which society would 
soon be dissolved. If the others did not punish the violation they would perforce 
become aware that they want to imitate the evil doer” (1938, 833).  
 For Freud, taboo offenders are punished because they are, in a sense, carriers 
of a psychological contagion of ambivalent and threatening possibilities. “They are 
the seat of tremendous power which is transmissible by contact, and may be liberated 
with destructive effect if the organisms which provoke its discharge are too weak to 
resist it” (Freud 1938, 823-824). It is something of this frightening contagion of taboo 
that Meursault’s prosecutor alludes to when he argues that “the emptiness of a man’s 
heart becomes, as we find it has in this man, an abyss threatening to swallow up 
society” (Camus 1988, 101).  
 One of the more fascinating aspects of The Stranger is that Meursault is not 
condemned simply because he violates the law. In addition to committing a murder, 
which is almost an afterthought in his trial, Meursault offends something else within 
his, and our, prevailing moral, social, or political orthodoxy. I will try to show that 
Meursault’s crime and his violations of social norms (norms related to death, 
mourning, marital engagement, and renunciations) are uniquely exacerbated by his 
apparent refusal to be a free subject. We may understand this claim if we imagine a 
hypothetical Meursault who commits the same crime and violates the same norms, 
but who presents himself as a free, Kantian subject, a Meursault who chooses, 
determines his will, reflects upon his actions, and can explain himself clearly. Were it 




Camus’ Meursault, who presents such a puzzle to his fictional court and to decades of 
readers of The Stranger. In addition to his senseless crime and his odd behavior, 
Meursault’s taboo unfreedom may be seen in at least three different aspects of the 
novel.  
 First, Meursault seems unable or unwilling to offer any reasoned account of 
his choices, his actions, or his preferences. He refuses to explain himself. By not 
couching his behavior in the language of freedom, the language of choice and will, 
Meursault does nothing to refute our impression that he is a radical exception to the 
presupposition of freedom in the kingdom of ends. In this sense, it is true that 
Meursault is condemned for having no explanations.  
 The two acts that appear to contribute the most to Meursault’s condemnation 
are his alleged “insensitivity the day of Maman’s funeral” (Camus 1988, 64), and his 
admitted act of murder. But it is a significant irony of the novel that Meursault is not 
really condemned for either, but for being unable to justify or explain them in socially 
acceptable ways. Meursault clearly has opportunities to save himself, to offer an 
explanation for his actions that might reduce his sentence or even get him acquitted 
(Camus 1988, 64-68, 103). These opportunities suggest that Meursault does not die 
for his criminal act but for his apparent refusal to freely choose that criminal act. This 
is one way to understand Camus’ remark in the Preface cited above that Meursault 
agrees “to die for the truth,” that “he refuses to lie,” and that “he does not play the 
game” (Camus 1968, 252).  
 The second mark of Meursault’s lack of freedom is his seemingly vast 




prerequisites to the Kantian processes of determining the ends of the will and acting 
freely and autonomously. On the contrary, Meursault refuses to recognize any 
differences between his actions and their alternatives. He claims that “one life was as 
good as another” (Camus 1988, 41), that marriage “didn’t really matter” (41), that “to 
stay or go [on the fateful beach], it amounted to the same thing” (57), and that “you 
could either shoot or not shoot” a person (56). Speaking of his mother, Meursault 
admits only that he loved her “the same as anyone” (67), and that “at one time or 
another all normal people have wished their loved ones were dead” (65). When asked 
if he regrets his crime, Meursault replies that rather than sorry he feels annoyed 
(ennui) (70). In the end, facing death, Meursault proclaims that “nothing, nothing 
mattered, and I knew why” (121), and that “since we’re all going to die, it’s obvious 
that when and how don’t matter” (114). By not distinguishing between his actions, 
their alternatives, and their consequences, Meursault seems to refuse the most basic 
components of moral freedom in the Kantian sense.  
 The third way in which Meursault seems unfree is in his submission to his 
own physical inclinations and impulses, as well as the inclinations and impulses of 
others. In fact, Meursault even admits at one point that his “physical needs” regularly 
get in the way of his thoughts and feelings (Camus 1988, 65). Meursault often yields 
to his inclination to sleep and because of his sleepiness, he half-stumbles through the 
most significant events of the novel, like his mother’s funeral (17-18). At his 
mother’s vigil, Meursault accepts conversation, coffee, and cigarettes from the 
funeral director (8), which, although seemingly a trivial matter, later serves as 




eat sausage and drink wine, Meursault acts as accomplice in Raymond’s illicit and 
violent sexual affair with a woman related to Meursault’s eventual murder victim (32, 
37). And, of course, the day after his mother’s funeral, Meursault swims, attends a 
comedic film, and sleeps with Marie, a young woman from his office (19-21). The 
fact that Meursault yields to these physical impulses at times and in situations where a 
more autonomous, Kantian subject might have exercised greater ‘will-power’ plays a 
significant role in Meursault’s trial and sentencing (94).  
 At the most crucial moments of his life, Meursault’s will appears to be 
determined by anything but itself. The heat of the sun, his constant sleepiness, an 
inexplicable urge to return to the beach, a headache, and a pressing physical 
discomfort are the only discernible antecedents to his perplexing act of murder. “The 
trigger gave,” Meursault explains, “and there, in that noise, sharp and deafening at the 
same time, is where it all started” (Camus 1988, 59). More of an account of the 
physical impulses that drove Meursault than an explanation of a free act, Meursault’s 
crime seems utterly will-less, undetermined, and unfree. Equally perplexing are the 
four additional shots, the “quatre coups brefs que je frappais sur la porte de malheur” 
(Camus 1942, 90), that Meursault fires into the dead body of his victim. These shots 
are unintentional in a strict sense, seemingly beyond his control, and they awaken him 
to his unhappiness as if he had heard them before realizing that it was he who was 
doing the firing.  
 By not accounting for his actions, by not discerning differences between 
alternatives, by not determining his will, and by yielding to impulse and passivity, 




light of this unfreedom, Meursault is condemned not only for the murder of the 
unnamed Arabe, but also for the death of his mother. Through the ‘contagion’ of 
taboo, Meursault’s crime is translated into a metaphorical matricide when he is 
accused by the prosecutor of being “morally guilty of killing his mother” (Camus 
1988, 101-102). To the defense attorney’s question, “Come on now, is my client on 
trial for burying his mother or for killing a man?,” the prosecutor replies, “between 
these two sets of facts there existed a profound, fundamental, and tragic relationship. 
‘Indeed… I accuse this man of burying his mother with a crime in his heart!’” 
(Camus 1988, 96). 
 Meursault’s crime is transformed not only into matricide but into parricide, 
the two ultimate, and ultimately taboo, crimes. The prosecutor proclaims that 
Meursault’s “callousness inspired in him a horror nearly greater than that which he 
felt at the crime of parricide” (Camus 1988, 101). And according to him, “a man who 
is morally guilty of killing his mother severs himself from society in the same way as 
the man who raises a murderous hand against the father who begat him. In any case, 
one man paved the way for the deeds of the other, in a sense foreshadowed and even 
legitimized them” (Camus 1988, 102).  
 Meursault’s actions seem to spread, to shape-shift, to slide from one murder to 
the next. Meursault becomes guilty not only of his crime but of other people’s crimes. 
The prosecutor concludes his case on just such a note: “‘I am convinced, gentlemen,’ 
he added, raising his voice, ‘that you will not think it too bold of me to suggest to you 




court tomorrow. He must be punished accordingly’” (Camus 1988, 102, emphasis 
added). 
 Although guilty of a single murder, Meursault comes to symbolize 
murderousness itself. The prosecutor finds Meursault to be inhuman, claiming that he 
has peered into Meursault’s soul and “found nothing” (Camus 1988, 101). According 
to the prosecutor, “the truth was that [Meursault] didn’t have a soul and that nothing 
human, not one of the moral principles that govern men’s hearts, was within [his] 
reach” (101). It is Meursault’s taboo, and not his crime, that seems responsible for 
transforming him from a criminal into a soulless monster.  
 The taboo qualities of Meursault’s attitudes and actions, even more than his 
criminal act or his ‘insensitivity’ to sensitive issues, challenge the presupposition of 
freedom that is the foundation of the modern moral vision. Like any grave taboo, that 
challenge appears to provoke an ambivalence that permits the prosecutor and the jury 
to condemn Meursault to death with clear consciences. In petitioning the jury for a 
capital sentence, the prosecutor offers a telling remark. “I ask you for this man’s 
head,” he explains, “and I do so with a heart at ease. For if in the course of what has 
been a long career I have had occasion to call for the death penalty, never as strongly 
as today have I felt this painful duty made easier, lighter, clearer by the certain 
knowledge of a sacred imperative and by the horror I feel when I look into a man’s 
face and all I see is a monster” (Camus 1988, 102, emphasis added).  
 That sacred imperative appears to be a complex combination of the 
categorical imperative and a taboo imperative, one that insists, in this case, that the 




detail below. Understanding Meursault to be taboo in the kingdom of ends, therefore, 
suggests a repressed ambivalence about the freedom and autonomy he challenges. 
Meursault seems to threaten to make us absurd, in that he threatens to make us aware 
of the precariousness of the presupposition of our freedom by appearing as an 
exception to it. We would like to deny that our freedom is precarious, even to deny 
that freedom is a presupposition, because admitting as much risks uncovering our 
ambivalence about passivity, dependence, and domination which the presupposition 
of freedom covers up. Put more simply, Meursault’s taboo punishment appears to be 
derived from a repressed wish to renounce our freedom and autonomy in imitation of 
Meursault. 
Absurdities and Ambivalences of Modern Freedom  
So far, I have argued that what is really ‘absurd’ about The Stranger is not 
Meursault’s idiosyncratic personality, but the ambivalent emotions that he ignites in 
the fictional society that tries him and in the readers of the novel who judge and 
interpret him. Absurdity in The Stranger, then, is not a property of a single character, 
but is evident in the interactions between the characters of the novel, within the 
dynamics of the novel as a whole, and among the interpretations of its readers and 
critics who often find their own ways to defend against the ambivalence Meursault 
provokes. Drawing this relationship between absurdity and ambivalence in The 
Stranger should permit us to use the novel to reflect upon the moral, psychological, 
and political implications of ambivalence about freedom and our reactions to it, 
themes to which Camus’ later work on the absurd (and the following chapters of this 




 There are a number of reasons why individuals might be ambivalent about 
freedom; I can only review a few in the remaining pages of this chapter. Whatever the 
reason, if individuals are at all ambivalent about freedom, it is important to recognize 
that such an ambivalence may well be taboo in ‘freedom-loving cultures’, especially 
in the United States, the ‘land of freedom’ that has idealized and identified itself with 
freedom throughout its history. Indeed, if “no idea is more fundamental to 
Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals and as a nation than freedom” (Foner 
1998, xiii), then understanding The Stranger in the way I have proposed may reveal 
not only the challenges of interpreting the novel in America, but the defenses against 
ambivalence about freedom that might otherwise remain hidden due to the central 
role freedom has played in shaping American (as well as European, modern, and 
liberal) identities.      
 Marcuse’s description of the relationship between Kantian freedom, 
autonomy, and subjectivity is a useful place to begin. According to Marcuse, the 
modern, idealist subject “is rational only insofar as it is entirely self-sufficient. All 
that is ‘other’ is alien and external to this subject and as such primarily suspect… 
Self-sufficiency and independence of all that is other and alien are the sole guarantee 
of the subject’s freedom. What is not dependent on any other person or thing, what 
possesses itself, is free… Relating to the other in such a way that the subject really 
reaches and is united with it (or him) counts as loss and dependence” (Marcuse 1989, 
60-61).  
 Marcuse is arguing that the modern presuppositions of freedom and reason 




By internalizing freedom and equating it with independence, the modern, idealist 
subject is able to feel free from the contingencies and hazards (but perhaps also the 
blessings) of the social and natural worlds. The individual presupposes his own 
subjective and internal freedom, therefore, as a kind of defense against what would be 
an eternal and impossible struggle to win absolute freedom in reality. And while this 
faith in freedom grants the illusion of freedom from the established order, according 
to Marcuse, it ultimately reinforces that order by presupposing its necessity. “Reason 
and freedom become tasks that the individual is to fulfill within himself,” Marcuse 
writes, “and he can do so regardless of external conditions. Freedom does not 
contradict necessity, but, to the contrary, necessarily presupposes it. Only he is free 
who recognizes the necessary as necessary, thereby overcoming its mere necessity 
and elevating it to the sphere of reason… Idealist rationalism canceled the given 
antithesis of freedom and necessity so that freedom can never trespass upon necessity. 
Rather, it modestly sets up house within necessity. Hegel once said that this 
suspension of necessity ‘transfigures necessity into freedom’” (1989, 60).  
 If modern societies insist that their citizens show outward signs or 
“semblances” of their internalized freedom (Marcuse 1989, 60), then Marcuse might 
argue that they do so not with the benevolent intent of ensuring that all of their 
citizens are equally liberated, but because the social order in some sense depends 
upon free subjects who are willing to translate political necessities into ideologies of 
freedom. Foucault’s vision of the complex interdependence between freedom and 
self-formation, political practice and self-practice, government and self-government 




the conduct of the governed… Governmental power assumes a ‘free subject,’… one 
whose subjection is consistent with forms of choice… The distinctive feature of any 
liberal mode of government is that it seeks to prevent the collapse of types of rule into 
mere domination by invoking the capacities and powers of the self-governing 
individual, while at the same time undertaking to foster, shape, and use those same 
capacities and powers” (Dean 1994, 162-163). Thus, an individual like Meursault 
who refuses free self-government seems to threaten those related processes of 
government that rely on the capacities of free subjects. Meursault not only presents an 
exception to the rule of ‘free’ methods of subjectivity and subjection, but he disrupts 
the harmony imagined between free and necessary conduct, threatening to uncover 
the contingency, dependence, and domination that the presupposition of freedom 
denies.  
 To make matters somewhat more complex, the illusory harmony provided by 
the presupposition of freedom is, itself, charged with ambivalence. It may be 
comfortable insofar as the presupposition of freedom promises protection from 
dreaded feelings of dependence and domination, but the comfort it offers comes at a 
psychic cost. That is, the task of the modern, free individual is elaborate and difficult. 
Marcuse described the freedom of modernity as “the freedom of interminable, 
arduous labor” (1989, 61). Of course, the labor Marcuse refers to here is not just labor 
in the economic sense, but the difficult emotional and intellectual work required for 
the constant creation and re-creation of the self, for the “constitution of the world for 
the ego,” and for the production and re-production of self and reality “in recalcitrant 




 Foucault’s What is Enlightenment? echoes some of the ambivalence involved 
in the “attitude of modernity” toward freedom, which Foucault describes as a result of 
the “difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom” 
(1984, 39). Modern freedom, in Foucault’s sense, compels persons to produce 
themselves in a particular and difficult way which is not entirely liberating nor 
entirely constraining. “To be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of 
the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult 
elaboration… This modernity does not liberate man in his own being; it compels him 
to face the task of producing himself” (1984, 39).  
 In Escape from Freedom and elsewhere, Erich Fromm described the 
psychological pressures of this difficult task in relation to the rise of Nazism and 
totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Fromm’s work points to an ambivalence 
about freedom that derives from the “ambiguity of freedom” (1994, 23), which 
consists of the helplessness and alienation caused by freedom, on one hand, and the 
gift of human culture on the other (1994, 31-32). This “ambiguous gift” of freedom is 
difficult to bear (1994, 32), especially in the modern world where individuals are 
often overwhelmed by “feeling[s] of isolation and powerlessness” (1994, 118). Thus, 
Fromm claimed that individuals may seek to “get rid of the burden of freedom” 
(1994, 151), through authoritarianism, destructiveness, or conformity.  
 While Fromm tended to characterize modern freedom as a kind of ‘aloneness’, 
this chapter has tried to emphasize the way that the presupposition of freedom may 
serve as a shared convention, a rite de passage into the kingdom of ends, and, in 




isolate and alienate the self in some respects, Camus’ novel points out that an ideal of 
freedom unites Meursault’s society against him, as it enforces its demands for 
freedom on the wills of all its subjects. If there is duplicity in The Stranger, it lies in 
the self-deception and hypocrisy of Meursault’s judges who evince, in Fromm’s 
words, “man’s capacity for distorting the reality of his own experience to conform to 
socially established norms” (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 106-107), as they mistake, 
warp, and demonize Meursault in order to defend themselves against the threat he 
poses.  
 Like Fromm, Kant invokes the familiar story of the expulsion from the 
Garden of Eden as a metaphor for ambivalence about freedom. In his Speculative 
Beginning of Human History, Kant claims that “this step,” from the garden to 
humanity’s exile, “is at the same time connected with man’s release from nature’s 
womb, a change that is, indeed, honorable, but also full of danger, since she drove 
him out of the safe and secure state of childhood” (1983, 53). The memory of the 
blissful garden haunts Kant’s man, who dreamed of “trifl[ing] away his existence in 
peaceful inactivity and permanent peace” (1983, 53). But, standing in the way of such 
fantasies, freedom and reason “restlessly and irresistibly drove… him to undertake 
with patience the toil that he hates, to chase after the frippery that he despises, and to 
forget death itself, which fills him with horror — all for the sake of those trivialities 
whose loss he dreads still more (1983, 53). 
 It is remarkable that Kant expresses the ambivalences of reason and freedom 
in such powerful terms, for we are much more accustomed to the Kant who 




opening line of his famous essay, “What is Enlightenment?,” is a case in point: 
“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity” (1983, 41). If 
we combine these accounts, we may imagine that part of the ambivalence of freedom 
resides in a desire to return to this state of immaturity, to a condition of being chosen 
for instead of choosing, a condition of dependence rather than independence. If the 
sacrifice involved in becoming a free subject is something akin to the sacrifices and 
renunciations of enlightenment or adult human development, then Meursault’s 
undeveloped self, his childishness, and his often-invoked “animality” (Doubrovsky in 
Brée 1962, 74), may be taboo precisely because they activate a repressed desire to 
return to the ease and security afforded by “the shackles of permanent immaturity” 
(Kant 1983, 41).  
 We have already discussed the influence of Jean Grenier upon his pupil’s 
conception of the desire for unity and the ambivalence of the absurd. Meursault seems 
to exercise a Kantian unfreedom not unlike that of Grenier’s sage, a “sovereign moral 
indifference” that “makes no distinctions between beings,” “abolishes values,” and 
refuses “to make use of any part of [his] liberty” (Grenier 1967, 52-54). Like 
Grenier’s sage, Meursault refuses the most basic tenets of freedom, subjectivity, and 
responsibility. And like Grenier’s sage, Meursault submits his will to his inclinations 
and the inclinations of others, permitting himself to be dominated by his physical 
impulses, by other wills, by necessity, and by nature. As opposed to the Kantian 
demand that the free individual reason, will, and act in full possession of his faculties, 
Meursault’s “supreme and incomparable freedom… does not assist him in acting or 




dominated by using a will toward dépossession” (Grenier 1967, 101). What is partly 
enviable about Meursault and Grenier’s sage is their indifference to the demands of 
freedom, a paradoxical freedom-from-freedom that “frees us of everything, and first 
of all from ourselves” (Grenier 1967, 93). By abandoning freedom, will, and reason, 
Meursault’s curious unfreedom holds an ambivalent attraction because it offers the 
possibility of making “all psychological constraints disappear” (Grenier 1967, 53).  
 In Rethinking Freedom, C. Fred Alford has identified among his interview 
subjects a split-consciousness about freedom, for which he offers a borderline cultural 
diagnosis, one which also reflects the ambivalence about freedom and autonomy this 
chapter has sought to explore. Alford’s informants define freedom as power and 
money, on one hand, but as abandon, passivity, and loss of self-control, on the other 
(2005, 24-25). His subjects are ambivalent about freedom in that most do not speak 
highly of the ‘symbols’ of freedom like those found in the Bill of Rights, and many 
are unable to unite the disparate conceptions of freedom they offer.   
 Alford’s informants seem to desire both abandon and omnipotence, which 
they express in complex and alternating equations of freedom with intoxication, 
power, money, relaxation, and death. While part of their difficulty in navigating 
freedom seems to have to do with a kind of symbolic impairment, a difficulty in 
making use of the symbols that moderate the polarities of freedom, they also give 
voice to an ancient ambivalence about freedom: the “hidden desire of Western 
civilization to abandon the Promethean struggle for mastery, built as it is on a vain 
attempt to assuage the wounded will” (2005, 78). Thus, while departing slightly from 




freedom is attributable to an ambivalent desire to be free and unfree, to possess the 
self absolutely and to escape the burdens that freedom levies upon the self. 
Critical Absurdities 
Whether we imagine the source of ambivalence about freedom to be the desire for 
sage-like indifference, a fear of freedom, a weariness of the demands of freedom 
upon the self, or just a recognition of the precariousness of its defense against 
domination and dependence, it should be clear that these emotions all play important 
roles in the fundamental ambivalence with which I have analogized the absurd: the 
desire for unity and the desire for the self. We may now summarize the complex 
relationship between the absurd and The Stranger.  Meursault’s behavior is taboo 
because it threatens to make us absurd, but by inciting repression and retribution from 
those whom he provokes, it is not so much Meursault as his judges and interpreters 
who reveal the primary dangers in contending with the absurd: the tendencies to 
defend, to scapegoat, and to inflict aspects of our absurdity upon others.  What may 
be surprising is that this repressive and retributive reaction is apparent not only within 
the plot of the novel, but among the critics and scholars who, in their own ways, have 
felt compelled to ‘punish’ Meursault.   
 Leo Bersani is right that we must think of Meursault’s trial as “a novelistic 
competition between the prosecuting and the defense attorneys” where “each of the 
lawyers tries his hand at spinning a yarn about Meursault’s ‘soul’” (1970, 220). But 
these novelizing tendencies are apparent not only in the fictional court that tries 
Meursault, but in the efforts undertaken by readers, scholars, and critics of The 




diagnostic efforts, like the efforts made by the prosecutor, judge, and jury that try 
Meursault, attempt to force Meursault to be free, revealing even among the most 
thoughtful critics the presence of an ambivalence about Meursault’s taboo and a 
defensive and even hostile reaction to it. 
 Readers and critics from a variety of fields have approached Meursault as 
pathological, ill, or flawed, as someone whose behavior is “the result of a lack” 
(Tisson-Braun 1988, 49). René Girard’s famous early interpretation saw Meursault as 
a childish “derelict” who committed murder and misbehaved mainly to get attention 
from others. “The only way to illuminate the esthetic structure of L’Étranger,” Girard 
claims, “is to resort to the social phenomenon called ‘juvenile delinquency’” (1964, 
531). According to Girard, Meursault, like the juvenile delinquent, “wants to be 
punished, in order to express his grief without confessing its real cause, even to 
himself. In the last sentence, Meursault practically acknowledges that the sole and 
only guillotine threatening him is the indifference of les autres” (1964, 531, emphasis 
in original). Girard is, of course, referring to the final words of the novel in which 
Meursault proclaims that when he walks to his death, all he requires “for everything 
to be consummated” and “to feel less alone” is “a large crowd of spectators… that 
greet [him] with cries of hate” (Camus 1988, 123).  
 In his interpretation of Meursault as a delinquent, Girard intuits (but does not 
make quite enough of) the contradiction and ambivalence in The Stranger. “We must 
not speak of the novel’s unity,” Girard claims, “but of its consistent duality and of its 
radical ambiguity. How could the novel be one when its creative process is truly 




division inherent in the murder; every denial of communication is really an effort to 
communicate; every gesture of indifference or hostility is an appeal in disguise” 
(Girard 1964, 530). And yet, even though he recognizes the ambiguity of the novel, 
Girard and other critics have focused too much attention on Meursault’s character, 
neglecting to understand Meursault’s relationship to his society and to his readers. 
 Meursault’s sociopathic behavior has been attributed to an astounding variety 
of diagnosable illness, most more psychiatrically-precise than ‘delinquency’. 
Meursault has been diagnosed with affectlessness (Nathanson 1997; Stone 1996), 
alexithymia (Poser 2002), “chronic covert self-destructive aggressiveness” (Leites 
1947), the “Meursault phenomenon” of psychoimmunization (Anthony 1987), 
impeded curiosity (Goldberg 2002), post-traumatic stress (Krystal 1978), 
sadomasochistic object-indifference (Makari, 1988), “oral scoptophilic and 
sadomasochistic ecstasy bordering on panic” (Leites in Longstaffe 1990, 57-58), and 
other questionable conditions (see Costes 1973; Duff 1977; Duncan 2002). These 
clinical diagnoses of Meursault appear in a surprisingly wide variety of fields, from 
literary criticism to clinical psychology, philosophy, criminal law, and child 
development.  
 But without turning their attention to the grounds upon which such judgments 
are made, diagnoses of Meursault are deflections of his challenge to the 
presupposition of freedom, effectively protecting the presupposition of freedom from 
any threat he poses. Even those who seek to save Meursault from the degradations of 
literary-psychiatric diagnosis end up returning to questionable interpretive tactics. 




unfit, only to exclaim that “what critics see as indifference or lack of awareness… is a 
wary rationality, a defense against the pain of loss and an endeavor to rationalize the 
irrational” (1990, 58). While rejecting a clinical diagnosis, Longstaffe imputes to 
Meursault an unwarranted rationality and a complex, defensive psychic process, even 
calling it “the vital key to his personality” (1990, 58).  
 I have said that Meursault’s treatment by the court that tries him and by 
scholars who interpret him reflect an attempt to force him to be free, to borrow the 
paradoxical phrase from Rousseau’s Social Contract. The social contract, Rousseau 
tells us, “tacitly entails the commitment — which alone can give force to the others 
— that whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire 
body. This means merely that he will be forced to be free. For this is the sort of 
condition that, by giving each citizen to the homeland, guarantees him against all 
personal dependence” (1987, 150, emphasis added). Just as the unfree individual in 
Rousseau’s social contract threatens the polity through his vulnerability to personal 
dependence and his propensity to dominate and be dominated, admitting that 
Meursault is not free opens the door to ambivalence and anxiety about dependence, 
domination, and the agonies of self-making that the presupposition of freedom denies.  
 To ‘force Meursault to be free’, then, is to interpret Meursault’s lack of 
freedom as an illness, an insanity, or even a reflection of a social or cultural 
alienation. By doing so, the presupposition of freedom, ostensibly shared by all ‘sane’ 
and ‘healthy’ subjects, remains unchallenged. Even the presupposition of Meursault’s 
particular freedom remains intact, insofar as his difference is accounted for as a 




established in those student days to which Meursault obliquely refers (see Camus 
1988, 41). It is to imply that Meursault would be free, if his freedom had not been 
eroded by disease or despair. To force Meursault to be free is, therefore, to approach 
him with uncritical reliance upon the categories of modern psychology, philosophy, 
and social science which, themselves, presuppose the freedom of the subject.  
 In the psychic social contract of the kingdom of ends, and, indeed, in our 
contemporary intellectual culture, living individuals and fictional characters alike 
may be forced to be free in this sense, for the alternative is to admit the possibilities 
of dependence, domination, and self-loss as well as ambivalent desires for the same. 
That such a possibility has been largely ignored in interpretations of Meursault, one 
of the best-known and most thoroughly-studied characters in all of modern literature, 
suggests that the ideology of the kingdom of ends still holds a powerful influence 
even in an circumspectly critical era.  
 In the remainder of this volume, I discuss Camus’ moral condemnation not 
only of indifferent positions like Meursault’s, but of equally dangerous defensive 
reactions to absurdity and ambivalence like the processes involved in taboo 
punishment described here. The following chapter begins the process of re-evaluating 
the morality and politics of the absurd by outlining Camus’ theory of rebellion in 
order to clarify the grounds for the moral distinction he draws between immature, 




Chapter 7: Revolt, Rebellion, and Revolution 
 
What is a rebel? A man who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a 
renunciation. He is also a man who says yes, from the moment he makes his first 
gesture of rebellion. 
— Camus, The Rebel 
 
The final three chapters of this dissertation argue that drawing an analogy between 
absurdity and ambivalence not only clarifies the meaning of the absurd, but also 
offers us a more cogent understanding of the moral and political consequences of 
absurdity. This chapter examines Camus’ notions of revolt, rebellion, and revolution 
as they are presented in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel. Chapter 8 applies the 
concept of ambivalence to the moral relationship between absurdity and rebellion and 
argues that we should understand absurd rebellion as the achievement of an ‘absurd 
position’, as a mature response to ambivalence, as resistance against defensive 
reactions, and as the maintenance of the grounds for creative and moral action. The 
concluding chapter of this volume discusses the political implications of these moral 
reflections and presents two political puzzles, Camus’ praise of Kaliayev and the 
Russian assassins of 1905 and Camus’ controversial position on the Algerian War, as 
miniature case-studies through which we may test, critique, and perhaps even re-
define the political philosophy of the absurd.    
The Road to Révolte 
Camus was not shy about discussing morality. One may even say that moral 
philosophy was his true intellectual home, the place to which his thought regularly 




those that did not, Camus sought to investigate the moral challenges, the moral 
paradoxes, and the moral implications of absurdity. Cruickshank put it nicely: 
“Valery once wrote that Sisyphus at least got something — well-developed muscles 
— out of his absurd task, but Camus wants much more than this. He wants to 
discover whether some kind of spiritual muscularity can be obtained, and if so, to 
what positive use it may be put” (1960, 57).  
 And yet, Camus struggled to define the relationship between absurdity and 
morality throughout his career. Avi Sagi remarks that both a play like Caligula and a 
polemic like his Letters to a German Friend, “convey [Camus’] frustration with the 
conclusions deriving from the absurd” (2002, 107). As early as 1939, Camus had 
written that “to ascertain the fact of absurdity can only be a beginning, not an end” 
(Cruickshank 1960, 92). Certainly at that time, it was not clear whether that 
‘beginning’ would inaugurate virtue or vice. In 1951, Camus claimed that by 
analyzing the sentiment of the absurd in The Myth of Sisyphus, he was “seeking to 
make that ‘clean sweep’ which precedes constructive effort” (Cruickshank 1960, 92), 
suggesting that his later works, and those more explicitly devoted to moral and social 
issues, would be built on the ruins of the former. Confirming this suggestion, in the 
opening pages of The Rebel, Camus declared that the absurd had “wiped the slate 
clean,” had lead us “down a blind alley” (1956b, 10), and could now only be 
considered “an experience to be lived through, a point of departure” (1956b, 8).   
 While Camus’ attention to the moral consequences of absurdity is apparent in 
almost all of his works, his understanding of those consequences appears to change 




Camus’ treatment of the indifferent Meursault, the four absurd heroic types outlined 
in The Myth of Sisyphus, the figure of Sisyphus himself, Dr. Rieux, Tarrou, and the 
lesser heroes of The Plague, Kaliayev and the Russian assassins of 1905, the 
amorphous hero of The Rebel, Daru of “The Guest,” D’Arrast of “The Growing 
Stone,” and Jean-Baptiste Clamence in The Fall, just to name a few. And there seem 
to be significant differences between each of these characters and Camus’ formal and 
abstract characterizations of the morality of the absurd. But I will argue that a basic 
moral orientation to the absurd unites all of these figures; that is, if we are able to see 
it, and see them, properly.      
 The basic moral dilemma facing Camus’ characters is that absurdity, by its 
very nature, seems unable to proffer moral values. Unlike an all-encompassing 
doctrine, the absurd seems poorly suited to respond clearly or consistently to moral, 
political, or social dilemmas. “What rule,” Camus asks rhetorically in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, “could emanate from that unreasonable order? The only truth that might 
seem instructive… is not formal: it comes to life and it unfolds in men. The absurd 
mind cannot so much expect ethical rules at the end of its reasoning as, rather, 
illustrations and the breath (souffle) of human lives” (1955, 68). As Camus begins 
The Rebel, he re-emphasizes the fact that “the absurd, considered as a rule of life, is… 
contradictory.”  And he asks, again rhetorically, “What is astonishing about the fact 
that [the absurd] does not provide us with values which will enable us to decide 
whether murder is legitimate or not?” (1956b, 9).   
 Camus has already argued in The Myth of Sisyphus that easy resolutions of the 




longing for familiarity that man’s heart harbors becomes useless. In Kierkegaard’s 
apocalypse that desire for clarity must be given up if it wants to be satisfied… 
Kierkegaard suppresses my nostalgia and Husserl gathers together that universe. That 
is not what I was expecting” (1955, 49). Instead, the absurd person, who is certainly 
tempted by these easy solutions “in which all the past contradictions have become 
merely polemical exercises,” must refuse them because “this is not the way he 
experienced them. Their truth must be preserved, which consists in not being 
satisfied” (1955, 49). As discussed in Chapter 5, these easy resolutions of the absurd 
are refused not exactly because they conflict with truth but because they conflict with 
an ambivalent desire for the self.  
 But if we really want to examine absurd morality, even this explanation will 
not suffice. An interpretation of Camus’ absurd as ambivalent conflict could never 
tell us which desire we ought to heed; instead, it would merely beg the question of 
why we should be faithful to experience or faithful to desire, absurd, ambivalent, or 
otherwise. Cruickshank rightly deems Camus’ entire line of argument on this point 
“unsatisfactory,” arguing that his reasoning is weak and self-defeating and that “logic 
is outraged” by Camus’ confusion of premises and conclusions (Cruickshank 1960, 
68). Indeed, if he is not careful, Camus may be fairly accused of trying “to derive 
from the absurd values which the absurd, by definition, cannot recognize” 
(Cruickshank 1960, 69). 
 In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus argued that the absurd suggested an ethic of 
quantity. “If I convince myself that this life has no other aspect than that of the 




opposition between my conscious revolt and the darkness in which it struggles, if I 
admit that my freedom has no meaning except in relation to its limited fate, then I 
must say that what counts is not the best living but the most living” (1955, 60-61). 
This moral position strikes many readers as questionable, and Camus even senses that 
such an ethic could be deplorably self-indulgent, even nihilistic, unless it is more 
carefully defined. He knows that “the most living: in the broadest sense… means 
nothing,” that “the notion of quantity has not been sufficiently explored. For it can 
account for a large share of human experience” (1955, 61).  
 Camus wishes to qualify the ethic of quantity, then, by associating it with 
insight, fullness of experience, and awareness. “A man’s rule of conduct and his scale 
of values have no meaning except through the quantity and variety of experiences he 
has been in a position to accumulate” (1955, 61). In this odd but important 
qualification, the quantity and variety of experience are indices of its meaning and 
moral value. That is, Camus is not arguing that the quantity of experience is a value, 
but that values have value to the extent that they are informed by a certain quantity 
and variety of experience. “I see, then, that the individual character of a common 
code of ethics lies not so much in the ideal importance of its basic principles as in the 
norm of an experience that it is possible to measure” (1955, 61). Here, ‘quantity’ 
somehow becomes ‘quality’ and Camus strives to find value in the accumulation of 
experience by suggesting in a footnote that the accumulation of one billion ions 
differs “not only in quantity but in quality” from a single ion (1955, 62n).  
 Even if we suspend our disbelief in these questionable qualifications, Camus’ 




renounces values only to make it his duty to accumulate experiences, to “break all 
records,” or to “win his own code of ethics” (1955, 62). Yet Camus cautions against 
this approach, for in it he finds not only a base competitiveness, but a philosophy that 
would not fail to do “as so many of those men I was speaking about earlier [the 
existentialist philosophers] — choose the form of life that brings us the most possible 
of that human matter, thereby introducing a scale of values that… one claims to 
reject” (1955, 62). This ethic of quantity, then, leads to either egotism or 
contradiction.  
 So Camus tries once again to qualify his ethic. “It is up to us,” he claims, “to 
be conscious of [experiences]. Being aware of one’s life, one’s revolt, one’s freedom, 
and to the maximum, is living, and to the maximum” (1955, 62-63). Now it seems to 
be a conscious awareness of experience that counts. But even ‘awareness’ is the 
wrong term for Camus, as we quickly learn that the ideal is actually a “feeling, a 
feeling on this earth” (1955, 63). Camus explains: “The present and the succession of 
presents before a constantly conscious soul is the ideal of the absurd man. But the 
word ‘ideal’ rings false in this connection. It is not even his vocation, but merely the 
third consequence of his reasoning. Having started from an anguished awareness of 
the inhuman, the meditation on the absurd returns at the end of its itinerary to the very 
heart of the passionate flames of human revolt” (1955, 63-64). Somehow, and it is not 
at all clear how, the ethic of quantity, with its likelihood to devolve into egotism or 
contradiction, has transformed into awareness, into feeling, and finally into revolt.  
 We are forced to say, without malice, that in The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus’ 




the absurd, “life will be lived all the better because it has no meaning” (1955, 53). 
Here, Camus means to suggest that there is no call for suicide, which, after all, was 
the topic of his essay. Rather, Camus argues that recognizing the absurd offers a kind 
of value that its denials did not. “Living an experience, a particular fate, is accepting 
it fully,” Camus maintains, and “no one will live this fate, knowing it to be absurd, 
unless he does everything to keep before him that absurd brought to light by 
consciousness” (1955, 53). In order to embrace our absurd fate, apparently it is 
necessary to keep before our minds the absurdity of existence.  
 But no one would ever want to do such a thing, Camus tells us, because the 
experience of absurdity is so unpleasant. Therefore, and without justification, Camus 
argues that, in spite of its unpleasantness, and in spite of the fact that we do not 
particularly want to preserve our absurd and ambivalent feelings, we must 
nevertheless constantly maintain our experience of the absurd. What the absurd 
person must avoid, Camus insists, is “negating one of the terms of the opposition on 
[sic] which he lives” because doing so “amounts to escaping it” (1955, 53). This 
recognition of the absurd, the admission of the unpleasant tensions associated with it, 
and the rather groundless directive not to escape the unpleasant experience of it all 
elliptically define Camus’ notion of revolt.  
 Camus argues that “to abolish conscious revolt is to elude the problem. The 
theme of permanent revolution is thus carried into individual experience” (1955, 53-
54), equating the maintenance of absurd experience with conscious revolt. But it is 
strange to argue that revolt is a consequence of absurdity and, at the same time, that it 




with a kind of maintenance of the absurd ‘problem’ which struggles not to be 
abolished or eluded. If Camus is serious about the idea of revolt, it appears to be a 
revolt against abolishing the absurd that he is calling for, and not a revolt against the 
absurd at all. In this light, absurd revolt is really a kind of counter-revolt, and in that 
sense, might even be considered more conservative than rebellious.  
 We have already discussed Camus’ famous comparison of the absurd and 
Orpheus’ wife, Eurydice. Camus told us: “Living is keeping the absurd alive. 
Keeping it alive is, above all, contemplating it. Unlike Eurydice, the absurd dies only 
when we turn away from it. One of the only coherent philosophical positions is thus 
revolt” (1955, 54). But here we can see just how convoluted Camus’ logic and 
language can be. In what sense is ceaselessly contemplating something a revolt? This 
statement can only make sense if we understand Camus’ revolt to be a revolt against 
the cessation of contemplation of the absurd, or even against the cessation of love for 
it. Even if these reflections were less abstruse, Camus’ rapid and changing 
explanations of revolt would only make the concept more elusive. He writes: “Revolt 
is a constant confrontation between man and his own obscurity. It is an insistence 
upon an impossible transparency. It challenges the world anew every second. Just as 
danger provided man the unique opportunity of seizing awareness, so metaphysical 
revolt extends awareness to the whole of experience. It is that constant presence of 
man in his own eyes. It is not aspiration, for it is devoid of hope. That revolt is the 
certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought to accompany it” 




The Is and Ought of the Absurd 
In response to the confusion surrounding the meaning of absurd revolt, many scholars 
have attempted to re-define the absurd as a ‘fact’ or a ‘datum’ from which a moral 
value might be deduced. The argument runs something like this: ‘If the absurd is a 
fact of existence, then any sincere person is obliged to admit it, respect it, and uphold 
it, and by upholding absurd facts, additional formal values may be discovered.’  But 
such an approach is difficult to defend for a number of reasons, not the least of which 
is that it relies on an assertion of a quasi-positivistic stance on truth and value that 
clashes with the spirit of Camus’ absurd oeuvre. Furthermore, there are no empirical 
grounds upon which one might claim absurdity to be a ‘fact’, according to any usual 
understanding of that term.  
 If absurdity is not exactly a ‘fact’ but, rather, a ‘datum’ of human experience, 
then it is not clear what, if any, content such a datum would hold or what, if any, 
truth-value such a datum could oblige us to ‘uphold’. To make matters worse, 
scholars who take this approach are forced to argue that the logical consequence of 
the ‘fact’ or ‘datum’ of the absurd is that one must accept it only to rebel against it. 
But this conclusion makes little sense on its face, and makes even less sense when we 
are told that the reason we must rebel against the absurd is precisely because we must 
seek to ‘uphold’ or ‘preserve’ the datum of the absurd as ‘true’.  
 In his otherwise exciting book, Avi Sagi makes two arguments on these points 
which are quite difficult to reconcile. First, he claims that when faced with the ‘data’ 
of the absurd, “the meaning of the authentic decision is to embrace the absurd,” 




clarity, as well as the readiness to express this disposition at all times. Paradoxically, 
the decision to endorse the absurd implies a harmony between the individual and 
her/his basic given data” (2002, 78). This is essentially the position I have described 
above. But three chapters later, Sagi writes that “the problem that Camus identified is: 
How to remain within the revolt without falling into the absurd? In other words, 
Camus acknowledges in The Rebel that the absurd is evil and injustice, and rebellion 
is a response that refuses to return to the absurd itself” (2002, 111). In the first 
instance, the absurd is clearly presented as data that one embraces in accordance with 
one’s supposed ‘immanent disposition toward clarity’ and the implied ‘harmony 
between the individual and her/his data’. But in the latter, the absurd is defined as 
‘evil and injustice’ against which one must rebel.     
 This particular confusion is common in the literature on Camus, the absurd, 
and revolt, and is likely responsible for the general misunderstanding that surrounds 
both the thinker and these concepts. In an attempt to answer what they see as Camus’ 
is-to-ought problem, philosophical interpretations like Sagi’s have only begged more 
questions: Why would an ‘immanent disposition toward clarity’ compel us to 
recognize the absurd when the absurd, it seems, defies clarity? How can we embrace 
the absurd as truth, but also fight it as evil? And what possible grounds are there for 
interpreting absurd morality with reference to what appears to be the ethical analogue 
of a correspondence theory of reality, the correspondence between ‘the individual and 
her/his… data’?  
 These questions find only more convoluted answers as critics, in their struggle 




principles in Camus’ philosophy, principles like ‘lucidity’, ‘authenticity’, ‘honesty’, 
and ‘integrity’ (see Duff and Marshall 1982; Golomb 1994; Sagi 1994, 2002). John 
Cruickshank argues that Camus’ theory of revolt is built upon the absurd wager, 
Camus’ inversion of the Pascalian wager, and the twin values of “lucidity” and 
“innocence,” making revolt “the first practical consequence of the wager” 
(Cruickshank 1960, 70). By Cruickshank’s account, Camus’ revolt operates according 
to values which are somehow exempt from the category of those values which may be 
wagered. Cruickshank tries to explain this odd argument:    
To claim experience of the absurd… means that there is a value judgment, a 
value, involved when this claim is made. To speak of the absurd at all is to 
have rebelled, in the sense of having said ‘no’, to some state of affairs. This 
means, then, that to speak of the absurd is ultimately to affirm, within the 
individual who has spoken this way, the presence of something against which 
the absurd is an offence. To say ‘no’ is to impose limits, and within these 
limits, we must conclude, values of some kind are still preserved despite the 
apparent destruction of all values by comprehensive nihilism. At this early 
stage the nature of such values may appear obscure, but their existence is no 
longer in doubt. (1960, xvi)  
 
But considering Camus’ efforts to discredit mysterious, transcendent values in The 
Myth of Sisyphus, it hardly seems fair to assert the presence of transcendent values 
which then inform the absurd method of questioning other values. If lucidity, 
innocence, integrity, honesty, or authenticity are values that we put aside, as it were, 
during the process of absurd wagering, why are these particular values exempt? It is 
really no more justifiable than making an is-to-ought leap to argue, as Sagi argues, 
that we must conceive of the absurd as “a normative negation, predicated on the 




 The line of thinking that seeks to resolve Camus’ is-to-ought problem tells us 
that we must suppose that values like lucidity simply pre-exist for Camus and that 
such pre-existing values inform the morality of all of his work, that “Camus can still 
only claim that evasion of lucidity is a sin by using some moral standard lying 
entirely outside the world of the absurd” (Cruickshank 1960, 68). Of course, if it were 
possible to establish values ‘outside the world of the absurd’, then the absurd would 
present so few problems that we could practically put it aside in our discussion of 
morality. This interpretation, then, is tantamount to avoiding the entire absurd 
dilemma by asserting that a priori values like lucidity (or innocence, integrity, 
authenticity, or justice) are not bothered by absurdity. Such an assertion merely 
sidesteps the core of the absurd dilemma, not least because it makes absurdity, itself, 
irrelevant to absurd morality.  
 Instead, what Camus contended, albeit paradoxically, was that the act of 
rebellion both affirmed values that do not exist and created those values in its act of 
rebelling. In the following chapter, I will argue that the only coherent way to 
understand this idea is to see absurd rebellion as a mature integration of ambivalence 
and a balance of rational and irrational action that makes further moral and creative 
activity possible. While this idea still requires some elaboration, it excludes the 
possibility that the philosophy of the absurd simply advances a set of non-
problematic, a priori moral values which can be kept apart from or outside of the 
notions of absurdity and revolt.           
 A related unfortunate solution to the problem of absurd morality, one that both 




absurdity, possess inherent meaning and value. As discussed earlier, this argument is 
presented succinctly in Camus’ Fourth Letter to a German Friend: “I continue to 
believe that this world has no ultimate meaning. But I know that something in it has a 
meaning and that is man, because he is the only creature to insist on having one” 
(Camus 1960, 28). While appealing, this logically ridiculous argument has been taken 
by some critics as the foundation for a humanistic absurd ethic.  
 What is worse, this argument has led critics to fundamentally mistake the 
absurd, equating absurdity with meaninglessness and equating revolt with an 
insistence on meaning. However, not only does such an equation over-simply Camus’ 
vision of absurdity, but it ignores an ambivalence about meaning which is part of the 
ambivalence of the absurd. In The Myth of Sisyphus and elsewhere, Camus argues 
that the notion of moral purpose, while attractive for its clarity, is also destructive of 
the individual experience valued in the opposing polarity of the absurd. “To the extent 
to which I hope,” Camus writes, “to which I worry about a truth that might be 
individual to me, about a way of being or creating, to the extent to which I arrange 
my life and prove thereby that I accept its having a meaning, I create for myself 
barriers between which I confine my life. I do like so many bureaucrats of the mind 
and heart who only fill me with disgust and whose only vice… is to take man’s 
freedom seriously” (1955, 58).  
 The desperate reasoning that asserts human meaning on the grounds that we 
desperately long for meaning follows the same steps for which Camus criticized 
Kierkegaard in his despair over the possibility of eternal nothingness. Kierkegaard, 




unpleasant. And Camus’ riposte to this argument is crisp: “This cry is not likely to 
stop the absurd man. Seeking what is true is not seeking what is desirable” (1955, 41). 
The argument that human beings have meaning because they wish they had meaning 
does not advance a logical claim but, rather, repeats an emotional plea, one that is not 
useful in formal ethics, but which may be useful if we wish to understand the 
appreciable moral differences between different reactions to the ambivalence of the 
absurd. To do so, the remainder of this chapter reviews the fundamental moral 
distinctions between revolt and revolution as Camus describes them in The Rebel.    
Revolt and Rebellion in The Rebel 
Apart from its obvious social commentary on revolutionary doctrines, The Rebel is 
Camus’ most elaborate attempt to answer the lingering questions and problems 
suggested by revolt and, therefore, to address the moral and political implications of 
the absurd. Herbert Hochberg, who elsewhere passes devastating judgments about 
Camus philosophical efforts, reads The Rebel as Camus’ attempt to distill a moral 
stance from his depiction of the absurd, to show “how a value, and hence an ethic, 
arises from the absurdist position… to reconcile the possible conflicts that may arise 
due to his holding life and freedom to be basic values” (Hochberg 1965, 96). 
Similarly, James Woelfel suggests that we read The Rebel as Camus’ “corrective, 
serving to refocus the philosophical discourse” on the absurd, perhaps in light of the 
failure of The Myth of Sisyphus to provide answers to many important questions (Sagi 
2002, 108).  
 Camus’ favored term, révolte, has been translated into English most often as it 




between ‘rebellion’ and ‘the rebel’. ‘Rebellion’ is quite close, but is perhaps not as 
precise as the English term ‘revolt’, which might often be a suitable alternative. The 
title of the work in question, L’Homme révolté, means ‘man in revolt’, while also 
connoting ‘revolted man’, suggesting not just action but refusal, and refusal with a 
subtle hint of revulsion or disgust. Throughout The Rebel, ‘rebellion’ is contrasted 
with ‘revolution’, the latter being absolute and total, while the former, in its original 
form at least, is measured, self-conscious, and scrupulous.  
 But both ‘revolt’ and ‘rebellion’ are, unfortunately, inadequate terms to 
describe the complex position that absurd morality ultimately defends. This matter 
involves something much more than terminology and translation. As Cruickshank 
points out, “we have in L’Homme révolté a multiple use of the term ‘révolte’ which 
causes confusion as did a similar use of the term ‘absurd’ in Le Mythe de Sisyphe” 
(1960, 118). What is more, in The Myth of Sisyphus, and often in The Rebel, the type 
of action that Camus describes does not accord with any usual meanings of the terms 
‘revolt’ or ‘rebellion’. This terminological mismatch is best seen in Camus’ repeated 
explanations of the imperative of absurd revolt: “to remain on that dizzying crest” 
(1955, 50), “to remain in this middle path where the intelligence can remain clear” 
(1955, 40), and to “tread a vertiginous ridge by refusing all the suggested ways of 
escape” (Cruickshank, 1960, 62). Camus names this type of action révolte, but it is 
difficult to see why it should not more appropriately be named ‘enduring’, ‘refusing’, 
‘resisting’, or even ‘remaining’, for it is ultimately the ability to endure the 
ambivalence of the absurd and to refuse and resist temptations of defense that define 




 “Let us insist again on the method,” Camus writes. “It is a matter of 
persisting. At a certain point on his path the absurd man is tempted… He is asked to 
leap” (1955, 52-53). But the absurd person persists, resists the temptation to leap, and 
struggles to maintain his balance. Even as Camus passes from an examination of 
suicidal logic in The Myth of Sisyphus to a study of homicidal logic in The Rebel, the 
moral activity of the absurd person remains the same: an “obstinate resistance” 
(Camus 1956b, 15), a “scandalized resistance” (Cruickshank 1960, 60, 94), and a 
“will to resist” (Carroll 2007, 54). In fact, in his letter to Roland Barthes on The 
Plague, Camus wrote not of ‘revolt’ or ‘rebellion’, but described his novel in the 
language of resistance: “The Plague can apply to any resistance against any tyranny” 
(Camus 1968, 340).  
 Unless carefully considered, the language of ‘rebellion’ may obfuscate the 
moral and political philosophy of the absurd. As Camus, himself, points out, 
“rebellion, after all, can only be imagined in terms of opposition to someone” (1956b, 
28), but the absurd person is also called to oppose himself, even to oppose his own 
unconscious temptations and desires. In contrast to the masthead of the journal 
Combat (“From Resistance to Revolution”), in The Rebel and his later writings, 
Camus wishes to take us in precisely the opposite direction: from revolution to 
resistance. Of course, for Camus, and in this volume, ‘resistance’ must maintain its 
political and moral meaning and not its psychoanalytic connotation of resistance to 
analysis, insight, or progress. In the chapters that follow, I often refer to aspects of 
absurd rebellion in the language of ‘refusal’, ‘tolerance’, ‘maintenance’, and 




at the heart of absurd rebellion. While some may think that disputing the connotations 
of ‘rebellion’ or adding shades of meaning to this now well-established term takes 
liberties with Camus’s work, I would argue, on the contrary, that remaining faithful to 
an unfortunate term at the expense of the accuracy of the concept would be the less 
thoughtful path.  
 Apart from any confusions associated with the term, there is a surprising lack 
of conceptual clarity about rebellion in The Rebel. The first invocation of rebellion 
defines it as a kind of ‘evidence’: “The first and only evidence that is supplied me 
within the terms of the absurdist experience, is rebellion” (Camus 1956b, 10). With 
this inauspicious beginning, Camus will describe rebellion as both a cause and a 
consequence of absurdity throughout the entire text of The Rebel, announcing both a 
call for and a caution against rebellion, inasmuch as rebellion may lead to the same 
excesses it opposes. There is some reason for this confusion, for Camus admits that 
“the absurd is itself, contradiction. It is contradictory in its content because, in 
wanting to uphold life, it excludes all value judgments, when to live is, in itself, a 
value judgment. To breathe is to judge. Perhaps it is untrue to say that life is a 
perpetual choice. But it is true that it is impossible to imagine a life deprived of all 
choice. From that simplified point of view, the absurdist position, translated into 
action, is inconceivable” (1956b, 8).   
 Camus confesses that the contradictions of absurd thought seem to prevent the 
definition of a clear moral stance, even in extreme cases. Given the absurd reasoning, 
we can only “return to the untenable position from which we were trying to escape. In 




we can not kill. It abandons us in this contradiction with no grounds either for 
preventing or for justifying murder, menacing and menaced, swept along with a 
whole generation intoxicated by nihilism, and yet lost in loneliness, with weapons in 
our hands and a lump in our throats” (1956b, 8). The absurd person may have sought 
refuge from false ideologies in the absurd method, but he now finds himself utterly 
lost, unsure whether to approve of or condemn murder.  
 Nevertheless, while absurd morality can not offer formal values, Camus finds 
the absurd experience to be somewhat less limited. It was, after all, “legitimate to take 
absurdist sensibility into account, to make a diagnosis of a malady to be found in 
ourselves and in others,” in spite of the fact that “it is nevertheless impossible to see 
in this sensibility, and in the nihilism it presupposes, anything but a point of 
departure, a criticism brought to life” (1956b, 9-10). That is, if we take the absurd as a 
doctrine or a set of propositions, a view which I have attempted to criticize 
throughout this work, we run headlong into either self-contradiction or nihilism. We 
mistake ourselves and the absurd “from the moment that we claim to remain firmly in 
the absurdist position and ignore the real nature of the absurd, which is that it is an 
experience to be lived through, a point of departure, the equivalent, in existence, of 
Descartes’s methodical doubt” (1956b, 8, emphasis added). Although “the absurd 
leads us down a blind alley… it can, by returning upon itself, open up a new field of 
investigation” (1956b, 10). Camus is, of course, not insisting that we define the 
absurd as methodical doubt. Quite to the contrary, only by understanding the absurd 




consequences and about which we must be vigilant, will we be able to comprehend 
the moral consequences of the absurd.  
 In The Rebel, Camus no longer argues simply that the awareness of absurdity 
leads to the moral conclusion of rebellion, as he did in The Myth of Sisyphus. He does 
claim that absurd awareness leads to absurd rebellion, but he also defends a corollary 
proposition: that rebellion leads to an awareness, a fuller awareness of the absurd. 
“With rebellion, awareness is born” (1956b, 15), and this awareness, “no matter how 
confused it may be, develops from every act of rebellion: the sudden, dazzling 
perception that there is something in man with which he can identify himself, even if 
only for a moment” (1956b, 14). Thus, rebellion seems to serve as both the 
foundation and the consequence of the absurd. “The basis of these values is rebellion 
itself. Man’s solidarity is founded upon rebellion, and rebellion, in its turn, can only 
find its justification in this solidarity… In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion 
must respect the limit it discovers in itself — a limit where minds meet and, in 
meeting, begin to exist.  Rebellious thought, therefore, cannot dispense with memory: 
it is a perpetual state of tension” (1956b, 21-22). Whether it is sensible to claim that 
rebellion is a beginning but also an end is a question that has troubled many of 
Camus’ readers. The tortured logic of rebellion, the source of its values, and the 
vaguely defined awareness of solidarity it both depends upon and yields, are only 
comprehensible if we take the long road and begin with the final words of the passage 
quoted above: rebellion is ‘a perpetual state of tension’.   
 The Rebel abounds with explanations of rebellions gone wrong, rebellions 




absurd rebel is difficult to locate amidst Camus’ criticisms. In the end, one feels that 
the only consistent guideline for true moral rebellion is the perpetual state of tension 
Camus describes, a tension generated by refusing and resisting the excesses apparent 
in all of the examples of rebellions gone wrong. But, at the risk of stretching the 
analogy too far, just as Freud and Klein devoted less time to describing ‘healthy’ 
psychological development than to detailing its detours and deviations, Camus is 
most interested in outlining what we might think of as the psychopathology of 
rebellion, in the hope that the exceptions will help define the ideal.    
Metaphysical Rebellion and the Origins of the Absurd Ideal 
Metaphysical rebellion is first presented as rebellion against the human condition and 
“against the whole of creation. It is metaphysical because it contests the ends of man 
and of creation” (Camus 1956b, 23). We are immediately confused by the example 
with which Camus begins. It is not of a person rebelling against the human condition 
but of a slave rebelling against his condition of enslavement. From this example we 
must draw our first conclusions about the metaphysical rebel: that “he affirms that 
there is something in him that will not tolerate the manner in which the master treats 
him,” that he “repudiates” his master “as a master,” and that he demands that “a 
common value, recognized by all as existing in each one… should be clearly 
recognized in himself because he knows that, without this principle, crime and 
disorder would reign throughout the world” (1956b, 23). 
 Camus’ metaphysical rebel, who is also a slave, appears to rebel on the 
grounds of unity, a unity we have already discussed in the context of absurd 




Metaphysical rebellion is a claim, motivated by the concept of a complete unity, 
against the suffering of life and death and a protest against the human condition both 
for its incompleteness, thanks to death, and its wastefulness, thanks to evil” (Camus 
1956b, 23-24). The rebel, in his earliest complete formulation, seems to be a 
principled protestor, acting on behalf of a vague indignation, defying the condition in 
which he finds himself, and denouncing his masters, earthly or transcendent, for the 
outrage of his condition. But even this abstract and lyrical expression of the content 
of metaphysical rebellion, as we will see, does not do justice to the complexities of 
the concept.  
 We are quickly introduced to one such complexity: a deeply ambivalent 
relationship to the master who oppresses. Camus is aware that “if the metaphysical 
rebel ranges himself against a power whose existence he simultaneously affirms, he 
only admits the existence of this power at the very instant that he calls it into 
question… Then he involves this superior being in the same humiliating adventure as 
mankind’s, its ineffectual power being the equivalent of our ineffectual condition. He 
subjects it to our power of refusal, bends it to the unbending part of human nature, 
forcibly integrates it into an existence that we render absurd, and finally drags it from 
its refuge outside time and involves it in history, very far from the eternal stability 
that it can find only in the unanimous submission of all men” (1956b, 24-25).  
 While the rebel defies his master (and it is not always clear what kind of 
master and what kind of oppression Camus is talking about), the rebel is strangely 
dependent upon him in order to oppose him. As discussed above, Camus knew that 




only thing that gives meaning to human protest is the idea of a personal god who has 
created, and is therefore responsible for, everything” (1956b, 28). The rebel, 
therefore, seeks not merely to deny the existence of a master, but rather, to affirm his 
existence only to remove him from his station and to subject him to the rebel’s will. 
The rebel can not be an atheist, as Camus points out. On the contrary, he is obliged to 
affirm the existence of a master precisely to defy him. If he rebels against God, the 
rebel seeks something more complex than the denial of God: he seeks to bring God 
down to earth to be tried, judged, and perhaps even punished in a way vaguely 
reminiscent of the metaphorical trials of God in the French Enlightenment.  
 The Hellenistic philosophers, Epicurus and Lucretius, are absurd rebels, 
according to Camus, but they are of a different order than the classical Greeks 
because the former banish the gods from their ‘citadels’ (1956b, 28). Camus’ 
inclusion of these two figures in the history of rebellion seems to contradict the very 
definition of rebellion we just heard, for Epicurus and Lucretius have little interest in 
tearing gods down from their throne or forcing them to confront the reality of human 
existence; rather, they simply wish to ignore the gods. Of course, Epicurus’ ‘citadel’ 
is not fortified not with pleasures and delights, as is often thought, but with only the 
most meager rations to ensure the absence of pain and fear and, we might imagine, 
the turmoil of clashes and conflicts with deities. Quite confusingly, Camus claims that 
Lucretius turns Epicurus into a revolutionary who, instead of being overly meek and 
“defensive” in his rebellion (1956b, 30), goes too far and seeks to usurp the gods’ 




gods who already existed,” Camus explains, “Lucretius’ hero [Epicurus], on the other 
hand, embarks on a revolution” (1956b, 31).  
 Against all rebelliousness, Camus argues that religions, and particularly 
Christianity, have disarmed rebels by making suffering appear necessary and by 
justifying the means with the ends. Camus follows Nietzsche in figuring Christianity 
as a kind of counter-revolutionary force against metaphysical rebellion, one that 
defuses the explosiveness of rebellion by offering up a God who suffers, dies, and 
experiences evil (1956b, 32). In response, for the last two millennia “all the efforts of 
the freethinkers are bent on making Christ an innocent, or a simpleton, so as to annex 
Him to the world of man” in order to posit and then rebel against the jealous God of 
Abraham (1956b, 34-35).  
 But in Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky, rebellion is no longer “directed only 
against a cruel and capricious divinity” (Camus 1956b, 33). Formerly it was “the God 
of the Old Testament who [was] primarily responsible for mobilizing the forces of 
rebellion” (1956b, 32), but, according to Camus, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche 
dramatically expanded the aim and scope of rebellion by demanding “an accounting 
from the God of love Himself” (1956b, 33). Here, we see not only the close reliance 
of Camus’ absurd morality on the thought of Nietzsche, but also a trace of the 
ambivalence implied by the activity of metaphysical rebellion, for it is a God of love 
against whom one strikes and from whom one demands an accounting. 
      Such is our introduction to the history of metaphysical rebellion, which 
Camus continues to trace throughout the works of Sade, the Romantics, Stirner, 




these figures fail, to one degree or another, to limit their rebellion; instead, they are 
tempted by excess. We are not wrong to feel a tension between Camus’ praise of 
metaphysical rebels and his criticism of their excessiveness. It is particularly difficult 
not to react negatively to Camus’ implicit comparison between figures like Epicurus 
and the Marquis de Sade. We even wonder how Sade, the ultimately excessive 
advocate of evil, can be classed as a rebel at all. Furthermore, we are tempted to ask if 
the excessiveness that Camus laments in most of his rebels might not be in the very 
nature of a metaphysical rebellion that takes as its target nothing less than God and all 
creation. Indeed, Camus claims that metaphysical rebellion “is always directed at 
everything in creation which is dissonant, opaque, or promises the solution of 
continuity” (1956b, 100-101). To read this is to be struck not only by how immense 
an enemy the rebel sets for himself, but also by how complex, even plural, Camus’ 
rebellion must be. How else could one rebel against everything that is dissonant, 
opaque, and continuous?  And how strange it is that the rebel, who makes “a 
perpetual demand for unity” (1956b, 101), must also rebel against everything that 
promises ‘continuity’.  
 While motivated by a desire for unity, the poor rebel seems to be fighting too 
many battles at once. “The rejection of death, the desire for immortality and for 
clarity, are the mainsprings of all these extravagances, whether sublime or puerile… 
The rebel does not ask for life but for reasons for living. He rejects the consequences 
implied by death… To fight against death amounts to claiming that life has a 
meaning, to fighting for order and for unity” (1956b, 101). It seems that the rebel 




we add to these the enemies set out in the original definition of rebellion, the rebel 
fights against God and masters, his servile status, the incompleteness of life, its 
wastefulness, the human condition, and all of creation.  
 To make matters even more complex, the rebel fights these many battles 
because he is scandalized by the unjustified injustice of the world. Oddly enough, it is 
“not the suffering of a child… but the fact that the suffering is not justified” that 
motivates Camus’ absurd revolt (1956b, 101, emphasis added). Thus, Camus’ rebel 
“is seeking, without knowing it, a moral philosophy or a religion” (1956b, 101). But 
if the rebel seeks a moral philosophy or religion, he does so by rejecting moral 
absolutes and God, along with any justifications for injustice that moral absolutes or 
God might provide. The only reasonable way to make sense of these matters is to 
interpret absurd revolt as an integrative response to the ambivalent desires for unity 
and for disunity that motivate it, an interpretation which I pursue in this chapter and 
whose consequences I explore in the next. To develop this interpretation, it is 
necessary to turn to Camus’ treatment of rebellions gone wrong, his explanation of 
how, when, and why rebellions become excessive, revolutionary, and criminal.    
When Good Rebellions Go Bad: Revolution  
“The rebel defies more than he denies,” says Camus. But the rebel’s strange enmity 
for his master is “animated by the desire to conquer,” leading the rebel down a 
dangerous path toward destruction. “The slave,” Camus tells us, “begins by 
demanding justice and ends by wanting to wear a crown” (1956b, 25). Camus knows 
that it is easy for good rebellions to go bad, even that rebels are not entirely to blame 




and a logical consequence of rebellion. “Each time that [rebellion] deifies its rejection 
or absolute negation of what exists it destroys. Each time it blindly accepts what 
exists and gives voice to absolute assent, it destroys again… One can be a nihilist in 
two ways, in both by having an intemperate recourse to absolutes… But they are 
identical, consumed with desire for the true life, frustrated by their desire for 
existence and therefore preferring generalized injustice to mutilated justice” (Camus 
1956b, 101-102).  
 Revolution is “the logical consequence of metaphysical rebellion” because 
once justifications of divine right and sacred authority are thrown into doubt, rebels 
tend to replace them with equally absolute alternatives (1956b, 105). “If God is 
denied, the King must die” because the new law, which “wants to be total and to rule 
absolutely,” commands it in the name of the new justice (1956b, 114). By a similar 
reasoning, for Camus, the history of modern revolution really begins with Rousseau 
because his ‘new gospel’ of the social contract establishes the absolute sovereignty of 
the people, introducing an absolutist logic into history and politics that has colored all 
rebellions and revolutions since. Camus claims that after the absolutism of the social 
contract, theories of sovereignty, the state, the general will, and other forms of 
political power would have to be considered absolute, infallible, and inviolable 
(1956b, 114-121). It is natural, but not therefore justifiable, that the rebel slave seeks 
to “dominate in his turn. His insurrection against his condition becomes an unlimited 
campaign against the heavens for the purpose of bringing back a captive king who 
will first be dethroned and finally condemned to death. Human rebellion ends in 




that it is now his own responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity that he 
sought in vain within his own condition, and in this way to justify the fall of God. 
Then begins the desperate effort to create, at the price of crime and murder if 
necessary, the dominion of man. This will not come about without terrible 
consequences, of which we are so far only aware of a few” (1956b, 25).  
 Rebellion goes wrong, therefore, if it succumbs to the extreme tendencies 
which are very much at the center of its activity. These tendencies are internal to the 
logic of both rebellion and revolution and are only managed differently by the self-
limiting rebels who somehow stop short of positing ‘all or nothing’ justifications for 
their actions. This self-limiting step is one that Camus consistently identifies with 
‘true’ rebellion and with the maintenance of an intellectual, emotional, and spiritual 
tension that we may equate with an ambivalent, absurd position. Camus explains:         
Those who rejected, for the sake of the world they had just created, all other 
principles but desire and power, have rushed to suicide or madness and have 
proclaimed the apocalypse. As for the rest, who wanted to create their own 
principles, they have chosen pomp and ceremony, the world of appearances, 
or banality, or again murder and destruction. But Sade and the romantics, 
Karamazov or Nietzsche only entered the world of death because they wanted 
to discover the true life. So that by a process of conversion, it is the desperate 
appeal for order that rings through this insane universe. Their conclusions 
have only proved disastrous or destructive to freedom from the moment they 
laid aside the burden of rebellion, fled the tension it implies, and chose the 
comfort of tyranny or of servitude. (1956b, 100, emphasis added)   
 
 The rebel begins by seeking to defy the forces that excuse injustice, but, if he 
ends badly, it is because in so doing he abandons the difficult integration of tensions 
that motivated his revolt, yielding to the temptation to idealize his own force and his 
own excuses in their place. Camus’ rebel “only wanted to conquer his own existence 




spiritual imperialism, he sets out in search of world conquest by way of an infinitely 
multiplied series of murders” (1956b, 103). He did not set out to destroy his enemies, 
but something about the activity of rebelling leads him to lose his balance and to 
justify doing so on the grounds of his superior vision of justice. Although these 
reflections are not really much more than common diagnoses of the excesses of the 
French Revolution combined with Camus’ twist on the master/slave dialectic, they 
contain telling resonances with the psychology of ambivalence. It is hoped that we 
can extract from his commentary something that helps us discern the exact 
differences between rebellion and revolution and, therefore, something that will 
reveal the moral and political consequences of the absurd.  
 Revolution, for Camus, is not yet real, only conceptual. “There has not yet 
been a revolution in the course of history,” he writes, somewhat surprisingly, because 
“if there had ever been one real revolution, there would be no more history” (1956b, 
106-107). Rebellion, on the other hand, is not primarily conceptual because rebellion 
is conceptually incoherent. While revolution, for Camus, is an overthrow of authority 
followed by the institution of an absolute regime, a regime assured of its own 
authority and justice, “rebellion is, by nature, limited in scope. It is no more than an 
incoherent pronouncement” (1956b, 106).  
 Revolution finds strength in “the realm of ideas” because it insists upon 
coherence and makes unequivocal and absolute demands. It is “an attempt to shape 
actions to ideas, to fit the world into a theoretic frame” (Camus 1956b, 106). 
Rebellion, on the other hand, is inconsistent, remaining only “an obscure protest 




characterization of rebellion meets with some difficulty because of Camus’ earlier 
description of the rebel’s demand for clarity and unity, we can help this argument to 
make sense if we imagine that the demands for clarity and unity made by the rebel are 
only part of his more complex ambivalent activity, while the revolutionary resolves 
his ambivalence and yields to his extreme position absolutely. That is, like the 
contradiction implied in the rebel’s affirmation and defiance of his oppressor, the 
rebel takes a logically incoherent but psychologically mature stance that both insists 
upon unity and rejects it. In fact, this incoherence and ambivalence will serve to 
check the extreme tendencies of rebellion by which the rebel might have otherwise 
been led to revolutionary excess.  
 According to Camus, Hegel’s “Napoleonic” philosophy is largely responsible 
for revolutionary excess because his thought incarnates “truth, reason, and progress… 
in the progress of the world” (1956b, 134). According to Camus, Hegel translates 
values into historically achievable ends rather than using them as guides for historical 
means, making “the rule of action… action itself,” and reducing all moral calculations 
to the law of efficacy (1956b, 134). Contemporary revolutionaries have purchased 
from Hegel “the weapons with which they definitively destroyed the formal 
principles of virtue. All that they have preserved is the vision of a history without any 
kind of transcendence, dedicated to perpetual strife and to the struggle of wills bent 
on seizing power” (1956b, 135). The result of this unchecked will to power is, of 





 Whether Camus accurately represents Hegel here (and many have argued that 
he does not) is beside the point of this chapter. What is worth noting is that Camus is 
engaged in a complex struggle with what he sees to be the tragic emotional logic in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology, starting with the notion that “consciousness of the self is… 
of necessity, desire” (1956b, 138), a fight for recognition which both demands and 
denies the difference of the other. As I will discuss more extensively in the next 
chapter, the desire for absolute recognition becomes self-defeating and destructive at 
the moment when it denies or controls the independent existence of the other on 
whom it depends. In fact, Camus finds the tragedy of Hegelian logic to be “absurd, 
since, in the event of one consciousness being destroyed, the victorious consciousness 
is not recognized as such” (1956b, 139, emphasis added).  
 It is not merely coincidental that Camus refers to the “ambiguity” of Hegel’s 
thought at least four times in this section while using the word “absurd” twice to 
describe Hegelian dialectics (1956b, 141-145). Although Camus clearly condemns 
the influence of Hegelian philosophy, there is a resemblance between Camus’ review 
of Hegel and the nearly dialectical ambivalences present in Camus’ own depiction of 
absurd revolt. What distinguishes them, at least in Camus’ eyes, is that Hegel’s 
followers resolve the dialectical tensions while Camus’ rebel would not. For this 
reason, Camus often compares revolution to a mere transposition of absolute 
authority. “The dialectical miracle,” Camus argues, “the transformation of quantity 
into quality, is explained here: it is the decision to call total servitude freedom… 
Historical thought was to deliver man from subjection to a divinity; but this liberation 




refuge in the permanence of the party in the same way that he formerly prostrated 
himself before the altar. That is why the era which dares to claim that it is the most 
rebellious that has ever existed only offers a choice of various types of conformity. 
The real passion of the twentieth century is servitude” (1956b, 234). These reflections 
may have extra poignancy given the discussion about the ambivalences of freedom in 
the preceding chapter.  
 Camus’ argument is simply that when values are subordinated to history, then 
history itself appears as the only value and power becomes the only ethic. As 
Chigalev says: “Beginning with the premise of unlimited freedom, I arrive at 
unlimited despotism” (Camus 1956b, 175). In Hegel’s logic and the logic of his 
followers (Camus often means to target Marx), Camus argues that history becomes a 
‘horizontal’ transcendent, merely replacing but not fundamentally changing the 
absolutism of the ‘vertically’ transcendent thought that preceded it. “Totality is, in 
effect, nothing other than the ancient dream of unity common to both believers and 
rebels, but projected horizontally onto the earth deprived of God” (Camus 1956b, 
233).  
 Camus claims that the key to understanding revolutionary excess, therefore, is 
its tendency to justify evil, whether on the grounds of an after-life or a future life. 
While Camus’ rebel supposedly refuses servility, crime, and excess on the grounds of 
his self-contradictory and ambivalent position, the revolutionary justifies these evils 
in light of a historical end which outweighs them. These qualities of revolutionary 




the name of a ‘horizontally’ transcendent future) all define the moment when 
rebellion has been “diverted from the path of truth” (Camus 1956b, 148).  
 The Hegelian emphasis on history and objectivity, whose impact Camus 
connects directly to the evils of Dachau and Karaganda, derive from the fact that it 
has sought to destroy parts of the ambivalence of the absurd. “Hegel, and then the 
Hegelians have tried… to destroy, more and more thoroughly, all idea of 
transcendence and any nostalgia for transcendence… The conqueror is always right; 
that is one of the lessons which can be learned from the most important German 
philosophical system of the nineteenth century” (Camus 1956b, 136-137). By denying 
‘vertical transcendence’ while focusing all aspirations on human history and progress, 
in Camus’ eyes, Hegel and his followers seek to make themselves into something like 
Grenier’s absolute heroes, revolutionaries with attitudes singulières whose only rules 
of action are their own.  
 The point at which the ambivalence of absurd rebellion gives way to the 
resolution of revolution, then, is the point when the rebel’s ‘extreme tension’ is 
eluded by a split, an idealization, or a devaluation. In that moment, we demand 
reconciliation, action, and even the unanimous approval of history, betraying the 
original ambivalence of absurd rebellion. According to the revolution, Camus 
charges, “man is nothing… if he does not obtain from history, willingly or by force, 
unanimous approval. At this exact point the limit is exceeded, rebellion is first 
betrayed and then logically assassinated, for it has never affirmed, in its purest form, 
anything but the existence of a limit and the divided existence that we represent: it is 




no simultaneously… When rebellion, in rage or intoxication, adopts the attitude of 
‘all or nothing’ and the negation of all existence and all human nature, it is at this 
point that it denies itself.” (Camus 1956b, 250-251)    
 At this ‘exact point’, the rebel is tempted to resort to a radical and primitive 
solution. He risks falling out of his ‘absurd position’ into an ‘all or nothing’ stance in 
which his tensions, constraints, and anxieties are resolved with the help of a split. In 
the following chapter, I argue that the best way to understand the moral and political 
differences between the extreme stance of the revolutionary and the measured stance 
of the rebel is to compare them with the differences between immature, regressive, or 







Chapter 8: A Grounding for an Absurd Morality 
 
Man does not show his greatness by being at one extremity, but rather by touching 
both at once.  
— Pascal, Epigraph to Camus’ Letters to a German Friend 
 
In any case, if he is not always able not to kill, either directly or indirectly, [the rebel] 
can put his conviction and passion to work at diminishing the chances of murder 
around him. His only virtue will lie in never yielding to the impulse to allow himself 
to be engulfed in the shadows that surround him and in obstinately dragging the 
chains of evil, which with he is bound, toward the light of good.  
— Camus, The Rebel 
 
Nearly all attempts to define the absurd philosophically and to derive from it precise 
moral values, including Camus’ own, have met with failure. On the other hand, most 
readers find Camus’ lyrical accounts of the emotions and experiences of the absurd to 
be persuasive and appealing. If John Cruickshank is right that Camus is just more 
convincing “when speaking to us as a moralist than when speaking to us as a 
logician” (1960, 64), this work argues that the disparity between the emotional 
persuasiveness and the logical perplexity of the philosophy of the absurd presents us 
with an opportunity and not only a failure. We may take advantage of that 
opportunity neither by condemning Camus’ thought as illogical nor by attempting to 
defend its logic with reference to hidden ethical principles, but by interpreting the 
absurd and its moral and political consequences in their emotional context.  
 As discussed earlier, Camus imagines absurdity to be a kind of mental illness, 
‘un mal de l’esprit’, an intellectual or spiritual sickness. The cause, the nature, and the 
consequence of this figurative illness form the subject of the absurd investigation. But 
if an ambivalence between the desire for unity and the desire for the self lies at the 




sick? In a sense, it does. As we saw in Chapter 5, “the important thing,” for Camus, 
“is not to be cured, but to live with one’s ailments” (1955, 38). But, if we want to be a 
bit more precise, the ambivalence of the absurd is no more a sickness than the 
ambivalence described by Bleuler, Freud, or Klein in Chapter 4. While the 
ambivalence of the absurd may be experienced as a kind of illness, and may lead to 
greater pathologies if not managed properly, ambivalence is not precisely the illness 
or the cure, although it lies at the root of both sickness and health.  
 How, then, are we to manage this ambivalence at the heart of the absurd? How 
should we respond to its discomforts, its dynamics, its pressures? If it is possible to 
‘integrate’ the ambivalence of the absurd without resolving it, repressing aspects of it, 
or splitting it in two, then how is that delicate integration achieved? This chapter 
argues that the moral philosophy of the absurd is an attempt to contend with these 
very questions. The absurd may be understood as the painful expression of an 
ambivalence for which we must not seek extreme, primitive, defensive, or destructive 
cures, cures that would be, as the saying goes, worse than the disease. Understanding 
the absurd in this way permits us to discern moral differences between responses to 
the absurd. Although the philosophy of the absurd can not proffer formal moral 
values, it can provide a framework by which different responses to the challenges and 
tensions associated with ambivalence and absurdity may be shown to lead to morally 
and politically distinct outcomes.  
Absurd Borderlands  
What distinguishes absurd rebellion from revolutionary excess is the maintenance of 




goal in The Rebel was to define a method by which we might restrict the extreme 
movement of rebellion, to maintain its original tensions and avoid what Camus sees 
as its tragic but natural tendency to over-reach. When the rebel turns revolutionary, he 
supplants the authority he has just destroyed with his own, replacing the limits he 
originally defended with new claims to limitlessness. He is able to justify his excess 
in the name of the new religion of the revolution and with the help of a clear division 
of the world into all and nothing. But we should remember that these extreme 
consequences “only occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose, 
tires of the tremendous tension created by refusing to give a positive or negative 
answer, and finally abandons himself to complete negation or total submission” 
(Camus 1956b, 25, emphasis added).  
 Instead, what Camus is advocating is a kind of rebellion that includes an 
active resistance against itself, against its own tendencies toward negation and 
submission, absolutism and nihilism. In contrast to the abandon, excess, and 
absolutism of revolution, the absurd rebel endures his ambivalence, integrates his 
powerful and opposing desires without resolving them, and “limits himself as a 
matter of principle, to refusing to be humiliated without asking that others should be” 
(Camus 1956b, 18). This chapter explores in more detail how the rebel comes to 
endure, integrate, and limit his rebellion thus.  
 The key to understanding the measure and limitation of absurd rebellion lies 
in our interpretation of the absurd as ambivalent, because it is only with reference to 
his ambivalence that the rebel resists the divisive and extreme pressures of the absurd. 




rebel tries to limit his rage and aggression, but he also refuses to over-limit or 
renounce them for fear doing so will lead him to resignation, compliance, or 
conformity. Only the maintenance of a ‘tremendous tension’ between limitation and 
over-limitation, between over-aggressiveness and meekness will allow the rebel to 
avoid becoming complicit in the crimes to which his original rebellion was opposed.   
 In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus used topographic metaphors to describe the 
absurd position. “At that last crossroad where thought hesitates, many men have 
arrived and even some of the humblest… The real effort is to stay there, rather, in so 
far as that is possible, and to examine closely the odd vegetation of those distant 
regions” (1955, 10). These ‘distant regions’ are often referred to by Camus as a 
“desert” of the mind and heart (1955, 22), or a “deadly” climate (1955, 29). And yet 
their locations are not exactly distant, as Camus suggests. Rather, they are betwixt 
and between. Their barrenness, to explore the metaphor, seems to derive not precisely 
from their remoteness from a single place, but from the fact that they are between two 
homelands, belonging perhaps to neither, along a kind of deserted and sparsely 
inhabited border. If the rebel is an exile, as Camus often argues, he is a double-exile, 
forced from one home but prevented from entering the neighboring land as well. In 
this chapter, I argue that the work of the absurd rebel is to transform that deserted 
borderland into a ground for creative and moral action.           
 Throughout The Rebel, Camus locates his rebel on the difficult brink between 
two worlds, the sacred and the human. “The rebel is a man who is on the point of 
accepting or rejecting the sacred and determined in laying claim to a human situation 




the sacred will lead the rebel down a dangerous path toward absolutism. Thus, the 
rebel who measures himself must choose neither. Instead, he suffers “a new form of 
anguish and a new happiness” (1956b, 70), always tensed by the in-betweenness and 
ambivalence that strains him. Maintaining that ambivalence is “an exhausting 
struggle” (1956b, 70), not least because it represents an exile from the simple clarity 
and security of either absolute.  
 Camus often mixes metaphors and strays from single images, but he always 
returns to the absurd with characterizations of its tension, its in-betweenness, its 
brinks and clefts, all of which express its powerful ambivalence in much the same 
way that tension, in-betweenness, and frightful clefts were visible themes in the 
psychoanalytic accounts of ambivalence discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Of course, as 
discussed earlier, one of the most profound dangers of living along the edges and 
borderlands of absurdity, “lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap,” a leap that 
would, to complete our metaphor, take the rebel back home (1955, 50).  
Absurd Responses  
In response to the discomfort of this double exile, Camus argues that we face a 
variety of choices. We can react to our position in a number of morally and politically 
distinct ways. Avi Sagi has outlined what he sees as four potential reactions or 
responses to the absurd, an enumeration which is, unfortunately, incomplete. The first 
is what Sagi calls the “dichotomical response,” an expression, he claims, of “radically 
incompatible reactions, for which no justification exists” (2002, 109). Sagi is 
referring to the contradiction between absurdity and moral action implied by Camus’ 




because “if we believe in nothing, if nothing has any meaning and if we can affirm no 
values whatsoever, then everything is possible and nothing has any importance” 
(Camus 1956b, 5). By his “dichotomical response,” Sagi means yielding to the 
feeling that nothing has any meaning, which gives us “clearance for murder” (2002, 
109).  
 Sagi’s second response, which is difficult to distinguish from the first, is 
“indifference and passivity in the face of evil, which means ‘accepting the murder of 
others’” (2002, 109). Perhaps the only difference here is that one accepts murder but 
does not actively participate in it. Of course, this distinction between active and 
passive murder, direct and indirect murder is one that Camus finds specious. The 
intimate relationship between direct and indirect participation in evil, as we will see 
more clearly in Chapter 9, forms a central part of Camus’ absurd moral and political 
philosophy. Sagi’s third reaction, which follows closely upon the second, is “making 
‘the cult of efficiency’ the supreme value” (2002, 110), which we have discussed in 
the previous chapter in terms of Hegelianism and modern revolution. And the fourth 
response, according to Sagi’s schema, is “rebelling against evil” (2002, 110).    
 While it is admirable to attempt to enumerate and classify all the possible 
responses to absurdity, Sagi’s categorization does not effectively capture or clearly 
distinguish between all the choices we face. A truly precise list would be difficult to 
produce, if only because there are no clear limits on the number of responses and 
there are no clear demarcations between one response and another. Indeed, it is part 
of Camus’ argument in The Rebel that one response to the absurd leads naturally into 




rebellion logically devolves into historical revolution as limited refusals become 
absolute affirmations or negations. Nevertheless, I think we may improve upon Sagi’s 
list.  
 To do so, it is helpful to note the similarities between reactions to the absurd 
and a brief outline of classic defenses against ambivalence.  
People defend against experiencing [ambivalence] in many ways. Those 
mechanisms of defense Freud mentioned include: reversing one side of the 
ambivalent feeling, usually by turning the negative side into a positive (‘love 
thine enemy’); repressing one side and rigidifying the other side into a 
reaction-formation, for example, in the idealization of a parent; displacing or 
substituting a remote object or symbol for the real object; projecting, for 
example, resolving one’s own ambivalent feelings toward a loved one who 
has died by blaming evil spirits; splitting or transferring the positive side of 
the ambivalence into an unqualified love of one person or object, and the 
negative side into an unqualified hatred of another. (Smelser 1998, 6) 
 
These defenses against ambivalence mirror the responses to absurdity that Camus 
treats in The Rebel. In Camus’ outline of the history of metaphysical rebellion in 
literature and philosophy, he highlights two extremes, absolute affirmation and 
absolute negation, which represent the two most basic reactions to the absurd and the 
two simplest ways to defend against its ambivalence. Absolute negation is passive 
nihilism and the tendency toward metaphysical revolution that includes the famous 
‘everything is permitted’ that characterizes the terrible freedom of Ivan Karamazov. 
Absolute affirmation is separated from absolute negation only by a fine line. Absolute 
affirmation is to affirm all that is, as it is, as an absolute value, after eliminating all 
other values, ideals, universal principles, and eternal concepts (Camus 1956b, 67). 




 Both of these reactions to the ambivalence of the absurd are destructive, and 
both may be invoked to legitimize murder. Absolute affirmation may be compared to 
a kind of repression, in which one suppresses the ‘negative’ side of absurd 
ambivalence while consciously clinging to the other. The absolutely affirmative 
response denies all consciousness of injustice and evil that would stand in the way of 
its total approval. Or rather, it denies that injustice is really unjust, which means that 
it also manages to suppress any standards, values, or even nostalgia for values that 
might speak against its idealization of reality and its affirmation of evil. The 
absolutely negative response may be thought of as an opposite kind of repression or 
as a reversal and reaction-formation in which one’s despair that ‘nothing has any 
meaning’ is translated into the hollow freedom afforded by the idea that ‘everything 
is permitted’. In either case, to repress, reverse, or “destroy one of [the absurd’s] 
terms is to destroy the whole” (1955, 30).  
 A third reaction to ambivalence not explicitly listed in Smelser’s enumeration 
but treated by Camus in both The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel is resignation. 
Camus wishes to resist the condition “in which I can have peace only by refusing to 
know and to live” (1955, 20), a response which simply accepts ambivalence and 
seeks to be resigned to it, settling for hypocrisy, conformity, and complacency. Faced 
with ambivalence and absurdity, this response is tempting, as our choices in the 
absurd climate seem to be “ordered in such a way as to bring into being that poisoned 
peace produced by thoughtlessness, lack of heart, or fatal renunciations” (1955, 20). 
 These resigned and complacent responses are just as much responses to 




“Opposites are closer to each other than heterogeneous characteristics. Hate and love 
are infinitely closer to each other than to indifference,” says Bleuler (1950, 375), 
explaining in the language of ambivalence what is now something of a cliché. 
Resignation or indifference, in this context, must be understood as an attempt to 
resolve ambivalence by neutralizing its force and diminishing its impact. In fact, we 
ought to interpret Camus’ claim that “the absurd man is the contrary of the reconciled 
man” (1955, 59n), to mean that reconciliation eventually destroys the ambivalence at 
the heart of absurdity.  
 I have not spoken about Meursault’s indifference or about yielding either to 
the desire for unity or the desire for the self as possible responses to absurdity. That is 
because, if Camus is right, it would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to 
yield absolutely to one or the other desire, to successfully become Meursault or 
Grenier’s indifferent sage. As much as we may wish to be less conflicted, to 
experience unity or absolute individuality non-problematically, Camus would argue 
that we can not. Instead, we find ways to escape the exigencies of ambivalence and 
absurdity by taking the paths of absolute affirmation, absolute negation, resignation, 
and radical splitting, which, because of their defensive nature, multiply the dangerous 
potential of the basic ambivalence that informs them, an ambivalence which can 
never be completely eliminated. The most dangerous of these paths, and the defensive 
reaction to absurdity to which Camus gives the most attention, is the split.  
Splitting Into All or Nothing  
In The Rebel, Camus is less concerned with complacency than with excessive 




radicalism over apathy would have been different. But even if so, Camus is deeply 
concerned that the rebel avoid the temptation to split because he finds it to be the 
most destructive response to absurdity. The rebel is tempted, according to Camus, to 
exceed the initial phase of limited and ambivalent rebellion by insisting on something 
more. “The act of rebellion carries him far beyond the point he had reached by simply 
refusing… The part of himself that he wanted to be respected he proceeds to place 
above everything else and proclaims it preferable to everything, even to life itself. It 
becomes for him the supreme good. Having up to now been willing to compromise, 
the slave suddenly adopts… an attitude of All or Nothing” (1956b, 14-15).  
 The ‘All or nothing’ split which Camus identifies in various places in the 
history and logic of rebellion is an appealing but pernicious reaction to absurdity (see 
1956b, 157). It is appealing because of its simplicity and clarity: the simplest way to 
address ambivalence is to split its ‘terms’ and to identify wholly with one ‘term’ 
while rejecting the other. Camus explains: “The rebel himself wants to be ‘all’ — to 
identify himself completely with this good of which he has suddenly become aware 
and by which he wants to be personally recognized and acknowledged — or 
‘nothing’; in other words, to be completely destroyed by the force that dominates 
him. As a last resort, he is willing to accept the final defeat, which is death, rather 
than be deprived of the personal sacrament that he would call, for example, freedom” 
(1956b, 15).  
 The rebel is tempted to identify himself with the ‘all’ or the ‘good’ or, at least, 
to be utterly destroyed by the ‘nothing’ or the ‘bad’ force that dominates him. This 




as a kind of projective identification, where his identity depends upon his 
identification with an absolute good he has projected onto his revolutionary ideal. 
Like the earliest defenses of the paranoid-schizoid position in Klein’s model, a certain 
amount of splitting likely permits the rebel to begin his fight, but, if it is not 
eventually abandoned, it leads him to justify crime and to sacrifice life (his and 
others’) according to the absolute values provided by the ‘all or nothing’ calculus and 
the unquestionable good of his ‘personal sacraments’.  
 While, in The Myth of Sisyphus, it seemed that the instant preceding the ‘leap’ 
was the instant fraught with the greatest danger, in The Rebel, the moment preceding 
the split is the crucial moment in which the rebel risks becoming the same as, or 
worse than, his enemy. Like Hamlet, in this moment the rebel risks becoming the 
criminal whose evil he seeks to avenge. And like Hamlet, the more that the rebel is 
able to recognize his difficult predicament, the greater will be his anxiety, for it is 
partly his escalating fear of losing the ability to distinguish good from evil that makes 
increasingly severe splits appealing; the originally well-intentioned rebel is soon 
tempted to embrace murder or death before compromise.  
 At the point that the rebel abandons the project of maintaining his absurd 
position, a position not entirely unlike Melanie Klein’s depressive position, in which 
he carefully manages ambivalence, resists the temptations of extremes, and 
recognizes the inevitability of his involvement with evil, the rebel transforms his 
ambivalence into a split vision of reality supported by the extremes of idealization 
and devaluation. The passage from absurd and ambivalent rebellion to absolute 




of the most immature and severe reactions against it. Although the splitting reaction 
appears to be more regressive than others, all defensive reactions, including 
repression, reversal, and resignation must be resisted according to the morality of the 
absurd because almost any suppression of absurdity permits the rebel to justify evil, 
to exaggerate or idealize his mission, and to deny the good or sacred qualities in 
others.  
   In one extreme scenario, the rebel splits the world into categories and is 
willing to sacrifice everyone, including himself, for his ideal of the good. In another 
extreme scenario, the rebel resigns himself to apathy, complacency, or compliance, in 
which he no longer resists or rebels against any injustice. The absurd moral actor, 
therefore, must resist not only first-order injustices, but these reactions to them. 
Maurice Friedman’s example of the Modern Job sheds light on the higher-order 
rebellion implied by absurd moral action.  
If the modern Promethean is marked by the either-or which holds that man 
must destroy the reality that faces him in order to recover his alienated 
freedom, the Modern Job is marked by the ‘both-and’ which faithfully affirms 
what confronts him as the ‘given’ of his own existence and at the same time 
does not submit to it but opposes and contends with it. The choice of the 
Modern Promethean is between submission and rebellion, and that of the 
Modern Job between this very either-or, in which submission and rebellion are 
the two sides of the same coin, and that other rebellion which holds the 
tension between the affirmation of oneself and the faithful confrontation of 
what faces one. (Friedman in Willhoite 1968, 62)   
 
 This excellent distinction between the either-or and the both-and illuminates 
absurd moral action as rebellion that also rebels against itself, as complex and 
reflexive rebellion that seeks not only to defy the other that oppresses, but that knows 




for values to be created and sustained. Absurd rebellion, as I have argued, is a higher-
order or reflexive rebellion waged with the help of experience and maturity. This is 
the link between the rebel’s moral activity and what appeared to be Camus’ hollow 
‘ethic of quantity’ in The Myth of Sisyphus. As we will recall, conscious experience 
did not define values, for Camus, but informed them, allowing the rebel to use his 
experience as a resource by which to eventually confront and contend with the 
pressures of ambivalence and absurdity. Here, the rebel’s ambivalence becomes his 
path to learning how to manage his ambivalence, a means by which he grows into his 
absurdity; his “problematic becomes a ground, the paradox of the person a stance, 
exile and rebellion a way” (Friedman in Willhoite 1968, 63). But it remains to clarify 
what the rebel makes of this ground and how he maintains his difficult way. 
Ambivalence and the Limitation of Rebellion  
As we have just discussed, the psychological and moral significance of ambivalence 
derives from both its inherent tensions and the possible reactions to which it gives 
rise, reactions which can either advance or restrain moral development. Just as the 
absurd method Camus pursued in The Myth of Sisyphus required vigilance, the 
morality of the absurd is a vigilance and a refusal to deny, to split, or to give up the 
ambivalence of the absurd. “In order to keep it alive, the absurd cannot be settled” 
(Camus 1955, 54). This absurd morality, then, is a matter of psychological endurance, 
“a matter of persisting” (Camus 1955, 52).  
 In his First Letter to a German Friend, Camus wrote in less abstract terms 
about the moral stance he attributed to the French resistance: “I know you think that 




distrust it at the same time” (1960, 7). In the Second Letter, Camus condemned his 
German friend for having lost just this ambivalence, for being “nothing but a single 
impulse” (1960, 18). Camus argued that the particular heroism of the French victims 
and resistance fighters derived from the fact that before seeking even to defend their 
country, they had to struggle with their scruples, “they had to conquer themselves 
first” (1960, 6). Because they sought a way forward without sacrificing part of their 
ambivalence over war and murder, because of their “scruples paid for with blood” 
(1960, 8), Camus claims that the French will have clean hands in the end, that they 
will have “a great victory won against injustice and against ourselves” (1960, 9).  
 Absurd moral action springs from ambivalence and must, in turn, recognize 
and renew this ambivalence in the face of the constant temptation to resolve or split it. 
Absurd rebellion entails a psychological resistance against the self, against the 
temptation to justify evil, to conform, or to otherwise de-limit the possibilities of 
action. In the case of the question of suicide treated in The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus 
argues that the essential thing is “to die unreconciled and not of one’s own free will. 
Suicide is a repudiation. The absurd man can only drain everything to the bitter end, 
and deplete himself” (1955, 55). Absolutes, reconciliations, and intellectual or 
physical suicides all relieve the individual of the burdens of absurdity, burdens which 
also constitute “man’s majesty” (1955, 55). The rebel’s burden is a constant 
insecurity, uncertainty, ambivalence, and even self-contradiction about his actions 
and his values. Thus, when Camus writes that “the absurd does not liberate, it binds” 
(1955, 67), he means that the absurd binds us to ambivalence and that ambivalence 




 Absurd rebellion and resistance is not resistance to analysis or insight, as the 
term is used in psychoanalytic contexts, but almost the opposite, a resistance to 
defensive reactions that would resolve or deny ambivalence, preventing analysis, 
insight, or change. The moral position Camus recommends, then, involves holding or 
containing absurdity in much the same way that a tolerance of “the back and forth 
movement between the poles of ambivalence opens the way to resolution of 
ambivalence by ‘living through’ possibilities to reach a point of being able to make 
satisfactory choices which themselves may involve future ambivalence, further 
exploration, evaluation, and change. Acceptance of this dialectical process is a type of 
resolution that does not involve the elimination or avoidance of mixed feelings, nor 
does it prematurely foreclose options presented by experiencing the world 
ambivalently” (Harrist 2006, 111, emphasis in original). The ability to tolerate 
ambivalence, like the ability to tolerate absurdity, leaves open the possibility for 
future ambivalent, exploratory, and changing responses to complex moral situations. 
Apart from the confusion created by using the term ‘dialectical’, Harrist’s common-
sense description of living-through ambivalence highlights a simple but practical 
moral consequence of absurd rebellion.  
 Perhaps Camus had a hard time developing and articulating the moral 
consequences of his position because he was fighting so stridently against 
Hegelianism and Marxism which advanced their own ‘dialectical’ theories using 
similar language and similarly ambivalent treatments of classes and historical 
developments (see Camus 1956b, 197-198). But, with the help of the analogy of 




revolutionary thought he critiques. First, the ambivalence of the absurd does not 
‘resolve’ itself in higher and higher stages or modes of life, spirit, or action. Although 
tolerating the ambivalence of the absurd may permit continued ambivalent responses 
by the individual, there is neither inevitability nor transcendence in Camus’ model, 
not even much gradual or historical progress. That is, the ‘absurd position’ is never 
settled, never set in stone. Rather, one is always presented opportunities to progress or 
regress to an absolute, revolutionary, or split position. Camus’ real critique of 
Hegelianism and Marxism is that because of their revolutionary promises, people 
willingly sacrifice themselves and others for a fantasy of progress: “In the perspective 
of the Marxist prophesy, nothing matters” except the future” (1956b, 207). The 
fantasized golden age that “justifies everything” promises to end ambivalence and 
absurdity (1956b, 208). The revolutionary does not ‘live through’ ambivalence; he 
seeks to transcend it.      
 On the contrary, for Camus, no genuine rebellion can take place without 
returning to its absurd origins. Without its ambivalent tension, all protest becomes 
univocal, hollow, and eventually nihilistic. “This survey of revolt during two 
centuries leads Camus to the conclusion that it has become lethal to life and liberty by 
failing to maintain the tension inherent in all metaphysical protest. While the tension 
remained, moral values could exist, but once the tension was dropped death, violence, 
and moral nihilism were inevitable” (Cruickshank 1960, 102, emphasis added). 
Perhaps like ambivalence in its psychoanalytic context, absurdity for Camus is a sort 




Without absurdity, any values or actions proposed would lack reference to the real 
challenges and complexities of living with ourselves and others.            
 Thus, the moral theory of absurdity proposes that we return to ambivalence in 
order to re-discover the limits of possible moral action. In a rather straight-forward 
sense, it is the rebel’s ambivalence about the ideas of de-limited values and actions, 
about absolute negation or absolute affirmation, or about total freedom or total power, 
that prevent him from becoming a revolutionary. Essentially, he preserves his own 
“contradiction, perhaps the most subtle of all spiritual forces” (1955, 65), in order to 
prevent less subtle and more destructive spiritual forces from taking over.    
 Rebellion, then, may be understood as a kind of insistence upon limits, as an 
attempt to affirm boundaries by preserving the ambivalence in his absurd position. 
The rebel asserts a boundary when he claims, “Up to this point yes, beyond it no.” In 
fact, Camus says, “his no affirms the existence of a borderline” (1956b, 13). The rebel 
does not exactly protest against his human condition, as Camus would have us 
believe; rather, he insists upon its basic integrity by resisting facile defenses that deny 
or destroy its limits. What he protests against is the regressive and destructive 
temptation to eliminate or abolish those limits. But he does not over-limit his 
rebellion either, as he might if he were consumed or paralyzed by ambivalence or 
excessively afraid of his own contradictions. Rather, as I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 9, the rebel insists upon limits even as he (paradoxically) forces himself to 
transgress them in their name.  
 Yet this transgression is not adolescent or ill-considered. As with 




boundaries and limits, but contribute to a more mature assessment of self and a more 
a mature recognition of others. Discussing the phenomenon of maternal ambivalence, 
Dagmar Lorenz-Meyer reminds us of how “‘achieving ambivalence’ (i.e. the 
experience of ambivalence and management of the attendant anxiety) bears the 
potential of self-knowledge and a more complete assessment of the other, which can 
promote both concern and responsibility and the necessary drawing of boundaries… 
Ambivalence (achieved)… does not obliterate opposed feelings but makes passion 
circulate, forces reflection and firms boundaries” (2001, 5). In the same way, the 
ambivalence of the rebel permits him to assess himself and others more completely, 
to tolerate the possibility of good and evil in himself and another, and to insist upon 
the boundaries that, ideally, protect the basic integrity of both.  
 As we have noted above, Camus’ absurd rebel seems to guide his action by 
insisting upon a limit. The rebel feels that his opponent is “‘exaggerating,’ that he is 
exerting his authority beyond a limit where he begins to infringe on the rights of 
others. Thus the movement of rebellion is founded simultaneously on the categorical 
rejection of an intrusion that is considered intolerable and on the confused conviction 
of an absolute right… It is in this way that the rebel slave says yes and no 
simultaneously. He affirms that there are limits and also that he suspects —and 
wishes to preserve— the existence of certain things on this side of the borderline” 
(Camus 1956b, 13).  
 This ‘confused’ stance of the rebel, the insistence upon a limit and the 
simultaneous breaking of that limit in defense of it, mirrors a kind of mature 




schizoid or borderline defenses. The rebel strives to preserve and affirm the ‘good’ 
things on one side of the borderline, but he also knows that he must not split the good 
from the bad, for that splitting is the exact process which he identifies in the 
‘exaggerated’ action of his enemy.  
 This interpretation of the relationship between ambivalence and self-limitation 
explains why Camus finds the suppression of ambivalence to be responsible for the 
worst ‘exaggerations’ of absolutist ideology, violence, and terror. When ambivalence 
is suppressed, the moral grounding that sustains limits is destroyed. And the 
consequences of this loss of moral grounding are not merely theoretical. Camus finds 
the loss of ambivalence to be responsible for the most horrific crimes of Nazi 
soldiers. The extraordinarily cruel and methodical obsessiveness with which the 
Nazis exterminated their victims represents, for Camus, a kind of historical 
manifestation of a primitive defense against ambivalence. For instance:      
The destruction of Lidice demonstrates clearly that the systematic and 
scientific aspect of the Nazi movement really hides an irrational drive that can 
only be interpreted as a drive of despair and arrogance… It illustrates the 
ravages of that irrational form of reason which is the only value that can be 
found in the whole story. Not only were all the houses burned to the ground, 
the hundred and seventy-four men of the village shot, the two hundred and 
three women deported, and the three hundred children transferred elsewhere 
to be educated in the religion of the Fuhrer, but special teams spent months at 
work leveling the terrain with dynamite, destroying the very stones, filling in 
the village pond, and finally diverting the course of the river… To make 
assurance doubly sure, the cemetery was emptied of its dead, who might have 
been a perpetual reminder that once something existed in this place. (1956b, 
185)  
 
La Mesure and Moderation  
Because revolutionary thought has led to such horrifying excesses, Camus advances a 




(1956b, 294). Relative values, relative truths, and “approximative thought,” says 
Camus, are the heart of absurd morality and they stand in opposition to every absolute 
(1956b, 295). But we become confused when we read that Camus’ treatment of 
rebellion and revolution is meant to demonstrate the “necessity for moderation,” or 
that his “law of moderation equally well extends to all the contradictions of rebellious 
thought” (1956b, 295). As Thomas Warren has convincingly argued, a pervasive 
translation error may have severely marred Camus’ moral message.  
 In light of Camus’ insistence upon limits and measure in his discussion of 
rebellion and revolution in The Rebel, there is little justification for translating his ‘la 
mesure’ so frequently as ‘moderation’. Rather, the spirit of the work and the contexts 
in which the term appears most often recommend that la mesure be understood with 
reference to Camus’ “ideal of the classical sense of proportion,” as Donald Lazere 
puts it (1973, 230). Warren suggests that the closest philosophical root for Camus’ la 
mesure is actually the Greek sophrosyne, and that it should be translated into English 
as either ‘measure’ or ‘measuredness’ (1992, 124-125). The difference between 
‘measure’ and ‘moderation’ is apparent in both philosophical and dictionary 
definitions. In French, “la mesure est objective; c’est quelque chose qu’on prend en 
dehors de soi pour se régler. Modération et modestie annoncent un esprit de douceur 
et d’humilité… Mais mesure désigne quelque chose d’extérieur, d’emprunté, qu’on a 
ou qu’on n’a pas” (Lafaye in Warren 1992, 127). Josef Pieper argues that, speaking 
philosophically, “‘the current concept of moderation is dangerously close to (mere) 




curbing, bridling, repression — all in contradiction to the classic prototype of the 
fourth cardinal virtue (temperantia or sophrosyne)” (Warren 1992, 128).     
 It is true that Bower’s choice of ‘moderation’ often makes little sense given 
the contexts in which la mesure appears. For instance, the famous line, “Rebellion in 
itself is la mesure and it demands, defends, and re-creates it throughout history and its 
eternal disturbances” (Camus 1956b, 301), makes little sense when la mesure is 
translated as ‘moderation’. In what sense has rebellion historically defended and re-
created moderation? Is it sensible to say, further down the page, that moderation is “a 
perpetual conflict, continually created and mastered by the intelligence” (1956b, 
301)? ‘Moderation’, here, seems too banal, too facile for the kind of complex activity 
that Camus intends. Is it not strange to claim that “to rebel… supposes an 
interminable tension and the agonized serenity of which Rene Char also speaks. But 
the true life is present in the heart of this dichotomy. Life is this dichotomy itself, the 
mind soaring over volcanoes of light, the madness of justice, the extenuating 
intransigence of moderation” (1956b, 302-303). It is not ‘the extenuating 
intransigence of moderation’, which makes very little sense, but the extreme tension 
implied by keeping the measure of absurdity and ambivalence that is at the heart of 
Camus’ moral vision.  
   Warren rightly points out that Camus’ ancient Greek heroes are mythical, 
tragic, even occasionally Platonic. And surely it seems odd to suggest that the chief 
virtues of Prometheus, Sisyphus, Oedipus, or even Plato’s philosophical hero 
emerging from the cave are those of moderation (Warren 1992, 127). In fact, Camus’ 




associate with moderation. Rather, his language often evokes the test, the measure, or 
the scale. “Rebellion, cut off from its origins and cynically travestied, oscillates, on 
all levels, between sacrifice and murder” (1956b, 280). “In history, as in psychology, 
rebellion is an irregular pendulum, which swings in an erratic arc because it is 
looking for its most perfect and profound rhythm” (1956b, 294). And “on the very 
day when the Caesarian revolution triumphed over the syndicalist and libertarian 
spirit, revolutionary thought lost, in itself, a counterpoise of which it cannot, without 
decaying, deprive itself. This counterpoise, this spirit which takes the measure of life, 
is the same that animates the long tradition that can be called pensée solaire, in 
which, since the time of the Greeks, nature has always been weighed against 
evolution [sic]” (1956b, 298-299). These images are not of moderation but of a 
complex balancing, measure, and limitation that reminds us of the distinction between 
the extreme tension of ambivalence and the carelessness of indifference.              
 I think it is fair to suggest that this basic misunderstanding of la mesure has 
significantly contributed to the misunderstanding of the morality and politics of the 
absurd. The morality of rebellion is certainly not born of a calm and gentle spirit, of 
mild or prudent behavior. Indeed, an ethic of moderation too closely resembles that of 
both the bourgeois conformist and, as Warren points out, the nihilist dilettante whom 
Camus rebukes in The Rebel. Both of these figures “quite naturally might adopt a 
policy such as ‘moderation in all things,’ or some other doctrine that would not 
commit beyond the safety of mild, modest, average, or superficial performances” 




Plagues Within and Without 
To understand the meaning of la mesure, limits, and rebellion in Camus’ moral 
thought, it is helpful to consider Camus’ most moralistic novel, The Plague, which 
treats a number of different responses to a deadly illness terrorizing the town of Oran. 
It is obvious that Camus intends this plague to serve as a metaphor for the Nazi terror, 
although he wrote to Roland Barthes that it could serve as a metaphor for any terror at 
any time. John Krapp has argued that The Plague, while it presents a strong moral 
voice through the character of Dr. Rieux, ultimately contains ethical ambiguities, a 
“vital moral dialogue among competing ethical positions,” in which “no single ethical 
position is permitted to dominate the others” (Davis 2007, 1008). But it is by 
considering some of the complexities of these competing moral visions that we may 
advance our exploration of the moral theory of the absurd.    
 Competing with Dr. Rieux’s lucid resistance against the plague (which is, 
after all, not an entirely problematic commitment considering Rieux’s profession as a 
medical doctor), there are positions of happiness-seeking represented by Rambert, 
reconciliation with faith represented by Paneloux, nihilism and criminality 
represented by Cottard, and moral grandiosity or seeking ‘sainthood without God’, 
represented by Tarrou. None of these characters strikes us as a typical ‘rebel’, unless 
we imagine working in sanitation units as ‘rebellion’ against a disease. Rather, most 
of these characters ‘resist’ the plague by serving in the struggle against it in one way 
or another. They diagnose patients, work in sanitation units, keep the books, and in 




also resist, in different ways and to varying degrees, the temptations of license, 
criminality, despair, and indifference that the plague seems to offer.  
 Perhaps oddly, Joseph Grand is named as the hero of the story, an 
“insignificant and obscure hero who had to his credit only a little goodness of heart 
and a seemingly absurd ideal” (Camus 1948, 137). Grand, an aging clerk who resists 
the plague in what ways he can and who aspires to complete a novel whose first 
sentence he repeatedly re-writes and effaces, is “the true embodiment of the courage 
that inspired the sanitary groups” because he resists the plague and its temptations 
“without a moment’s hesitation and with the large-heartedness that was a second 
nature with him” (1948, 134).  
 What Camus seems to argue through his choice of narrator and hero, is that a 
non-problematic, natural resistance against terrors like the plague is the correct moral 
stance. When Rieux thanks Grand for his help, Grand reacts with surprise: “Why, 
that’s not difficult! Plague is here and we’ve got to make a stand, that’s obvious. Ah, 
I only wish everything were as simple!” (1948, 134). That simplicity is, itself, quite 
confusing in the context of Camus’ novel and his otherwise complex moral thought, 
for, if anything is clear, it is that moral calculations are not simple for Camus, that 
they require an extraordinary degree of tolerance for tension, ambivalence, and 
contradiction, for weighing and balancing possibilities and limits. But, then again, 
why should resistance against a plague be complex? Grand’s easy and obvious 
reaction is completely appropriate given the circumstances. These reflections then 
beg the question why Camus would choose a plague as his metaphor for terror if 




intricacies of rebellion against human terror, tyranny, and oppression require a much 
more complex and subtle understanding. As noted earlier, this question has bothered 
many of Camus’ readers and critics.    
 As a way to approach this question, we may read the following speech, 
delivered by neither Rieux nor Grand but by Tarrou. Tarrou has begun by describing 
the sentence of a man condemned to death by firing squad. Tarrou once mounted a 
fight against the death penalty, but has now come to realize that he is complicit in 
murder in a thousand subtle and indirect ways, a realization that vexes him. 
For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed, of having been, even 
with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. As 
time went on I merely learned that even those who were better than the rest 
could not keep themselves nowadays from killing or letting others kill, 
because such is the logic by which they live; and that we can’t stir a finger in 
this world without the risk of bringing death to somebody. Yes, I have been 
ashamed ever since; I have realized that we all have plague, and I have lost 
my peace… That… is why this epidemic has taught me nothing new, except 
that I must fight it at your side… Each of us has the plague within him; no 
one, no one on earth is free from it. And I know, too, that we must keep 
endless watch on ourselves lest in a careless moment we breathe in 
somebody’s face and fasten the infection on him. What’s natural is the 
microbe. All the rest — health, integrity, purity (if you like) — is a product of 
the human will, of a vigilance that must never falter. The good man, the man 
who infects hardly anyone, is the man who has the fewest lapses of attention. 
And it needs tremendous will-power, a never ending tension of the mind, to 
avoid such lapses. Yes, Rieux, it’s a wearying business, being plague-stricken. 
But it’s still more wearying to refuse to be it. (Camus 1948, 252-253)  
 
 I have quoted this passage at length because it is arguably the most significant 
meditation on the morality and psychology of absurdity in the novel. Tarrou’s belief 
in a kind of universal, collective guilt (just like his quest to be a secular saint) is a bit 
too extreme to be in full accord with Camus’ perspective, and yet Tarrou’s admission 




the maintenance of mental tension, his refusal to “join forces with the pestilences,” 
his rejection of the judgment that leads to “rational murder,” his insistence upon 
“plain, clear-cut language,” his decision “to take, in every predicament, the victim’s 
side, so as to reduce the damage done,” and his vague intuition of a “third category” 
of moral action that somehow integrates the contradictions of rebellion, limits, and 
absurdity are all very much in line with Camus’ moral positions (1948, 253-254).   
 Tarrou recognizes the profound interdependence between himself and others. 
He recognizes the ease with which people can and do harm one another, and he sees 
in himself the same evil which he finds present in the world. One is almost tempted to 
say that Tarrou finds himself in a position of depressive guilt. Yet, Tarrou’s half-
ironic quest for perfection, perhaps a response to his guilt (1948, 255), appears to be a 
somewhat foolish quest for personal purity that Dr. Rieux, the more obvious hero of 
the tale, does not share. However, near the end of the story, after Tarrou’s death, 
Rieux comments that Tarrou “had lived a life riddled with contradictions and had 
never known hope’s solace” (1948, 292), suggesting perhaps that Tarrou had never 
completely yielded to his fantasy of self-perfection, garnering him a bit of absurd 
dignity thereby.  
 Rieux, on the other hand, is perhaps the most stoic plague combatant and the 
story’s narrator, a role which he half-heartedly conceals until the end of the novel. 
Germaine Brée comments that “unlike Rieux, Tarrou cannot come to terms with the 
reality of man’s metaphysical condition nor accept man’s participation in its cruel 
rites. [Tarrou] is touched more deeply perhaps than Rieux at the very source of life, in 




to the plague is lauded by some as the ideal response to evil, and yet it is impossible 
to ignore the way in which Rieux’s actions slowly cut away at his sensitivity and 
humanity. Either his role as a medical leader in the fight against the plague or his role 
as the narrator of the story forces him to suppress his emotions. Perhaps it is both. 
Rieux, in the third person, tells of his role:     
This chronicle is drawing to an end, and this seems to be the moment for Dr. 
Bernard Rieux to confess that he is the narrator. But before describing the 
closing scenes, he would wish anyhow to justify his undertaking and to set it 
down that he expressly made a point of adopting the tone of an impartial 
observer… Summoned to give evidence regarding what was a sort of crime, 
he has exercised the restraint that behooves a conscientious witness. All the 
same, following the dictates of his heart, he has deliberately taken the victims’ 
side and tried to share with his fellow citizens the only certitudes they had in 
common — love, exile, and suffering… To be an honest witness, it was for 
him to confine himself mainly to what people did or said and what could be 
gleaned from documents. Regarding his personal troubles and his long 
suspense, his duty was to hold his peace. (Camus 1948, 301-302)   
 
 This final apology is not entirely convincing. Rieux appears to be such a hard-
working combatant and such a dutiful narrator that his emotion and creativity are 
stifled. Brée feels that “Rieux survives but is dehumanized — he knows that the 
plague will always be with him,” for he has seen his wife leave him for a sanatorium 
(even before the plague becomes a force) and thus, “Rieux has allowed one 
dimension of life to slip from his hands, that is, the personal, total love that links two 
human beings” (1964, 122). Although Rieux reacts strongly to the death of a child, 
his separation from his wife he almost accepts as a necessary sacrifice in his combat 
against the plague.     
 In the end, it appears that Rieux’s role as doctor and his role as narrator 




job is primarily to watch, to diagnose, and to draw the necessary conclusions. Having 
‘the definitive word’, having to “speak for all” (Camus 1948, 302), having all the 
words composes a significant part of the oppression of the plague upon Rieux. It is 
the toll charged for his work, demanding the eventual sacrifice of his wife, as well as 
Rieux’s happiness and sensitivity. His role as ‘diagnoser’ is echoed in his function as 
narrator and even in his name. To pronounce the name, Dr. Rieux, in French, one 
unavoidably pronounces the French word for eyes, yeux. In fact, because the ‘r’ is 
repeated, it is almost as if the doctor’s name were Doctor Yeux, Doctor Eyes.  
 In keeping with his moniker, Dr. Rieux permits himself no illusions, and yet, 
his clear-sightedness comes at a cost which even he occasionally describes. For 
instance, he admits that “his exhaustion was a blessing in disguise” because, without 
it, the “all-pervading odor of death might have made him sentimental” (1948, 193). 
On seeing his friend, Dr. Castel, exhausted and asleep in his chair, Rieux feels a lump 
in his throat: 
His sensibility was getting out of hand. Kept under all the time, it had grown 
hard and brittle and seemed to snap completely now and then, leaving him the 
prey of his emotions. No resource [sic] was left him but to tighten the 
stranglehold on his feelings and harden his heart protectively. For he knew 
this was the only way of carrying on. In any case, he had few illusions left, 
and fatigue was robbing him of even these remaining few. He knew that, over 
a period whose end he could not glimpse, his task was no longer to cure but to 
diagnose. To detect, to see, to describe, to register, and then condemn — that 
was his present function. Sometimes a woman would clutch his sleeve, crying 
shrilly: ‘Doctor, you’ll save him, won’t you?’ But he wasn’t there for saving 
life; he was there to order a sick man’s evacuation. How futile was the hatred 
he saw on faces then! ‘You haven’t a heart!’ a woman told him on one 
occasion. She was wrong; he had one. It saw him through his twenty-hour 
day, when he hourly watched men dying who were meant to love. It enabled 
him to start anew each morning. He had just enough heart left for that, as 
things were now. How could that heart have sufficed for saving life? No, it 
wasn’t medical aid that he dispensed in those crowded days — only 





 In his Notebooks, Camus compared the minor character of the man who spits 
on cats from his balcony with Tarrou, while comparing Rieux to the asthmatic man 
who spends his days counting beans. The two may have even been intended to be 
mirrors, “crude replicas” of Rieux and Tarrou (Brée 1964, 123). The first, the man 
with the cats, “needs to establish a relation with a living being; the second reduces life 
to the most elementary and indifferent automatism” (Brée 1964 123). But in the end, 
like the bean counter, Rieux gets the last word because, in some strange way, part of 
himself is removed from these emotional needs, and this removal permits him to 
function, to fight, and to perhaps not to baulk at the unsavory aspects of his combat. 
Rieux explains: “When a man has only four hours sleep, he isn’t sentimental. He sees 
things as they are; this is to say, he sees them in the garish light of justice — hideous, 
witless justice. And those others, the men and women under sentence to [sic] death, 
shared his bleak enlightenment. Before the plague he was welcomed as a savior… 
Now, on the contrary, he came accompanied by soldiers, and they had to hammer on 
the door with rifle-butts before the family would open it” (Camus 1948, 193).       
 Now Rieux is a part of a partly oppressive solution to the oppressions of the 
plague. As he is well aware, he must send infected citizens to die in stadiums that 
resemble concentration camps. He must sacrifice some for the good of others. His job 
and his role is to cleanse, to disinfect, to separate and segregate. Like Tarrou might 
have said in his speech quoted above, Camus wrote in his Notebooks that “there is not 
a single thing one does (one really does) for a human being that does not negate 




beings, this law sterilizes forever. In the final analysis, loving a human being amounts 
to killing all others” (1978, 199).  
 The moral dilemma of involvement with evil in the combat against evil turns 
out to be the most complex moral issue between Tarrou and Rieux: whether one 
should strive to keep one’s hands clean or whether such a quest for purity amounts to 
a kind of escape from moral realities. In light of this complex dilemma, we may see 
the way that Rieux is forced to constrain his love for particular human beings 
precisely in order to pursue his resistance on behalf of all the others. In a sense, he 
chooses between loving one and helping all (or most). But faced with such a choice, 
as we already know from Camus’ other writings, there is no ideal solution.  
 Rieux does his work honorably and tirelessly, it is true, and he does it because 
it is his duty, which is admirable. But Rieux seems to have lost some of his creativity, 
some of his illusions, even some of the ambivalence that Camus argues is vital to life, 
art, and morally valuable action. To raise this point is certainly not to condemn Rieux. 
Rather, Camus seems to want to show that plagues, like other terrors, demand terrible 
sacrifices, that there may be no way to combat them while keeping every aspect of 
our creativity and morality intact. This particular theme is not even precisely Camus’: 
it may be said to be a central theme of both classical tragedy and absurd literature and 
drama.  
 But while Camus’ style in The Plague is heavy-handed, his moral message 
may actually be rather subtle. Camus is not suggesting that Rieux, or any character, 
could be morally perfect, even if it were not for the plague. While Rieux’s moral 




the novel’s characters. The absurd, if it is present in The Plague, is present between 
the characters and perhaps even between the characters and the reader, where we are 
forced to recognize the imperfection of all responses to the plague, a recognition 
which prevents us from taking refuge in defenses and splits that deny our 
involvement in evil. This interpretation of the role of the absurd in The Plague 
explains Camus’ choice to make the subject a disease more satisfactorily than Camus’ 
own explanation for that choice, which was that the symbol of disease had broad 
applicability. If we can not avoid being involved in evil even when resisting a non-
problematic, natural evil like a plague, then how much stronger, how much more 
careful, how much more mature must we be in reacting to the infinitely more 
complex moral dilemmas involved in fighting human evil.     
 We are warned in The Rebel that “absolute justice is achieved by the 
suppression of all contradiction: therefore it destroys freedom” (Camus 1956b, 287-
288). The same reasoning that holds justice and freedom in contradictory tension 
applies equally to the conflicts between violence and non-violence, collaboration and 
resistance, murder and silence. “The contradiction of rebellion, then, is reflected in an 
apparently insoluble contradiction, of which the two counterparts in politics are on 
the one hand the opposition between violence and non-violence, and on the other 
hand between justice and freedom” (1956b, 286). In either case, Camus knows that 
absolutes are destructive while in-betweens necessitate involvement in crime and 
culpability. “Absolute non-violence is the negative basis of slavery and its acts of 
violence; systematic violence positively destroys the living community and the 




 Camus is aware that it is necessary to act, to resist plagues and terrors (see 
1956b, 289), but the absurd rebel must act with regard to a moral rule that he finds 
dubious while, at the same time, transgressing the very limits he defends. This 
message is echoed in The Plague through the polyphony of moral perspectives, 
through the toll that trying to maintain his difficult ‘absurd position’ exacts upon 
Rieux, and even through the monologue of Tarrou, who, while not without his share 
of flaws, is the one character who is able to vocalize some of the agony and 
contradiction at the heart of the absurd.  
 Colin Davis has argued that The Plague is about the clearing away of 
contradiction, debris, and “residue,” as he calls it. This process of cleaning and 
clearing begins with the first rat that is found “out of place” (Davis 2007, 1012). 
Davis finds the novel to be a pronouncement in favor of ‘tidying up’ the world, of 
correcting the messiness of creation; and he seeks evidence of this motif of 
cleanliness not only in the story’s explicit treatment of sanitation and health issues, 
but in the moments of communion in which, he thinks, Camus’ characters create “a 
world cleansed of otherness” (2007, 1012). Davis argues that Rieux rejects ‘residue’ 
in his narration, because he “presides over a neatly tidied text” (Davis 2007, 1015), 
because Rieux insists that Rambert tell only the whole truth about the conditions in 
the Arab quarter, and because Rieux merges with Tarrou when the two men find 
reprieve from the plague by “swimming side by side, with the same zest, in the same 
rhythm” (Camus 1948, 257).  
 But Davis’ account does not do justice to the complexity of the text or of 




clearly exist in The Plague, it seems almost impossible not to notice that they stand in 
ambivalent relation to the countervailing forces of difference, individuality, and 
liberty. And Davis’ bizarre conclusion, that “Camus’s notion of art as the correction 
of reality fails to appreciate that something of value may be lost when the world is 
made unified and coherent” (2007, 1019), could not be more inaccurate. Somehow, 
this interpretation has mistaken Camus for someone else, neglecting the ambivalence 
in the text and in the philosophy of the absurd. Rather, as I have attempted to show 
throughout this volume, the desire for unity and coherence represents only half of the 
ambivalence of the absurd. In the character of Rieux, it is true, a particular response 
predominates, and yet, it is clear in the text that his stance entails certain undesirable 
consequences. While Rieux’s eyes see all and while his voice tells all, the reader is 
prevented from whole-heartedly embracing Rieux’s outlook, forcing the reader to re-
engage the moral polylogue between all of the other characters. In this way, Rieux’s 
slight flaws actually reveal Camus’ intention to sound all of the competing voices in 
the novel in all of their polyphony, tension, and ambivalence.  
 While Davis would disagree with the conclusion I draw here, he has collected 
a useful list of the novel’s antimonies and ambivalences, which he presents, oddly, as 
examples “not so much of antimonies in the strict sense as instances of how the text’s 
clarities appear less clear” (2007, 1015). But the following ‘less clear clarities’ are 
the very antinomies and ambivalences at the heart of The Plague’s complex moral 
polylogue: 
(i) It is important to stand up for the truth / sometimes no one can be sure what 
the truth is. 





(iii) People should speak clearly and call things by their name / human 
language is ambiguous and inadequate to the task of self-expression. 
(iv) Some responses to the plague are preferable to others / no one has a 
secure basis on which to condemn other people’s decisions and beliefs. 
(v) There are no heroes / some people are more heroic than others. 
(vi) On balance there is more to admire in people than to despise / on balance 
people are selfish and ignorant and have short memories. 
(vii) Everyone should join in the struggle to defeat the plague / the plague 
cannot be defeated. (Davis 2007, 1015)      
 
Each of these antinomies may be supported by excerpts of dialogue spoken by 
different characters at different points throughout the novel. This illuminating 
(although not exhaustive) compilation condenses many of the contradictory views 
expressed by various characters in the text. Each of these voices struggles with itself 
and with others, but none finds absolute resolution. Thus, what some critics have 
claimed to be a weakness of the novel, we may now see as one of its strongest moral 
messages: “The novel struggles against itself, wanting to clarify and to disambiguate, 
to call things by their proper name, but also stumbling at every stage, finding 
strangeness and ambiguity seeping into its fabric” (Davis 2007, 1019). When taken as 
a whole, the novel’s refusal to clarify, unify, and resolve its moral questions reflects 
the higher-order morality that checks idealism and ideology, that limits and measures 
its own possible actions, and that seeks to preserve an ambivalent ‘absurd position’.      
 While Davis and others understand the contrasting forces in The Plague to be 
cleanliness and messiness, these are not likely the most significant ambivalences in 
the text, and they are certainly not the most important motifs in Camus’ work. On the 
contrary, the characters of The Plague are quite plainly concerned with what to do 
about basic moral and political problems. What are the moral limits of rebellion 




tempt us to engage less fully? If we accept wrong-doing, how can we differentiate 
ourselves from our enemies? These questions resound throughout the text and the 
very impossibility of coming to a simple answer to them is perhaps the most 
significant message of the novel. The moral hero of The Plague, therefore, is not any 
of the characters taken individually, but rather all of the characters when taken 
together, when their competing voices are ‘integrated’, as it were, into a complex 
whole.  
 Camus even hints at how we might conceive of this ‘integrative’ process by 
making Rieux face one of the more subtle challenges of combating evils like the 
plague: the threat that evil poses to his personhood and his creativity. Like Winnicott, 
whom I briefly discuss in the next section of this chapter, Camus is aware that “of 
individuals dominated at home, or spending their lives in concentration camps or 
under lifelong persecution because of a cruel political regime… it is only a few of the 
victims who remain creative” (Winnicott 1971, 68). Given the lack of ‘ideal’ 
solutions to the plague, given the pressures of the ambivalent dynamics of the absurd, 
and given the difficulty of limiting one’s actions against unlimited evil, the morality 
of the absurd will depend upon the rebel’s creativity, but this very creativity is 
threatened by the forces he struggles against.  
Rebellion and Creativity  
In “The Artist and his Time,” Camus wrote: “I shall certainly not choose the moment 
when we are beginning to leave nihilism behind to stupidly deny the values of 
creation in favor of the values of humanity, or vice versa. In my mind neither one is 




Tolstoy, Melville) by the balance he managed to maintain between the two. Today, 
under the pressure of events, we are obliged to transport that tension into our lives… 
We must simultaneously serve suffering and beauty. The long patience, the strength, 
the secret cunning such service calls for are the virtues that establish the very 
renascence we need” (1955, 211-212). In fact, Camus regularly linked absurd 
rebellion to creativity and the creative process. Like rebellion, for Camus, “art is the 
activity that exalts and denies simultaneously… Artistic creation is a demand for 
unity and a rejection of the world” (1956b, 253).  
 But while Camus’ thought on rebellion and his ideas about artistic creation 
have been scrutinized independently, the moral link between them has not been 
sufficiently appreciated. As I hope to show in this section of this chapter, absurd 
rebellion must creatively manage its ambivalence, affirm and transgress its own 
limits, and resist defensive reactions and destructive tendencies in order to preserve 
creative possibility. Like creative art, absurd moral action both depends upon a 
creative resourcefulness and, in its expression, preserves the boundaries that make 
further creativity possible.  
 At first glance, it might appear that our absurd rebel lacks the unity or 
coherence required to form genuine intentions or actions. We might imagine that 
without a clear self-concept, identity, or ideal, Camus’ ambivalent self lives without 
“a basic place to operate from” (Winnicott 1986, 39), without that degree of security 
and cogency necessary for creative thought and action. But the ambivalent position 
that Camus defends as the cornerstone of rebellion actually accords well with norms 




Camus knows that artistic, moral, and personal creativity arise not in relation to some 
imagined, absolute unity of the self but in relation to the maturity, strength, and 
flexibility with which ambivalences and tensions are managed. The “source of 
rebellion,” Camus explains, is “where refusal and acceptance, the unique and the 
universal, the individual and history balance each other in a condition of acute 
tension” (1956b, 273). The rebel’s management of these ambivalences permits him to 
be creative, in the fullest sense, to achieve a greater integration of opposites, and to 
develop a more mature relationship with others and the world. By diagnosing 
contemporary ideologies as defensive reactions to ambivalence, Camus is trying to 
argue for an absurd morality that is active rather than re-active, creative rather than 
defensive or compulsive.  
 The goal of both the rebel and the revolutionary is change. Both are inspired 
by a desire for unity, a fantasy of merging or fusing with an ideal that defines part of 
the ambivalence of the absurd, as discussed in Chapter 5. But there is a difference 
between the rebel’s and the revolutionary’s method, a difference that is attributable to 
something more subtle than the rebel’s self-limitation. Put differently, the rebel’s self-
limitation derives partly from his ambivalence but partly from his recognition of the 
need to preserve the grounds for creative and moral action. This ground for creativity 
and morality informs the idea of the limit, and becomes a part of the good for which 
the rebel struggles. In order to understand this rather complicated argument, we have 
to briefly discuss the logic of change.  
 In order to attain the goal of change, a certain amount of control over objects 




we might say that it is necessary to be able to affect or impact others or the world. 
Even in the simple case where a rebel seeks to make a small change, or a change only 
to himself, others will have to recognize and react to these changes in ways that 
confirm that a change has happened. However, for this reason, the individual who 
seeks change leads himself down a dangerous path, at the extreme end of which lies a 
self-defeating insistence on absolute control and domination, an insistence which 
paradoxically denies the externality of the world on which his activity depends.  
 Just as Camus will argue that the Hegelian consciousness denies the 
subjectivity of other consciousnesses in its desperate quest for recognition (1956b, 
138-139), so Camus’ rebel always risks destroying the very force against which he 
defines his rebellion. The rebel is in a difficult position because he seeks to defy the 
domination of a master, but he has trouble doing so without destroying him in his 
turn. In an article which is neither about Camus nor the absurd, David Levine has 
very nicely articulated this contradiction intrinsic to the drive for change and its 
relationship to destruction and control: 
Control over objects, if complete, destroys their quality of being objects 
because it destroys their quality of being external to the self. Once the object 
is destroyed in this way, however, it can no longer afford the individual the 
sought-after recognition that provides the avenue to securing the manic state 
by making the self-ideal an objective — that is, external reality. There is, in 
other words, a contradiction embedded in the goal of fusion. It demands an 
externality within which the reality of an internal (ideal) can be established, 
and yet, it seeks to accomplish the goal of making real (therefore establishing 
in reality) what is subjective by destroying the externality of the world. (1999, 
233-234)   
 
 If this contradiction makes total change and total unity with an ideal self-




he must “maintain the object in a state that is and is not external. This is 
accomplished, to borrow Hegel’s formulation, by preserving the object in a state of 
bondage to the self. The objective of change, then, is not to absorb the object into the 
self but to enslave the object” (Levine 1999, 234). In this situation, a kind of sadistic 
and repetitive conquest becomes “the sustainable alternative to fusion” (Levine 1999, 
235).  
 We must note the discomfiting similarities between this position of 
enslavement and at least one way of understanding Camus’ absurd rebel, who seeks 
not to kill his master but merely to defy and degrade him. In a sense, Camus’ rebel 
preserves the existence of his master in order to constantly rebel against him, to 
“enslave the object rather than be enslaved by it” (Levine 1999, 234). The rebel 
“involves this superior being in the same humiliating adventure as mankind’s… 
subjects it to our power of refusal, bends it to the unbending part of human nature, 
forcibly integrates it into an existence that we render absurd, and finally drags it from 
its refuge outside time and involves it in history” (Camus 1956b, 24-25). The rebel’s 
attack on his enemy, with its apparent goal of humiliation and its imagery of dragging 
the enemy (although, unlike Hektor, still alive) around the city walls, permits us to 
see the resemblance between the manic and controlling aspect of change and the 
regressive and destructive potential of absurd rebellion.  
 Cruickshank notices something of this similarity but uses it to compare 
Camus’ rebellious stance to Kierkegaard’s almost humorous characterization of 
demoniac despair. Demoniac despair, according to Kierkegaard, revolts “against the 




is (to describe it figuratively) as if an author were to make a slip of the pen, and that 
this clerical error became conscious of being such… it is then as if this clerical error 
would revolt against the author, out of hatred for him were to forbid him to correct it, 
and were to say, ‘No I will not be erased, I will stand as a witness against thee, that 
thou art a very poor writer’” (Kierkegaard in Cruickshank 1960, 69). It is true that 
Camus’ metaphysical rebel revolts ‘against all creation’ (theoretically including his 
own), and seeks to “keep intact the abuses from which he suffers so as to be able to 
continue his rebellion against them” (Cruickshank 1960, 103n). But while it is 
amusing to think of the petulant rebellion implied by Kierkegaard’s despair, Camus’ 
stance implicates the rebel in potentially more destructive and controlling 
relationships with real enemies and others against whom he rebels. 
 But before we condemn Camus rebellion as hopelessly pathological, we 
should recall that Camus most often seeks to point out the dangers of rebellion, to 
note how easily it loses its dignity and purpose. Camus is, indeed, well aware that our 
powerful desire for unity is inseparable from our more destructive desires to possess, 
control, or even sterilize the world. Camus recognizes that the fantasy of fusion at the 
heart of revolutionary change is an impossible dream that risks destroying both the 
self and the objects in its way. And yet, Camus candidly places this desire and its 
contradiction at the heart of rebellion, as both its animating and potentially 
annihilating force. Camus writes:   
No human being, even the most passionately loved and passionately loving, is 
ever in our possession. On the pitiless earth where lovers are often separated 
in death and are always born divided, the total possession of another human 
being and absolute communion throughout an entire lifetime are impossible 
dreams. The desire for possession is insatiable, to such a point that it can 




loves… In the final analysis, every man devoured by the overpowering desire 
to endure and possess wishes that those whom he has loved were either sterile 
or dead. This is real rebellion. Those who have not insisted, at least once, on 
the absolute virginity of human beings and of the world, who have not 
trembled with longing and impotence at the fact that it is impossible, and have 
then not been destroyed by trying to love halfheartedly, perpetually forced 
back upon their longing for the absolute, can not understand the realities of 
rebellion and its ravening desire for destruction. (1956b, 261-262, emphasis 
added)         
 
Camus’ candor about the deadly destructiveness of rebellion really accentuates its 
extreme ambivalence, for rebellion, here, is not based on sober moderation, but on a 
ravenous and radical desire for the extreme unity of death. Nevertheless, we know 
that rebellion is not only this, that this extraordinary statement of its power is 
balanced by something equally powerful that restrains it.  
 Camus’ warnings about the destructive potential of rebellion permit us to 
appreciate the extraordinary emotional force that generates the precarious 
ambivalence of the absurd, an ambivalence which grounds absurd moral creativity. It 
is not exactly in order to degrade, enslave, or repeatedly attack the enemy that 
Camus’ rebel insists on the limitations of rebellion or ‘the sustainable alternative to 
fusion’; rather, the rebel seeks to defeat the enemy in order that the rebel (and others) 
may again act in less-defensive, less-than-totally-destructive, more creative ways. 
Perhaps a subtle difference, it is not in a state of bondage but in a state of boundaries 
that the ideal absurd rebel would seek to place his opponents. Total change or fusion 
would destroy the subjectivity of the other on which the rebel’s activity depends, and 
bondage would merely implicate the rebel in a continuing, sadistic, and degrading 




sufficiently bound so that the rebel (and others) can act creatively, not defensively, 
desperately, or reactively.  
 One of the easiest ways to remark this particular emphasis in Camus’ thought 
on rebellion is to notice that he attacks totalitarian solutions and absolutist or nihilistic 
defenses because they destroy our creative capacities.  
The tragedy of this [Communist] revolution is the tragedy of nihilism — it 
confounds itself with the drama of contemporary intelligence, which, while 
claiming to be universal, is only responsible for a series of mutilations to 
men’s minds. Totality is not a unity. The state of siege, even when it is 
extended to the very boundaries of the earth, is not reconciliation. The claim 
to a universal city is supported in this revolution only by rejecting two thirds 
of the world and the magnificent heritage of the centuries, and by denying, to 
the advantage of history, both nature and beauty and by depriving man of the 
power of passion, doubt, happiness, and imaginative invention — in a word, 
of his greatness. (1956b, 240)   
 
Here, the revolutionary solution not only ‘mutilates men’s minds’ but rejects ‘two 
thirds of the world’ along with all that grounds creative thought and action: ‘the 
heritage of the centuries’, nature, beauty, passion, doubt, and the imagination. By 
rejecting these capacities and resources, revolution finds itself in the contradiction of 
total change that leads to the end of creativity and morality.  
 Camus is quite aware, therefore, of the limit at which change spells the end of 
change, at which control spells the loss of control. These limits are the limits of 
rebellion, the limits that permit continued creative and moral interaction. In fact, one 
of the only ways to make sense of Camus’ convoluted concept of rebellion as that 
which (a) creates the absurd, (b) results from the absurd, and (c) defines the values by 
which absurd rebellion operates, is in the light of this comparison with creative and 




that he be affected, so that I know that I exist — but not completely destroyed so that 
I know he also exists” (Benjamin in Levine 1999, 237). If we can rebel in such a way 
that the other is affected but not destroyed by our actions, then our actions form “part 
of the assertion that there is indeed an object and not only a subject. This puts in place 
the necessary setting for creativity because it establishes the subject in an objective 
world… Only in our acting against the world do we develop the internal attitude 
toward it that fits the creative stance” (Levine 1999, 237).  
 If the absurd moral actor rebels, he must rebel creatively, not only 
destructively, and his actions must not destroy the grounds for the creative stance he 
adopts, grounds which include the requirement that his enemy be able to act 
creatively as well. His attack must be limited and measured according to the grounds 
necessary for his own, and for others’ creative action. The work of D.W. Winnicott is 
helpful in understanding the meaning of this mutual, morally creative stance. For both 
Winnicott and Camus, creative action requires a kind of “reaching out” which is 
opposed to defensive activity. It is impossible to be creative if one’s actions are 
merely reactions against painful stimuli or withdrawals from a painful world (see 
Winnicott 1971, 55; Winnicott 1986, 39; Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 196). While 
Winnicott tends to contrast creativity with compliance, it is equally impossible to be 
creative if one has developed a broader pattern of defense, seeking refuge in split 
visions of the world, fantasies of absolute power or omnipotence, or severe 
repressions of ambivalent aspects of experience.  
 Like Camus, Winnicott finds creativity in the balance between the acceptance 




a balance between illusion and disillusionment (1986, 46-47; 1971, 65-85). For 
Camus, art and rebellion “can neither totally consent to reality nor turn aside from it 
completely” (Camus 1956b, 269). As Camus would agree with Winnicott (and Freud, 
and Klein) that tolerating and integrating ambivalence implies a degree of individual 
maturity (see Winnicott 1971, 70), Camus would also agree that any notion of 
absolute or solitary creativity leads us into a moral and philosophical contradiction. It 
is not the goal of the rebel to be creative for creativity’s sake, or to be creative alone, 
and Camus’ is not in any sense an aesthetic morality. Winnicott would agree that “in 
our sanity, we only create what we find. Even in the arts we cannot be creative into 
the blue unless we are having a solo experience in a mental hospital or in the asylum 
of our own autism” (1986, 53). Mature creativity, therefore, requires that we tolerate 
and even maintain the tensions between reality and fantasy, between creation and 
destruction, and between assertion and respect for others and objects. Part of the 
demand of one person’s creativity is that others be able to be creative as well.  
 The two poles in Winnicott’s conception of the self are the state of illusory 
omnipotence and the harsh objectivity of the Reality Principle. These two poles in 
many ways mirror the two poles of the ambivalence of the absurd. One is mere 
“solipsistic subjectivity,” a world of ‘subjective objects’ over which one has total 
control; the other is purely “objective perception,” the “world of separate and 
independent others” (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 195). And what Camus advances 
as a mediation (but not a ‘moderation’) between these two extremes is not entirely 
dissimilar to Winnicott’s concept of transitional objects, which rely on the tension 




(Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 195). Like transitional objects, absurd rebellions make 
use of illusions and symbols while resisting the temptations of absolute objective 
reality, on one hand, and absolute solipsistic subjectivity or fantasy on the other. And 
like the absurd borderlands described above, the intermediary or “potential space” of 
transitional phenomena between the self and the environment, between the me and 
the not-me (Winnicott 1971, 100), holds powerful emotions and intense 
ambivalences. But it is also an interactive and creative ‘space’ where culture and play 
happen. For Camus, we might say that the morality of the absurd insists that this 
potential space remain open, even, if necessary, by violating that space in order to 
preserve it in the name of making continued creative and moral action (and inter-
action) possible.  
   “Creativity exists at an intermediate point between the attitude that considers 
the world purely an extension of the subject and the attitude that sees it as an external 
fact having no subjective qualities at all… At this intermediate point, we will find 
what I am calling the capacity for freedom or the free person,” says Levine (1999, 
240). Camus tells us something similar, that the rebel and the artist create and define 
values “on the borderland between reality and reverie” (1956b, 264), and that “great 
art, style, and the true aspect of rebellion lie somewhere between these two heresies” 
of formalism (or idealism) and realism (1956b, 272). Perhaps more clearly, Camus 
explains that “the procedure of beauty, which is to contest reality while endowing it 
with unity, is also the procedure of rebellion” (Camus 1956b, 276), which we may 




which is ancient, old and orthodox by re-creating it after destroying it” (Greenberg 
and Mitchell 1983, 189).  
  For this interpretation of absurd moral action to make sense, we must not 
conceive of creativity merely as the impulse to relive or recreate, in phantasy, the 
happiness of lost internal worlds (see Segal 1964, 79). Neither can we think of 
creativity (and most of us do not) as merely the capacity to adapt to reality. Instead, 
creative activity must learn to subjectively ‘create’ reality while recognizing the 
boundaries that make that subjective creation possible. This process involves both 
creation and destruction, for both Winnicott and Camus, not only because it is 
necessary to destroy some illusions to make room for others, but because 
“development for the individual includes achieving the standpoint from which there 
exists an objective world outside his or her self… The attack on the world we 
associate with the term destruction simultaneously seeks to overcome this externality, 
without which we cannot survive, and acknowledge it, because destruction is only 
meaningful against the opposition of an external world. We can, then, say that 
destruction acknowledges reality and thus creates reality (as a subjective matter, that 
is, it creates reality for the subject)” (Levine 1999, 237). This creative and destructive 
stance has often been overlooked by Camus’ critics who see in his thought either an 
adolescent rebellion against reality in the name of an illusion of unity or a negative 
brand of existentialism that seeks to destroy all illusion in order to embrace reality. It 
should be clear that either interpretation of Camus is far too simplistic.  
 Rather, if we are able to interpret his works as I have suggested, Camus’ 




both fundamentalism and pragmatism. If all illusions are destroyed and only the real 
exists, then there is nothing that can inform our dealings with the real and we find 
ourselves back in a lawless struggle for conquest. While absurd rebellion destroys in 
the name of reality, it also rejects reality in the name of fantasy. “In every rebellion,” 
Camus writes, “is to be found the metaphysical demand for unity, the impossibility of 
capturing it, and the construction of a substitute universe. Rebellion, from this point 
of view, is a fabricator of universes” (1956b, 255). Absurd rebellion, like art, creates 
“an imaginary world” whose essence lies in a “perpetual alteration” of experience that 
aims “primarily, at unity and thereby expresses a metaphysical need” (Camus 1956b, 
264). When Camus advances a rebellious “style” of living, he means a “creative 
effort [to] reconstruct the world, and always with the same slight distortion that is the 
mark of both art and protest” (1956b, 271). His ‘style’, in this sense, is the rebel’s 
repeated attempts to create and destroy within and in the name of that potential space 
that allows his actions to affect (but not destroy) others and that allows others’ actions 
to affect (but not destroy) him. This process, which could be offered as a basic 
definition of the creative stance, is fundamental to Camus’ understanding of the 
morality of the absurd.  
 Camus even advocates the ‘creation’ of an illusion of human nature to help 
maintain these creative boundaries and to inform the limits of political action. Camus’ 
rebel rejects illusions and absolutes, it is true, but he does so not just negatively, but 
on the grounds of what he takes to be more mature illusions of his own creation. 
“If… rebellion could found a philosophy it would be a philosophy of limits, of 




everything. The rebel, far from making an absolute of history, rejects and disputes it, 
in the name of a concept that he has of his own nature” (Camus 1956b, 289). Indeed, 
Camus will frame the entirety of human history as a battle waged over this creative 
illusion of human nature. “The fate of the world,” Camus claims, “is being played out 
between the forces of rebellion and those of the Caesarian revolution. The triumphant 
revolution must prove by means of its police, its trials, and its excommunications that 
there is no such thing as human nature. Humiliated rebellion, by its contradictions, its 
sufferings, its continuous defeats, and its inexhaustible pride, must give its content of 
hope and suffering to this nature” (1956b, 250). For Camus, even though the idea of 
human nature relies on fantasy, it is the limits and possibilities implied by the 
assertion of human nature, the boundaries or the rules of the game that a human 
nature suggests, that permits authentic moral action.      
 This notion of ‘creating’ a human nature according to which and for the sake 
of which one must rebel makes it clear that the ethical and political maturity Camus is 
calling for is not a formal principle but a position or stance that resembles artistic and 
personal creativity. The difference between absurd rebellion and destructive 
revolution, then, may be understood as the difference between creativity and control. 
“There is a difference between the effort to remake the world and the effort to live 
creatively in it. This is the distinction between… two types of change… For one, the 
object of change is the complete and more or less instantaneous transformation of 
reality… For the other, the goal of change is a specific improvement in human 




 If part of what distinguishes creative rebellion from revolutionary excess is 
the measure and modesty of the rebel’s aims, we may also say, at the risk of being 
melodramatic, that it is also a question of love. “Rebellion,” Camus claims, “cannot 
exist without a strange form of love” (1956b, 304), because without love, without an 
emotional connection, communion, or identification, the rebel cannot limit his 
aggression, tolerate ambivalence, or create within the potential space that bounds 
absurd moral activity. While it may be a diffuse love, the “insane generosity” of 
rebellion “proves… that it is the very movement of life and that it cannot be denied 
without renouncing life. Its purest outburst, on each occasion, gives birth to existence. 
Thus it is love and fecundity or it is nothing at all” (1956b, 304). In the end, it is the 
creative and even loving potential of rebellion that must combat what Camus sees as 
the terrible secret of our time, a simple but deadly secret: “that it no longer loves 
life… That is why they wanted to efface joy from the world and to postpone it until a 
much later date” (1956b, 305).  
Bad Faith, Good Revolt 
In Chapter 2, I introduced the notion that Camus’ paradoxical rebellion resembled 
Sartrean bad faith (mauvaise foi), but perhaps not necessarily in a damning way. 
Now, after exploring the linkages between creativity and absurd morality, I would 
like to conclude this chapter by revisiting that suggestion to see if it can further 
clarify the unique moral position implied by the absurd.  
 For Sartre, the person in bad faith is in a complex psychological situation. 
Indeed, Sartre is often criticized for his equivocal stance on the question of the 




intentionally? Or can bad faith occur, as it were, by accident? According to Sartre, the 
person in bad faith “must know in his capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden 
from him in his capacity as the one deceived… He must know the truth very exactly 
in order to conceal it more carefully” (Sartre in Sherman 1995, 66-67). That is, the 
individual in bad faith must deceive himself. Knowing the truth, he somehow hides it 
from himself.  
 Oddly enough, this situation is not entirely dissimilar to ethical stance Camus 
ultimately defends. But this comparison need not be taken as a criticism. Camus’ 
individual remains ambivalent, unresolved. He recognizes that there is no justification 
for creating illusions like human nature, for maintaining his difficult stance, for 
transgressing the values that he, himself defends, indeed for acting morally or 
immorally at all, but he does these things anyway, without forgetting, of course, that 
he must never become complacent or reconciled with all of his terrible contradictions.  
 While Camus situates his rebel in an absurd and ambivalent emotional 
position, Sartre derives bad faith from “the double property of the human being, who 
is at once a facticity and a transcendence” (Sartre in Sherman 1995, 61). But these 
accounts actually share a certain logic, for just as Camus’ absurd rebel seeks not to 
deny or destroy either term of his ambivalence, the person in bad faith “does not wish 
either to coordinate them [facticity and transcendence] or to surmount them in a 
synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It 
must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in 
such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends one, he can find himself 




depiction of bad faith here captures almost exactly the complex psychology of absurd 
rebellion. In an ambivalent gloss on Sartrean bad faith, perhaps we may find room for 
the moral, rebellious creativity of Camus’ absurd.   
 Because it is grounded in ambivalence, the morality of the absurd challenges 
not just Sartre’s, but most rationalistic moral formulas. Absurd and ambivalent 
rebellion certainly poses a radical challenge (although not Meursault’s challenge) to 
Kant’s ideal of the autonomy of the will. Contrary to Kant, the absurd moral position 
insists upon maintaining a certain heteronomy of the will. The rebel’s ambivalence, 
self-contradiction, and reliance on illusion (all clear signs of heteronomy), are not 
moral flaws but the crux of the moral action of the absurd. Contrary to Kant’s ideal, 
the absurd person seeks never to ground his actions in a single, final, or categorical 
principle, just as the moral imperative of the absurd explicitly rejects the idea that any 
action could be or should be established as ‘a universal law’. Instead, absurd morality 
insists upon the recognition of a kind of contingency, dependency, culpability, and 
heteronomy of the self without ever refusing the possibility of (temporarily) creating 
value and meaning.  
 Camus would have to argue, therefore, not only with Kant but with Lawrence 
Kohlberg over the proposition that universal, generalizable moral reasoning is the 
highest stage of moral development (see Kohlberg 1973). The moral philosophy of 
the absurd argues that any universal ideal of justice is, itself, inherently unjust insofar 
as it legitimizes the ‘remainders’ of suffering when it performs its abstract moral 
computations. Instead, absurd morality entails the claim that the highest stage of 




it is similar to Kierkegaard’s claim that the personal suspends the ethical, for absurd 
moral action derives from that crucible of ambivalence and creativity which exceeds 
mere reliance on laws or principles. If that ambivalence and that creative capacity are 
reasoned away, even for the sake of a moral principle, then Camus would say that the 
foundation for genuine moral action and interaction is lost.  
 While the absurd is not able to provide formal moral rules, the logic of the 
interpretation I have offered should permit us to analyze absurdity, ambivalence, and 
rebellion as forces which, if contained and integrated properly, permit moral values to 
exist. The complex rebellious action that derives from the absurd represents a step, a 
development beyond rationalistic morality, for Camus. It does not exactly define a 
new morality, but it ‘opens the way to morality’ in a manner that is unique in both 
ancient and modern moral and political philosophy. Absurd rebellion, Camus tells us, 
“opened the way to a morality which, far from obeying abstract principles, discovers 
them only in the heat of battle and in the incessant movement of contradiction. 
Nothing justifies the assertion that these principles have existed eternally; it is of no 
use to declare that they will exist one day. But they do exist, in the very period in 
which we exist” (1956b, 283).  
 Camus’ absurd rebellion, therefore, is a statement about what is needed for 
individuals to create moral solutions to intractable moral problems; it is also a 
statement about how to live with the tensions and ambivalences created by those 
problems without resorting to facile solutions and primitive defenses. By beginning to 
think of moral action as creative action, and not as action that follows rules or fits into 




the grounds for morality. Now, to see if this absurd moral grounding can shed light on 
specific political problems, the final chapter of this volume tests it against two 
politically troublesome cases: Camus’ defense of the ‘fastidious’ Russian assassins of 






Chapter 9: Political Philosophical Conclusions 
 
Thus the rebel can never find peace. He knows what is good and, despite himself, 
does evil.  
— Camus, The Rebel 
 
 
Camus believed that absurdity was relevant to political life, but, as in other aspects of 
his thought, the relationship between the philosophy and the politics of the absurd has 
become rather obscure. Some critics have tried to clarify this obscurity by splitting 
the two aspects of Camus’ thought apart; others have focused exclusively on one 
while neglecting the other. Perhaps even more common (and more problematic for 
our understanding of absurd politics) has been the tendency noted in earlier chapters 
to equate absurdity with ‘evil’ and to conclude that the absurd must simply ‘be 
fought’ in all of its aspects, natural, political, and otherwise.  
 I have attempted to show that the absurd can not be equated with ‘evil’, but 
must be understood as a kind of ambivalence which, nevertheless, may be partly 
‘evil’ and from which, to be sure, ‘evil’ responses may spring. As Camus’ absurd is 
neither purely evil, nor purely political, it is quite distinct from Malraux’s. Malraux 
believed that “man’s position is absurd, but his position is clearly the work of 
civilization. Change his civilization and it is possible that the Absurd will become less 
real” (Hall 1960, 30). Camus had no such hope. No change in civilization, even 
utopian change, could (or should) make the absurd any less real. In fact, the moment 
the absurd becomes unreal is the moment we lose the balance needed to act creatively 
and morally. And yet, the fact that the absurd is ineradicable for Camus does not 




 One of the more persuasive political philosophical readings of the absurd has 
come from Maurice Friedman, John Cruickshank, Fred Willhoite, Jr., and others who 
have noted that the political possibilities offered by the absurd are not entirely 
dissimilar to Martin Buber’s concept of dialogue between subjects, between I and 
Thou, which implies an ethic of “openness, directness, mutuality, and presence” 
(Friedman in Willhoite 1968, 64). Camus argued that “in order to exist, man must 
rebel, but rebellion must respect the limit it discovers in itself — a limit where minds 
meet and, in meeting, begin to exist” (1956b, 22). This meeting of minds somehow 
occasioned by rebellion seems to allow people to engage in civic dialogue, perhaps 
even to form a political community. Indeed, in drawing a distinction between 
dialogue and directive, Camus employs a language that seems suited to comparisons 
with Buber.  
Every ambiguity, every misunderstanding, leads to death; clear language and 
simple words are the only salvation from this death. The climax of every 
tragedy lies in the deafness of its heroes. Plato is right and not Moses and 
Nietzsche. Dialogue on the level of mankind is less costly than the gospel 
preached by totalitarian regimes in the form of a monologue dictated from the 
top of a lonely mountain. On the stage as in reality, the monologue precedes 
death. Every rebel, solely by the movement that sets him in opposition to the 
oppressor, therefore pleads for life, undertakes to struggle against servitude, 
falsehood, and terror, and affirms, in a flash, that these three afflictions are the 
cause of silence between men, that they obscure them from one another and 
prevent them from rediscovering themselves in the only value that can save 
them from nihilism — the long complicity of men at grips with their destiny. 
(1956b, 283-284)  
 
 Communication, therefore, has been thought to be one of the central moral 
goods of Camus’ political vision. Injustice, Camus tells us, “kills the small part of 
existence that can be realized in this earth through the mutual understanding of 




survive only in the free exchange of conversation” (1956b, 283). As rebellion 
depends upon others just as much as it defies them, it insists upon a community in 
which communication and dialogue are possible. “What balances the absurd is the 
community of men fighting against it. And if we choose to serve that community, we 
choose to serve the dialogue carried to the absurd against any policy of falsehood or 
of silence. That’s the way one is free with others” (Camus 1978, 126).  
 Camus’ way of being ‘free with others’ appears, then, to be based upon a 
communicative ethic and a loosely value-pluralistic outlook. Camus defines liberty as 
“the ability to defend what I do not think, even in a regime or a world that I approve. 
It is the ability to admit that the adversary is right” (1978, 105). This definition of 
liberty implies not only a basic level of tolerance and a political infrastructure that 
supports dialogue, but, as I will emphasize below, a capacity to identify with and 
even adopt perspectives that are not one’s own. Similarly, Camus defines the 
democrat as the person “who admits that his opponent may be right… [and who] 
therefore allows him to express his views and agrees to think about them” (Camus in 
Cruickshank 1960, 132). In this statement as well, we find not only an advocacy of 
tolerance and dialogue but an appeal to a more complete interaction with others, 
implied by the requirement that the democrat not merely permit his opponent to speak 
but agree to ‘think about’ his views. We may imagine that the mature and creative 
absurd position this volume has discussed also encourages a less-fractured 
relationship with others and a greater “confirmation of meaning” between opponents 
(Buber in Willhoite 1968, 68), making something like a Buberian “genuine 




 But if it is clear that, for Camus, limits are superior to excess, dialogue is 
superior to directive, and communication is superior to deafness, to be frank, these 
conclusions are not terribly interesting. They strike us as banal, and perhaps not even 
worth all of the trouble required to arrive at them. It is a complicated argument to 
make, but Camus’ critics and, to some extent, Camus, himself, seem to have 
understated the political implications of the absurd. While apparently advocating 
tolerance and dialogue, an absurd politics should be able to advocate radical 
reflections on moral and political boundaries, the creation of new, strategic moral 
identifications and communions, and bold political stances on the grounds of the 
ambivalence of the absurd. I try out a few of these stronger and, hopefully, more 
interesting political conclusions, after seeking to understand Camus’ political stance 
with respect to two specific political cases: (1) Camus’ curious praise of the Kaliayev 
and Russian assassins of 1905 and (2) Camus’ controversial stance on the Algerian 
War (1954-1962). In an attempt to avoid easy answers, I have deliberately chosen to 
examine Camus’ most difficult and least palatable political positions. It is important 
to note, however, that in both of these cases, I seek neither to defend Camus’ 
positions nor to independently re-assess the historical situations in question; only to 
interpret, critique, and perhaps expand upon Camus’ stances in light of the analyses 
of the philosophy of the absurd undertaken so far.        
Kaliayev and the ‘Just’ Assassins  
In The Rebel, Camus heaps praise upon Kaliayev and the assassins of the Combat 
Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party as “exemplary” (1956b, 151), while 




conspires to assassinate the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich. Camus classifies 
these assassins, these delicate murderers (meurtriers délicats) as terrorists, but, in his 
mind, at least two things distinguish them from terrorists who would come before or 
after.  
 The first, and, one must admit, the less significant distinction for Camus is 
that these terrorists are not capricious killers. They take great care not to harm 
innocent people and only to attack their precise targets. In Les justes, Kaliayev returns 
from his mission to bomb the carriage of the Grand Duke utterly dejected, “his face 
streaming with tears” (1958, 252), because he was unable to carry out his mission as 
planned. It was not because of cowardice, of course, that Kaliayev baulked, but 
because the Grand Duke’s niece and nephew (and the Grand Duchess) were riding in 
the carriage along with him. Apart from Stepan, who represents the hardened, 
extreme revolutionary Camus wished to warn against, the group agrees with 
Kaliayev’s decision.  
 The second, and more important quality shared by the assassins, in Camus’ 
mind, is that they are deeply ambivalent about their plan and the paradoxical 
necessity and immorality of their chosen course of action. Here, we encounter a 
certain sentimentality. Kaliayev, in Les justes, touchingly describes his joy in 
awaiting the carriage and his subsequent surprise when he saw the innocent children 
with their “grave, intent look” (1958, 253), a look which he can not face. As the 
group discusses the situation, they soon find themselves reflecting on the meaning of 
love and innocence, happiness and despair. Kaliayev and Dora, for instance, have a 




Kaliayev: I shall go beyond hatred.  
Dora: Beyond? There’s nothing beyond.  
Kaliayev: Yes. There is love. 
Dora: Love? No, that’s not what is needed. 
 […] 
Kaliayev: But we love our fellow men. 
Dora: Yes, we love them — in our fashion. With a vast love that has nothing 
to shore it up; that brings only sadness… 
Kaliayev: But surely that’s precisely what love means — sacrificing 
everything without expecting anything in return? 
Dora: Perhaps. Yes, I know that love, an absolute, ideal love, a pure and 
solitary joy — and I feel it burning in my heart. Yet there are times when I 
wonder if love isn’t something else; something more than a lonely voice, a 
monologue, and if there isn’t sometimes a response… Can you see what I 
mean? 
Kaliayev: Yes, Dora, I can; it’s what is called love — in the simple human 
sense.  
Dora: Yes, darling you’ve guessed what I mean — but does that kind of love 
mean anything to you, really? Do you love justice with that kind of love? And 
how about me, Yanek? Do you love me — as a lover? 
Kaliayev: No one will ever love you as I love you. 
Dora: I know. But wouldn’t it be better to love — like an ordinary person? 
Kaliayev: I’m not an ordinary person. Such as I am, I love you. (Camus 1958, 
269-270) 
 
And Kaliayev’s and Dora’s conversation about the meaning of love continues. Thus, 
while we may occasionally blush, Camus makes it clear that what he finds 
exceptional about these individuals is their profound emotional complexity. It is the 
fact that they discuss love in the context of their duty as killers, that they contemplate 
self-sacrifice out of a sense of justice, that they search not for simple answers to make 
their choices easier but for emotional truths, no matter how painful and complex, to 
help them comprehend what they can and must do. Put simply, they “[make] attempts 
on the lives of others only after the most scrupulous examination of conscience” 




 Rather than neglecting the uniquely problematic circumstances they face or 
viewing them through the lens of an ideology which might either justify their crimes 
or excuse complacency, the assassins accept the consequences of the solution they 
devise. These individuals “of the highest principles” are “the last, in the history of 
rebellion, to refuse no part of their condition or their drama” (Camus 1956b, 167). 
That is why Camus finds that “these fastidious assassins lived out the rebel destiny in 
its most contradictory form” (1956b, 169). Kaliayev explains to Dora that he had 
“thought it was quite easy to kill, provided one has courage and is buoyed up by an 
ideal. But now I’ve lost my wings. I have realized that hatred brings no happiness. I 
can see the vileness in myself, and in the others, too. Murderous instincts, cowardice, 
injustice. I’ve got to kill — there are no two ways about it. But I shall see it through 
to the end” (Camus 1958, 269). Kaliayev and the others are able to admit their own 
complicity in evil, even to face up to the consequence of this complicity, and this 
implies that they have not forsaken their ambivalence, that they have sought to 
manage the contradictions that threaten to destroy them.  
 Camus’ assassins are therefore something very close to ideal absurd rebels, 
“disillusioned with love, united against the crimes of their masters, but alone in their 
despair, and face to face with their contradictions, which they could resolve only in 
the double sacrifice of their innocence and their life” (1956b, 164). Yet, as with his 
characters in The Plague, Camus does not mean to show that their actions are morally 
perfect, only that their posture or position evinces a more integrated and more mature 
moral activity than the defensive, evasive, or otherwise regressive positions by which 




emotional struggles, making them into agonies of tragic proportions. But Camus sees 
their situation as one of just such tragic proportions. The lives of the assassins, like 
the lives of tragic heroes, are morally flawed, but by the force of their absurdity, 
ambivalence, maturity, and creativity, they manage to act immorally while sustaining 
the possibility of moral value.     
 For Camus, if the assassins had convinced themselves that no killing was ever 
justified, they would have done too little. If they had justified their actions on the 
grounds of an ‘all or nothing’ ideology, they would have done too much. But because 
the assassins are able to tolerate the ambivalence and contradiction of their 
moral/immoral choices, they are able to avoid both over-destructiveness and 
meekness, finding a seemingly impossible ‘third’ moral choice where, according to 
the extant categories, none existed. Camus writes:  
It is possible to believe that they too, while recognizing the inevitability of 
violence, nevertheless admitted to themselves that it is unjustifiable. 
Necessary and inexcusable — that is how murder appeared to them. Mediocre 
minds, confronted with this terrible problem, can take refuge by ignoring one 
of the terms of the dilemma. They are content, in the name of formal 
principles, to find all direct violence inexcusable and then to sanction that 
diffuse form of violence which takes place on the scale of world history. Or 
they will console themselves, in the name of history, with the thought that 
violence is necessary, and will add murder to murder, to the point of making 
of history nothing but a continuous violation of everything in man which 
protests against injustice. This defines the two aspects of contemporary 
nihilism, the bourgeois and the revolutionary. (1956b, 169)  
 
 Instead of adopting these facile positions, Camus claims that the assassins 
“create the values they lack” (1956b, 165), precisely because they do not invoke 
values as justifications for their actions, nor do they assert the absence of values as a 




is of their own absurdity and of the paradoxical necessity and inexcusability of their 
choices. By discovering a way to act in spite of, through, or within this contradiction, 
the actions of the assassins paradoxically create “a human value that stands halfway 
between innocence and guilt, between reason and irrationality, between history and 
eternity” (Camus 1956b, 171), which resembles the moral, creative, and ‘potential’ 
value discussed in the previous chapter.  
 But this value they create to fit their uniquely complex moral dilemma is one 
in which they do evil, knowing that it is evil, and then demand a personal sacrifice for 
it. “Kaliayev doubted to the end, but this doubt did not prevent him from acting; it is 
for this reason that he is the purest form of rebellion. He who accepts death, to pay for 
a life with a life, no matter what his negations may be, affirms, by doing so, a value 
that surpasses him in his aspect of an individual in the historical sense” (Camus 
1956b, 173). By demanding self-sacrifice for their crimes, by insisting upon such 
severe self-punishment and still having the strength to act, Camus claims that “the 
men of 1905, tortured by contradictions, really did give birth, by their very negation 
and death, to a value that will henceforth be imperative, which they brought to light in 
the belief that they were only announcing its advent. They ostensibly placed, above 
themselves and their executioners, that supreme and painful good which we have 
already found at the origins of rebellion. Let us stop and consider this value, at the 
moment when the spirit of rebellion encounters, for the last time in our history, the 
spirit of compassion” (1956b, 166, emphasis added).  
 That ‘supreme and painful good’ of compassion, creativity, and humanity 




are nevertheless obliged to violate. The assassins, therefore, ‘create’ values because 
they do not deny this contradiction in their action, because they consciously recognize 
the evil in which they are complicit, and because they enforce an equitable penalty for 
that evil. “A life is paid for by another life, and from these two sacrifices springs the 
promise of a value. Kaliayev, Vionarovsky, and the others believe in the equal value 
of human lives. Therefore they do not value any idea above human life, though they 
kill for the sake of ideas. To be precise, they live on the plane of their idea. They 
justify it, finally, by incarnating it to the point of death” (Camus 1956b, 170).  
 Camus uses the story of the assassins to pronounce on murder and his 
pronouncement is simple: murder is “the limit that can be reached but once, after 
which one must die. The rebel has only one way of reconciling himself with his act of 
murder if he allows himself to be led into performing it: to accept his own death and 
sacrifice. He kills and dies so that it shall be clear that murder is impossible” (1956b, 
282). In a short (1946) article, “To Save Lives,” Camus offered a theoretical frame 
for this position: “People like myself want not a world where murder no longer 
exists… but one where murder is no longer legitimized. Here we are indeed utopian 
— and contradictorily so… In a more relative utopia, we could demand that murder 
be no longer legitimized” (1991, 120-121). The fastidious assassins, in Camus’ mind, 
give us an example of ‘relatively’ utopian action because, while they commit murder, 
they refuse both nihilistic and utopian thought, demanding instead, by their own self-
sacrificial actions, that murder never be legitimized.  
 But it must be said that Camus’ defense of the 1905 assassins is more than a 




suicide ‘negates’ a crime, or that “to die… cancels out both the guilt and the crime 
itself” (1956b, 171). In fact, Camus’ seems to be a self-centered moral calculus, one 
that oddly forgets its victims even as it exacts self-punishment for killing them, and 
one which, as George Kateb and others have pointed out, easily devolves into “a 
defense of a bloody doctrine” in which “the stain of blood can be erased only with 
more blood” (Willhoite 1968, 157). It is even somewhat repugnant to discuss 
assassination and self-sacrifice as ‘creative’ acts (as, admittedly, I have). While 
absolute non-violence may condemn one to passivity and timidity in the face of evil, 
we are nevertheless surprised that Camus, the man who famously declared that he had 
“always denounced terrorism” (Apter 1997, 499), has mounted what appears to be a 
moral defense of targeted suicide-bombing.  
 Camus seems to be claiming that, as long as the suicide-assassin is 
emotionally bothered and as long as he refuses to see himself as innocent or 
omnipotent, then his deadly violence may be praiseworthy. We wonder how this 
rationale squares with Camus’ condemnation of institutionalized terrorism, the reign 
of “the new aristocracy and the grand inquisitors… [who] excuse their cruelty, like 
the Satan of the romantics, by claiming that it is hard for them to bear… A new and 
somewhat hideous race of martyrs is now born. Their martyrdom consists in 
consenting to inflict suffering on others; they become the slaves of their own 
domination” (1956b, 175-176). Do the self-sacrificing assassins not resemble these 
new martyrs? Does Camus not defend them on the grounds that their crimes are 
difficult for them to bear? To be fair to Camus, it is true that the fastidious assassins 




‘innocence’ ought to be at the heart of the agony suffered by these supposedly 
delicate and scrupulous murderers. Perhaps the more important distinction between 
State terrorists and fastidious assassins is that the latter, while their behavior may not 
always evince it, refuse to be reconciled with murder, demanding their own death as 
an expression of their guilt. Camus would argue that even if both appear to be martyrs 
who excuse their cruelty by claiming that it is hard for them to bear, the fastidious 
assassins never permit themselves to become resigned to the violence which they 
nevertheless find inevitable.  
 We must consider, then, to what extent the presence of ambivalence and 
psychological conflict can serve as a foundation for a theory of moral or political 
action. Is there not a risk in such a theory that an internal moral process might be 
mistaken as accounting for the real destructive action taking place between the 
assassin and his victim? That is, Camus’ justification for declaring the fastidious 
assassins to be morally superior to other terrorists is primarily based upon their 
internal contradiction, their agony, and their demand for the ultimate self-punishment. 
This moral defense would seem to run the same risks as rebellious art: it may seek to 
repair and restore objects in fantasy when they ought to be repaired in reality, 
permitting the assassins to justify the real destruction they cause on the grounds of an 
internal price paid (see Alford 1989, 104-124). While, ultimately, Camus argument is 
that self-scrutiny and self-punishment creates a value not only in the minds of the 
assassins but for the members of their Organization and for the larger society that 




emotional) suffering and for their (real and physical) self-sacrifice, is troubling 
because it seems to blur the lines between concern for the self and concern for others.  
 Martha Crenshaw’s study of the causes of terrorism forces us to ask further 
troubling questions about Camus’ apparent defense of the assassins. In her assessment 
of common causes and dynamics of terrorism, Crenshaw is not the first to observe 
that “shared guilt and anxiety increase the group’s interdependence and mutual 
commitment and may also make the followers more dependent on leaders and on the 
common ideology as sources of moral authority. Guilt may also lead terrorists to seek 
punishment and danger rather than avoid it” (Crenshaw 1981, 395). Camus certainly 
recognized that the dynamics of the Organization may have helped push the assassins 
toward a deeper commitment to each other and toward self-sacrifice. He claims, in 
fact, that “the bond that united them replaced every other attachment in their minds,” 
that “bound only to one another,” the group chose for itself the role of executioner 
and chose to live “in the same paradox, combining in themselves respect for human 
life in general and contempt for their own lives — to the point of nostalgia for the 
supreme sacrifice” (1956b, 167-168). Camus even admits that Dora Brilliant felt that 
terrorism was “primarily embellished by the sacrifice it demanded” and that Kaliayev 
“passionately desired to make the sacrifice” (1956b, 168).  
 If the bonds of collective guilt and shared suicidal fantasies motivated the 
ostensibly moral and creative code of the assassins, don’t these motivations affect the 
moral worth of their actions? “In other cases of terrorism,” Crenshaw writes, 
“individuals much more pragmatic than Kaliayev, admittedly a religious mystic, 




underground existence and a sense of content and fulfillment. For example, Meridor, 
a member of the Irgun High Command, felt ‘high spirits’ and ‘satisfaction’ when 
arrested by the British police… In fact, until his arrest he had felt ‘morally 
uncomfortable,’ whereas afterwards he felt ‘exalted’” (1981, 395). If many terrorists, 
and not just the 1905 assassins, have desired self-sacrifice, for reasons of fidelity to a 
code of the group, or out of desire to absolve themselves of guilt and anxiety, or due 
to a simpler desire to be released from the strains of underground living, we must ask 
if that changes the moral persuasiveness of Camus’ arguments.   
 But while we may (nay, we must) take offense at the actions of the 1905 
assassins, I believe it is possible to respond to these questions and criticisms on behalf 
of the moral and political theory of the absurd. For Camus, the precise source of the 
assassins’ desire for self-sacrifice is not the determining factor of their moral worth. 
Although their scrupulousness is key to their virtue, Camus would argue that we need 
not be so naïve as to believe that all ambivalence, all scruples, and all moral activity 
derives from a pristine moral psychology. Why should we condemn the assassins for 
feeling intolerable guilt or fear when faced with the prospect of murder? Might not 
these emotions underline their basic humanity and even their basic moral 
identification with their victims? While the assassins commit murder in a cause of 
resistance, their emotions and their actions proclaim the impossibility of murder, the 
unjustifiability of evil, the limits of their cause, the humanity of their victims, and the 
need to make reparations even for crimes undertaken soberly in the name of a greater 
good. That is, for Camus, the moral good created by the assassins is their paradoxical 




inevitable. Camus would say that this statement preserves more of the ambivalent, 
creative, moral ground than their targeted violence destroys.    
Camus’ Algeria 
In Stockholm in 1957, Camus famously said: “I have always denounced terrorism. I 
must also denounce a terrorism which is exercised blindly, in the streets of Algiers for 
example, and which one day could strike my mother or my family. I believe in 
justice, but I shall defend my mother before justice” (Apter 1997, 499). This 
statement expresses, in a casual way, some of the more complex tensions informing 
Camus’ response to the Algerian war against French colonial rule, a response that has 
since become the most controversial topic concerning Camus’ life and career.  
 In his repudiation of the French administration in Algeria, and in his equally 
adamant condemnation of the FLN’s violent tactics, we see another side of Camus’ 
politics, one that is as interesting (and perhaps as troublesome) as his apparent 
advocacy of suicide-assassination discussed above. In the case of Algeria, Camus’ 
response, unlike the more expressive assassins of Les justes, consisted of a kind of 
silence. It was not that Camus did not speak and write at length about the conflict, but 
he refused to lend his voice to either side of what had become an increasingly 
polarized battle in which both parties seemed willing to justify elaborate excesses. In 
this situation, he said, “when speech can lead to the remorseless disposal of other 
people’s lives, silence is not a negative attitude” (Judt 1998, 119). For his silence, 
which was more like a long speech to which no one was listening, Camus was 




maintained; right or wrong, he felt he was called to advance a more measured, more 
complex, and perhaps more creative solution to the problems Algeria faced.  
 In his (1958) Preface to Actuelles III, a collection of his Algerian reports, 
Camus defined his stance as a kind of double-refusal. “As they stand,” he wrote, 
“these texts sum up the position of a man who, faced very young with the misery of 
Algeria, in vain multiplied his warnings and, long aware of his country’s 
responsibilities, cannot approve a policy of preservation or oppression in Algeria. But 
I have long been alert to Algerian realities and cannot approve, either, a policy of 
surrender that would abandon the Arab people to an even greater misery, tear the 
French in Algeria from their century-old roots, and favor, to no one’s advantage, the 
new imperialism now threatening the liberty of France and of the West” (1960, 111). 
 Camus thus refused the positions of both the Left and the Right. He argued 
against Algerian independence on the grounds of the instability, poverty, and new 
imperialism he thought it would bring. But he also sought to bring to light the 
deplorable conditions of Algerians under French rule throughout his career, beginning 
in 1939 with a well-known series of investigative articles in Alger Républicain, 
Misère de la Kabylie. He denounced terrorism, but he also thoroughly criticized the 
repressive methods of the French against Algerians. He contrasted the FLN with the 
1905 assassins saying that the terrorism of the FLN had assumed such a violent and 
indiscriminate form that “no revolutionary movement has ever accepted it, and the 
Russian terrorists of 1905, for instance, would have died (they proved this statement) 
rather than stoop to it” (1960, 115). But he also reproached the use of torture and the 




more extraordinary comparison: “the fact is there, clear and hideous as the truth: we 
are doing in these cases what we reproached the Germans for doing” (Camus in 
Carroll 1997, 525).  
 Amidst these mutual condemnations, one theme seemed to recur in his 
thought: “The question is not how to die separately but rather how to live together” 
(Camus 1960, 117). For Camus, it was not only violence that killed both French and 
‘Arab’ Algerians. Camus felt that even the politics of independence and reconquest 
represented ‘deaths’ for both parties. “If you want France alone to reign in Algeria 
over eight million mutes,” Camus protested, “she will die. If you want Algeria to 
separate from France, both of them will perish in the same way. If, on the other hand, 
French and Arabs resolve their differences in Algeria, the future will have a meaning 
for the French, the Arabs, and the whole world” (1960, 118). Camus feared that 
Algerian independence would not only require the exile of more than one million 
French Algerians, but would leave the country in a state of disrepair, in his words, in 
the hands of “an empire of Islam which would bring the Arab peoples only increased 
poverty and suffering” (1960, 124). Thus, Camus felt that he could not advocate any 
course of action except reconciliation for the ‘two peoples of Algeria’ and he could 
not support any official policy except that of the briefly-tenured Pierre Mendès-
France (see Camus 1960, 119; Bronner 1996, 95-96).   
 Camus was therefore not unaware that “the time of colonialism is over” and 
that all that remained was “to know this and to draw conclusions from it” (1960, 120), 
but, for him, redressing the injustices of colonialism by punishing the French living in 




and beneficiaries of the French colonial system were not those living in the colonies, 
but the metropolitan French. Like many French Algerians, Camus contended, his own 
family had fought and died in wars for France, had labored for the true colons whom 
he despised, and, “being poor and free of hatred, [had] never exploited or oppressed 
anyone” (1960, 119). Camus believed that, given time, French Algerians would admit 
the necessity of making sacrifices for the creation of “a juster and freer order” (1960, 
119), and that Algeria would reconcile itself to a less radical solution.  
 Thus, on behalf not only of the oppressed Algerian population, but of the 
French population in Algeria, Camus defended his stance in perfectly clear terms. 
“Recognizing the end of colonialism,” he claimed, “my solution excludes dreams of 
reconquest or of maintaining the status quo; really mere reactions of weakness and 
humiliation, such dreams only prepare for the definitive divorce and the double 
misfortune of France and Algeria. But my solution also excludes the dream of 
uprooting the French in Algeria, who, if they haven’t the right to oppress anyone, do 
have the right not to be oppressed and to be their own masters in the land of their 
birth. There are other ways of re-establishing the necessary justice than substituting 
one injustice for another” (1960, 124, emphasis in original).  
 But Camus’ solution of a long-term republican association between France 
and Algeria, of an “Algeria made up of federated settlements and linked to France” 
(Camus 1960, 124), was widely criticized for suffering from colonial naivety. In spite 
of statements like the one cited above, Camus was accused of defending the status 
quo. Perhaps his position was so interpreted because the sentiment at the time was 




reconquest or Algerian independence (Judt 1998, 120). By continuing to insist upon a 
‘third option’ of civil truce and reconciliation even unto his final public 
“intervention” into the crisis (Judt 1998, 120), Camus was thought by his 
contemporaries to be either unwilling or unable to rise above the mindset of a liberal, 
“well-intentioned colonizer” (Judt 1998, 119).   
 Since then, critics like Conor Cruise O’Brien and Edward Said (1993) have 
indicted Camus for what they see as his gross mishandling of the racial and colonial 
issues of Algeria. O’Brien criticized Camus for his fantastical vision of an Algeria to 
which he belonged, one in which all Algerians shared a common culture (O’Brien 
1970, 10-11). He rebuked Camus for justifying a continued colonial presence and for 
being unable to imagine an Algeria in which he, and other pieds noirs, did not exist. 
O’Brien and other critics have suggested that Camus’ inability to see the need for 
Algerian independence was reflected even in his novels and stories, in his frequent 
depiction of Arabs who are little more than “stick figures holding up the scenery, or 
scopic effects, tracking European inquisitors with malevolent diffidence” (Apter 
1997, 503), and in what O’Brien argues amounts to Camus’ “artistic final solution of 
the problem of the Arabs of Oran” in The Plague (1970, 56).  
 O’Brien argues that Camus drew the wrong conclusions about Algeria 
because he suffered from a colonial ‘hallucination’ of a shared cultural heritage. 
Emily Apter has more recently argued that Camus’ “idealized proto-Braudelian 
fantasy of ‘Mediterranean man,’ a Euro-African subject whose cultural attachments 
allow him to forget the Realpolitik of colonial power imbalance, shatters in the 




opposed to culturally composite” (1997, 508). David Carroll somewhat more kindly 
describes Camus’ vision of a French-Arab Algerian identity as one of “an original 
sharing and being-together before separation, difference, and conflict, a kind of Ur-
cultural being-in-common that is so deeply grounded in each — in the ground of their 
being and in the ground itself — that it cannot be destroyed”  (Carroll 1997, 529). 
 Leaving culture and ‘Ur-culture’ aside, Camus felt that Algeria was a ‘native’ 
soil for its French inhabitants who had been born there, and some of whose parents 
and grandparents had been born there. And while it is true that Camus occasionally 
defended his position with reference to a mysterious ‘Mediterranean culture’, shared 
by North Africans and Europeans (see Apter 1997, 510-511), his preferred (and 
preferable) defense of an inclusive Algerian community was founded not on a fantasy 
of shared culture but of a less abstruse historical and civil bond.  
 In his Letter to an Algerian Militant, Camus writes to his friend Aziz Kessous 
that, like Algerians, the French in Algeria are also “attached to the soil of Algeria by 
roots that are too old and too vigorous for us to think of tearing them up” (1960, 127). 
Camus wrote of an almost patriotic community that he thought all Algerians shared. 
“You and I, who are so much alike — having the same background, sharing the same 
hope, having felt like brothers for so long now, united in our love for our country — 
know that we are not enemies and that we could live happily together on this soil that 
belongs to us. For it is ours, and I can no more imagine it without you and your 
brothers than you can probably separate it from me and those who resemble me” 
(1960, 127). While surely some fantasies are dangerous and excessive, and while it is 




particular fantasy about an Algerian community was relatively restrained. It was to a 
reformed (although admittedly fantastical) “Franco-Arab community of Algeria” that 
Camus’ thought on Algeria most often returned (Camus 1960, 129).      
 O’Brien, Said, and Camus’ many other critics are, therefore, quite correct in 
claiming that Camus could not imagine an Algeria without him in it. Camus seems to 
have opposed the colonial administration while failing to admit the possibility that his 
solution would merely rename and extend the French-Algerian colonial relationship. 
O’Brien argues that Camus should have seen that he was on the wrong side of this 
issue, especially because so much of Camus’ work confesses to the feeling of being 
“a stranger on the African shore, and surrounded by people who are strangers in that 
France of which they are legally supposed to be a part” (Carroll 1997, 521). But 
Camus thought of himself neither as a colon, nor as French. A stranger in Algeria, but 
perhaps even more estranged in France, Camus felt that he and those like him 
belonged to neither side and both sides at the same time. Algerians under French rule 
were, of course, estranged in addition to being oppressed. But Camus seems to have 
felt that peaceful co-existence across racial and national lines was possible in part 
because a kinship between pieds noirs and Algerians had been created by the colonial 
situation, itself, along with its mutually alienating forces. That ‘community of 
strangers’ formed of all Algerians was being tested, to be sure, but Camus claimed 
that it was more substantial than whatever colonial relationship was supposed to exist 
between French Algerians and the Parisian métropole and that it was much less likely 
to disintegrate than an independent Algeria (which is, sadly, the kind of thing other 




 It is tempting to speculate that, in Camus’ mind, the Algerian crisis may have 
been replaying, in brutal and real terms, the kind of absurd contradictions and 
ambivalences he had written about throughout his career. When we read Camus’ 
objections to the proposed exile of over one million French Algerians, it is difficult 
not to hear his more abstract opposition to the removal of one of the ‘terms’ of the 
absurd equation in The Myth of Sisyphus. Likewise, in Camus’ disapproval of the 
ideas of French reconquest or endless war, one hears the traces of his rejection of 
absolutist and nihilistic responses to the absurd outlined in The Rebel. At the same 
time, Camus seems to have felt that the opposition between French Algerians and 
‘Arab’ Algerians was largely artificial, that the battle was ideological rather than 
practical, and that no sacrifice of life should be justified for the sake of an abstract 
independence which he feared would only harm everyone involved.  
 If Camus’ work and his life often met uncomfortably in the case of Algeria, 
his stance on Algerian question stands in particularly curious relation to the decision 
of Daru, the pied noir of Camus’ short story, “L’Hôte,” which means both “The 
Guest” and “The Host.” In an unofficial “wartime” without any declaration of war 
(Camus 1958b, 91), Daru is recruited against his wishes to hold and then hand over 
an Algerian criminal to the French police. But Daru, unwilling to determine the fate 
of his ‘guest’, takes his prisoner into the desert and allows him to choose his own 
direction, to turn himself in or to flee.  
 The prisoner chooses to turn himself in to the police, but it is clear that Daru’s 
decision (or his indecision) would have been condemned by his French compatriots, 




for condemning their brother to death. Daru’s deferral of his choice to his prisoner, 
which seems to result from his sensitivity and his profound “ambivalence” (Kritzman 
1997, 573), is the only solution he feels he can adopt given his status as both a 
‘native’ Algerian and a pied noir. Daru resorts to a less partisan (although not 
completely non-partisan) solution in an attempt to avoid the conflict of which both he 
and his guest are at the center. But his decision seems only to defer and to perpetuate 
the antagonistic condition in which he, the French, and the Algerian populations find 
themselves. Indeed, his act of “neutrality,” of trying to avoid taking a side, is 
ultimately revealed to be useless, futile, even “empty and politically meaningless” 
(Carroll 1997, 537).  
 Daru’s act is therefore neither ideal nor entirely damnable. It is an ineffectual 
act, it appears to avoid personal responsibility, and it may even fail to take full 
account of the historical violence that lies behind the French presence in Algeria, but 
it is also an attempt to find a ‘third way’, an alternative resolution to the conflict that 
better respects the limits of both men’s positions. The moral of the story is, obviously, 
that attempts at subtle moral actions are futile when two peoples are at war. 
Unfortunately, however, Camus’ stance on Algeria seems too often to echo the 
paternalism in the interactions between the educated, professional French ‘host’ and 
the mute, criminal Arab prisoner who, even under his own power, willingly submits 
himself to the French authorities.  
 Camus’s position on the Algerian War, therefore, reveals a side of absurd 
politics that both resembles and differs from the moral defense of Kaliayev and les 




appears to deny the role played by the pieds noirs in the system of colonial injustice, 
a denial that surprises us when coming from the defender of Kaliayev and the creator 
of Tarrou, whose primary virtues are rooted in their vigilant awareness of the evils 
they inevitably commit. Why didn’t Camus recognize that the ‘sacrifice’ that had to 
be made for Algeria was a French departure and Algerian independence? While 
Camus may have known that his position on Algeria was, like Kaliayev’s, both 
necessary and inexcusable, why did he not act more like Kaliayev and willingly 
sacrifice his claim to the land of Algeria to rectify an obvious injustice?  
 Although it is impossible to offer certain answers to these questions with 
respect to Camus, we may rephrase them and pose them to absurd political theory in 
general. Can a political philosophy cogently defend both a continued French presence 
in Algeria and a resistance against oppression and imperialism like the one Kaliayev 
and the Combat Organization mounted? Can a political philosophy advocate evils of 
commission, on one hand, and evils of omission, one the other? Can a political 
philosophy that seems to forgive widespread and longstanding historical injustices in 
Algeria while demanding ultimate self-sacrifices for a single criminal act in Russia be 
of any use, or is it, in its ambivalence and self-contradiction, merely doubly confused 
and doubly destructive?  
Conclusion 
I have found both of these cases to be troubling. It seems that the morality of the 
absurd, as Camus understands it and as we have understood him, advocates political 
assassination and tacitly approves of colonialism, or at least a kind of neocolonialism, 




such. This advocacy is difficult to swallow, not least because it calls up unfortunate 
means-ends moral calculations which tend to beg more questions than they answer 
and which, in extreme cases, may be used to justify almost any evil. Surely, the 
absurd person should hate to find himself deciding who is innocent and who is guilty, 
which oppressions are acceptable and which are not, which murders are necessary 
and which are not. But perhaps Camus’ point is that there is simply no way to avoid 
making these decisions, that, indeed, we make them every day without having the 
strength to admit it. According to this absurd moral vision, it is pretending that there 
is a morality free from evil that is the real danger, because that kind of pretending 
collapses the moral, potential space which it is the absurdist’s duty to sustain.  By 
accepting his or her unavoidable involvement in evil and by seeking to make 
reparations for it, at least the absurdist preserves the possibility of continued creative 
and moral action.  
 The moral and political philosophy of the absurd, on this account, seems to 
recommend, as a first step, that we recognize the impossibility of not doing evil, and 
that we confront the defensive processes that permit us to pretend that indirect 
violence is the same thing as innocence. Obviously, these reflections suggest that one 
of the first recommendations of an absurd political theory would be to dramatically 
increase the complexity of moral and political discourse, in the hope of recognizing 
the complex and distant implications of even seemingly harmless behavior. 
Recognizing that the mere enjoyment of the benefits of unjust or immoral practices 




 If one takes this line of thought a bit further, it implies that we ought to be 
engaged in an endless process of appraising justifiable and unjustifiable wrong-doing, 
although the moral philosophy of the absurd does not seem to provide any real 
guideline for conducting these endless appraisals. But even this criticism of the lack 
of a guideline has its limits, for, according to an absurd morality, all systematic 
definitions of moral wrong-doing or right-doing are suspect because they legitimize 
those ‘remainders’ of injustice and violence not accounted for in their computations. 
An absurd model for assessing the morality of actions would have to be continuously 
updated and informed by repeated estimations of: (a) the severity and extremity of the 
circumstance in which one struggles, while compensating for the distance between 
the agent and the victims, (b) the degree of genuine moral conflict experienced in 
contemplating and undertaking any violent or destructive action, and (c) the 
willingness to sacrifice one’s freedom and even one’s life, not precisely for the cause, 
but in compensation for violating the boundaries and limits one paradoxically seeks to 
defend.  
 Obviously, this rather haphazard sketch of an absurd moral and political 
calculus could never hold up to philosophical scrutiny, and, in fact, on an emotional 
level it is unsettling as well. I imagine that many of us feel unwilling to associate 
ourselves with violence, terrorism, or assassination plots, and I can not say with 
certainty that I would hold a different view even if I were not so comfortably 
protected from the violence, oppression, and degradation against which these actions 
might be directed. Nevertheless, it is possible that, as a start, the morality and politics 




the real causes and consequences of that resistance in order to determine if it is 
principled or conformist, defensive (a defense against the extreme anxiety that can be 
generated by contemplating evil) or constitutive of a creative moral stance.  
 As we might expect, the morality and politics of the absurd asks us to reflect 
upon and manage our reactions to ambivalence, but perhaps that includes reflecting 
upon our resistance to wrong-doing as well as our resistance to recognizing (and 
making reparations for) the wrong-doing we do, either directly or indirectly. That is, 
if we accept inevitable culpability, then the absurd call for maturity and creativity 
appears in a different light. Certainly, it seems more difficult than we may have 
thought, and perhaps it even seems more admirable, for it is difficult to be mature and 
creative if one is burdened by one’s own guilt and responsibility. Yet, and perhaps 
this is the key, the moral and political philosophy of the absurd asks us to turn that 
difficulty and those burdens toward others, toward the formation of moral 
identifications, interactions, and communions across that ‘space’ that allows us to 
interact morally, creatively, and reparatively with those whom we inevitably harm.  
 Early in this chapter, I hinted that Camus and his critics may have over-stated 
the value of dialogue in the political philosophy of the absurd. Against the 
mainstream of critical interpretations of the absurd, dialogue and communication 
strike me as only tangentially related to absurd politics and as ultimately ephemeral 
grounds for absurd political action. We must admit that genuine dialogue is rare, and, 
in an absurd climate, it is likely to be even rarer. Genuine dialogue relies on norms of 
parity and equality, but this reliance makes it difficult for dialogue, itself, to address 




should be among the first to recognize that the ideal of pure, genuine, equal 
communication is largely mythical, perhaps as mythical as the ideal of pure, genuine, 
equal subjects whose shadows lurk behind many communicative-ethical programs. 
Even if something approximating genuine dialogue were to be attained, one suspects 
that its most profound effects would be attributable not to any resolutions reached in 
dialogue per se, but to the basic changes in identification with others that result from 
profound interpersonal interactions. That is, at the heart of the ideal of dialogue, the 
absurd moralist will seek out the more basic, more emotionally-potent force of moral 
identification.               
 In speaking about moral identification, I mean to suggest a mature form of 
identification that, like most identifications, is ambivalent, but that reflects upon its 
limits and respects the basic integrity of self and others in accordance with the 
grounding for absurd morality described in Chapter 8. In addition to staking out that 
limited, creative, moral ground, we may now add that the ambivalence of the absurd, 
itself, becomes a key ingredient in moral and political identification. That is, in the 
absurd, as in ambivalence, “we have an essential ingredient in the ability to 
empathize, to feel what another person feels… And pressing one step farther, the 
ability to feel others’ points of view seems to be a fundamental element in moral 
consciousness; for without it we would experience others only as objects… It is, 
arguably, because we can feel conflicting points of view that there is such a thing as a 
moral dilemma” (Koch 1987, 279).  
 We may apply this notion of moral identification to Fred Willhoite’s argument 




movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Willhoite contends that this movement proceeded 
from “spontaneous protests against subhuman treatment, implicitly in the name of a 
common human nature and to protect an essential human dignity with which the 
protestors identified themselves” (Willhoite 1968, 75). But in his defense of this 
example, which is interesting and provocative, Willhoite glosses over the most 
important connection between it and absurd morality. He mentions only as an 
afterthought that the “freedom movement” was “impelled not by rational calculations 
of self-interest but simply by ‘identification of one’s destiny with that of others’” 
(1968, 76). Willhoite, like Camus himself, attempts to extrapolate the moral and 
political significance of “dialogical communion” by over-emphasizing ‘dialogue’ and 
under-emphasizing ‘communion’ (1968, 67). Instead, like some of the most 
significant and lasting successes of the civil rights movement, an absurd politics 
depends upon the establishment of stronger ‘communions’, stronger basic 
identifications between individuals and groups formerly split apart, and upon the 
renewed moral and political possibilities such identifications offer.  
 Camus explicitly argued against this interpretation of the political morality of 
the absurd, but I believe it is possible to resolve his objections to it. Camus wrote:       
Then we note that rebellion does not arise only… among the oppressed, but 
that it can also be caused by the mere spectacle of oppression of which 
someone else is the victim. In such cases there is a feeling of identification 
with another individual. And it must be pointed out that this is not a question 
of psychological identification — a mere subterfuge by which the individual 
imagines that it is he himself who has been offended. On the contrary, it can 
often happen that we cannot bear to see offenses done to others which we 
ourselves have accepted without rebelling… Nor is it a question of a 
community of interests. Injustices done to men whom we consider enemies 
can, actually, be profoundly repugnant to us. There is only identification of 




man identifies himself with other men, and so surpasses himself, and from this 
point of view human solidarity is metaphysical. (1956b, 16-17) 
 
Camus’ argument here is that psychological identification is mere fantasy, almost 
hysteria, while absurd rebellion involves the more lucid choice of sharing a destiny. 
In some ways, this follows Freud’s assessment of identification as the earliest way of 
relating to objects and as a regressive replacement for object-ties in individuals and 
groups (see Freud 1959, 46-50). But Camus’ rejection of psychological identification 
(along with his use of the term ‘metaphysical’) only obscures the point. To feel, to 
imagine, to intuit an identification with another is likely to be both a political and an 
imaginary (or fantastical) process, and there is no reason to condemn all 
identifications as ‘mere subterfuge’. This pejorative phrase might be more usefully 
applied to those identifications that are especially primitive, regressive, narcissistic, 
projective, or otherwise immature.  
 Rather than calling one process of identification ‘psychological’ and the other 
‘an identification of destiny’, a more useful distinction may be made between 
immature identifications that arise defensively and largely unconsciously and mature 
identifications that work against these defensive and unconscious processes. In the 
former, splitting, scapegoating, group narcissism, even callous indifference to the fate 
of others predominate, while, in the latter, identifications retain (and require) a bit 
more conscious access, more profound reflexivity and reflection, and more mature 
and creative relationships between better-integrated selves and others. Clearly, this 
distinction is imprecise and artificial, as moral and political identifications likely 




varying symbolic, imaginative, and emotional registers (see Sedinger 2002). Yet, the 
question that the politics of the absurd ought to take up is not only how injustices 
have been perpetuated by immature responses to the ambivalence of the absurd, but 
how we can forge new, strategic communions and more deliberate moral and political 
identifications that could combat such injustices.             
 One missed opportunity for such an identification has been among citizens of 
the United States and Iraq. Although difficult if not impossible to prove, there seems 
to be room for greater empathy and identification between US citizens, Iraqi citizens, 
and even resistance and terror groups who often injure and kill both Iraqis and 
Americans. The lack of substantial identification between US and Iraqi citizens is 
complex, of course, but it is facilitated in surprisingly straight-forward ways, such as 
in the absence of any official count (the absence of a system of ‘identification’) of 
Iraqi injuries or deaths (Burnham et al. 2006). 
 American citizens may face challenges in identifying with Iraqi citizens and 
victims of the conflict, for identification raises the issue of culpability, to which our 
defenses may be strong. To push the politics of absurdity one step further, US citizens 
must even face the more difficult prospect of identifying with individuals in 
resistance and terror organizations operating in Iraq, in spite of the deep distress of 
empathizing with sworn enemies dedicated to killing American soldiers. While such a 
notion seems far-fetched, it should be mentioned that in order to identify with others 
in a mature sense, it is not necessary to approve a doctrine or a method. It is only 




in Camus’ words, ‘to admit that the opponent may be right’ and ‘to agree to think 
about his views’, no matter how repugnant they may seem. 
 A greater identification with Iraqi citizens accompanied by a greater 
recognition of the extraordinary evils committed by the United States in that country 
would go along way toward creating a political and emotional relationship between 
the citizens of the two countries which could inform the efforts of the US resistance 
to the war, help Americans recognize the limits of what US policy can accomplish in 
Iraq, both militarily and politically, and re-open a space for creative political action 
undertaken by Iraqis. A genuine absurd politics would recommend a strategic 
identification with Iraqi citizens, whose possibilities for action and interaction with 
both allies and enemies must be dramatically expanded.   
 The absurd moral processes of reflection, resistance to defense, admission of 
culpability, and mature identification may be applied to any number of political and 
social ills where they could check the divisions and denials that legitimize injustice. 
For instance, one can not help but think that the truly bizarre attitude of Americans 
toward the incarcerated might be ameliorated by a greater moral identification 
between ‘free’ citizens and prisoners. In a country that has broken all records of 
incarceration, imprisoning one in every one hundred adults, one in thirty-six Hispanic 
adults, and one in fifteen black adults (Warren 2008), perhaps it is not surprising that 
irony, primitive jokes, and uncomfortable silences dominate popular treatments of 
this subject. While more and more films and television shows depict the inhumanity 
of prison life, talk show hosts and comedians continue to make jokes out of the 




Taken as a sort of natural and even humorous occurrence, these outrages are 
legitimized in a popular culture that denies any involvement with incarcerated 
individuals while, at the same time, perversely seeking out, glamorizing, and even 
reveling in the brutality of prison life.  
 Of course, part of the idea of imprisonment is that it forcibly removes 
individuals from society, encouraging the psychological and cultural split between 
‘free’ citizens and prisoners that legitimizes inhumane treatment (see Foucault 1975, 
272). If it were possible to forge more substantial identifications between ‘free’ 
citizens and prisoners, to encourage greater (non-exploitative) public involvement in 
prison affairs, and to better articulate some of the underlying causes and correlates of 
crime and punishment, it would likely improve the present climate in which otherwise 
decent Americans accept and even advocate rape and violence in prison on the 
grounds of indifference, retribution, or revenge. A morality and politics of the absurd 
would encourage us to confront our split perception of a country of ‘free’ citizens and 
criminals and to reflect upon how our defenses against involvement and against the 
imagination of evil may tempt us to defend evil. 
 Finally (and one could apply these themes to political issues ad infinitum), 
while the debate over illegal immigration seems to serve ideological purposes more 
than to address genuine social or political ills at present, it is an unfortunate example 
of the scapegoating process that stronger and more strategic identifications could 
combat. The idea, for instance, that candidates for the Republican Presidential 
nomination, Rudy Giuliani and Mitt Romney, could have been engaged in a debate 




as a great merciful good, illustrates the vitriol and vehemence against the ‘illegal’ or 
undocumented immigrant, at least in conservative circles (Haberman 2007).  
 There has been a call for greater identification between US citizens, legal 
immigrants, and illegal immigrants, one in which the premises of illegal immigration 
are called into doubt. The rallying cry of this movement, and the title of various 
books, blogs, and immigrant rights organizations, has been: ‘No one is illegal’. But I 
much prefer, and I think an absurd political actor would prefer, Todd McGowan’s 
subtly different approach to identification expressed in the slogan: ‘No One Is Legal” 
(2008, 60, emphasis added). This formulation expresses a solidarity with the would-
be scapegoat while offering the distinct advantage of throwing into doubt the 
imagined innocence and security of legal citizenship which give this particular form 
of scapegoating much of its force. Indeed, identifications like this not only create 
continuities and connections between disparately powerful groups, connections that 
frustrate the splits and defenses that otherwise legitimize injustices; they also insist 
that we recognize the contingencies and contradictions inherent in liberal society, in 
the ‘free’ subject and the ‘legal’ citizen. While these conclusions are obviously quite 
preliminary, we may suggest that reflecting upon our shared guilt and responsibility 
even for distant inequalities and injustices, forging strategic identifications that cut 
across the more facile identifications of nation, class, race, or status, and sustaining 
the space needed for continued creative and moral action and interaction are all 







Abecassis, Jack. 1997. Camus’s pulp fiction. French issue, MLN 112 (4): 625-640. 
Abel, Donald. 1989. Freud on instinct and morality. Albany: State University of New 
York Press.  
Alford, C. Fred. 1989. Melanie Klein and critical social theory: An account of 
politics, art, and reason based on her psychoanalytic theory. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press.  
———. 1999. A psychoanalytic study of evil. American Imago 56 (1): 27-52.  
———. 2005. Rethinking freedom: Why freedom has lost its meaning and what can 
be done to save it. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Alvarez, Michael and J. Brehm. 2002. Hard choices, easy answers: Values, 
information, and American public opinion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Anthony, E. James. 1987. Risk, vulnerability, and resilience: An overview. In The 
Invulnerable Child, ed. E.J. Anthony and B. Cohler, 3-48. New York: 
Guilford.  
Apter, Emily. 1997. Out of character: Camus’s French Algerian subjects. French 
issue, MLN 112 (4): 499-516. 
Archambault, Paul. 1972. Camus’ Hellenic sources. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 





Arias-Bolzman, Leopoldo, G. Chakraborty, and J. Mowen. 2000. Effects of absurdity 
in advertising: The moderating role of product category attitude and the 
mediating role of cognitive responses. Journal of Advertising 29 (1): 35-49. 
Aronson, Ronald. 2004. Camus and Sartre: The story of a friendship and the quarrel 
that ended it. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Augustine. 1961. Confessions. Trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin. London: Penguin.  
Balogun, F. Odun. 1984. Characteristics of absurdist African literature: Taban lo 
Liyong’s Fixions — a study in the absurd. African Studies Review 27 (1): 41-
55. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1992. Survival as a social construct. In Cultural theory and 
cultural change, ed. M. Featherstone, 1-36. London: Sage.  
Beckett, Samuel. 1956. Waiting for Godot: a tragicomedy in two acts. First Evergreen 
ed. New York: Grove Weidenfeld.   
———. 1958. Endgame: A play in one act — followed by — Act without words: A 
mime for one player. New York: Grove Press.  
Benjamin, Lorna. 1993. Interpersonal diagnosis and treatment of personality 
disorders. New York: Guilford. 
Berger, Benjamin. 2001. Qohelet and the exigencies of the absurd. Biblical 
Interpretation 9 (2): 141-179. 
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four essays on liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bersani, Leo. 1970. The Stranger’s secrets. NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 3 (3): 212-
224. 




Bleuler, Eugen. 1912. The theory of schizophrenic negativism. Trans. W. White. 
Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series 11. New York: Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company. (Orig. pub. 1910.)  
———. 1950. Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias. Trans. J. Zinkin. 
Monograph Series on Schizophrenia 1. New York: International Universities 
Press. (Orig. pub. 1911)   
Braiterman, Zachary. 1998. (God) after Auschwitz: Tradition and change in post-
Holocaust Jewish thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.   
Brée, Germaine, ed. 1962. Camus: A collection of critical essays. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
———. 1964. Camus. Revised / First Harbinger Books ed. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press.  
Bronner, Stephen. 1996. Albert Camus: The thinker, the artist, the man. Danbury, 
CT: Franklin Watts.  
Burnham, Gilbert, R. Lafta, S. Doocey, L. Roberts. 2006. Mortality after the 2003 
invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey. Lancet 368 (9545) 
October 21: 1421-1428.  
Cacioppo, John, W. Gardner, and G. Berntson. 1997. Beyond bipolar 
conceptualizations and measures: The case of attitudes and evaluative space. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 1: 3-25.  
Camus, Albert. 1942. Le mythe de Sisyphe: essai sur l’absurde. Nouvelle édition 




———. 1948. The plague. Trans. S. Gilbert. First Vintage International ed. New 
York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1947.) 
———. 1955. The myth of Sisyphus and other essays. Trans. J. O’Brien. First 
Vintage International ed. New York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1942.)   
———. 1956. The fall. Trans. J. O’Brien. First Vintage International ed. New York: 
Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1956.)    
———. 1956b. The rebel: An essay on man in revolt. Trans. A. Bower. First Vintage 
International ed. New York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1951.)   
———. 1957. L’étranger. Paris: Gallimard. (Orig. pub. 1942.)  
———. 1958. Caligula and three other plays. Trans. S. Gilbert. New York: Vintage. 
(Caligula orig. pub. 1938; Le malentendu orig. pub. 1943; Les justes orig. 
pub. 1950.) 
———. 1958b. Exile and the kingdom. Trans. J. O’Brien. First Vintage International 
ed. New York: Vintage.  
———. 1960. Resistance, rebellion, and death. Trans. J. O’Brien. First Vintage 
International ed. New York: Vintage. (Letters to a German friend orig. pub. 
1943-1944.) 
———. 1965. Notebooks: 1935-1942. First Modern Library ed. Trans. P. Thody. 
New York: Knopf. 
———. 1968. Albert Camus: Lyrical and critical essays. Ed. P. Thody. First 
American ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. (L’Envers et l’endroit orig. pub. 




———. 1978. Notebooks: 1942-1951. Trans. J. O’Brien. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
———. 1988. The stranger. Trans. M. Ward. First Vintage International ed. New 
York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1942.)   
———. 1991. Between hell and reason: Essays from the resistance newspaper 
Combat, 1944-1947. Trans. and ed. Alexandre de Gramont. Hanover, NH: 
Wesleyan University Press.   
———. 1995. The first man. Trans. D. Hapgood. First Vintage International ed. New 
York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1994.) 
Carroll, David. 1997. Camus’s Algeria: Birthrights, colonial injustice, and the fiction 
of a French-Algerian people. French issue, MLN 112 (4): 517-549.  
———. 2007. Rethinking the absurd: Le mythe de Sisyphe. In The Cambridge 
companion to Camus, ed. E. Hughes, 53-66. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Castles, Stephen. 1998. Globalization and migration: Some pressing contradictions. 
International Social Science Journal 50 (156): 179-186.   
Champigny, Robert. 1969. A pagan hero: An interpretation of Meursault in Camus’ 
“The Stranger.” Trans. R. Portis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press.   
Chan, Joseph and B. McIntyre, eds. 2001. In search of boundaries: Communication, 
nation-states, and cultural identities. Advances in Communication and 




Cooper, Steven and D. Arnow. 1984. Prestage versus defensive splitting and the 
borderline personality: A Rorschach analysis. Psychoanalytic Psychology 1 
(3): 235-248.  
Costes, Alain. 1973. Albert Camus ou la parole manquante: Étude psychanalytique. 
Paris: Payot. 
Craig, Stephen and M. Martinez, eds. 2005. Ambivalence and the structure of public 
opinion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Craig, Stephen, M. Martinez, J. Kane, and J. Gainous. 2005. Core Values, Value 
Conflict, and Citizens’ Ambivalence about Gay Rights. Political Research 
Quarterly 58 (1): 5-17. 
Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics 13 (4): 379-
399. 
Crosby, Donald. 1988. The specter of the absurd: Sources and criticisms of modern 
nihilism. Albany: State University of New York Press.  
Crowder, George. 2007. Two concepts of liberal pluralism. Political Theory 35 (2): 
121-146. 
Cruickshank, John. 1960. Albert Camus and the literature of revolt. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Davis, Colin. 2007. Camus’s La peste: Sanitation, rats, and messy ethics. Modern 
Language Review 102: 1008-1020. 
Dean, Mitchell. 1994. “A social structure of many souls”: Moral regulation, 





Dickerson, John. 2006. Stranger and stranger: Why is George Bush reading Camus? 
Slate. August 14. http://www.slate.com/id/2147662/.  
Dillon, Michael. 1999. The sovereign and the stranger. In Sovereignty and 
subjectivity, ed. J. Edkins, N. Persram, and V. Pin-Fat, 117-140. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner.  
Dor-Shav, Ethan. 2004. Ecclesiastes, fleeting and timeless. Azure 18: 67-87. 
Dowd, Maureen. 2006. Camus comes to Crawford. New York Times. August 16.  
Du Plock, Simon. 2005. Albert Camus: Existentialist or absurdist? And why it 
matters. Existential Analysis 16 (1): 15-23. 
Duff, R. A. 1977. Psychopathology and moral understanding. American 
Philosophical Quarterly 14: 189-200.  
Duff, R. A. and S. E. Marshall. 1982. Camus and rebellion: From solipsism to 
morality. Philosophical Investigations 5: 116-134.  
Duncan, Martha. 2002. “So young and so untender”: Remorseless children and the 
expectations of the law. Columbia Law Review 102 (6): 1469-1526. 
Esslin, Martin. 1960. The theatre of the absurd. Tulane Drama Review 4 (4):3-15.   
———. 2001. The theatre of the absurd. Third ed. First Vintage Books ed. New 
York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1961.)  
Feldman, Stanley and J. Zaller. 1992. The political culture of ambivalence: 
Ideological responses to the welfare state. American Journal of Political 
Science 36 (1): 268-307. 
Fitch, Brian. 1982. The narcissistic text: a reading of Camus’ fiction. Toronto: 




Fletcher, John. 1970. Interpreting L’Étranger. Special issue, French Review 43 (1): 
158-167. 
Foner, Eric. 1998. The story of American freedom. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Foucault, Michel. 1975. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Second 
Vintage Books ed. Trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage. 
———. 1980. Power / Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-
1977. Trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, and K. Soper. New York: 
Pantheon. 
———. 1984. What is Enlightenment? Trans. C. Porter. In The Foucault reader, ed. 
P. Rabinow, 32-50. New York: Pantheon.  
Fox, Michael. 1989. Qohelet and his contradictions. Bible and Literature Series 18. 
Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press (Almond Press).  
Fredericks, Daniel. 1993. Coping with transience: Ecclesiastes on the brevity of life. 
Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press (JSOT Press).  
Freud, Sigmund. 1909/1955. Analysis of a phobia in a five-year-old boy. In Two case 
histories: ‘Little Hans and the ‘Rat Man’. Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 10, 5-149. Trans. and ed. J. Strachey. 
London: Hogarth.  
———. 1912/1958. The dynamics of transference. In The case of Schreber, papers 
on technique, and other works. Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 12, 97-108. Trans. and ed. J. 




———. 1914/1957. On narcissism. In On the history of the psychoanalytic 
movement, papers on metapsychology, and other works. Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 14, 67-102. Trans. and 
ed. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth.  
———. 1915/1957. Repression. In On the history of the psychoanalytic movement, 
papers on metapsychology, and other works. Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 14, 146-158. Trans. and ed. 
J. Strachey. London: Hogarth.  
———. 1915/1957. The unconscious. In On the history of the psychoanalytic 
movement, papers on metapsychology, and other works. Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 14, 166-216. Trans. and 
ed. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth.  
———. 1917/1957. Mourning and melancholia. In On the history of the 
psychoanalytic movement, papers on metapsychology, and other works. 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 14, 
243-258. Trans. and ed. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth.  
———. 1920/1957. Beyond the pleasure principle. In Beyond the pleasure principle, 
group psychology, and other works. Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 18, 7-64. Trans. and ed. J. Strachey. 
London: Hogarth.  
———. 1923/1957. The ego and the id. In The ego and the id and other works. 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 19, 




———. 1925/1959. Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. In An autobiographical 
study, inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety, the question of lay analysis, and 
other works. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud 20, 87-172. Trans. and ed. J. Strachey. London: Hogarth.   
———. 1938. The basic writings of Sigmund Freud. Trans. and ed. A. A. Brill. New 
York: Modern Library.  
———. 1950. The interpretation of dreams. Trans. A. Brill. New York: Modern 
Library. (Orig. pub. 1900.)  
———. 1959. Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. Trans. J. Strachey. New 
York: W.W. Norton. (Orig. pub. 1921.) 
———. 1961. Civilization and its discontents. Trans. J. Strachey. New York: W.W. 
Norton. (Orig. pub. 1930.)  
———. 1961b. The future of an illusion. Trans. J. Strachey. New York: W.W. 
Norton. (Orig. pub. 1927.) 
———. 1963. Three case histories. First Touchstone ed. New York: Touchstone. 
(Orig. pub. 1909-1918.) 
———. 1966. Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. Trans. J. Strachey. New 
York: W.W. Norton. (Orig. pub. 1916-1917.) 
Friedman, Maurice. 1967. To deny our nothingness: Contemporary images of man. 
New York: Delacorte.  
Fromm. Erich. 1994. Escape from freedom. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston.  
Gabhart, Mitchell. Mitigated scepticism and the absurd. Philosophical Investigations 




Galston, William. 2005. The practice of liberal pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Garfitt, J.S.T. 1983. The work and thought of Jean Grenier. London: Modern 
Humanities Research Association.  
———. 2007. Situating Camus: The formative influences. In The Cambridge 
companion to Camus, ed. E. Hughes, 26-38. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Geertz, Clifford. 1968. Ritual and social change: A Javanese example. In 
Comparative perspectives on social change, ed. S. Eisenstadt, 94-113. Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company.  
Gergen, Kenneth J. 2000. The saturated self: Dilemmas of identity in contemporary 
life. New York: Basic Books.  
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late 
modern age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
Giovacchini, Peter. 1982. A clinician’s guide to reading Freud. New York: Jason 
Aronson. 
Girard, René. 1964. Camus’s stranger retried. PMLA 79 (5): 519-533.  
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. 1832/1976. Faust: A tragedy with interpretive notes, 
contexts, modern criticism. Trans. W Arndt. Ed. Cyrus Hamlin. Second ed. 
New York: W.W. Norton.   
Goldberg, Carl. 2002. Escaping the dark side of curiosity. American Journal of 




Golomb, Jacob. 1994. Camus’s ideal of authentic life. Philosophy Today 38 (3): 268-
276.  
Goodman, Paul. 1960. Growing up absurd. New York: Sphere. 
Gopnik, Adam. 2006. Read it and weep. The New Yorker. August 26.  
Gordis, Robert. 1968. Koheleth — the man and his world: A study of Ecclesiastes. 
Third augmented ed. New York: Schocken.   
Gordon, Jeffrey. 1984. Nagel or Camus on the absurd? Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 45 (1): 15-28. 
Graubert, David and J. Miller. 1957. On ambivalence. Psychiatric Quarterly 31 (1): 
458-464.  
Gray, John. 2000. Two faces of liberalism. New York: New Press.   
Greenberg, J. and S. Mitchell. 1983. Object relations in psychoanalytic theory. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Greenspan, Patricia. 1980. A case of mixed feeling: Ambivalence and the logic of 
emotion. In Explaining emotions, ed. A. Rorty. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.  
Grenier, Jean. 1961. Absolu et choix. Initiation Philosophique, ed. J. Lacroix. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France.  
———. 1967. Conversations on the good uses of freedom. Trans. A. Coleman. 
Cambridge, MA: Identity. (Orig. pub. 1948) 
———. 2005. Islands: Lyrical essays. Trans. S. Light . Kobenhavn: Green Integer. 




Guyer, Paul. 2003. Kant on the theory and practice of autonomy. Social Philosophy 
and Policy 20: 70-98.  
Haberman, Clyde. 2007. Sanctuary was a lovely word. Then the G.O.P. got hold of it. 
New York Times. November 30, B1.  
Habermas, Jürgen. 1985. Theory of communicative action, vol. 1: Reason and the 
rationalization of society. Trans. T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.  
———. 1998. Inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory. Trans. C. Cronin. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press   
Hall, Gaston. 1960. Aspects of the absurd. Albert Camus issue, Yale French Studies 
25: 26-32.  
Halsey, Charles. 1882. An etymology of Latin and Greek. Boston: Ginn, Heath, & Co.    
Hanna, Thomas. 1958. The thought and art of Albert Camus. Chicago: Henry 
Regnery. 
Harrist, Steve. 2006. A phenomenological investigation of the experience of 
ambivalence. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 37 (1): 85-114.  
Havel, Václav. 1990. Disturbing the peace: a conversation with Karel Hvíždala. 
Trans. P. Wilson. New York: Knopf.  
Held, David, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, & J. Perraton. 1999. Global transformations: 
Politics, economics, and culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Henry, Patrick. 1975. Voltaire and Camus: The limits of reason and the awareness of 
absurdity. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century. Banbury, UK: 
Voltaire Foundation.  




Hobby, Françoise. 1998. La symbolique d’euphémisation dans l’univers fictif d’Albert 
Camus. New York: Peter Lang. 
Hochberg, Herbert. 1965. Albert Camus and the ethic of absurdity. Ethics 75 (2): 87-
102. 
Hochschild, Jennifer. 1981. What’s fair? American beliefs about distributive justice. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Holy Bible. Authorized King James Version (AV). New York: Meridian Books.  
Hopwood, Christopher and L. Morey. 2007. Psychological conflict in borderline 
personality as represented by inconsistent self-report item responding. Journal 
of Social and Clinical Psychology 26 (9): 1065-1075.   
Horkheimer, Max and T. Adorno. 2002. Dialectic of enlightenment. Trans. J. 
Cumming. New York: Continuum.  
Isaac, Jeffrey. 1992. Arendt, Camus, and modern rebellion. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.   
Jacoby, Russell. 2004. Accidental friends: Review of Camus and Sartre: The story of 
a friendship and the quarrel that ended it, by R. Aronson, and Sartre and 
Camus: A historic confrontation, ed. D. Sprintzen and A. van den Hoven. The 
Nation. April 5, 25-29.  
Jastrow, Morris, Jr. 1919. A gentle cynic: Being a translation of the Book of Koheleth 
commonly known as Ecclesiastes stripped of later additions also its origin, 
growth, and interpretation. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott. 
Judt, Tony. 1998. The burden of responsibility. Blum, Camus, Aron, and the French 




Kant, Immanuel. 1981. Grounding for the metaphysics of morals. Trans. J. Ellington. 
Indianapolis: Hackett. (Orig. pub. 1785.) 
———. 1983. Perpetual peace and other essays. Trans. T. Humphrey. Indianapolis: 
Hackett.  
Kaplan, Kalman. 1972. On the ambivalence-indifference problem in attitude theory 
and measurement: A suggested modification of the semantic differential 
technique. Psychological Bulletin 77 (5): 361-372.  
Katzenstein, Peter, R. Keohane, and S. Krasner. 1998. International organization and 
the study of world politics. International Organization 52 (4): 645-685. 
Kernberg, Otto. 1975. Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. New York: 
Jason Aronson.  
———. 1984. Severe personality disorders: Psychotherapeutic strategies. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.   
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1846 / 1946. Concluding unscientific postscript to the 
“Philosophical Fragments”: An existential contribution by Johannes Climacus. 
Trans. D. Swensen, L. Swenson, and W. Lowrie, 190-258. In A Kierkegaard 
anthology, ed. R. Bretall. First Princeton Paperback ed. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.   
———. 1938. The journals of Søren Kierkegaard. Trans. and ed. A. Dru. London: 
Oxford University Press.  
———. 1980. The sickness unto death: A Christian psychological exposition for 
upbuilding and awakening. Trans. H. Hong and E. Hong. Princeton, NJ: 




———. 1985. Fear and trembling: Dialectical lyric by Johannes de silentio. Trans. 
A. Hannay. London: Penguin. (Orig. pub. 1843.) 
———. 1969. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Orig. pub. 1846.) 
Kiesler, Donald. 1996. Contemporary interpersonal theory and research. New York: 
Wiley. 
Klein, Melanie. 1975. The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 1: Love, guilt, reparation 
and other works, 1921-1945. New York: Free Press.  
———. 1975b. The writings of Melanie Klein, vol. 3: Envy and gratitude and other 
works, 1946-1963. New York: Delacorte / Seymour Lawrence.  
Koch, Philip. 1987. Emotional ambivalence. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 48 (2): 257-279.  
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1973. The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral 
judgment.  The Journal of Philosophy 70 (18): 630-646.  
Kritzman, Lawrence. 1997. Camus’s curious humanism or the intellectual in exile. 
French issue, MLN 112 (4): 550-575.  
Krystal, Henry. 1978. Trauma and affects. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 33: 81-
116. 
Lasch, Christopher. 1979. The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of 
diminishing expectations. New York: W.W. Norton.   
Lazere, Donald. 1973. The unique creation of Albert Camus. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  




Levine, David. 1999. Creativity and change: On the psychodynamics of modernity. 
American Behavioral Scientist 43 (2): 225-244.  
Lifton, Robert Jay. 1970. Boundaries: Psychological man in revolution. New York: 
Vintage. 
———. 1993. The protean self: Human resilience in an age of fragmentation. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Litowitz, Norman and K. Newman. 1967. The borderline personality and the theatre 
of the absurd. Archives of General Psychiatry 16 (3): 268-280.  
Longstaffe, Moya. 1990. A happy life and a happy death: The quest of Camus’ 
Étranger. French Review 64 (1): 54-68.  
Lorenz-Meyer, Dagmar. 2001. The politics of ambivalence: Towards a 
conceptualisation of structural ambivalence in intergenerational relations. 
Gender Institute New Working Paper Series 2, 1-23.  
Luppé, Robert de. 1966. Albert Camus. Trans. J. Cumming and J. Hargreaves. 
London: Merlin.  
Lyman, Stanford. 1997. Postmodernism and a sociology of the absurd and other 
essays on the ‘nouvelle vague’ in American social science. Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas Press. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984/2003. The postmodern condition: A report on 
knowledge. In From modernism to postmodernism, ed. L. Cahoone, 259-277. 
Expanded second ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell.   
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. After virtue: A study in moral theory. Second ed. Notre 




Makari, George. 1988. The last four shots: Problems of intention and Camus’ The 
Stranger. American Imago 45 (4): 359-374.  
———. 2008. Revolution in mind: The creation of psychoanalysis. New York: 
Harper Collins. 
Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced 
industrial society. Boston: Beacon.  
———. 1989. Philosophy and critical theory. In Critical theory and society: A 
reader, ed. S. Bronner and D. Kellner, 58-74. New York: Routledge.  
Mariner, Joanne. 2001. No escape: Male rape in US prisons. Human Rights Watch 
Report.  
McCarthy, Patrick. 1982. Camus. New York: Random House. 
McGowan, Todd. 2008. The case of the missing signifier. Psychoanalysis, Culture & 
Society 13 (1): 48-66. 
McGraw, Kathleen, E. Hasecke, and K. Conger. 2003. Ambivalence, uncertainty, and 
processes of candidate evaluation. Political Psychology 24 (3): 421-448.  
McNulty, Michael. 1992. The absurd connection: Pascal and Camus on the human 
condition. De Philosophia 9: 53-59. 
Merriam, Charles. 1972. The history of the theory of sovereignty since Rousseau. 
New York: Garland. 
Merton, Robert with E. Barber. 1976. Sociological ambivalence and other essays. 
New York: Free Press.  
Merton, Thomas. 1981. The literary essays of Thomas Merton. Ed. Patrick Hart. New 




Mill, John Stuart. 1925. A System of Logic. Eighth ed. London: Longman, Green and 
Co. (Orig. Pub. 1843.)  
———. 1975. On Liberty. Ed. D. Spitz. New York: W.W. Norton. (Orig. pub. 1859.)   
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The sociological imagination. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Minsky, Rosalind. 1998. Psychoanalysis and culture: contemporary states of mind. 
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
Montaigne, Michel. 1580/1993. Essays. Trans. J. Cohen. London: Penguin.  
Mooney, Edward. 1981. Understanding Abraham: Care, faith, and the absurd. In 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical appraisals, ed. R. Perkins, 100-
114. University, AL: University of Alabama Press.  
Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. The democratic paradox. London: Verso.  
Nagel, Thomas. 1971. The absurd. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (20): 716-727.  
Nathanson, Donald. 1997. From empathy to community. Annual of Psychoanalysis 
25: 125-143.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1956. The birth of tragedy and the genealogy of morals. Trans. 
F. Golffing. New York: Doubleday. (Orig. pub. 1871/1887.) 
———. 1966. Beyond good and evil: Prelude to a philosophy of the future. Trans. W. 
Kaufmann. Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage. (Orig. pub. 1886.)       
———. The gay science. 1974. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage. (Orig. 
pub. 1887.) 




O’Brien, Conor Cruise. 1970. Albert Camus of Europe and Africa. New York: 
Viking.    
Onimus, Jean. 1965. Albert Camus and Christianity. Trans. E. Parker. University, 
AL: University of Alabama Press. 
Pascal, Blaise. 1670/1995. Pensées and other writings. Trans. H. Levi. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Petrakis, Peter. 2003. Meursault as gadfly: The Stranger as Camus’ Apology. Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL, April 6-9. 
Poser, Steven. 2000. The unconscious motivation to become a murderer in Camus’ 
The Stranger. Modern Psychoanalysis 25 (2): 259-267.  
Priester, Joseph and R. Petty. 1996. The gradual threshold model of ambivalence: 
Relating the positive and negative bases of attitudes to subjective 
ambivalence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (3): 431-449. 
Quillot, Roger. 1970. The sea and prisons: A commentary on the life and thought of 
Albert Camus. Trans. E. Parker. University, AL: University of Alabama Press. 
(Orig. pub. 1956.)  
Rawls, John. 1996. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.  
———. 1999. A theory of justice. Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ricoeur, Paul. 1998. Philosophy after Kierkegaard. In Kierkegaard: A critical reader, 
ed. J. Rée and J. Chamberlain, 9-25. Malden, MA: Blackwell.  





Robertson, Roland. 1995. Globalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity. 
In Global modernities, ed. M. Featherstone, S. Lash, and R. Robertson, 25-44. 
London: Sage.  
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1987. On the social contract, or principles of political right. 
In Jean Jacques Rousseau: The basic political writings. Trans. and ed. D. 
Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett. (Orig. pub. 1762.) 
Sagi, Avi. 1994. Is the absurd the problem or the solution? The Myth of Sisyphus 
reconsidered. Philosophy Today 38 (3): 278-284.  
———. 2002. Albert Camus and the philosophy of the absurd. Trans. B. Stein. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. First Vintage Books ed. New York: 
Vintage.  
Sartre, Jean Paul. 1962. An explication of The Stranger. In Camus: A collection of 
critical essays, ed. G. Brée, 108-121. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
———. 1964. Nausea. Trans. L. Alexander. New York: New Directions.  
———. 1989. No exit and three other plays. Vintage International ed. New York: 
Vintage.  
Scherr, Arthur. 2001. Camus’s The Stranger. Explicator 59 (3): 149-153. 
Schufreider, Gregory. 1983. The logic of the absurd. Philosophy and 




Sedinger, Tracey. 2002. Nation and identification: Psychoanalysis, race, and sexual 
difference. Cultural Critique 50: 40-73. 
Sefler, George. 1974. The existential vs. the absurd: The aesthetics of Nietzsche and 
Camus. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 32 (3): 415-421. 
Segal, Hanna. 1964. Introduction to the work of Melanie Klein. New York: Basic 
Books.  
Shaw, Elizabeth. 2004. Review of Albert Camus and the philosophy of the absurd, by 
Avi Sagi. Review of Metaphysics 57 (4): 865-867.  
Sherman, David. 1995. Camus’s Meursault and Sartrian irresponsibility. Philosophy 
and Literature 19 (1): 60-77. 
Showalter, English, Jr. 1989. The Stranger: Humanity and the absurd. Boston: 
Twayne.  
Siegel, Lee. 2006. Strangerer: Camus does Bush. New Republic 235 (10): 11-11.  
Smelser, Neil. 1998. The rational and the ambivalent in the social sciences: 1997 
Presidential Address. American Sociological Review 63 (1): 1-16.   
Solomon, Robert C. 2004. Pathologies of pride in Camus’s The Fall. Philosophy and 
Literature 28 (1): 41-59.  
Sprintzen, David. 1988. Camus: A critical examination. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press.   
Steiner, George. 1998. The wound of negativity: Two Kierkegaard texts. In 
Kierkegaard: A critical reader, ed. J. Rée and J. Chamberlain, 103-113. 




Stone, A.M. 1996. Clinical assessment of affect. In Knowing feeling, ed. D. 
Nathanson, 22-36. New York: Norton. 
Thody, Philip. 1989. Albert Camus. Modern Novelists Series. New York: St. 
Martin’s.  
Thompson, Megan and M. Zanna. 1995. The conflicted individual: Personality-based 
and domain-specific antecedents and ambivalent social attitudes. Journal of 
Personality 63 (2): 259-288. 
Tisson-Braun, Micheline. 1988. Silence and the desert: The flickering vision. In 
Critical Essays on Albert Camus, ed. B. Knapp, 42-55. Boston: G.K. Hall. 
Todd, Olivier. 2000. Albert Camus: A Life. Trans. B. Ivry. New York: Carroll and 
Graf.  
Viggiani, Carl. Camus’ L’Étranger. PMLA 71 (5): 865-887. 
Walker, R.B.J. 1993. Inside/outside: International relations as political theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Warren, Jenifer. 2008. One in 100: Behind bars in America 2008. A Report of the 
Pew Center on the States’ Public Safety Performance Project. Pew Charitable 
Trusts.  
Warren, Thomas. 1992. On the mistranslation of la mesure in Camus’s political 
thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1): 123-130.  
Westphal, Jonathan and C. Cherry. 1990. Is life absurd? Philosophy 65: 199-203.  
Willhoite, Fred, Jr. 1968. Beyond nihilism: Albert Camus’s contribution to political 




Williams, I.J.H. 1986. Scepticism and the absurd. Philosophical Investigations 9 (4): 
308-314. 
Winnicott, Donald W. 1971. Playing and Reality. Hove: Brunner-Routledge.  
———. 1986. Home is where we start from: Essays by a psychoanalyst. Ed. C. 
Winnicott, R. Shepard, and M. Davis. New York: W.W. Norton.  
Wright, Elizabeth. 1998. Psychoanalytic criticism: A reappraisal. Second ed. New 
York: Routledge.  
Zielyk, Ihor. 1966. On ambiguity and ambivalence. Pacific Sociological Review 9 (1): 
57-64.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
